Paul Fletcher (Bradfield, Liberal Party, Shadow Minister for Government Services and the Digital Economy) Share this | Hansard source

I rise to speak on the Surveillance Legislation (Confirmation of Application) Bill 2024. This bill relates to information obtained in the course of Operation Ironside, which was conducted by the Australian Federal Police between 2018 and 2021. As of June 2024, Operation Ironside has resulted in 392 alleged offenders being charged with 2,355 offences. These offences include crimes such as trafficking in illicit drugs, money laundering and dealing in the proceeds of crime.

One of the central features of Operation Ironside was the use of a dedicated encrypted communications application, the ANOM app, which allowed surveillance of alleged organised crime networks. Relevantly, the bill before the House clarifies certain aspects of the operation of Australia's Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 and other relevant legislation as they apply to information obtained during the police operation. The use of information obtained through the ANOM app has been challenged on at least two occasions in courts. The central basis for those challenges has been a claim that the information was obtained by 'intercepting' of messages sent through the ANOM app.

Section 7 of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act prohibits the interception of communications passing over a telecommunications system, except where certain criteria apply, such as where the interception is authorised by a warrant. You cannot intercept communications unless authorised. However, the word 'intercept' is not defined in the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act . Instead, section 6 of that act explains what is meant by the phrase 'interception of a communication passing over a telecommunications system'. It says that interception 'consists of listening to or recording, by any means, such a communication in its passage over that telecommunications system without the knowledge of the person making the communication'.

It is clear that, under the law, for there to be an interception, there must be a communication which is listened to or recorded 'in its passage over the telecommunications systems' and 'without the knowledge of the person making the communication'. Both the Supreme Court of South Australia and the South Australian Court of Appeal have considered how these concepts apply to information obtained through the ANOM app. The South Australian judiciary, which at appeal stage relevantly included the Acting Chief Justice, has made clear that the use of the ANOM app does not involve an interception for the purposes of that act. Instead, the ANOM app sends a completely separate message, comprising a copy of the original message and some additional data, to a server. The information on that server can then be lawfully accessed by police if authorised by a warrant under the Surveillance Devices Act 2004. This distinction is technical but important.

What this bill does is clarify the operation of the law in a way that is consistent with the position taken by the courts to date in relation to a limited number of specified warrants. This certainly is welcome and no doubt will assist in the continued investigation and prosecution of criminal organisations which profit from harming the Australian community. I thank the House.

Debate adjourned.

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