House debates
Wednesday, 21 June 2006
Aviation Transport Security Amendment Bill 2006
Second Reading
Debate resumed from 29 March, on motion by Mr Truss:
That this bill be now read a second time.
10:00 am
Arch Bevis (Brisbane, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Aviation and Transport Security) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source
This bill amends the Aviation Transport Security Act 2004. It is driven in large part by the 2005 Wheeler review into aviation security and policing. The Wheeler review was an important and long overdue assessment of aviation security in Australia. The government’s decision to appoint Sir John Wheeler to conduct that review was welcomed by the Labor Party at the time. Indeed, the Labor Party made a submission to the Wheeler review outlining a range of concerns Labor had held in respect of aviation security post 9-11. It is something of an indictment of the Howard government’s approach to aviation security that it took some years after the 9-11 disaster for a comprehensive review of aviation security to be undertaken. It is an indictment of its failure to take practical measures in the years that followed 9-11 2001 and the failure of the government to properly administer the Office Of Transport Security that an outside expert was required to be brought in to conduct that review. Nevertheless, as I said, Labor welcomed the Wheeler review. We made a submission to it and I believe the recommendations contained in the Wheeler review were widely accepted throughout the aviation industry as containing sound, practical measures which the government is in the process, belatedly, of implementing. The bill before us implements some of those matters that were dealt with by Wheeler.
The bill operates in two main ways. First, the bill improves operational arrangements in the regulation of cargo inspection. Cargo inspection was a matter of concern included in the submission that I gave on behalf of the Labor Party to Sir John Wheeler and it was a matter of comment and concern to Sir John Wheeler in the recommendations that he produced. Second, this bill allows for the variation of security regimes at airports for special events such as the upcoming APEC 2007 heads of government conference and the Australian International Airshow at Avalon, which is held on a biennial basis. I think the next Avalon air show is due in March 2007. This bill provides for some variation of procedures so that major activities of that kind can be dealt with under a different regime. That is, I think, a sound approach.
Cargo security is improved in the bill by clarifying the requirements for cargo being examined, certified and cleared. Labor called for improvements of this kind in its submission to Wheeler, but cargo is still not being appropriately screened in Australia. This bill, whilst offering some improvements, does not address a number of practical holes in the system. They are, in part, the subject of an amendment I will be moving shortly.
Labor shares the view outlined in the explanatory memorandum that the one size fits all approach under the current arrangements imposes an unnecessary burden on some players. It fails to take account of the scale of operations or to take account of where the particular provider fits into the supply chain of the cargo service. The creation of two separate classes of cargo businesses—regulated air cargo agents and accredited air cargo agents—is, we think, an appropriate security regime without becoming unnecessarily burdensome on smaller operators.
Cargo, as it relates to the aviation industry, is often handled by multiple operators and passes through several consolidation points before it gets loaded onto an aircraft. For that reason, it is not always appropriate for cargo screening to take place exclusively at airports and, indeed, apart from a security aspect of this, there are efficiencies that I think industry would take advantage of in being able to conduct screening at other points in the process. It is a practice, I know, that is followed in other countries. Having not long ago visited the United States to talk about homeland security matters, I am aware that they are looking at sophisticated methods of cargo tracking and security at various stages of production, not simply at the point of departure or at the point of boarding an aircraft.
Screening at airports, whilst practical for passengers and baggage—indeed, absolutely essential for passengers and baggage—is not always practical for air cargo. Cargo security must occur wherever possible from the start of the transport chain, through a validation process to the point of departure. This bill amends what was an inflexible act that attempted to treat cargo like passengers. And, as I said, that is a change which we regard as appropriate.
The two classes of cargo agents clarified in the bill will be subject to regulations and consultation with industry for the purpose of intercepting cargo in the transport chain prior to being loaded onto an aircraft. I encourage the government in its consultations to cast a broad net amongst the range operators—the cargo merchants, the forwarding agents and the transport companies and airlines. I also encourage the government to consult with the representatives of the workers in the industry. The government has benefited, as has national security when it has dealt with areas such as maritime security cards and aviation security cards, by consulting not just the major employers involved but also the relevant unions. The workers in these industries have a very vital interest in these matters and often have a perspective and knowledge of events that provides for improvements that would not otherwise be incorporated into these security regimes. That is certainly the case in cargo. Over the course of the last 12 months I have received a range of advice and good information from people working on site in these places who are able to identify potential shortcomings in the system. Their knowledge and expertise, not to mention their clear interest in these matters, is important. If there were to be a terrorist event, if there were to be an explosive device contained in the cargo, these are the very people whose lives are at risk first and foremost. They have a high stake in ensuring the security of cargo transport is as good as it can be and their input and that of those who represent them in the trade union movement should be actively sought in the consultation process.
Other security fixes in this bill allow for regulations against unlawful aviation interference and also to prescribe requirements in relation to each type of airside event zone. Prescribed requirements can include the screening of people, vehicles or goods for entry to airside event zones and the security checking, including any background checking, of people who have access to airside event zones.
In essence, this bill makes it easier for an aviation industry participant to vary the usual security arrangements at security controlled airports during certain specified events. An airside event is an event which occurs in an area located within the airside zone of a security controlled airport. For most of us who travel as passengers on aircraft, that is those parts of the airport we are not allowed into. It is the security restricted parts of the airport zone. Under the bill, a zone in a security controlled airport could be managed at a lower level of security than that which normally applies to that area. Operating an event at a lower level of security must be approved by the secretary of the department, who is required to satisfy himself or herself that the risk of a proposed event will be managed in an appropriate way. Furthermore, events that happen airside in a security controlled airport with a lower level of security must also use a screening point to control access to vulnerable aircraft and runways.
These changes are practical measures, but I think we need to understand that, whilst they are practical measures appropriate for events such as those that I mentioned—for example, the International Airshow at Avalon in 2007—they are nonetheless a reduction in what would otherwise be tighter security. I think in those circumstances it would be prudent for the Inspector of Transport Security to be required to monitor the operation of these new arrangements and to report—and I believe the minister should report to the parliament—on the operation of these new arrangements so that the parliament, along with the government and the public, can be confident that these new, less stringent arrangements for significant events that are airside can be carried out in a manner that facilitates the event with a minimum of interference whilst at the same time not compromising the level of security that I know all Australians expect to be provided at their airports.
Sadly, as is the case with this bill, on too many occasions the government’s response to the threat of terrorism has been too slow, too focused on laws and insufficiently focused on practical measures. This bill actually does deal with a number of practical measures. We have to bear in mind that we stand here in the middle of 2006 discussing changes in airport security and that the world focused very heavily on airport security matters on 11 September 2001. We are nearly five years down the track, and we are now dealing with this matter. The government has been extraordinarily slow to act, particularly slow when you consider the public spin this government likes to place on matters associated with security and in response to terrorism. The government has been keen to legislate, but it is far less capable of implementing practical measures that make a difference. Accordingly, I move:
That all words after “That” be omitted with a view to substituting the following words: “whilst not declining to give the bill a second reading, the House condemns the Howard Government for its failure to provide necessary air-security and protect Australians, including its:
- (1)
- mismanagement of the Aviation Security Identification Card (ASIC) system;
- (2)
- failure to ensure all baggage is screened;
- (3)
- failure to properly upgrade security at regional airports; and
- (4)
- failure to establish adequate security measures for charter flights”.
I could easily have expanded that list of items of concern that Labor has with respect to aviation security and the government’s failure to address a number of important measures. But they are amongst the most significant, and I want to take a few minutes to refer to those items.
The government, with the support of the Labor Party and the industry, put in place a new aviation security identification card system, the ASIC system, and that is a necessary requirement to improve security at our airports. This system has been operating for only a couple of years, and something in the order of 10,000 ASICs have been issued. The frightening fact of life is that, with only 10,000 ASICs in circulation for only a couple of years, we know that at least 384 of them have been lost or are unaccounted for. We know that 384 have been lost or unaccounted for, because that information was given in evidence at the end of last year to a Senate inquiry.
The fact that, from a total of 10,000 cards, some hundreds of ASICs can be lost in the space of a couple of years should cause great concern to anybody with an interest in security matters. It does make you wonder about this government’s capacity to implement the national ID card that was being suggested a few months ago. If this government cannot competently manage a 10,000 security card system in the aviation industry, you are only left to wonder what the effect would be of this incompetent government trying to administer the 16 million ID cards that were being touted for security purposes—although I know the government now says that we are not going to have an ID card for security purposes and Minister Hockey and others are pursuing some alternative, supposedly to reduce identity theft and fraud.
Be that as it may, the simple fact is that in this quite confined area of airport security, hundreds of security cards, out of about 10,000, have been lost or misplaced. We know where two of them are, because two individuals were charged with the offence of improperly using them and I think are currently before the courts. Those two individuals were carrying aviation security identification cards without authority. So we know the whereabouts of two of those misplaced cards but unfortunately we do not know the whereabouts of the other few hundred misplaced cards.
A security system is as good as its weakest point. The entire aviation security system at airports relies upon ASICs. They authorise people to enter security sensitive areas of an airport. To think that in the space of a couple of years they could be so mismanaged as to see a few hundred lost or unaccounted for is mind-boggling. What confidence can the public have in the administration that this government is responsible for when that is the outcome? As shadow minister for homeland security, I have to say I have little confidence in this government’s management ability in these areas. This government is far more concerned with getting the political spin right, with getting the headlines right, and far less concerned with getting the security on the ground in place. We see a situation where the operation of these critically important ASICs has been completely maladministered by the Howard government. It is a terrible state of affairs.
Baggage is still not being X-rayed as the government said it would be. The government made an announcement some years ago that by 31 December 2004 all checked baggage on international flights departing Australia would be X-rayed. Certainly a couple of months ago that was not the case and, as far as I am aware, that is still not the case. A couple of months ago Australia’s largest airport, Sydney airport, was not X-raying 100 per cent of checked baggage on international flights. That is more than a year after the deadline by which this government said it would have that system in place. Maybe something has happened in the last couple of months, but this week I made some inquiries to try to find out whether Sydney airport is now X-raying 100 per cent of its checked international baggage. The advice I was given this week is that they are not. I have not been able to get a third confirmation on that; hence my qualification on the statement.
