David Hawker (Speaker) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I have received a letter from the honourable member for Brisbane proposing that a definite matter of public importance be submitted to the House for discussion, namely:

The Government’s mismanagement of aviation security and its failure to put in place the practical measures necessary to make Australian aviation safe from terrorism.

I call upon those members who approve of the proposed discussion to rise in their places.

More than the number of members required by the standing orders having risen in their places—

Arch Bevis (Brisbane, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Aviation and Transport Security) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Another day in question time, another mistake from the Minister for Transport and Regional Services. Yesterday, in answer to questions, he was telling us that the reason the Commonwealth cannot legislate to provide a basis for the Commonwealth Inspector of Transport Security was somehow the states’ fault. Of course, the reality is far from that. The government have dragged the chain—in fact, no draft legislation has been provided to any of the states. It is little wonder that there has been no response from the states—they have not been given a firm proposal by the Commonwealth.

Today we saw it again. Today, in answer to a question in relation to the open door policy at Sydney airport in recent times, the minister claimed that there was no problem at all, that this is all part of the grand plan of security at our largest airport—that you leave a security gate open. I draw the minister’s attention to the actual article. He was very quick to assert that the Daily Telegraph were lying about this. I suggest he have a look at the photograph in the article. What he will discover, in looking at the photograph in the article, is that the gate displayed, completely open and without any security guard, has on it the large Air Services poster: ‘Restricted area’. That ‘Restricted area’ poster includes the normal information that you would see in all restricted areas in all airports around Australia. It makes it clear that you can only access the area if you are:

... persons holding and displaying a valid identification card for this area and a lawful excuse for entry.

That is what the sign on the gate that was left open says. Today, the minister would have us believe that leaving that gate open is somehow part of his grand plan to protect Australia’s travelling public and the aviation industry.

That fits with a few other things the minister has had to say. We found out today that our regional airports are secure, not because there are police and Protective Services personnel available to look after them—there are not—but because there are four teams in Australia to look after about 140 airports. You do not have to be too good at either geography or maths to understand how poor that coverage is. No, we don’t need any of that: the minister assured us today that what we have are ‘plans’. We have security plans. You can just see the boffins, the bureaucrats, writing out their security plans, and the impact that would have on a potential terrorist. The terrorist would be sitting down thinking, ‘We’d better not attack that airport—they’ve got a plan! They don’t have any security guards; they don’t have any security gates—but they’ve got a plan.’ You can see someone walking into a bank to conduct a hold-up and telling everybody: ‘Stick ’em up, I’ve got a plan!’ It is an absurd proposition that the minister advanced today that our aviation industry and our regional airports are secure—even though this government have mismanaged that for some years, they are secure because they have written a plan. The facts are that, when it comes to matters of border security and airport security, the Howard government are all hot air and no substance. They are long on talk and they are short on practical measures.

Howard government ministers think that national security and border protection are the names of some photo studio. They never miss a photo opportunity. If there is someone there in uniform, if there is a flag to drape themselves in, they will be there like a shot; but get them to focus on the necessary practical measures that are required to provide security for the Australian travelling public and they are nowhere to be seen—we get the glib, shallow comments that we have seen from the minister this week in parliament. Australia does not protect its borders by pretending they do not exist, like the Howard government wants us to; and we certainly do not protect our airports by just talking about them in the way this government does.

The government has had five years since the terrorist attacks in America on September 11 to get these things right. Instead, dangerous security lapses are becoming common. Barely a week goes by now where there is not a serious breach of security in one of Australia’s airports. Barely a week goes by without another example of this government’s incompetent management of aviation security, at a time when aviation security is front and centre, part of the proper management of the nation in the face of a terrorist threat.

Yesterday’s incident, which I have referred to, saw literally a procession of vehicles going in and out—no guard, no boom gate, no security—of an area clearly identified as a security area for which people required passes. That was not the only incident at Australia’s largest airport. Remember, this is our premier airport. This is the largest, busiest airport in the nation. You might think that, if security were correct in one place in Australia, it would be at the busiest airport in the nation. But just three weeks ago there was another incident at Sydney airport, when two vehicles tailgated a van through a security gate. That gate was set up to allow one car to pass with a security pass. Two other vehicles followed them through. On that occasion, we were lucky—it was an act of road rage. Contemplate for a minute what might have happened if it were not an accident—that is, if it were a planned attack; if terrorists actually wanted to do some harm. We have security by good luck and good fortune, certainly not by good management. The simple fact of life is that the incidence of vehicles tailgating was drawn to the attention of the government more than a year ago.

You have to remember that the government were put on notice, like all governments in the world, on September 11 2001. We all knew that aviation was going to be a focus of attack by terrorists. Four years after that, they got an expert from the UK, Sir John Wheeler, to come here and tell them what they should have been doing for the previous four years. One of the things that John Wheeler specifically mentioned was the problem of vehicles tailgating through security gates at our major airports. So a year ago they got advice from their own expert, and here we are in 2006 and a couple of weeks ago precisely that same incident occurred. Where? Our busiest and largest airport—Sydney airport.

