De-Anne Kelly (Dawson, National Party, Parliamentary Secretary Trade) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I present the explanatory memorandum to this bill and move:

That this bill be now read a second time.

The Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Amendment (Maritime Security Guards and Other Measures) Bill 2005 amends the Maritime Transport Security Act 2003 (the act).

The bill will strengthen Australia’s maritime security by enhancing the capacity of ports and other maritime industry participants to deter and deal with unauthorised incursions into maritime security zones. Under the act maritime security zones are established in security regulated ports or on board security regulated ships to prevent unauthorised access to areas requiring additional security measures. Maritime industry participants are required to monitor and control access to these zones, and strict liability offences apply under the Maritime Transport Security Regulations 2003 (the regulations) to persons entering without authorisation.

Maritime security guards are deployed by maritime industry participants as part of their preventive security arrangements. In the course of his or her duties, a maritime security guard might detect a person who has entered a maritime security zone unlawfully. Under the act, guards have the power to restrain an unauthorised person and detain the person until a law enforcement officer—usually a state or territory police officer—arrives. However, maritime security guards do not have the power to request identification from the person, ask the person why he or she is in the zone, or request that the person move on if it has been established that the person has breached the provisions concerning access to zones. Nor do maritime security guards have the power to remove occupied or unoccupied vehicles or vessels found without authorisation in zones. In these circumstances, they would have to call the police to arrange removal. This is not always a quick and convenient solution to effect the removal of a potential threat from a maritime security zone.

Following a comprehensive review of Australia’s maritime security policy settings conducted by the Secretaries Committee on National Security in 2005, the Australian government decided to enhance the powers of maritime security guards under the act through provision of limited move-on powers. These new powers are contained in schedule 1 of the bill, as well as some powers incidental to the implementation of the move-on powers.

Under the new powers a maritime security guard may request that a person found within a maritime security zone provide identification and reason for being in the zone. When confronting the person the guard will be required to identify himself or herself, advise the person of his or her authority to request information, and tell the person that noncompliance is an offence under the act. These safeguards are intended to provide a balance between the coercive nature of the move-on powers and the rights of the individual.

If a maritime security guard has established that a person is in the zone without authority, then the guard can request that the person leave the zone. The previously mentioned safeguards apply in these circumstances as well. If a person fails to comply, the maritime security guard may remove the person from the zone, but may not in the process use greater force, or subject the person to greater indignity, than is necessary.

Schedule 1 provides that a maritime security guard may remove, or cause to be removed, a vehicle or vessel found in a zone without authorisation. These provisions apply to occupied or unoccupied vehicles or vessels. There is a statutory obligation not to cause unreasonable damage to the vehicle or vessel being removed, and a requirement to notify the owner of the removal. Expenses incurred for the removal, relocation and storage may be claimed from the owner of the vehicle or vessel.

These powers acknowledge a key difference between airports and ports. Where persons can be prevented from unauthorised access to airports through traditional access control arrangements, such as fences and monitored gates, ports are, by their very nature, open on at least one side—the waterside. Providing maritime security guards with the means to request that waterside intruders move on or else face removal and potential fines for noncompliance will address this natural weakness in port security.

It is expected that these new powers will complement the extensive waterside protection arrangements already in place, and enhance their deterrent effect. Of course, they will not eliminate the need for state or territory police forces to respond to an incident or threat when called. But they will provide ports with an immediate response capability, and an ability to promptly deal with nuisance incursions into zones without having to call on police resources.

Schedule 2 of the bill provides for a number of miscellaneous amendments to the act which clarify meaning, including an amendment which provides that a higher security level relevant to specified waters can be given to a regulated Australian ship.

The Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Amendment (Maritime Security Guards and Other Measures) Bill 2005 will strengthen Australia’s maritime security arrangements, providing for better security for our ports, port facilities and ships against the scourge of international terrorism, and enhancing the protection of both Australia’s maritime transport sector, and the Australian community.