But even if that has happened in the last couple of months it is an appalling performance by this government. Some years ago it set itself a target of ensuring that, by the end of December 2004, 100 per cent of international checked baggage would be X-rayed. By the end of December 2005, it had not done it. By the middle of 2006, on my best advice it still has not done it. If you cannot implement those basic security arrangements in our largest international airport, what signal does that send to the rest of the world? Of course, it is one of the reasons why you see the speculation surrounding people such as Schapelle Corby. The debate as to whether or not baggage was being properly handled or whether it could be interfered with was raised in the defence of Schapelle Corby by her lawyers and supporters. I do not want to get into the argument about Schapelle Corby’s case—that is a matter for another debate—but the fact that a large number of Australians were quite happy to believe Schapelle Corby’s defence indicates that the Australian public think it is quite possible, if not probable, that their baggage on these flights can be interfered with. The fact is that we know some of it has been. We know people have been arrested for interfering with baggage, and there was a drug ring operating at Sydney international airport.
We even had the bizarre situation of a fellow who worked at the airport taking a camel suit out of one of the pieces of luggage and parading around the airport. We can all have a bit of a chuckle about someone doing that, but there is a very serious side to that story. If somebody can interfere with the baggage in that way, they can just as easily put drugs in, put a bomb in or do anything with the luggage—put it in or take it out. That is not a secure system. Leaving aside the question of responding to terrorism, that is not an acceptable standard for any customer-client relationship. But when we are talking about questions of security, particularly post 11 September, it beggars belief that we could see that sort of malaise in the day-to-day operation of security on the ground.
As we stand here today, my best advice is that we are still not X-raying 100 per cent of the baggage going out of Sydney on international flights. They X-ray some of it, and the bits they do not X-ray they swab—and no-one pretends that the swabbing is a substitute for X-ray. If it were, that is what we would be setting as the standard. We do not. The standard is to X-ray 100 per cent, and it is not happening. We are about to reach another deadline shortly, which is to X-ray 100 per cent of domestic checked baggage. We will see whether or not the government can manage that better than they manage the international cargo. Sydney airport managed to get itself a special exemption from that. Sydney Airports Corporation, headed up by Max Moore-Wilton—a person well known to members in this parliament and a former head of the Prime Minister’s department—managed to get an exemption.
So the Department of Transport and Regional Services allows Sydney airport to continue an operation that fails to meet the standard which the government itself set and the deadline of 2004 for that standard to be met. It happens to be an issue of speculation—more in the industry than in politics—as to how that conversation went that enabled the corporation that Max Moore-Wilton heads up to get that special exemption, but there are plenty of other people in the industry who have cast a cynical eye over the arrangements that have seen this government allow Sydney airport to operate a less secure screening process than other airports in Australia are obliged to follow. The sooner Sydney gets its act together and does X-ray 100 per cent of international baggage—as I believe most, if not all, other international airports do—the better it will be for the entire Australian travelling public.
There is also a problem with cargo on those flights that include checked baggage. This is cargo carried on passenger aircraft. The Wheeler report made comment about that. Wheeler said:
It is recommended that the Australian Government require that the screening of cargo be expanded and include mandatory screening of all cargo on passenger aircraft where passengers’ checked baggage is screened.
Very shortly, Australian regulations will require all domestic and all international flights in Australia to have checked baggage X-rayed. So the simple answer here is: wherever there are passengers on planes who can check baggage in, we should also be ensuring that the cargo on those flights is subject to the same scrutiny—that it is X-rayed as well. I am not sure whether that recommendation has been adopted across all airports. I would be interested in advice from the minister in reply to this debate confirming what the situation is with that. Certainly my understanding is that it is not followed in all airports, but I think it is nonetheless a sensible recommendation from Wheeler that deserves consideration.
There is a separate matter, of course, which is air cargo on cargo flights. On that matter I have had a number of representations from people who work in the industry. They are very concerned that the security is inadequate. It was a matter that we included in our submission to Wheeler last year, when Sir John Wheeler was here in Australia and I discussed it with him. I think it is also an area of concern as part of the overall aviation security envelope.
The amendment also refers to the government’s failure to properly upgrade security at regional airports. One thing which became clear and which is mentioned quite a bit in the Wheeler report is a problem that people responsible for security at regional airports have to confront. Examples have been given of people being able to get on a plane in a low-security environment airport, where they are not X-rayed and their baggage is not checked, and landing at a high-security airport, a counter-terrorism first-response airport, and being able to walk airside with very little supervision. That was a matter of concern to Labor and it was an issue raised also by Sir John Wheeler. There is also the problem of the actual security of those airports.
The government’s response to that has been to build some fences. As people in the industry have said, the fences are more useful for keeping the rabbits and the wallabies out than for protecting the security of the airport. There are some questions that we have to look at seriously for regional Australian airports. Some provincial airports, quite significant sized airports, that have flights regularly into our capital cities have inadequate security—and the government, as a priority, needs to look at those. Sir John Wheeler said as much. The government again has been slow to pick up that recommendation and to put in place practical measures to address it.
The final point in my second reading amendment deals with the establishment of adequate security for charter flights. A lot of focus has been put on the operation of our major airlines—and correctly so—but Australia has a significant charter flight industry. Typically, charter flights fly from different terminals to the main airlines. They can be on the opposite side of the airfield or quite some distance away from the normal security structures that exist for major airline passenger travel, and an audit of that charter industry needs to be undertaken.
People who have focused on situations like September 11, with the threat of the hijacking of aircraft and so on, I think wrongly focus on the hijacking of large aircraft. A lot of good work has been done in securing large aircraft. I think the Australian aviation industry can be proud of the work that it has done to make sure that our large aircraft are as secure as they reasonably can be made. The assumption made by some that you have to have a very big aircraft to have an impact in an incident I think misunderstands not only the motive of some terrorists but also the other half of the equation—that is, if a plane is going to be hijacked for the purpose of turning it into a missile, the impact can be determined just as easily by what the plane runs into as distinct from the size of the plane. There are a number of targets you could identify that are potentially explosive and would produce a catastrophic incident should a small aircraft be hijacked and used as a missile with them in mind.
I think we pay too little attention to the charter industry and the small aircraft industry in this security debate. In a sense, with questions associated with terrorism, we run the risk of doing what military planners condemn, which is planning to fight the last war. We run the risk of planning to deal with the last terrorist attack rather than contemplating what the next terrorist attack might be. After September 11, there has been a flurry of activity to make large aircraft secure and to make major airport terminals secure—and that is the right thing to do. I applaud efforts in that direction. But it is folly to pretend that, having done that, we have addressed aviation security questions.
We do confront the threat of terrorist activity. We need to be ahead of the game and not playing catch-up. In the aviation industry, a couple of areas where we simply have not been ahead of the game are the aircraft charter and cargo sectors of the industry. This bill does not address those issues adequately, although, as I said, we do support the provisions in the bill that are practical. I hope the government takes up the Labor Party’s suggestion that these matters should be the subject of review and report to parliament, particularly those that deal with the relaxation of procedures for major events. A sound enough position is in the bill, but it is appropriate that these matters be the subject of public consideration so that we can be confident that the changes we are making with this bill are, indeed, correct on balance.
Ian Causley (Page, Deputy-Speaker) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source
Is the amendment seconded?
Michael Hatton (Blaxland, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source
I second the amendment and reserve my right to speak.
10:30 am
Cameron Thompson (Blair, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source
It is a pleasure to speak today on the Aviation Transport Security Amendment Bill 2006 and to follow the comments made by the member for Brisbane. This government has been vigilant in ensuring that our legislation and our forces are up to date and are able to deal quickly and effectively with terror threats, which are becoming an increasingly permanent part of the international landscape. As has been demonstrated in recent terror attacks, there are a range of different ways that terrorists can choose to strike and it is impossible to fully tabulate those and prepare for every contingency in advance. Consequently, the government has to be proactive in ensuring that our security measures are tight and effective across the board and that we do not fall into the trap, as outlined by the member for Brisbane, of merely confining our preparedness and our antiterror activities to the narrow band of contingencies that were exhibited, say, in the 9-11 attacks.
Our security forces and the government as a whole are much more creative than that and do have the proactive capacity to be able to plan more generally, to anticipate some of those potential contingencies and to make preparations for that. We have seen plenty of examples of that right across Australia at every level of government. We have seen coordinated planning between the Commonwealth and the state and local authorities—for example, looking at critical infrastructure and looking at a whole range of different ways in which a terror threat may manifest itself. So I think it is a bit glib of the member for Brisbane to have criticised the government when such a broad-ranging effort has been undertaken.
This bill deals with aviation security, and it follows on from the 2005 Wheeler review. It has been designed in consultation with the industry. There are two major concerns that are addressed within the bill: firstly, improving the regulatory arrangements that would apply when a security controlled airport conducts activities that are not part of its usual business and, secondly, better arrangements for the management of cargo management and handling.
I was listening to the comments of the member for Brisbane, and in his address he criticised the government for being too slow to act on the terror threat. I rebut that completely. I think the government has been comprehensive in its response. It has not been a knee-jerk response. It has been a considered, weighted, ongoing response. As potential contingencies have been developed and considered properly within all those different levels of government, they have found their appropriate home and are dealt with in that time. It is not a knee-jerk response. It is a considered, effective response. If the member for Brisbane wants to criticise the government for being tardy in response to the 9-11 incident, I can equally go back to incidents in the past and I could criticise former Labor governments for failing to respond.
I remember when I was working at the Rockhampton Morning Bulletin in Queensland, which was about the period that Labor came to power federally. There was a huge gold heist in which people crawled into the belly of planes. They basically posted themselves in boxes all over Australia and were sent in the belly of an aircraft. It was so simplistic it is unbelievable that they were able to do it, but they did it. Off they went in these posted packages on board the plane. Of course, as soon as the plane took off and got into the air, they crawled out of their little boxes and proceeded to open various packages within the aircraft that contained gold.