These incidents are not isolated. The example in the Daily Telegraph that was mentioned in question time is not a one-off. These are problems that are recurring all around Australia and the minister sits in blissful ignorance of all of this, wanting us to believe that it is all being put right. If those two people who were tailgating through security gates actually did have an aviation security identity card—one of the industry security cards—it probably would not have helped us a great deal anyway. The government put in place this aviation security identity card. It was a good idea; they just have not managed that properly either. In the couple of years in which it has been operating, already in excess of 380 have been lost or are unaccounted for. Think about that for a moment. This is the security pass that gains you access to the secure side of airports around Australia and, in the short time it has been operating, we have lost 380-odd of them.

Yesterday, when asked about this, the minister tried to fob it off by saying, ‘It is just like the Parliament House pass. You might lose one of them.’ I have news for the minister: it is not like the Parliament House passes. Unless he knows something about the checks done on Parliament House cardholders that the rest of us do not, there is not a criminal record check done on people holding a Parliament House pass. The Federal Police and ASIO do not do detailed background checks on everybody who has a pass, including those in the gallery. It would be an interesting exercise perhaps if they did. The simple fact is that an aviation security identity cardholder is subjected to all of that, and quite rightly so, because these people have access to security sensitive areas of airports at a time when we know the aviation industry is a target of terrorists. Yet yesterday the minister blithely passed it off as if it were just like misplacing one of the Parliament House passes. How much confidence do you think that instils in the people who work in the industry, who regard this government’s administration of these matters as a very sorry, sad joke?

There have been plenty of other incidents at Sydney airport that I could mention. I will just refer to two. We all remember the Sydney airport camel suit incident. That was a good one. We all had a chuckle about that. It was a bit of a problem really though. Baggage that was supposed to have been securely checked and examined went off and someone opened it up, took out a camel suit and ran around the tarmac in it. That is what you call a high-security environment! That is the administration this government is running. That was last year.

The member for Lowe has quite correctly pointed out the problems of closed-circuit television monitors at Sydney airport. They are a good thing to have, Minister. You should have a look at them. I commend them to you. The only trouble with CCTV monitors is that for a good deal of the time they are either out of focus or pointing at the wall. They really will not tell you a great deal about what is going on. The member for Lowe is on top of that and I am sure that in due course, one of these days, hopefully before the next election, the member for Lowe might even get some answers to his questions that are on notice about that.

Then there are the regional airports in Australia that are a major weak link in our national security environment. This is not news to the government. I assume they did read the Wheeler report—after all, they went to the trouble of bringing Mr Wheeler from England to conduct the inquiry.

Michael Danby (Melbourne Ports, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Mr Danby interjecting

Ian Causley (Page, Deputy-Speaker) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The member for Melbourne Ports is in a very delicate position.

Arch Bevis (Brisbane, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Aviation and Transport Security) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The report from Sir John Wheeler pointed out the problems at regional airports and the need for an urgent upgrade, particularly in those airports in regional Australia that have flights directly into major airports: Brisbane, Sydney, Melbourne—the major counter-terrorism response airports. The simple fact is that they do not check people. That does not happen. At the moment you can hop on a plane without having your baggage checked, without going through any X-ray scans or metal detections. You can hop on a plane and fly directly to Sydney, Melbourne or Brisbane and be airside on a secure part of the tarmac without any security check ever having been done on you.

The minister may well say, ‘Yes, but there are procedures put in place for people who actually fly to those airports to then be checked.’ That does not always happen, sadly, because what ends up occurring is that when flights are delayed from those locations—and there are plenty of people we can produce to attest to this—passengers are ushered quickly to the new aircraft they are getting on, which then takes them to the next port of their destination, which can be another capital city. So there are plenty of people who are leaving from places like Dubbo, flying to places like Sydney and going on to subsequent jet flights without going through any check of their baggage or of themselves and their carry-on baggage.

Warren Truss (Wide Bay, National Party, Minister for Transport and Regional Services) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

That is just wrong.

Arch Bevis (Brisbane, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Aviation and Transport Security) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The minister says, ‘That is just wrong.’ It is like the last two days when he has made mistakes on both the matters. Minister, before you open your mouth about this and put yourself on the record, I suggest that you do not take the word only of those people in your office. Talk to people on the job who work in the environment every day of the week and you might find that some of the advice you have been given is not right.

The minister has also made mention of metal detection wands and the importance they play in regional airport security and the fact that the government have had a program of providing these wands to regional airports. That is a good thing to do, Minister. It is a pity that they are not used in those regional airports, isn’t it? As has been reported in a number of media outlets over the last couple of days, the simple fact is that in most of those regional airports none of those wands is used; they are all under lock and key.

I noticed in yesterday’s Adelaide Advertiser a story precisely about that problem which noted alarm at lax rural flight safety in South Australia. The article commenced by saying:

Hundreds of thousands of passengers have boarded aircraft at regional airports in the past two years without security checks, while detection equipment remains unused.

That is happening in South Australia, and I can assure the parliament that is in fact happening in a number of places. It might have been a good idea if the government had decided to get its top public servant on security on the job. In 2003 the government decided they would appoint an Inspector of Transport Security. It was a good idea. The trouble is it took them an entire year before they had filled the position, so 12 months later they appointed Mick Palmer—a good decision. I think Mick Palmer’s experience in the AFP suits him well for the task. The trouble is that since then he has hardly been given a task to do. Amazingly, since the London terrorist attack a year ago—and you would have thought the government would have a heightened concern for these matters—he has been on the job one day a week on average. It might have been a good idea to get the Inspector of Transport Security out checking Sydney airport and some of these matters that have come to light in the course of the last three weeks.