Arch Bevis (Brisbane, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Aviation and Transport Security) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

In 2003, the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act introduced a maritime security framework for Australian ports, Australian shipping and some aspects of foreign shipping in Australian waters. That security framework was subsequently extended to oil and gas facilities in offshore Australian waters by the Maritime Transport Security Amendment Act 2005. The Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Amendment (Maritime Security Guards and Other Measures) Bill 2005 amends the 2003 act to increase the statutory powers of maritime security guards. Maritime security guards are required to have a certificate II in security operations or the equivalent training as the appropriate qualification level. The Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Regulations 2003 required the guard to have ‘a working knowledge of the act and these regulations’.

Section 162 of the act already deals with the prescribed training and qualification requirements for maritime guards. In short, it requires that a maritime security guard must (1) hold at least a certificate II in security operations that is in force or (2) hold a certificate or qualification that is in force and that is equivalent to at least a certificate II in security operations—for example, a certificate II in security guarding—or (3) have undergone training and acquired experience while working as a security guard that is sufficient to satisfy the requirements for obtaining a security guard licence in the state or territory where the person intends to work as a maritime security guard. The person must hold a licence to work as a security guard, being a licence that was issued or recognised by the relevant state or territory and that is current and in force, and the person must have a working knowledge of the act and these regulations, including knowledge about how to restrain and detain persons in accordance with section 163 of the act.

This bill allows a maritime security guard (1) to request that a person found within a maritime security zone provide identification and reason for being in the zone, (2) to request a person found in a maritime security zone without authorisation to move out of the zone and, if that request is not complied with, to remove the person from the zone and (3) to remove or have removed vehicles and vessels found in maritime security zones without authorisation. This bill further provides that, when confronting a person, the guard will have to identify themselves, advise the person of their authority and advise that noncompliance is an offence. The guard, of course, may not use greater force than is necessary. When removing a vehicle or vessel, a guard also must not cause unreasonable damage and must notify the owners.

These new powers are significant. A number of concerns are held within the industry and on this side of the parliament about whether the training of guards is adequate, having regard to the powers that they will now have conferred on them by and be able to exercise through this bill. These are, in fact, quasi law enforcement officers, with powers to move on and powers to use reasonable force in the circumstances.

To exercise these significant powers they are required to have simply a level II certificate in training. It is worth noting what constitutes a level II certificate. The Australian Standard Classification of Education sets out the criteria for the award system of certification in Australia. It describes certificate I and II in these terms:

Certificate I & II level provides a knowledge and skills base ranging from basic knowledge in a narrow range of areas to basic operational knowledge in a moderate range of areas.

It does not get more basic! Level I and level II qualifications are the most basic form of post compulsory education training. Indeed, entry to level I and level II need not require a year 10 school certificate, although year 10 level or equivalent is a standard point of entry for someone undertaking certificate I or II work. The guidelines in fact say:

Entry to this level is by various pathways which may include the completion of Year 10 or equivalent, or completion of a recognised programme and/or recognition of prior learning.

So we have in this bill quasi-legal powers, law enforcement powers, being afforded to people with minimum levels of training and experience. How long does it take for someone to get a level I or level II certificate? I actually had a look on the internet at a few course providers for level I and level II certificates in security and looked at the courses of the first two that came up under the Google search. One was a one-week course, continuing with one night a week on occupational health and safety matters for a couple of weeks after that first week; the other was a nine-day program. So we are talking about people with a week to two weeks of training to empower them to exercise these powers, including requiring vessels to be moved—not an insignificant matter in maritime safety or, indeed, in the operation of a maritime fleet. Moving vessels can be an expensive and time-consuming business, and the power to determine whether a vessel is going to be moved is afforded to these security guards whose training is, as defined, basic.

Evidence was given to the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee expressing concern about this. The Association of Australian Ports and Marine Authorities, in its evidence to the committee, said:

The quality of that training has been queried by some of our members. It is certainly nowhere near the level of that provided to law enforcement officers, yet MSGs—

maritime security guards—

are expected to carry out the duties set out in the Bill.