I notice that, in the statistics that I have drummed up in looking at this incident and in looking at this bill, there is quite a proportion of aircraft cargo which does involve the transportation of gold. The three top exports by value of air cargo are non-monetary gold, medicinal and pharmaceutical products and miscellaneous manufactured articles. So in about 1983 we had an incident where human beings who had been able to post themselves in boxes on board planes leapt out of the boxes and were able to steal gold shipments from on board that aircraft. This was foiled only when some eagle-eyed baggage handler at Rockhampton airport, as I recall, happened to notice an arm sticking out of a package and, of course, it was attached to one of these bandits.
Michael Hatton (Blaxland, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source
A one-armed bandit!
Cameron Thompson (Blair, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source
Yes, a one-armed bandit. He was not one-armed—he had two arms and one of those arms was hanging onto a whole bunch of gold. What was the Labor Party’s response to that? Mr Deputy Speaker, I submit that, if you were to properly analyse that, you could see the possibility of a whole lot of horrors coming out of that incident. If a human being could crawl onto an aircraft and conduct an activity like that, then who knows how many bombs might be able to be put, or what sort of sabotage or what other kind of activity might be able to be got up to, in the belly of an aircraft anywhere in Australia. In fact, you could say a properly-functioning government considering such an activity might start to anticipate that a coordinated series of attacks on aircraft could occur and that that might have an outcome. If you wanted to be wise in hindsight, you could say that, but I believe that the member for Brisbane and the opposition in general are now trying to be too clever by half and are taking the obvious course of saying, ‘You are being too soft,’ and, if the opportunity presents itself, no doubt they would also say that the government is being too hard in its responses. They really are just presenting an argument for argument’s sake, and if you want to do that then let us go back and consider what you the Labor Party did in response to that great gold heist. What was the outcome of that? Stuff all!
The member for Brisbane was saying that we are not X-raying every single bag going by. They certainly did not X-ray those boxes that contained the human beings that were hopping on the planes and stealing the gold. It really is quite incredible that they—
Michael Danby (Melbourne Ports, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source
Mr Deputy Speaker, I seek to intervene.
Duncan Kerr (Denison, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source
Does the honourable member seek to ask a question?
Michael Danby (Melbourne Ports, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source
I do.
Ian Causley (Page, Deputy-Speaker) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source
Does the member accept the question?
Cameron Thompson (Blair, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source
Yes, certainly, I am all for that.
Michael Danby (Melbourne Ports, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source
Sir Frederick Wheeler, in the report that he made to this parliament for your government, suggested that baggage on passenger aircraft be carried. It is not in the government legislation, but do you support it?
Cameron Thompson (Blair, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source
It is wonderful that the member opposite raises the Wheeler report because, of course, the legislation we are dealing with is responding directly to the Wheeler report. Given that the Wheeler report was completed on 12 September last year, and given that it came down with that finding, is it not a shame that Wheeler did not conduct his inquiry back in 1983 after the gold heist? If there was going to be a serious examination of aircraft security measures, would you not think that in the very early days of the Hawke government they would have been concerned about the capacity of human beings to crawl into an aircraft and commit sabotage or other things? But, no, there they were charging along telling the community in general that anyone who complained about such a thing was probably a bum.
There are two parts to this bill. Firstly I would like to talk about events which occur at airports and that are outside the usual business of an airport. I am sure we can think of things that they might be—for example, air shows. There have been several fantastic air shows conducted at the local RAAF Base Amberley. The one that comes around every year is the Avalon air show. Obviously, events such as that need to be carefully managed so that they do not present opportunities for terrorism or for some other kind of sabotage or activity that threatens the security of our country.
Of course, whenever a dignitary such as a visiting international representative arrives at an airport a huge press contingent turns up and that disrupts the usual activity of an airport. It is similar when pop stars turn up. When the Beatles arrived in Australia there was a huge disruption. We have to be able to plan for that. That is part of this bill. Upcoming events which this legislation will apply to would include APEC 2007. That is an incredible undertaking with activities going on all over the country in a range of different locations. That is an absolutely vital and important part of the business of our country and international affairs and it needs to be carefully resourced. Of course, there is the international air show at Avalon next year. Similarly, that also needs to be addressed.
This bill allows security zones to be tailored to suit each of these events and indeed other events that may take place. Security controlled airports range in size and complexity from airports such as Sydney and Melbourne dealing with very high traffic right down to small, low-volume regional airports. There is every reason for us to have this kind of flexibility and capability to be able to put measures in place at somewhere as remote as Hamilton Island airport or the airport at Proserpine. These are things we need to be able to control effectively.
Thus the level of threat and the level of risk varies according to the airport. There is a misrepresentation continually coming from members opposite. As if the government is going to be able to be fully prepared for every single contingency. You can only do that sort of thing with the wisdom of hindsight. ‘If only we had greater awareness then perhaps 9-11 would never have happened. If only we had greater awareness, perhaps they would not have been, back in 1983, stealing gold off planes, as they did then.’ You can only say that with hindsight. We are getting an effort from the opposition to paint the government in a light that is unfavourable by simply highlighting every little opportunity that they might happen to trip over or be able to misrepresent as being a threat to the public, to scare the pants off the public and to perhaps win the view of the public and win their support to the notion that what is being done is inadequate.
However, as the Wheeler report has demonstrated, the response of the government is comprehensive and wide ranging. The Wheeler report made 17 recommendations dealing with a range of issues, including policing roles and responsibilities at airports, the procedures for background checking, and the flow of information and intelligence to airport operators as well as government agencies.
Since the completion of the Wheeler report, there has been quite a deal of funding allocated to implement the measures recommended by Wheeler. In total, the government has committed $866 million in response to that report. The figure includes the initial $119.5 million announced in response to the review in September 2005 and an additional $644 million covered in the 2006-07 budget. In total, since September 11, 2001, the government has committed more than $1.1 billion in aviation security initiatives.
Additional packages include $214 million towards enhancing aviation security capability and programs, $48 million for securing our regional skies and $21 million towards the Regional Air Funding Program. I commend that expenditure to members opposite. Perhaps they might like to consider it while they are nitpicking with various elements around the edges.
The government has also taken measures to strengthen air cargo security. The government, in partnership with industry, will implement new measures to further strengthen the security of domestic and international air cargo through a $48 million package of initiatives announced in the 2006-07 budget which complement and are directly associated with the bill we are dealing with today. The funding will significantly increase the ability of DOTARS and Customs to identify, inspect and respond to high risk export air cargo. The additional funding reflects the government’s strong commitment to counter potential security threats to the aviation sector and to improve the safety and security of aircraft and airline passengers. The sum of $35 million will be provided to Customs primarily for the purposes of introducing the use of mobile X-ray units and additional explosive detector dog teams to examine export air cargo. The sum of $13 million is to be provided to DOTARS to expand the use of explosive trace detection equipment.
Both international and domestic air cargo are securely regulated by DOTARS through the Regulated Air Cargo Agents Scheme. There are approximately 850 air cargo businesses currently securely regulated. I say ‘securely regulated’ in that these days those companies are so much more heavily and carefully scrutinised and so much more effectively monitored with the various checks and balances that apply that it is incredible to believe that back in 1983 people were able to crawl on planes by simply couriering themselves one to the other. This is an incredible jump forward. It shows an awareness by the government of this problem and it also shows that as we move forward and as further potential issues arise there will be a constant revision of the regime within which air cargo companies work, of the monitoring program that is applied to them, of the enforcement and policing measures that apply, of the coordination between police forces and policing measures, and of the regulations that apply to the transportation of the cargo itself.
There has been quite a deal of work through the Department of Transport and Regional Services on the implementation of measures flowing from the Wheeler review and also in the wake of the COAG response, which involved every level of Australian government. Work to date by DOTARS on implementation includes the appointment of additional security analysis staff to facilitate the exchange of security and criminal related information, and significant progress has been made on strengthening background checking. The ASIC background checking regime has been strengthened by removing grandfathering provisions including a pattern of criminality and providing for more frequent background checking where a lower level of criminal activity is evident.
The necessary regulatory changes have been made and the new strengthening disqualifying criteria for the pattern of criminality came into effect on Monday, 6 March 2006. In addition, the government will establish a new division within the Attorney-General’s Department to coordinate background checking on people working in the secure areas of air and sea ports.
As I say, this is a comprehensive program that goes to the grassroots of the cargo management system and extends right through to proactive planning of policing and other activities. I commend the Aviation Transport Security Amendment Bill 2006 to the House. It is an effective response by the government, and I give it my full support.
10:50 am
Michael Hatton (Blaxland, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source
I am happy to endorse the Aviation Transport Security Amendment Bill 2006. Minor changes have been made in terms of Australia’s aviation transport security—the first steps, as indicated by Minister Truss, in responding to Wheeler’s report. But those first steps are relatively minor. There were 17 major recommendations in the report. Here we have two. What do they affect? Special events. What is the core of the action taken in relation to special events? The action is to say that, where you have a security controlled airport, effectively the level of security you need can be variable. This bill allows for that variability based on events, whether they are large or small. The bill allows you to have a much lesser security level imposed given the nature of a particular event, so that you do not have the same expectation throughout all of the operations of the airport.
You would have to wonder how significant this bill actually is as a response to the problems at Sydney airport and others. I would say, firstly, in my estimation it is extremely minor. It is a welcome step, sure, but minor. Secondly, in relation to air cargo and air cargo screening, a series of changes have been made here, and they are important. Why? Because we still do not have a full regime to ensure that, where cargo goes by air in passenger aircraft, there is full screening of that cargo. Currently only 80 per cent is screened. Are you happy to fly it when you know that 20 per cent of the cargo is not screened at all? People who own the aircraft and people who are flying on those aircraft should—given that the world has changed and given that the member for Blair’s speech was fundamentally about hindsight and about trawling back to when we were last in government—realise that things are different.
Whenever any party is in government, it is material to ask about what they did in relation to the challenges and responses that faced them. It may surprise the government to know that they have been in power for 10 whole years—an entire decade; one-tenth of a century. They should be responsible and they should take responsibility for what happens on their watch. Will the government do it? The answer to that, fundamentally, is no. Try and find a minister who will take responsibility for what really happens within their purview and within their effective control. It has not happened since 1998. Try to find a member of the government who will stand up and say, ‘There really still are fundamental problems in the area of aviation security.’