It has been five years, Minister, since the US attacks when we were all put on notice about these matters. It is clear that the government are incapable of putting in place the necessary practical measures. The government are behaving like the emperor with no clothes: all bluff and no substance. They are going around parading their rhetoric and everyone in the industry knows that is all it is: rhetoric without substance. The simple fact that is becoming increasingly obvious to the industry is that only Labor has got a demonstrated policy and a drive to get these things right. The government’s handling of this matter over the last five years has been one of incompetence. The Australian people and travelling public deserve much better. (Time expired)

Warren Truss (Wide Bay, National Party, Minister for Transport and Regional Services) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The honourable member for Brisbane has trotted out all of the old stories and all of the old discredited arguments without providing any plan or vision for how in fact Australia can handle its airport and other security obligations in any better way. I took the opportunity to read the Labor Party policy statement on airport security before the last election and there is not a single thing in that policy that we have not already completed and in fact exceeded. The reality is that Labor has no new plans, no new ideas and no new reasonable assessments and approaches to these issues.

I have always had a high regard for the member for Brisbane. We came into parliament together and I think he has generally been a decent sort of a guy. I have been a bit disappointed lately, however, because, even when he has been told that something that he has said may have been an inadvertent error, he has gone back and repeated it again and again, and in reality therefore has perpetrated an attitude of pathetic scaremongering without any substance. One of the worst examples of this has been his repeated statement that Australia does not check the baggage of international passengers.

Arch Bevis (Brisbane, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Aviation and Transport Security) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

It’s the 100 per cent X-ray policy.

Warren Truss (Wide Bay, National Party, Minister for Transport and Regional Services) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Okay, you say we do not X-ray the baggage of international passengers.

Arch Bevis (Brisbane, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Aviation and Transport Security) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

But it’s the 100 per cent X-ray policy.

Warren Truss (Wide Bay, National Party, Minister for Transport and Regional Services) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

That is simply not true. You obviously misled the Leader of the Opposition, because he said the wrong thing yesterday, and then this morning the member for Griffith made the same inaccurate statement. One hundred per cent of the checked baggage on international packages is screened.

Arch Bevis (Brisbane, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Aviation and Transport Security) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Mr Bevis interjecting

Warren Truss (Wide Bay, National Party, Minister for Transport and Regional Services) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

That is the law—100 per cent of it—and it is checked using advanced technology, in-line X-ray equipment. It has been the law that 100 per cent has to be checked since December 2004—and that is happening and has happened for more than a year. So please, Member for Brisbane, the statement is not correct. The law requires this baggage to be screened—and it is. For that reason I am disappointed that that statement continues to be made.

Australia’s security regime is intelligence driven. It is risk based and it is outcomes focused. I think everyone accepts that the level of risk in some places is higher than in others and that we should devote the maximum effort and our expenditure to targeting those areas where the risks are the highest. Inevitably—and you do not have to be an authority on security to realise this—the capital city airports are more likely to be targets than the regional airports, and the small country airports are far less likely to be targets than those where there are big volumes of traffic. Indeed, whilst Australia’s security risk is assessed as being medium, the reality is that the assessment for regional airports is low.

It would be possible for the airports and airlines to screen every passenger at a regional airport in the same way that the airlines and airports screen passengers at capital city airports. I asked for a rough estimate of the cost of that the other day and it came back at about $500 million if we wanted to screen the four per cent of passengers in Australia who board airports in regional areas where there is no screening. It works out at around $3½ million per site. Some of these airports only take 10 or a dozen passengers a week. Are you seriously suggesting that we should impose a cost of millions of dollars on the local council and local airports struggling to manage services in those areas? And of course they would pass it on to the passengers. Fares would go up by hundreds of dollars in some of these places if we were to impose those kinds of restrictions.

I guess we would if the assessment risk was such that it needed to be done, but the assessment risk is precisely the opposite. We have the Independent member for Mildura, Mr Savage, making these kinds of irresponsible statements in Mildura about how Mildura was a high-risk airport. Indeed, the experts say it is a low-risk airport, but Mr Savage thinks he knows more than they do. Does he want to impose upon the people of Mildura and district levies on their air tickets of $50 or $100 when the experts say the risks do not justify it?

For that reason we need to have a multilayered approach to the way in which we deal with airport security. We do not rely just on aviation security identification cards, we do not rely just on security machines, we do not rely just on security guards, we do not rely just on fences, we do not rely just on deterrent penalties, we do not just rely on closed-circuit television, we do not just rely on intelligence support and we do not just rely on police and other law enforcement agencies. We rely on a combination of all of these things. Inevitably there will be faults in any one of these elements of a security package. No-one is perfect and machines are not perfect, and from time to time therefore somebody may breach one layer of security. But one has confidence that there are many more layers of security to ensure that our system can operate effectively and smoothly. An excellent example of the additional security that has been provided in regional airports is the government’s investment in placing security doors, hardened cockpit doors, on all of the aircraft carrying more than 30 passengers and operating into these country airports. That is an important security measure that the government has fully funded.