I think the Australian ports and marine authorities association’s concerns should be heeded. We should look closely at the operation of this bill in practice. It may well be that this parliament will need to revisit this bill in the not too distant future if the concerns of the Association of Australian Ports and Marine Authorities, along with those of others, prove to have substance.

For all that, we know that improving port security is an important matter. The government, for all of its rhetoric, has been quite slow to act on this. This bill was introduced into the Senate on 23 June 2005—well over a year ago. The Senate’s Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee reported on this bill in September 2005. Here we are in September 2006 now dealing with it. It has been a long gestation. Now that it is in the parliament, Liberal and National Party members seem to have no interest in it at all. If you look at the speakers list as it stands at the moment, there are three government members listed to speak on this bill—only three. There are 12 Labor Party members listed to speak on this bill.

Labor are fair dinkum about maritime security. We are fair dinkum about homeland security. We are fair dinkum about national security. We think they are important. Part of the problem we have in this debate in Australia at the moment is that the Howard government like to talk the terrorist threat. They divide the Australian community, setting Australian against Australian. They promote extreme laws that Senate committees and even their own backbench will not support. But they fail to implement the necessary sensible safeguards and procedures to protect Australians from the threat of terrorists or organised crime. The government’s mismanagement and incompetence have exposed Australians to a higher level of risk.

Labor have repeatedly lobbied for specialised port police at Australia’s ports. We think the maritime environment does require specialised people who understand that unique environment if we are to properly improve security. It is those concerns that lead me to move the following amendment that is being circulated in my name. I move:

That all words after “That” be omitted with a view to substituting the following words: “whilst not declining to give the bill a second reading, the House condemns the Government for its failure to provide necessary maritime security and protect Australians, including:

(1)

its careless and widespread use of single and continuing voyage permits for foreign vessels with foreign crew who do not undergo appropriate security checks;

(2)

permitting foreign flag of convenience ships to carry dangerous goods on coastal shipping routes; and

(3)

failing to;

(a)

ensure ships provide details of crew and cargo 48 hours before arrival;

(b)

x-ray or inspect 90 per cent of containers;

(c)

establish and properly fund an Australian coastguard; and

(d)

establish a Department of Homeland Security to better coordinate security in Australia”.

I spoke just a couple of days ago in the debate on the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Amendment (Security Plans and Other Measures) Bill 2006, to which I moved a second reading amendment in similar terms. I raised then the massive security dangers posed by ammonium nitrate being carried by foreign crewed, foreign flagged vessels around our coastline. That is an important part of this debate as well. In the evidence that was given last year to the Senate committee that looked at this there were some startling admissions made by the government’s own representatives. In answer to questions about the issuing of permits to flag of convenience vessels to ply their trade around the Australian coast, DOTARS, the Department of Transport and Regional Services, advised the Senate:

Our responsibilities are really around the risk profiling of those foreign vessels and dealing with a foreign vessel when it indicates its intention to come to an Australian port.

                  …              …              …

... there is not an additional check looking at particular seafarers when considering the approval of a single voyage permit or a coastal permit, because that has in effect already been done when the ship came to Australia.

Let me restate the important part of the evidence DOTARS gave. They said that there is not an additional check looking at particular seafarers when they consider the approval of a single voyage permit—that is, the department does not care about the security background on the crews of foreign ships. Most of them come from flag of convenience nations where there is little or no regulation governing either the quality of the ship or the seafarers. No check is done. Last year, in evidence to the Senate committee, the department of transport said that they did not think that was part of their job before they handed out a permit.

Earlier this week, I commented that the government’s approach to handing out permits to foreign flagged ships, particularly flag of convenience vessels, is like handing out tickets for a Friday night chook raffle—and there is the evidence to prove it. The department told the Senate that they do not think checking the background of foreign seafarers is something they need to bother about. Most countries in the world think it is something they should bother about. Most countries in the world understand that there is a real and growing threat from ships being used for terrorist and illegal activities.