This bill is only minor in taking two small recommendations from Wheeler. Does it really get down to the core of what Wheeler identified? I grant that John Anderson, who was then minister for transport, asked Wheeler—an international expert in relation to not only airport security but also the related matters of policing and terrorist effect—to conduct this review. I am glad that he did it. The results of that review are very important. But the key recommendations in the report are not in this bill, and they should be. If the government has laboured since September 2005 to bring forward this product, it should be an elephant and not a mouse. What we have is a mouse. The core recommendation that Wheeler made is that there should be one policing force responsible for aviation security within Australian airports. Is that in this bill? The answer is no.
We know that Wheeler identified problems with Customs and what Customs powers are in relation to the airport. We know that there are problems with the operation of the Australian Federal Police at airports—that there are not enough AFP officers and that there is a combined presence of the AFP, the Australian Protective Service and private security companies, which I will come back to. I have spoken about this before, but it represents a fundamental problem with security clearances, an aspect specifically dealt with in this bill and in the amendment. There is also an interface with state policing organisations. What did Wheeler say specifically about this? He said that he wanted more extensive intelligence sharing and recommended ‘a permanent police presence at 11 major airports under a single airport police commander at a staffing level based on threat and risk assessment’.
However, this government does not take seriously the charge that is put on it by the Australian community—the charge to take charge of what it should be in charge of. When this government took office, it declared, through the National Commission of Audit—which it designed and presented—that the Commonwealth government should not take responsibility for a single element of service delivery in Australia. The goal of this government, expressed 10 years ago in a yellow covered document of about 160 pages, was that the Commonwealth should merely audit and benchmark. It should be a spectator sitting on the sidelines. Where is the model for that? Question time. Where is the real action, according to the way this government sees it? The action is in the press gallery or it is in the public galleries, with people looking on, watching and saying, ‘They should be doing better, shouldn’t they? or, ‘There should be a bit more action in relation to this.’ This government will not take responsibility for what is in its charge and it will not really move to do what it needs to do to aggressively fix the problem of aviation security in Australia.
The member for Brisbane outlined a series of arguments in relation to the sorts of things that should be happening and argued for those in regard to our amendments. But the underpinning factor here is that the government has paid money to someone insightful, Wheeler, to do a report. He has come in, had a look at the situation and said effectively, ‘This is a mess’—and it has been a mess for a long time. It does not matter who is in government. We were in government previously and this government has been in government for a decade. If it is a mess, fix it. If you do not fix it, every Australian travelling through Sydney airport is at peril, for a range of different reasons. But most of the peril does not come from those coming into and passing through airports. From a series of revelations that have been made over the past six to 12 months and from those that have occurred before then, we know that part of the peril comes from there being no effective control over what happens on the other side of the fence—that security clearances are not right.
I have argued previously, both in the Main Committee and in this House, that this government needs to look carefully at exactly what is happening with those security clearances that are being given. What are the key problem areas that are not addressed in the changes that have been made here? The key problem areas are in the embedded groups of people who have been there for a long time. Go to Sydney airport and talk to security staff who work there. I have done that, so I know them personally. When they were Qantas security staff, I was involved in helping them in trying to keep their jobs, before airport security was taken over by a private security company and they were thrown out.
We now have a scaled reaction in terms of security, which is one of the fundamental problems. Airport security has been outsourced because we do not have an Australian government with the gumption of the American government. The American government takes responsibility for aviation security at its airports. It employs federal government employees to be responsible for aviation security—not only to undertake all of its aspects but also to be directly responsible to the elected representative who is in charge who, in the end, is responsible and has to report to the President and his cabinet. They take it from the very ground.
What does the government here do? Not only does it allow the situation where we do not have a single police force under a single commander so that one particular element can take control of and have responsibility and regard for the whole situation; it also allows the situation where a security company can take up the head lease and say, ‘Yes, we will provide security on this airport,’ and then sublet that task to another security company or a series of companies, which can then employ people on a temporary or casual basis. Security checking in that regard has been absolutely useless. No-one has really vetted those people. This bill goes a very small way to do that, but that is a fundamental area where there are particular problems.
We know from the first indications that baggage handlers who should not have been working there were identified as having previous terrorist connections. We know from that that this should have been taken far more seriously than it has been. We have a situation where the security at Sydney airport in particular, although identified by Wheeler, has not been comprehensively addressed. Part of the reason is that the government just does not understand the depth of the problem at Sydney airport. The only fundamental solution to clearing out the security problems, the criminal activity that is rampant at Sydney airport and the associated potential for terrorists to operate with the people who have acted criminally at Sydney airport over decades, is to put the state police in control—not the AFP, because they do not have the resources; not the APS; not a series of different entities that have not been coordinated in the past. We need to put aside any jealousies with regard to this and say that what we need at Sydney airport and in the other major airports is state police under state control. They will take full responsibility and have the use of experienced detectives and constabulary who know what to look for in terms of identifying criminal activity and stamping it out. You still need to regulate that very heavily because the money to be made at airports throughout Australia and particularly in Sydney is simply massive.
Previously, there have been massive security holes and people could conduct criminal activities with enormous amounts of cargo going through those airports. They have had a number of different ways of going about covering up what they were doing, including making sure that extra CCTV cameras that have been provided as part of this are either turned off or not used. They have used a series of different approaches. But you need to actually take this out by root and branch. If it cannot be done effectively then you need to ensure that the steps are made here—the first two steps out of the 17—and that the mouse-like steps that have been taken are added to quickly with the further recommendations of Wheeler.
So I would suggest to the minister that he looks seriously at what Wheeler has said and at what would not be a normal response—that is, saying: maybe we should have the state police actively involved in providing security and also coordinate with Customs to ensure that we actually stamp out the criminal practices that have been involved there for decades. We need to break up the groups that have been involved in trafficking through those airports and therefore take more effective measures at stopping the confluence of crime and terrorism at those major airports. So it is not just a question of saying, ‘In the past Labor was in government and a couple of one-armed, two-armed or three-armed bandits stole gold and did all the rest of it.’ You could say that the response to that by whoever was responsible for that at the time was completely inadequate, but the world changed from September 2001. Things are dramatically different.
Sydney airport is not far from me, but I also have Bankstown Airport in my electorate. The question of what is done in relation to charter aircraft is not dealt with materially here; it is dealt with in our amendment. There is the failure to establish adequate security measures for charter flights. We have charter flights running out of Bankstown Airport and there are still inadequate controls. Further, we have had some upgrading of security at Bankstown Airport, but our amendment quite specifically says that to properly upgrade security at regional airports you have to take much greater measures.
There is still vulnerability at the major airports because there is access from those regional airports that are not, and never will be, security controlled. So I support those two elements. I have already supported the other element of our amendment here: that all baggage should be screened, and indeed all cargo, because the world is different. The thrust of the argument from the member for Blair was that you cannot really make preparation; you cannot just base it all on hindsight. The government’s job is to be foresightful, to look ahead, to plan and not merely to react, but in particular to plan more effectively because of the depth of the problem that is apparent here.
I go to the key question—and this has been looked at twice, really. There has been the Wheeler review, which was so significant, and there has also been a joint committee on aviation security in Australia. They proposed a review of this act. They also proposed changes to background checking processes of applications for aviation security identification cards, and we have got that element involved there. But I do not think there is an understanding of the complexity of this right down at the lower level, and that is: if you do not grab and take charge of something, if you allow it to be conducted by other agencies and private companies, then you are not just not taking responsibility for it, you are probably not going to fix the problems.
I do not think it is well understood that in the United States—the central capitalist country for the whole of the Western world, the one that is laid up as that—they are not as ideological as this government. They are not as hidebound by what they have convinced themselves to believe. The Americans still fundamentally understand that it is the duty of American state and federal governments to secure their citizens and to take responsibility for running the programs that will secure them and not to allow private companies that they cannot control to operate in this area. Certainly they will not be responsible for them. They can audit and benchmark what those private companies are doing as much they want, but I am not as assured when going onto Australian aircraft with the security mechanisms that we have got here, both front of house and back of house, as I am when I go to the United States. They take a hell of a lot longer to process you, but you are pretty sure now that you are going to get from one end of that process to the other, and I know there is a government willing to take charge and take responsibility, whatever its partisan stripe. That has happened in the United States. That lesson needs to be taken on board by this government.
They were very significant arguments from that Senate committee, but I want to go to another aspect that Wheeler pointed out and that aspect is very important. The review found that security infrastructure at airports was lacking. It recommended an increase in CCTV coverage of all international airports, a tightening-up of the security card system including amalgamation and streamlining of its processes, and it stated:
The present Aviation Security Identification Card (ASIC) system has a number of weaknesses, and there is confusion as to what airport access an ASIC enables.
… … …
Some casual or contract workers, such as security screeners and cleaners do not initially hold ASICs and may not always be accompanied on the job by an ASIC holder as required under current legislation.
Unless that is fixed, as Wheeler recommended, we remain at great risk because the casualisation of security on our airports is not something that we can afford. You cannot have people wandering in and out of the place who have not been properly vetted; it needs to be strictly controlled. But that is not the mode of operation that exists in Australia’s security controlled airports now. It is not properly addressed by this, even though there are some changes within this. I do not think the level of threat is really appreciated by the government, nor do I think they appreciate how much they actually have to do here.
To sum up, where are we with this? We have got a mouse instead of an elephant. We have got two recommendations instead of the other 15 out of Wheeler. The two recommendations do come from the joint committee report—at least the government has taken those up. But if this is the government’s first response it sure as hell better have some second, third and fourth responses pretty quickly. I would hazard a guess that it may not, because it does not take seriously enough or understand the responsibilities it has. It does not understand that governments need to grasp those problems and fundamentally say, ‘Yes, even if we have thought in the past that we should be out of this game and be simply auditing and benchmarking, we will take responsibility for what is in our charge and ensure that we do not just take the minimum number of changes and put those into effect but that we get to the very core and hub of what is the problem with aviation security and fix it and fix it now.’