The other day I read a report somewhere that the government has spent $35 million on airport security since September 11. I suspect it was a reference to the $36.5 million that we have been providing to regional airports to provide just basic levels of security—things like fences, CCTV, locks and lighting et cetera. Since September 11 we have provided over $1.2 billion in expenditure on security. Of course, the government has not done it alone—the airports have also spent huge amounts of money on upgrading their security at their expense. The airlines spend large amounts of money on security checking, again at their expense, although obviously they pass those costs on to the users of their system. So there has been a massive national effort. It has not been the government alone, although we have provided leadership. We have expected, and indeed required in many instances, substantial upgrading of the services that are provided at airports—and, for that matter, at other transport facilities around the nation—from those who have primary responsibility for securing those systems, but we have been prepared to work with them.

When outside observers have looked at our system, they have been complimentary. Wheeler, in his report, was overwhelmingly complimentary about what we have been able to achieve in Australia and, indeed, made the point that we are world leaders in security in a whole range of areas. Yes, he identified 17 areas where he felt we could make improvements. The government has adopted all of those 17 recommendations and we are in the process of implementing the last of them.

I think one of his most important recommendations was the need to create a unified policing structure at each airport under a police commander. We in Australia have suffered because of territorial wars between state and federal police, between Customs and Quarantine and all the other officers who are there. It is important that there be a seamless approach to security issues and that they work together. We sought the cooperation of the states because I think it is very important that the state police also have a presence in and around airport areas. Some states were very cooperative. Victoria opened up a police station right outside Melbourne Airport because they recognised that some of the criminal activity that they might be interested in could well have an airport gateway. At the same time, the New South Wales government closed down the police station close to the airport and it is now probably three-quarters of an hour away whenever a call is required. So there has not been the level of cooperation in the past that there should have been and some of it has been built from traditions over the years. But I think the $700 million investment that we are now making in a unified policing structure can make a real difference and ensure not only that we have the personnel in the right place but also that there is a coordinated approach to dealing with the various issues.

I briefly refer again to a couple of the matters that were raised by Mr Bevis in his speech. The first was the issue that was highlighted in the Daily Telegraph today. We know that the Sydney newspapers—and, for that matter, others—search out isolated cases, where they can find them, where something has not gone as well as it should have. In this particular case the wide open gate that they were referring to was actually the access to a building site. The Qantas terminal is being upgraded and so a temporary but secure fence was provided to ensure that no-one could breach the airside areas of the airport, which naturally need to be kept safe. One mistake they did make was to fail to take down the sign that was outside the temporary fence. I understand that has now been done and so it will be clear to everyone where the secure area actually starts. But the people moving in and out did not have access to aircraft or the airside operations of Sydney airport.

I also refer again to the oft-made statement by the opposition about the role of Mick Palmer, Inspector of Transport Security, who is often referred to as ‘part time’. It would be fairer to say that he is an ‘on call’ officer who will be invited to undertake investigations and inquiries when there are particular issues which need to be addressed. He is currently undertaking some work, in cooperation with the states, on the issue of land transport security. That report and that work is going well. But if there is a significant issue associated with aviation security then we will ask him to do a report on that as well. He does not have some kind of an inspector-general overall supervisory role. That was never the intention and it was never what was envisaged when the office was created. I think he can play a useful role in bringing to the role his expertise and understanding of security issues for the benefit of the government and we look forward to being able to take up his advice and recommendations on issues of concern.

Airport security is important. People want to be able to travel with confidence. We in Australia are fortunate that we have been spared some of the appalling events that have occurred in other parts of the world. I cannot guarantee that there will not be an attack of some kind on Australia’s aviation system at some time in the future. The risk is currently assessed as medium and, in spite of everything that has happened in the United Kingdom over recent days, that risk has not changed. I am pleased that the UK and the US have both now lowered their own alert levels, so that means travel to and from those countries will be a little easier but still much harder than it is to and from a country like Australia.

We want to preserve our reputation of being a safe and secure place in which to holiday. We live in an insecure world. We live nearby and close to areas where appalling events have occurred so we cannot assume that we are immune from these sorts of problems. It is important that all Australians recognise that they also have a role in securing our country. Everyone needs to be an ‘eyes and ears’—to look out for any potential threat and be prepared to advise authorities on the 1800 number or someone close by whenever they see an issue of concern. I, therefore, do not mind when people come to me about issues or when they perceive that there may be a weak point in our security. In fact, I welcome that advice and the government seek to respond to it from time to time. Quite often, when we check the alleged claims, they cannot be substantiated.

This morning on Sunrise I was confronted with an example of a man who claimed he took some Stanley knives through Karratha Airport. On checking with Karratha Airport, we found that they have no record of it. We have asked the Roebourne Shire Council, who run the airport, and Qantas and they have no evidence of it. If he did so, he has committed an offence, so I can understand why he might not want to be identifying himself. But, where there are deficiencies, we need to know about them and we will seek to address them.