11:10 am
Kay Hull (Riverina, National Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source
It does give me great pleasure today to speak on the Aviation Transport Security Amendment Bill 2006, which amends some previous legislation and will enable improvement of the operational arrangements for aviation security. There are three areas here, but I will start with the first area. I wholeheartedly welcome the first set of amendments in the bill, because I have been involved in events over many years and I can see that the first amendment, which focuses on managing events and specialised activities at security controlled airports, is desperately needed. There are many occasions where airport operators manage events or specialised activities that are outside their usual business. These include receiving and farewelling dignitaries at international airports, managing large commercial ventures such as air shows and hosting community events at a regional airport. I believe that the special events security rules being tailored to suit the type of event being held show particular merit.
There is a proposed aviation conference and exhibition to be held in Wagga Wagga, which is expected to attract more than 5,000 visitors each year by 2009 to 2011. That is pretty exciting for the business operators, the motel industry and the events industry. The whole of our community and region at large would get a major financial and economic benefit from something like this happening. The organisers have had discussions with me. They have talked about a similar event that is held in a town in the US with a similar population to that of Wagga Wagga—about 62,000 people. This event in the US has grown and now attracts about 750,000 visitors annually, and facilities have been set up to make it an owner-operator stopover. That event provides an enormous contribution to their city and their district.
I do not see the event in Wagga Wagga attracting 750,000 visitors annually, but I certainly hope that it will achieve its target of 5,000 visitors. That would have a significant impact once a year and provide enormous benefits. If we have this event in Forest Hill at the airport, there will be a great spin-off. It is important that we promote tourism in regional areas, and it is my view that this bill will make it easier for the organisers of the event in Wagga Wagga to continue to plan and to have it as a calendar event in the shortest possible time.
My area, the Riverina, is ideally placed as a central fly-in destination. David Lowy has invested big time in the Temora Aviation Museum. It is an attraction to behold, and I encourage anybody who is interested in aviation to visit Temora. It is something you would expect to see only in a major metropolitan city placed in a tourism zone, and yet here in Temora, with the assistance of the Temora Shire Council and the absolute commitment of the industry, we have seen the Temora Aviation Museum grow and prosper and become a place of renown. It is something that they need to be very proud of.
The entire region has good prospects for continued aviation, and while I believe the existing scheme of airport security zones is well adapted to those routine activities, the industry has indicated that there is a need for a more flexible structure in order to manage these specialised areas and many of these things in rural and regional airports. The bill provides for a system of event zones, which will make it far easier to appropriately vary or suspend some of the usual security arrangements for the duration of an event, such as the one I have just spoken about. For example, some events that we have are so strictly managed that it is simply not necessary to require everyone present to wear an aviation security identity card.
I go to an example of that in relation to a regional express airlines fundraiser. Rex, our fantastically successful regional carrier, has a fundraiser each year. Last year that fundraiser was for Country Hope, which supports kids with cancer. It was a sensational day. There was airside access, but it was tightly controlled. It was a great family day, raising significant dollars for Country Hope to meet the needs of the local children who are suffering from cancer. This is another area of need that is addressed by this bill. Rex requires measures such as these not only to contribute to regional airline and aviation opportunities for regional people but also to go further and offer the services of all of its staff and the finances and economics of its business in order to put in place fundraisers which benefit country kids with cancer. I very much support schedule 1 in the bill, which will improve the regulatory arrangements for airport security by creating event zones that may be used when an airport conducts an activity that is not part of its usual transport business.
Schedule 2 of the bill looks at the way in which we deal with cargo. We all know that the new aviation security regulatory framework came into effect in March 2005 following the passage of the Aviation Transport Security Act and subsequent making of the aviation transport security regulations. The purpose of that framework was to prevent unlawful interference with aviation through an entire range of mechanisms and measures, one of which has been to install security in airports right across Australia.
An airport in my electorate that has been high on the agenda and that recently received some funding—it is its third stage of funding of $202,000 to upgrade security—is Griffith Airport. It was one of 147 regional airports that were required to have a transport security program approved by the Australian government to strengthen aviation security around the country. But there were some problems, particularly in Griffith, because an aviation industry was set up in a boundary and a zone that was airside. That presented a problem for a particular industry operating out of Griffith Airport. Through no fault of its own, it had established Skycroppers, which found that access to their supplier was going to be limited by the impact of the security legislation.
To their great credit, the minister’s office and the Griffith City Council have been working with the owner-operator of Skycroppers to try to resolve this difficult situation. Whilst it is great to insist on implementing security at Griffith Airport we have businesses to think about. It was a stressful time for the operator of Skycroppers. He could not seem to work his way through the mire of issues that were going to see him unable to accept the sort of customer he had in the past. His was one of those industries that have come under consideration, bearing in mind that he has agricultural chemicals on board. We had to do something to ensure that access to this business was controlled and secure, with ASICs, et cetera. But the guy had to be able to continue to operate his business. He could not be stymied by this type of regulation, about which people have spoken so passionately, in our efforts to enforce security across Australia. He is just one example of how it is not possible to do this in a carte blanche way. It is not possible to do a one-size-fits-all without impacting on people who have done nothing wrong, who established businesses before any of these processes were put in place as a result of the terrible terrorism events that we witnessed.
The good news and the upside is that through negotiation and discussion and some compromise—but certainly no compromise in the security area—we found a way forward until such time as this business is in a position whereby it will have no difficulty in complying with Griffith airport’s safety and security plan. At Griffith a large amount of both export and domestic air cargo is currently loaded aboard aircraft without any form of screening or inspection. A small business man was being impacted upon, although the issue was a large one, confronting cargo right across Australia. There is a definite risk to the aviation industry if somebody decides they are going to unlawfully interfere with aviation by putting illegal consignments of unauthorised explosives or explosive devices aboard a plane with the intention to detonate such items whilst that plane is in the air. Other risks exist with mislabelled high consequence dangerous goods. The primary focus of schedule 2 of this bill is on mitigating the risk of an active unauthorised interference with aviation.
We might have heard in debate that we should have in place a far more rigorous security process throughout Australian aviation. The way the minister is going about it, responding to and putting in place recommendations, is the way he should go. We should be dealing with things when we know we can manage them so we do not have unintended consequences. Schedule 2, in creating a new division 2(a) of part 4 of the act, which deals exclusively with how cargo will be examined to ensure that it is safe to be carried by aircraft, was drafted with a lot of thought, a lot of information and an understanding of the long chain of events involved in how a product comes to be a part of the cargo on an aeroplane. Somebody 46th or 84th down the chain should not be impacted upon. At the beginning of the process, in a one-off situation, that carrier might have to pick up a piece of cargo that ultimately ends up in many hands thereafter, yet he is expected to have the same rigorous security principles and clearances as somebody at the front end.
This security of cargo has been an evolving issue. Implementing a security airport upgrade has enormous unintended consequences, particularly for small businesses, which have done absolutely nothing wrong. We need to recognise that there is a propensity for that to happen and the potential is there for severe unintended consequences that could put people out of business simply because we have been too rigorous and used too much gusto in the way we have implemented these measures of security. There is no one way that airline and aviation can be totally 110 per cent protected from an event taking place. We want to ensure that there is a sense of importance about aviation security. We want to implement, as it becomes available, a program to ensure further airport and aviation security for the traveller and to ensure that we keep in the minds of people that it is safe to travel on airlines.
Let us be very clear: there will be mechanisms and ways for people to break laws, but the intention to continue to try to interface with people in order to establish and introduce new amendments to our legislation is an excellent way forward to ensure that our airline industry is as protected as possible and our consumers are as protected as possible. But in doing so we must ensure that our small businesses and people who could be impacted on in an enormous way through unintended consequences are also considered in the introduction of these measures. I support the minister and I support the commonsense approach to the way in which the aviation transport security bill is being added to. I support these sensible amendments. There will probably be many more but I think this is the exact way that policy should be implemented to ensure that there are as few as possible unintended consequences.
11:28 am
Michael Danby (Melbourne Ports, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source
In addressing the Aviation Transport Security Amendment Bill 2006 I strongly support the amendment moved by my friend the member for Brisbane, the shadow minister for aviation and transport security. The purpose of this bill is to amend the Aviation Transport Security Act 2004 to improve aviation security by making new rules for the inspection of air cargo and to allow for improved aviation security during special events at airports, such as the arrival of heads of government for next year’s APEC summit.
It does seem passing strange that the government should be amending its own aviation security legislation after only two years. The 2004 act was, after all, framed in the light of events of September 11 2001 and if its provisions are now deemed to be inadequate this seems an admission that the 2004 act was inadequate at the time it was passed. We can now see that the 2004 act was pushed through parliament without sufficient scrutiny or thought, as we on this side said at the time. Security legislation is urgent by its very nature, but that is no excuse for sloppy legislation that has to be substantially amended only two years later. As we have heard, this legislation takes up only two of the 15 recommendations of the Wheeler report—the serious report that was done into aviation security as a result of widespread feeling that this issue had not been properly examined and that the previous legislation was inadequate.
I must also make the point that the government’s failures in this respect reflect a continuing stubborn resistance to the idea of a minister for homeland security. Labor, in the form of the honourable member for Brisbane, has a shadow minister for homeland security and a shadow minister for aviation and transport security. This gives him oversight of the whole security area within Australia and a broad view of the issues involved.
On the government side, responsibility is divided between the Attorney-General, who has many other things to deal with, and the Minister for Transport and Regional Services, who also has a very broad portfolio. There is no single minister with responsibility for homeland security issues in continental Australia. In the new security environment which has existed since 2001, this is not good enough for the Australian people. It is bad enough that this inefficient arrangement has produced inadequate legislation such as the bill we are now amending. It will be infinitely worse if the glaring holes in our aviation and maritime security arrangements lead to a successful terrorist strike on mainland Australia. That is the risk the government is running by clinging to its outmoded, pre-2001 ministerial arrangements.