I know that no human being is perfect and no machine is perfect. Of course the terrorists keep trying to get one step ahead of the technology, and so we need to continue to make substantial advances. Our government has been active in funding the development of new security machinery and looking at new systems so that we can deal with issues which might arise in as effective a way as possible. What we do not really want is scaremongering causing unnecessary concerns when in fact the complaints lack substance. The reality is that we do enjoy a safe aviation system in Australia. It is as secure as any in the world—in fact we would say more secure than most in the world. We have put a substantial investment into a multilayered approach to security. A single-layered approach, once penetrated, would be shattered. But when you have a multiple approach where you are seeking to identify people of concern, monitor those who may give rise to incidents and put in place effective barriers such as checking systems and the like, you can have, layer upon layer, a system which will guarantee as much as humanly possible the secure passage of all passengers through our airports and into the international transport system. (Time expired)

Michael Danby (Melbourne Ports, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

In supporting the motion moved by the member for Brisbane, the opposition’s full-time spokesman on homeland security, aviation and transport security, I would reflect on the events last week in Britain. I ask: can anyone doubt that this is a portfolio area that requires the full-time attention of a senior minister? That is what Australia will have next year under a Beazley government. What do we see today in the House? The government’s case being put by the Minister for Transport and Regional Services, who is responsible for a whole range of transport and regional issues across Australia, from the protection of the sea to shipping levies to agricultural chemicals. He shares responsibility for security with the Attorney-General, who is responsible for everything from patents to bankruptcy law to saving Australia from the ‘spectre’ of same-sex marriage.

In any government that took its responsibility seriously, the Attorney-General would be a full-time job; transport and regional services would be a full-time job; and homeland security, including aviation security, would be a full-time job. Australia has never needed a European style interior ministry—for which in many ways we should be grateful. This is partly because in our federal system police and prisons are the responsibility of the states. But we live in a changed world—and we should be flexible and aware of some of those unwelcome changes due to terrorism. This involves new flexibility in attitudes of governments. This government has acted in many areas in response to security threats, and nearly always it has done so with the support of the opposition. Yet the inadequacies of our response in the area of aviation security are very glaring, as the member for Brisbane made clear. It seems obvious to me that the lack of a full-time minister in this area is partly to blame for those inadequacies.

The minister, in his response to the member for Brisbane, claimed that, for instance, in this particular incident in Sydney of the open gate referred to in the Daily Telegraph today there was no access to airside security. Minister, please go and speak to the officials at Mascot airport. I know that you are not listening now, but the people who read Hansard for you afterwards will be able to explain to you that in the previous two weeks there was an open gate which you could slide open and shut when you went into that building site about which you talked so knowledgeably in your speech. There was an open gate where any person could have breached the security of Mascot airport, our biggest airport, and could have passed through into a secure area. So it is not true to say that people did not have access to Sydney airport from that open gate at the building site of a new hangar; there was a sliding gate that people could open just two weeks ago.

Next month will mark the fifth anniversary of September 11—a day which still seems incomprehensible in its pure evil; a day which should have changed forever the way we think about aviation security. Last week’s events in London remind us that September 11 was not a one-off disaster, something that could not happen again in our lifetimes like the 2004 tsunami. It was a declaration of war by a ruthless enemy, an enemy who is still active and still thinking of new ways to attack us. We know that Australia is on its target list—something the two Bali bombings have made very clear.

In July last year the government appointed the Rt Hon. Sir John Wheeler, a former British Conservative MP and security minister in the Northern Ireland office, to conduct an inquiry into Australia’s aviation security system. Labor welcomed his appointment and we made a submission to the inquiry. Sir John and his team did an excellent job and reported to the government in September, nearly a year ago. The Wheeler report made a number of recommendations. The Prime Minister immediately announced, as if almost from the script of Yes, Prime Minister, that he accepted what he called ‘the thrust of the recommendations’. This was typically careful prime ministerial phrasing meaning that the government reserved the right not to accept any specific recommendations, just the thrust of the report. A year later we can see what this means in practice. The Wheeler report found a number of deficiencies in Australia’s aviation security system. I will give the House just a few quotes. First of all, the report said:

12. Policing at major airports in Australia is often inadequate and dysfunctional, and security systems are typically uncoordinated.

Another quote says:

18. The present Aviation Security Identification Card (ASIC) system has a number of weaknesses, and there is confusion as to what airport access an ASIC enables.

Another quote from the report of Sir John Wheeler says:

... in the current environment, consideration should be given to more comprehensive security control over regional flight passengers when arriving at major airports such as Sydney because of the risk to larger aircraft and facilities when passengers disembark at the apron.

The report continues:

25. While 80 per cent of Australia’s air cargo is carried on passenger aircraft, it is not all screened. It is clearly inconsistent for one category of aircraft user to be treated differently from another, thereby putting the safety of the aircraft in jeopardy.

These are all quotes from the report of government-appointed Sir John Wheeler. To use the Prime Minister’s terminology, the ‘thrust’ of the Wheeler report was that aviation security in Australia is inadequate and dysfunctional—mainly because of the overlapping jurisdictions and confused lines of responsibility. This is always a sign of weak leadership from the top. It was not Sir John Wheeler’s role to make recommendations about the structure of government, so let me once again make the obvious recommendation: Australia needs a single, full-time minister for homeland security—someone like the member for Brisbane—with undisputed authority over aviation security matters.