Having said that, to the extent that this bill aims to improve Australia’s aviation security, it is welcome and the opposition supports it. However, the honourable member for Brisbane has moved an amendment referring to the government’s mismanagement of the aviation security identification card system; its failure to ensure that all baggage is screened, a year after the Wheeler review and nearly five years after September 11; its failure to properly upgrade security at regional airports; and its failure to establish adequate security arrangements for charter flights.
The first part of the bill amends the Aviation Transport Security Act 2004 to improve the regulatory arrangements for airport security by creating event zones that may be used when an airport conducts an activity that is not part of its usual transport business such as the welcoming of a head of state, an air show or a commercial or public event.
The second part of the bill deals with the process of how cargo is to be examined to ensure that it is safe to be carried on aircraft and how cargo is to be cleared for air carriage. The bill allows for the creation of two separate classes of cargo businesses—regulated air cargo agents and accredited air cargo agents. These two classes of cargo agents will be subject to regulations to be designed in consultation with industry so that cargo that might pose a threat to aviation can be detected and intercepted before it is loaded onto an aircraft.
The third part of the bill allows the secretary to approve alterations to existing transport security programs. This new alteration process will operate as a less formal alternative to the existing process by which a program can only be changed by means of a formal revision. The intention of this section is to make it easier for an aviation company to make changes to its operational practice so as to conform to the requirements of the regulatory framework.
These are all appropriate and sensible measures, which is why we are supporting them. We always support genuine security measures when they are properly explained to this House. I do not think it is appropriate that the security bills become a matter of partisan debate, and that is a view widely shared in the opposition. But it is the duty of the opposition to hold the government to account, and that is why I again make the point that it is surprisingly disappointing to find that, nearly five years after September 11, this government is still trying to get a law relating to aviation security right. It is still introducing measures which should and could have been introduced years ago, and it is still failing to take the further necessary steps referred to in the opposition amendment.
Let me turn to the amendments relating to cargo. In its submission to the Wheeler review, Labor suggested a series of improvements, but now we find that cargo is still not appropriately screened in Australia. These amendments are a belated recognition of the weakness of the Aviation Transport Security Act 2004. Nevertheless, this bill does offer some improvements to aviation security. We agree that the one-size-fits-all approach, which imposes the same degree of regulatory burden on all companies regardless of size and without taking into account their role in the handling of cargo, is a problem. The creation of two separate classes of cargo businesses—regulated air cargo agents and accredited air cargo agents—is an improvement to the security regime and will make it easier for small companies to comply with the law. We also agree—and, in fact, have argued in the past—that screening of cargo at airports is not practical and creates an incentive for companies to try to evade screening. The existing act treats cargo as if it were the same as passengers, another sign that the original act was rushed through this House by a complacent government without fully thinking through the security implications of this problem in aviation security revealed in both Australia and other countries.
The amendment moved by the honourable member for Brisbane refers to, amongst other things, the government’s mismanagement of the aviation security identity card. There are serious problems with this system. In April this year a constituent wrote to me and to the minister describing the long delays in making these cards available and the effect this was having on the ability of people to earn a living in the aviation industry. Let me read some of the points made in this letter by my constituent so that people will therefore get an understanding of how it affects people individually:
I am a free lance pilot.
In august of last year I applied for an ASIC card ... which is essential for me to work, as I will be required to fly into aerodromes where holding an ASIC card is mandatory.
As a result of administrative failures these cards have been very slow in coming and many pilots have still to receive their cards. I have made over twenty enquiries by phone and e-mail with regard to the progress of my application. I received two letters prior to the deadline for implementation of the AS1C requirement, telling me that my application was being processed but have had no mail, e-mail or phone calls informing me of progress since then.
Finally as a result of persistently telephoning to CASA, last week I found that my application had been refused. I was told that I should have received a letter informing me of the reason. The person I was dealing with could not tell me why I had been refused but said that they would contact someone and call me back with details of a contact person who I could discuss it with. They also said that I could appeal the decision. Despite a multitude of attempts since, 1 have not been unable to contact anyone by telephone nor e-mail nor have I been able to find information on the websites as to how to proceed. The web sites are circular. You find a reference to appeals and follow it and end up at the initial page of the web site.
If the appeal process mirrors the application process I will have another 8 months to wait, to most likely be met by a refusal of the appeal as a result of either bureaucratic timidity or the blunt instrument nature of the regulations and the requirements.
It is chaos and my livelihood depends on it being resolved.
This is not good enough. I understand that the appeal process to CASA is very difficult for people like this constituent to get through. I believe that he had a minor infraction of the law some 15 years previous to that. But there should have been, as then minister for transport, Mr Anderson, promised at the time, an ability for people to make commonsense appeals on the basis of having no major criminal record, it being their livelihood and having demonstrated a record of safe operations in the aviation sphere. The fact that this has not happened in the case of this person is very regrettable.
Let me return to the amendment moved by the honourable member for Brisbane. Let us just go back to the ‘mismanagement of the ASIC system’. The mismanagement of this aviation security identity card by the transport minister, Warren Truss, is a clear-cut example of what we regard as incompetence. When the minister for transport set an arbitrary date for the ID card applications of 31 December 2005, he failed to take into account the time taken for pilots to pay for and receive police checks. That had the potential to create massive holes in this crucial defence in the war on terror. I have given you an example of precisely how one individual has been adversely affected.
The second part of the amendment of the honourable member for Brisbane deals with the ‘failure to ensure all baggage is screened’. Almost one year after the Wheeler review and nearly five years after September 11, the government still does not screen all cargo and baggage on passenger aircraft where passengers’ checked baggage is screened. I believe this is toying with the lives of the Australian people. Cargo checked onto passenger aircraft ought to be screened in the same way that passengers are screened.
The next part of the honourable member for Brisbane’s amendment concerns the ‘failure to properly upgrade security at regional airports’. A large number of regional airports with more than 50,000 passenger movements a day are still not required to have passenger and ground staff screening facilities. Passengers travelling to regional centres from major airports such as Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane are subject to screening. However, when flying out of key regional airports, passengers are not screened.
Let me remind you where the events of September 11 started. They started in a small regional airport in Portland, Maine. The infamous vision of the hijackers going on to the planes was actually filmed in Portland airport, on the CCTVs. I do appreciate the earnest hard work that many private and public people in protective agencies do at major airports and regional airports. We all have to go through the inconvenience of taking off belts and having explosive checks when we are just about to miss a flight, but millions of people put up with that. But the government does not pay sufficient attention to the pattern of how people have practised international terrorism previously, including the major events of September 11 which sparked incredible international concern and which began at a regional airport, as I said, in a small American state. The hijackers flew from there to a major airport, in Boston, to commence their dreadful flights into the twin towers. That is something that ought to be borne in mind by all of the Australian public, and we ought to have our regional airports upgraded.
The other part of the amendment moved by the honourable member for Brisbane concerns the ‘failure to establish adequate security measures for charter flights’. The government’s failure to hold any real investigation into secure cockpit arrangements of certain classes of charter planes is, I believe, playing with the lives of Australian people, just as the member for Brisbane suggested.
I want to conclude by referring to one other area that I believe the Australian government, Qantas and other people should be looking into in airline security, and that is the eventual necessity to place on Australian aircraft, particularly major Australian aircraft flying through regional hubs where there is evidence of the activity of such nefarious groups as Jemaah Islamiah, the kinds of devices to deflect shoulder-fired missiles that are being placed on British civilian aircraft. These missiles are referred to as MANPADS. Some international airlines are having anti-MANPAD devices deployed on all important civilian aircraft that they fly. Remember that in November 2002 terrorists associated with al-Qaeda fired two shoulder-launched missiles at an aircraft leaving Mombasa, Kenya. The attack was claimed by al-Qaeda. It was, fortunately, unsuccessful. Only in May of this year a major antiterrorist operation was launched in Switzerland when Swiss agents discovered another al-Qaeda plan to down an aircraft. That airline had ceased flying to Geneva for a whole week in December last year. The story was given that it was for technical reasons, but it was in fact because of good intelligence that an attack using shoulder-fired missiles was planned on an aircraft.
Internationally, the cost of these missiles is coming down more and more. I believe we have to be very open-minded, particularly with regard to major Qantas jumbos landing in Bangkok, Jakarta and Bali. These are the kinds of arrangements that a far-sighted government would be talking to Qantas about and subsidising. When I first raised this issue a couple of years ago the Prime Minister wobbled the day afterwards and suggested that the government might be speaking to Qantas about introducing deflection devices. After what I regard as overconfident reassurances from Qantas, the government backed down. I believe it is certainly something that, given the constantly lowering price of this technology, the Australian people should look at and demand of their government and their major international airline, Qantas.
11:45 am
Alex Somlyay (Fairfax, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source
I think certain things happen in our lifetimes that we will always remember where we were at the very moment that they happened. I recall some of those events, like the assassination of John F Kennedy, when man first set foot on the moon, when Princess Diana died and, of course, the events of 9-11. The member for Melbourne Ports will be well aware where the Prime Minister was on the occasion of 9-11. He was in Washington, and he had first-hand experience of the trauma that the American people felt with the events of 9-11.
I will speak very briefly on the Aviation Transport Security Amendment Bill 2006, because aviation security is a high priority for the Howard government and the regulatory framework is under constant review to ensure that we can respond to changing threats to our aviation industry, our people and our economy. The amendments in this bill are not about increasing requirements and burdens on stakeholders. They are about making the existing legal framework more flexible so it can more easily and quickly meet a variety of needs on different occasions instead of being a one-size-fits-all approach—an approach which can be inefficient and unnecessarily burdensome on the stakeholders.
The bill has two aspects: special events at airports, and cargo before it is loaded on to the plane. Firstly, the bill creates event zones within airport boundaries, allowing flexibility to handle a range of special events at airports. Secondly, it broadens the security processes governing domestic and international cargo before it is loaded on to the aircraft, allowing more flexibility to meet the changing needs. The bill aims to better tailor aviation security outcomes to aviation business operations. Sometimes special events outside normal operational events can be held at airports. Examples would include a community event at a regional airport, an air show or the arrival of a foreign head of state at a major airport. It is not feasible under the act to specify general rules to apply to all such events because, firstly, airports differ in size and complexity; secondly, there is a great variation in the subject matter, size and complexity of different events; and, lastly, different types of events carry different levels of security threat.