Australia also needs a full-time Inspector of Transport Security, a position currently occupied by former police commissioner Mick Palmer, from my home state of Victoria, when he has time to spare from his other duties at the moment. The opposition has been saying for over a year that Mr Palmer should be doing the job full time and that, if he is not available full time, someone should be found who is. Yesterday in question time, the minister said that Mr Palmer is not:

some kind of ‘el supremo’ who is in charge of all airport security in Australia.

…         …         …

It is not his role—

intoned the minister—

to take on some particular oversight of all of the transport security arrangements in Australia.

The obvious response to this is: why not? If Mr Palmer is the right man for the job, and the opposition agrees that he is, then he should be an ‘el supremo’ and he should indeed have oversight of all the transport security arrangements in Australia. We are still waiting for the government’s legislation giving the Office of the Inspector of Transport Security a statutory basis and giving the holder of this post real authority over the multitude of competing authorities.

Sir John Wheeler made 17 recommendations. Time does not allow me to go through them all, but let me say something about the more important ones. Wheeler recommended that the background checking process required to obtain and hold an aviation security identity card be further tightened and centralised in the Attorney-General’s Department and that this should be harmonised with maritime cards. The ASIC is becoming something of a scandal. The honourable member for Brisbane asked the minister yesterday about the reports that 384 of these cards, which give access to security sensitive areas of airports, have been lost or stolen. The minister did not deny the figure. As the member for Brisbane pointed out today, he simply replied by saying, ‘Well, people lose these cards all the time—they are like Parliament House passes.’ But holders of Parliament House passes, just as the member for Brisbane said, do not have to undergo criminal background checks. A lost or stolen ASIC is not just an inconvenience, Minister. It is a breach of security and it is potentially a threat to the lives of Australians. Doesn’t the minister watch TV? Doesn’t he realise that one of the suspects in the arrests over the weekend in London was an employee at Heathrow airport? Doesn’t he understand the parallels and the implications for the Australian people?

A stolen ASIC has great potential value to criminal elements as well, and the link between criminal activity at airports and security risk is something that Sir John Wheeler specifically commented on. Each one of those cards represents a real security breach. The minister said that 384 lost or stolen cards is a small number in relation to the total number of cards issued. Perhaps it is, but I do not find that reassuring when I think of 384 potential breaches of security at our major airports.

Wheeler also found that there are 188 authorities competent to issue an ASIC, that there is no single database of everyone who has been issued an ASIC and that there is no single set of criteria of eligibility for an ASIC. He noted:

... even at a single airport an applicant can be rejected by one employer and given an ASIC by another on the basis of the employer’s assessment of a criminal record.

In other words, airport employees are able to make  subjective judgments about whether a person qualifies. Sir John also highlighted another fundamental weakness of the ASIC system when he noted that there was confusion between the function of the ASIC as a background checking process. He said:

Many take the ASIC card to be a general access card, rather than merely to be an indication that the holder has had a background check to enable potential entrance.

It does not follow that everyone who is qualified for an ASIC should have access to all security sensitive areas, as currently seems to be the assumption of some airports. There needs to be a much clearer definition of what an ASIC is and what it is for and tighter regulations on who is allowed to go where among the tens of thousands of people who are currently holders.

Let me conclude by saying something about regional airports. The Wheeler report noted that the great majority of Australian airports—in fact, 147—have no specific additional requirements beyond those imposed on all airports, such as protecting secure areas and having a transport security program. Screening of either passengers or property is not compulsory at these airports. We have four security teams for 140 airports. What a joke! The minister does not seem to understand that, in the case of the September 11 hijackers, the terrorists entered from a regional airport in Portland, Maine, and then got into Logan airport from where they began their monstrous task. This is the potential that he should remember when addressing insufficient security at regional airports. (Time expired)

Jason Wood (La Trobe, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I have listened carefully to the Australian Labor Party’s arguments. When it comes to terrorism they are weak, they are indecisive, there is a true lack of knowledge, there is a lack of leadership and there is a lack of commitment. Apart from that, they are doing a great job! What I would first like to discuss is their weakness in this area.

What I have seen since being a member of parliament is that every time terrorism or security or drug related issues come up the Labor Party enjoys ripping the guts out of the legislation to make it as weak as possible, even offering ridiculous suggestions. One of the classic ones I heard related to the telephone intercept legislation, which would help law enforcement agencies, in the case of terrorism or drug trafficking, by allowing police to tap the phones of a third party. One suggestion by a Labor Party member was that they should alert the person whose phone is to be intercepted so that they can notify their friends. That is the dumbest piece of security advice I have heard.

We can also look at what has happened recently. All last week’s migration bill—which the Labor Party opposed—was about was securing our borders. This government’s No. 1 responsibility is the protection of its citizens. The situation, which the Labor Party supported, of allowing people to be processed on Australian shores rather than offshore is obviously a worst-case scenario for our country’s security. From looking at the latest potential terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom, we can see that one of the persons charged was a mother. Therefore we have to get out of our heads that the only people who get involved in terrorist attacks are males. We have seen the same thing happen with suicide bombing attacks in Israel.

The Australian public also realise that one of our greatest strengths is the war against terrorism. In the latest Australian Newspoll for 14 to 16 July, Mr Howard’s total support for his way of handling national security and terrorism related issues was 56 per cent, Mr Beazley’s was 25 per cent and, going back to Latham’s days, it was 31 per cent. I have heard the member for Melbourne Ports and the member for Brisbane say that we need a minister in charge of homeland security. We have got that person: he is the Prime Minister of this country. His No. 1 priority is the security of this nation. He is doing a fantastic job.

I have also seen a number of issues raised today by the member for Brisbane with regard to the restricted area access. This was a construction site. It is not like we had people going there planning terrorist attacks. I do take the member’s point though—everything needs to be done to make sure we have the best security possible, but let us get real about it: this was not a life or death situation.

We should also look at the arguments about regional airports. We heard the Minister for Transport and Regional Services say today that only four per cent of travellers use regional airports. The cost of upgrading security would be in the vicinity of $400 million. I am not sure if the Labor Party is actually suggesting this—and this is what greatly interests me. If it is suggesting this, and if it is going to ignore intelligence—which is the way we should counter terrorism—it should also look at having police and major security at every train station and every bus stop. We all know that is totally impracticable; therefore, we must rely on the intelligence we are receiving.

Let us have a look at the figures on ASICs. It is reported that 380 ASICs are lost or missing. Obviously, we hate to see that happen, but more than 100,000 cards have been issued. We also have the position of Inspector of Transport Security. We cannot have only one person in this country with the overall responsibility of being on the ground all the time, and that is why we have spent $700 million to upgrade law enforcement agencies and to assist with Customs and the AFP. They are our people on the ground; they are the ones doing the hard yards.

To find out how crucially Labor looks at this issue, I looked through Hansard for the year that I have been a member. I believe the shadow minister for homeland security has asked questions only on aviation security, and that was in the last two days. If the Australian Labor Party want to get serious about aviation security they should get their act together and bring it to question time rather than some of the ridiculous questions they raise. It is vitally important that we make sure this is a major issue which is being addressed, and the Australian Labor Party need to get serious about it.

So what has the government done? The government has spent a lot of money on aviation security. The major thing we need to remember is that this is for risk based security outcomes. We have 187 airports in Australia, up from 38 under the previous regime, and the Australian government is working very hard to ensure that all security is upgraded. On international flights, 100 per cent of luggage is checked. That is contrary to the Australian Labor Party’s statement that that is not taking place. Since September 11, 2001, the government has invested $1.2 billion in additional aviation security measures. There have been 100,000 ASICs issued, with photo ID and police background checks. We have introduced a unified policing model at a cost of $800 million. ASIO funding has been doubled since September 11. There are air security officers on selected flights. There are hardened cockpit doors on all jet RPT aircraft of 30 seats or more. The Australian government used an expert, Sir John Wheeler, to look at our security measures.

I would like to see what would happen today if the Australian Labor Party were in charge of the federal government. First of all, we should look at what the state governments do when it comes to security. One of my biggest criticisms of the state Labor governments is the lack of data exchange—that is, police forces do not pass information from their databases to other states. We had the ridiculous situation of Cornelia Rau. She was a missing person in one state. Her correct name was checked in another state, but it did not match up. My greatest concern is having crazy situations like the high school teacher in Queensland who used false identification to purchase 53 kilograms of Powergel explosive—equivalent to 10 times what was used in the London bombings. It is the responsibility of the state Labor government to make sure that proper identification checks are done on people who buy chemicals and explosives and who receive a photo ID. In Melbourne and Sydney, in November last year, people were purchasing chemicals. With proper identification checks, the chemical manufacturers will be aware of these people and the police can immediately be notified. The police can then do a check and they may find that the person is connected to a terrorist organisation. At the same time, we will not have people using false identification to buy 53 kilograms of explosives.

Michael Danby (Melbourne Ports, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

That’s what happened in New South Wales originally.

Jason Wood (La Trobe, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I would love to see the member for Melbourne Ports tell Victorian Premier Steve Bracks that this is an absolutely urgent issue. Have a look at what happened in Jordan in 2004. Terrorists got hold of 20 tonnes of chemicals—enough to kill 100,000 people. You must go back and tell the Premier of Victoria to get his act together and share intelligence with other states on the CrimTrac database.

In the UK at the moment, 25 terrorist suspects are in custody under preventative detention legislation. When it comes to our preventative detention legislation, I have not heard the Labor Party say that we can hold a suspect in custody for 14 days. This was recommended by the states, but the Australian Federal Police and state police cannot ask one question of the terrorist suspects. That is an absolute disgrace. We need to have the interview clause removed and allow our law enforcement agencies to do their job. If the same thing happened in Victoria, or anywhere in Australia, our law enforcement agencies would only have 24 hours, under part 1C of the Crimes Act, before the person must be released. (Time expired)

Tony Windsor (New England, Independent) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I would like to speak to this matter of public importance, which is an issue that I have raised on a number of occasions before. I do not think the matters that have been raised on other occasions—up to three and four years ago—have been sufficiently addressed. I think the member for La Trobe gave an inkling—probably inadvertently—as to why some of the issues about regional airport security have not been addressed. He highlighted the amount of money that would be required to do that. I think he gave an estimate that it would cost something like $400 million to secure our airports from terrorist attack.

He also made the point, in terms of the Labor Party calling for a homeland security minister, that the Prime Minister was currently that, and that in his view he was doing a great job. He also said that the main focus of the Prime Minister’s job is—as it should be, and I do not vary from that—the security of the nation.