The amendments to schedule 1 of the bill focus on creating a more flexible legal framework which allows different types of event zones to be prescribed to manage different kinds of events within airport boundaries. It does not necessarily mean tighter security processes for an event. With appropriate safeguards and risk assessment and evaluation, sometimes events will be able to be managed at a lower level of security than that which applies generally to the airside area. This could mean, for instance, relaxing requirements to display photographic ID and making it easier to permit the use of tools that would otherwise be prohibited items.
While export air cargo makes up only one per cent of Australia’s annual exports in volume, it represents 21 per cent in value, so the security of our air cargo supply chain is critical to our economy. Cargo is often handled by multiple operators, and a large proportion of our export and domestic cargo is currently unscreened. When you realise that 80 per cent of cargo is carried on passenger planes, you understand how important air cargo security is not just to the economy or to industry but to the safety of our people. One of our major concerns is explosive devices, but robust air cargo security measures the government believes necessary for the protection of our people, our trade and our economy are not possible under the current regulatory framework, because cargo is combined into the section of the act for screening people and baggage.
People and their baggage are identified and screened at airports before entering a sterile area. Cargo is different. The cargo security supply chain extends well beyond the airport environment and may be handled by a number of agencies between dispatch and the airport. The act is currently not flexible enough to accommodate that. It cannot, for instance, direct the cargo terminal operators to use explosive trace detection on cargo before it reaches the airport. Neither does the current legislation provide the flexibility for a layered approach. It does not distinguish between a multinational company with significant air cargo business transporting, storing and consolidating cargo and a small courier business which occasionally picks up an item that may be transported by air. Neither does it capture all businesses that handle air cargo.
This bill creates a separate framework for cargo regulation instead of including it with people and luggage and introduces a new class of regulated business so that a layered approach can be used to broaden the security coverage without imposing onerous burdens on the smaller players in the transport network. After extensive consultation, this was found to be the preferred option both for industry and for government agencies. The subsequent regulations will also be developed in consultation with industry.
These amendments do not introduce additional requirements on any industry stakeholders; what they do is establish a legal framework which allows regulations to be made specifically relating to the security of cargo before it is loaded onto an aircraft, instead of lumping it into the section of the act governing people and their luggage. It also provides more flexibility to deal with a diverse range of special events at controlled airports without endangering security or imposing unnecessary restrictions. As the minister said in his second reading speech, this bill is the first step in the review of aviation security legislation that was recommended in the 2005 Wheeler review. It is designed not only to improve security outcomes but also to allow for better alignment of regulations with actual operations in the air cargo industry. I commend this bill to the House.
11:53 am
Kim Wilkie (Swan, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source
I rise to speak on this important amendment bill and to add my voice to the concerns raised by the shadow minister. This bill amends the Aviation Transport Security Act 2004 and changes the regulatory arrangements in three important ways, as the shadow minister has explained. For the benefit of the House, I would like to briefly summarise the amendments proposed by the government. Firstly, schedule 1 alters the regulatory arrangements for airport security by creating event zones. These will be designed for use when conducting special events at an airport, such as the arrival and departure of visiting foreign dignitaries—for example, the arrival of the official delegation of the upcoming Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum to be hosted by Australia in 2007.
Secondly, schedule 2 creates a new division 2A of part 4 of the act to deal exclusively with the methods by which cargo is to be examined and cleared for air carriage. The schedule also allows for the creation of two separate classes of cargo businesses: regulated air cargo agents and accredited air cargo agents. The creation of two separate classes of cargo businesses seems to be a logical step. The one-size-fits-all approach under current circumstances imposes the same level of regulatory burden and red tape across all cargo carrying businesses, irrespective of the scale of their operations and without consideration of the business place in the chain of supply.
Finally, this bill proposes to give the Secretary of the Department of Transport and Regional Services the power to approve alterations to an existing transport security program. This will mean that such changes to security arrangements will be much easier to undertake than through the existing process, by which a program can only be changed by means of a formal revision.
While we on this side of the House support the measures in this bill, the opposition calls for the government to refer this legislation to the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee, and that call should be heeded. These matters are too important to be treated in the cavalier way in which this government treats important legislation, as the member for Calare pointed out yesterday. The Senate committee would be able to give these issues the serious consideration that they deserve.
I am very concerned that what the government has proposed in the Senate regarding the Senate committee process will severely water down Senate committee procedures and practices. Unfortunately, I believe it will lead to a lot of legislation not receiving the adequate scrutiny that it deserves in that forum. I think this is just another example of where the government is watering down the whole process of democracy in this country by removing parliamentary scrutiny at all levels and reducing debate on vitally important pieces of legislation and issues. I hope the government will see the light and change its mind on what it intends to do with the Senate committee process, because I believe abolishing a large number of committees and then putting government members in charge of those committees is a serious threat to our democratic process.
The problem is that the government is just determined to ram this legislation through the parliament without our being able to give it due attention. Once again, the Howard government is treating the parliament and all of its members with contempt. It is a clear sign of the fact that this government has been too long in office and its arrogance is palpable. It is our belief on this side of the House that this bill highlights the abject failure of the Howard government to come to grips with the increased demands on all transport systems in these days of heightened terrorist risk. Members will recall the chaos which surrounded the government’s appointment of Sir John Wheeler to review Australia’s airport security systems.
I am pleased that Sir John Wheeler was able to undertake this work for the government, given his deep understanding and broad experience of these matters. The recommendations in his report should have already been implemented but, sadly, they have not been. The fact remains that, if this government had been doing its job, there would not have been the need for such a review. The Wheeler report, of itself, was an indictment of the former minister. It cited completely inadequate information-sharing arrangements, the desperate need for better intelligence on criminal and illegal activities at airports and the need to X-ray all baggage and cargo.
The Wheeler report was also a de facto report card on the then minister: the report card said one word with a capital F, and that word was ‘Fail’. No wonder the member for Gwydir went scurrying off to early retirement on the back bench. He was a total embarrassment to the government and indeed, in my view, to The Nationals. It is doubly embarrassing for the government that one of the most neglected aspects of aviation security which Sir John identified was in fact regional airport security. This was one aspect of aviation security with which we would have thought the former minister would be concerned. But, no, as usual he postured and pouted on regional issues while failing in a real sense to look after the interests of regional Australians. In typical fashion, the then minister was more concerned to get some dubious regional projects through the vetting process of an intimidated and compromised bureaucracy. Meanwhile, regional airports have become a disgrace.
At the time, Sir John reported that airports at Gladstone, Grafton, Tamworth, Port Lincoln and Devonport did not even have screening of passengers, let alone of baggage. Some did not even have proper perimeter fencing. So much for the then minister. We all know that he established the Wheeler inquiry in a panic when he realised that his petulant obsession with handing out rorts to his coalition colleagues and turning a blind eye to the AWB giving funds to Saddam Hussein had distracted his attention from his day job of running Australia’s airport and aviation security systems. The fact that the minister has since resigned, pending his retirement from this place, is a plus for all Australians in many ways—not least for those who have a genuine concern for the safety of our transport systems.
It is vitally important that airport and aviation security be strengthened, but we need to ensure that no stones are left unturned in our pursuit of the best aviation airport security in the world, because that is what all Australians deserve. That is why the Senate committee should be asked to review the matters before the House in this legislation. Doubtless the government will reject this eminently sensible suggestion or, as I have said, because they are modifying the committee process in the Senate they might be able to get away with a kangaroo court type inquiry rather than a very transparent and appropriate inquiry.
Labor supports the passage of this bill, but further and better aviation security is required. The roll-out of the aviation security identification cards must be done immediately. The risks in not doing so are substantial, and I will cover some examples a little later. At risk is the safety of all Australians who travel by air and who work at airports. The stinginess of this government in failing to ensure that urgent upgrades are carried out is appalling. This government is willing to squander many hundreds of millions of dollars on taxpayer-funded political advertising, yet it will not spend the money necessary to ensure that all Australians can travel knowing that their safety is assured and that all Australians who run businesses at airports or who work at airports can do so safely. Put plainly, this government is playing with Australian lives. That is the tragedy of this government’s incompetent management of airport and aviation security. It must be fixed as a matter of urgency.
I want to look at some issues surrounding the airport in my electorate of Swan, Perth airport. I raise firstly an incident that happened over a year ago. I have talked about the need to improve the aviation security identification cards, but these are the sorts of things that can occur even if you do have in place a decent system of cards and identification. If you do not have policing in place to ensure that people with cards are screened, you will have all sorts of problems. In this incident that happened over a year ago, in March 2005, three allegedly inebriated men were able to scale the airport security fence and get on board one of our big aircraft. They spent over an hour on board this aircraft having a great old time in first class, drinking all the wine and whatever was left there. Finally, after an hour of being on the aircraft, they were apprehended and dealt with.
Unfortunately, the minister who was in charge of security at the time, Chris Ellison, claimed, ‘It doesn’t really matter, it was just a joke and, quite frankly, it’s not that much of an issue.’ The issue is this: if those people had intended to do some serious damage and were on this aircraft for over an hour without being apprehended, it could have created enormous problems for Perth airport or for any airport that did not have proper security in place. Despite the minister dismissing the incident as nothing more than a bit of drunken larking about, when these people appeared in court the lawyer who was prosecuting the case said that the matter was so grave and threatening, the magistrate should throw the book at the trio.
That incident, which happened at Perth International Airport, is one example of there being significant flaws in security. In another example, a senior citizen managed to wander onto the tarmac and climb aboard a plane that was bound for Singapore. He had no identification and no boarding pass. He might have been a little deranged. He managed to wander onto the tarmac and get on board the aircraft and he was told, ‘Hang on, you haven’t even got a boarding pass—there’s something seriously wrong here.’ It would not have mattered if he had had a security card, because no-one was bothering to police that particular problem.
We had another incident at Perth International Airport which was slightly different. A guy who was a bit unhappy with what was going on at the airport decided that he was going to have his own little protest and he rode his motorbike through the front doors of the international airport. He managed to drive right into the booking area and through the front windows. If he had been a terrorist, it would have created a serious problem for us at that airport.
I would also like to talk about what happens with cargo, given that this bill talks about doing some more screening. We have some serious problems at Perth airport, because it is on the way to the gulf in the Middle East and military aircraft often use the airport. A lot of explosives, rocket launchers and other sorts of military equipment is handled through the airport. I am very concerned that if people such as those I have mentioned can get on the tarmac and access ordinary aircraft then they could also access civilian aircraft that might be used by the military to carry military payloads. It is totally unacceptable that the security is so slack that these sorts of incidents can occur.
For example, not so recently the military put in a request to on-load 10,000 kilos of explosives at Perth, which request was knocked back. But you do not need a permit to load up to 3,000 kilos of high explosives on to aircraft operating out of Perth airport. Three thousand kilos is an enormous amount of explosives in its own right. The flight carrying that cargo is directed on its flight path across the suburbs of Perth on its way to either the eastern states or overseas. Mr Deputy Speaker, if you consider the impact of 3,000 kilos of explosives going off inappropriately because someone might have boarded the aircraft and set a charge, you realise that something needs to be done to ensure that these sorts of incidents cannot occur. That type of cargo not only needs to be screened but also protected when it is on the ground.
I was very alarmed to find out that, when we were leasing these aircraft previously, they were going to Pearce air base, where they were fully guarded, receiving a full SAS payload and coming down to Perth and, because they were considered to be commercial and not military aircraft when landing at Perth, they were subjected to no security whatsoever. In addition, often they would stay overnight on the tarmac before refuelling and taking off en route to the gulf. That is a frightening concept, when you consider that people without passes could access that tarmac with that sort of payload sitting there on the ground without adequate protection. We have now bought C17s, which will operate as military aircraft. But I am concerned that, if Perth airport is to be used in the future for loading and off-loading of those particular aircraft, we need to ensure there will be proper security at that airport to protect that cargo.
These are just some examples of the security issues at Perth airport, which I believe need to be addressed. If these things are happening at Perth airport, I am sure that these issues need to be addressed at other airports right across the country. I hope that the situation is improving but, as I said before, it is not clear at this stage whether the government will adequately deal with the situation.
I also see something in this bill about regulations to do with air shows at Avalon. It is great to see that the Avalon air show is coming up next year. As you know, Mr Deputy Speaker Scott, we had the pleasure of going to it last year. It is a fabulous show for Australia; in fact, I understand that it is one of the best air shows in the world. I would urge anyone who has the opportunity to get down to Avalon to see it, and I commend the fact that we have some regulations there to help address that.
In conclusion, I again draw all members’ attention to the Wheeler report. In preparing for this speech, I reread that report. It is certainly worth reading. It highlights the fact that, while some of the issues he raised have been addressed, unfortunately we have a long way to go. On 29 March 2006, in his second reading speech to the House on the Aviation Transport Security Amendment Bill 2006, the Minister for Transport and Regional Services proclaimed that aviation security is a high priority for this government. I think not. If that were the case, we would not have a situation where, more than four years after September 11, the government is still in a blundering mess when it comes to a nationally coordinated airport security policy. I commend the bill to the House.
12:08 pm
Warren Truss (Wide Bay, National Party, Minister for Transport and Regional Services) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source
Firstly, I thank honourable members for their contribution to the debate on the Aviation Transport Security Amendment Bill 2006. Some were constructive, some less so. Let me say that I was particularly disappointed with some of the personal insults and criticism by the honourable member for Swan of the previous minister. That is not the way he normally addresses issues. Unfortunately, it must have been a relief speechwriter that produced that effort, because the criticism in many instances I think was unfair and inappropriate—and, I might add, in some instances inaccurate.
The honourable member for Brisbane, who led off for the opposition, usually gets his lines from the trade unions; again, from his contribution today, that is clearly where his remarks came from. But usually, when you get your lines from the trade unions, the facts are wrong. That did not get in the way of the honourable member for Brisbane’s criticisms, but it would have been more constructive if a few of his facts had been right.
It is simply beyond dispute, in spite of the criticism by some members opposite, that this government has done more to upgrade security at our nation’s airports and in the aviation industry than any in our history. Since the Wheeler report alone, the government has announced another $644 million worth of budget expenditure to upgrade security. That includes significant expenditure for counter-terrorism first response teams, money for the Joint Airport Intelligence Group, funding for community policing, significant funding for CCTV and also funding for air cargo security. Indeed, the government has committed a total $1.1 billion in aviation security initiatives since September 11, 2001, so when the opposition are critical of the government’s commitment in this regard they would not want to compare our record with their own. Clearly, little was done. I accept that the environment was different in that time, and people were not as conscious or aware of the importance of security as they are today, but in reality Labor did nothing to anticipate the growing terrorism threat across the nation and then to ensure that there was a capacity within Australia to respond. That has all been left to this government, and I think we have responded in a very powerful and effective way.
I will also deal with a couple of the other comments that were made during the debate and respond to them specifically. The honourable member for Brisbane claimed that there had only been 10,000 aviation security cards issued. In fact, there have been well over 100,000 cards issued to workers in all sectors of the aviation industry. He may perhaps have confused that with the issue of ASICs to the general aviation sector, but even there his figure is wrong. There are something like 14,000 ASICs issued to pilots by CASA alone. Maybe that is where his confusion occurred. He also was critical in making claims that Sydney airport has not met its targets for checked baggage screening. I am pleased to report to the Committee that Sydney airport is achieving 100 per cent compliance with the aviation transport security regulations and is using inline multiview X-ray checked baggage screening systems to screen 100 per cent of international baggage. So the shadow minister’s claims in that regard are also incorrect.
He made some criticism as well, and I have also heard other members opposite being critical, of security at regional airports—again, not acknowledging the very substantial expenditure that this government has provided for security programs at regional airports, particularly to deal with issues like fencing, lighting, secure locks, gates, alarm systems and CCTV. I also remind the Committee that a significant program is being completed to ensure that there are now bullet-proof doors on the cockpits of all of the major aircraft operating around Australia and, of course, a whole range of other security measures which are making our aviation system very much safer than it has ever been.
However, it is true to say that security measures really have to be risk based. No-one can remove risk entirely, but we concentrate our expenditure on the areas where we consider the risks are greatest. Clearly, the larger the aircraft, the larger the airport, the greater potential there is for some kind of a security incident. A small aircraft at a remote airport is unlikely to be the centre of a major security incident. So our layering of security initiatives is designed to take greatest effect in places where the risk is highest. That is the reason we have a layered security system which puts in place additional depths of security in places where the risks are considered greater. The honourable member for Swan in his remarks referred to incidents, some of which he acknowledged were quite ancient and would have been before current security measures were put in place. That, I think, is an example of how the multilayered system of security actually works: if somebody has breached the first layer, then there is another layer, then another layer and then another layer after that before any incident can actually become serious.
So I think it is important that we look at these sorts of issues in perspective. No government will ever be able to guarantee a regime that is absolutely risk free, but we are seeking to minimise the potential for an incident to occur in Australia. Let me say that I am thankful that those measures have been successful to date and Australia has been spared the incidents and appalling acts of violence that have occurred in other parts of the world.
Turning specifically to this legislation, let me acknowledge that the Australian aviation industry is complex; therefore, dealing with all of the various elements of having a secure system is indeed a difficult task. This is the first bill to amend the Aviation Transport Security Act, so it is an important step in the never-ending task of finetuning the legal requirements of aviation security with the changing operations of aviation businesses. All the amendments in this bill were developed in consultation with the industry.
The bill will enhance Australia’s security regime by amending the Aviation Transport Security Act in three ways. Firstly, it will enable airport operators to manage security risks within airports when hosting unusual events. Reference has been made to air shows, VIP arrivals and things of that nature. I know the honourable member for Hinkler, who is in the chamber, has been particularly interested in these sections of the act because of important fly-ins and the like that are held at Bundaberg Airport. I am confident that these new arrangements will meet the honourable member for Hinkler’s concerns and ensure that events in that city are able to proceed.
This legislation also delivers more robust regulation of air cargo and allows aviation industry participants to make simple alterations to their transport security programs. We believe that these amendments will increase our high level of aviation security, will enhance national and international confidence in Australia’s regime for handling air cargo, and will provide a flexible and targeted mechanism for airport operators to manage special events and temporary, non-routine activities that can be contained in a specific area of the airport.
In the area of air cargo, the proposed amendments will maintain the broad scope of the cargo security scheme while introducing a legal framework for regulations to provide a more flexible and appropriately modulated approach to security at each step of the transport chain. Australia’s airports are used for much more than just regular passenger services. Major international airports have to be able to host receptions for the arrival and departure of VIPs. Our regional airports are a core community infrastructure and their facilities are used for a wide range of low-risk, community based activities, including air shows and even drag racing and vintage car shows. These special event amendments will enable airport operators to effectively manage the security of the events and activities that are appropriately held at airports but which are outside the airport’s core business. This will allow airports to tailor special event zones to suit the type of event they are hosting and the assessed risk that is associated with each particular event.
The government has paid careful attention to the many issues that Australian aviation has raised in our two regular industry consultative forums: the Aviation Security Advisory Forum and the Regional Industry Consultative Meeting. This bill is a response to some of the concerns that have been raised through those processes. Let me assure the committee that the Australian government is committed to working with the aviation industry in the never-ending task of protecting Australia’s travelling public and air commerce. Whilst security is primarily a matter for the industry—the airlines and the airports—the Australian government is demonstrating its willingness to work with the industry to achieve the highest possible levels of air security in this country. I commend the bill to the House.
Bruce Scott (Maranoa, National Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source
The original question was that this bill be now read a second time. To this, the honourable member for Brisbane has moved as an amendment that all words after ‘That’ be omitted, with a view to substituting other words. The immediate question is that the words proposed to be omitted stand part of the question.
Question agreed to.
Original question agreed to.
Bill read a second time.
Ordered that this bill be reported to the House without amendment.