That brings me to my key point, which is that we seem to have an illogical way of determining which airports or which aircraft are possibly at risk. I have raised this issue a number of times. One time, I was given a briefing by the appropriate departmental people, which did not tell me much, on the risk assessment process applied to our airports. Essentially, the logic goes, as I understand it, that some airports or aircraft are more at risk than others. And when you ask about that risk assessment process—and I think the minister said of it today that it is constantly changing, and I do not disagree with that at all—obviously the answer comes back that, because it is about security, you cannot talk about the process.

What I can talk about, and what I think demonstrates the illogical approach to security at airports, is that I can board a 50-seat Dash 8 Qantas aircraft in Tamworth and carry virtually anything I like onto that aircraft. I proceed to Sydney, where I disembark from that aircraft and am screened going into Sydney. And then, on some occasions, I can board the very same 50-seater aircraft again and and have my luggage screened et cetera. The question is: why are different airports being treated differently? Why is the aircraft, the 50-seater aircraft that I—

John Forrest (Mallee, National Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Mr Forrest interjecting

Tony Windsor (New England, Independent) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The member for Mallee says there is no risk at Tamworth. I suppose he would say to the people in America, where some of the aircraft that carried out the September 11 atrocity came from some regional airports, that there was no risk to them. I sincerely hope—and I have a great respect for the member for Mallee—that those words that there is no risk at regional airports do not come back to haunt him.

The process, as I said, in my view is very illogical. Why is Sydney airport at risk when Tamworth and Wagga and other airports are not at risk? Who has determined that? And I think the member for La Trobe gave an inkling of the answer, as I said, today. It is not about risk assessment or potential risk. Obviously, a terrorist with half a brain, when he or she views the Australian scene and sees a number of airports with Dash 8 aircraft will see that some are screened and others are not. If that were the choice of weapon, obviously they would probably avail themselves of a hire car and drive to one of those places.

There seems to be this logic that it is only the big aircraft that can do damage. I do not believe that and I think history says that that is not necessarily the case. But it also says to me that these people, these murderers that are carrying on their activities around the world, will make choices based on the ease of access to ways and means of destroying Australian people and various pieces of infrastructure. They are probably more intelligent—more intelligent than some of us would think—than that they would all blunder into Sydney or Melbourne airports and be detected by some form of detection there and not even consider a regional airport. As the member for Mallee says, there is no risk, apparently, at regional airports! I sincerely hope it is on page 8 of the al-Qaeda handbook on terrorist attacks that regional airports are not at risk.

I think the government really has to look at this issue. The member for La Trobe talked about the money issue—that it would cost $400 million to secure our airports. Since the government has been in power—and I respect the government’s economic management, and the way in which it has been able to create surplus budgets et cetera—something like $33 billion has been returned to the taxpayer through tax cuts alone since 2001.

It is not a matter of whether there is enough money to be able to secure the airports. There are decisions made, on this very airy-fairy definition of risk assessment, that are in a sense financial decisions. It is expensive to do that. Everybody would agree with that; I would agree with that. But if it is expensive, why protect Sydney airport? If there is no risk, why protect Sydney airport? Why not have every airport in Australia treated the same? If we are going to protect some airports from terrorism, and if terrorism is deemed by the government to be a threat to this nation and the people who live within it and who we need to protect—and we heard the debate today about a gate left open and all the semantics that went on about whether that gate was open or not open—

Michael Danby (Melbourne Ports, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

It’s still open.

Tony Windsor (New England, Independent) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Irrespective of whether it was open or not, the whole debate was about the security of that gate and the possible impact on people. So there is obviously recognition within the government, and the opposition for that matter, that there is a threat to the Australian people from terrorist activity. If there is not, we should not have any protection at any of our airports. But the way in which it is structured at the moment, and the way in which people will look at our airports, is obviously that some airports are protected and others are not. They have similar aircraft on them, in many cases. Obviously, if there were a terrorist threat, people would be making their own determination as to where they were more likely to be caught.

A lot of people have argued about a range of matters in respect of security. I would like to offer a contribution from today’s Northern Daily Leader, which asked—as I am sure they have in many regional newspapers—whether security at our airports is up to scratch. Helen Green, from Tamworth, said:

No. Security needs to be tighter. We definitely need more security in country areas.

Andrea Fox, from Tamworth, said:

Yes, it is. If they (terrorists) want to get through, they will.

Jodie Thompson, from Quirindi, said:

Probably not generally speaking. It needs to be tighter.

Tania Kasch, from Kootingal, said:

No, I don’t think it is. If people can get on planes with nail files or knives, no.

Christina Tattam, from Tamworth, said:

In some ways, yes. There are areas that need to improve, though. I would like to see more security guards and more cameras.

Paul Kelly, from Narrabri, said:

No, I think there should be more security. You only have to look at what happened in London. Security at regional airports should be increased.

That is a bit of a snapshot of what real people are actually thinking about security. Obviously they recognise that there is a risk, because we are being told at government level and internationally that there is a risk. People who use regional airports would like to be treated as equal citizens to their city cousins, not as second-class citizens.

Ian Causley (Page, Deputy-Speaker) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The discussion is concluded.