For the benefit of the House and this debate, I should recap some of the points that I made earlier this week about dealing with the threat that this presents. At the moment, the Australian government happily allow foreign crewed vessels to carry thousands of tonnes of ammonium nitrate around our shores without knowing whether or not criminals or terrorists are members of those crews; indeed, no proper security check is done on any of them.

This is not the case for Australian ships and crews. As members of this House should know, Australian seafarers are obliged to undergo quite intrusive security checks. Federal police and ASIO checks are done on all Australian seafarers. The members of the MUA, the people who work on our waterfronts and ships, undergo security checks that we in this parliament do not put ourselves through and that most of our staff do not have to go through, although some ministerial staff might have to. The simple fact is that Australian seafarers must have a maritime security identity card, which they get only after the Federal Police and ASIO have vetted them and found them suitable—but not so for foreign crews. Foreign crews can turn up on ships that we know little about, because they are flag of convenience vessels; the government takes little interest in their background and allows them to carry dangerous and explosive chemicals into our major cities and ports.

There are a number of examples of where that threat has been real. Last year, a flag of convenience vessel, the Pancaldo, carried 3,000 tonnes of ammonium nitrate around the Australian coastline. If 3,000 tonnes of ammonium nitrate were to explode in a major harbour like those of Geelong or Botany Bay, it would leave a very substantial disaster in such a city. To put that disaster into some perspective, I will describe the only known case where such a large quantity of ammonium nitrate exploded. I say ‘such a large quantity’ because ammonium nitrate is regularly used by terrorists. The Oklahoma bomber used a very small amount of ammonium nitrate to blow up the building in Oklahoma City.

Just after World War II, a ship was carrying 2,300 tonnes of ammonium nitrate. It was a French vessel called the SS Grandcamp and it was in Texas City. In 1947 it exploded in the harbour. The ammonium nitrate had ignited and the explosion from it was heard 150 miles away. It produced a mushroom cloud that rose to the height of 2,000 feet over Texas City. Locals thought the nuclear holocaust had begun, that there had been a nuclear bomb attack on Texas City, so great was the devastation. The anchor of the Grandcamp, which weighed 1½ tons, was flung two miles from the site. Finally, it was found embedded 10 feet in the ground. That is the only known example of a large quantity of ammonium nitrate exploding on a ship.

We have a problem here: ships carrying more than that amount of ammonium nitrate operate around the Australian coastline on a regular basis. They are not Australian vessels or crewed by Australians. We know little or nothing about the people who crew these vessels; they are from flag of convenience countries that make an industry out of not asking questions of merchant carriers. This should be doubly worrying because it is a widely accepted fact that al-Qaeda either own or have long-term leases on between 15 and 18 vessels. It does not take a lot of imagination to foresee a circumstance in which one of those vessels might be used as a floating bomb. Indeed, I have made a number of comments warning of that threat.

But these things could happen by accident as well. Earlier this year, in Geelong, another vessel, the Pos Aucklandthankfully, not carrying ammonium nitrate but, nevertheless, carrying chemicals that you would not want to see dispersed around the harbour—found itself in a very dangerous situation when one of the crew members stabbed a fellow sailor, threatened to take over the ship and then blow up the ship. On that occasion, thankfully, the authorities were able to disable the individual who had gone berserk. That was not a planned terrorist attack; it was just one of those unfortunate incidents that can occur.

However, it highlights the fact that the security checks do not exist on those foreign seafarers. It highlights the fact that, even without a planned attack, incidents of that kind, which can have devastating effects, can easily unfold. Against that background, we now know from evidence to the Senate committee that the government do not believe that it is their job to check the background of sailors before they hand out permits for those foreign ships to work the Australian coastal route.

My advice to the government is to adopt Labor’s policy on this, which is that no dangerous chemicals should be transported in Australian waters unless they are being transported by people who have had a full security check. We already have plenty of those people. They are called Australian seafarers and the Australian maritime industry. The maritime security identity card was established precisely for that purpose. Let us make sure that the security checks done are Australian and are the standard applied when people are transporting dangerous chemicals in and out of our ports, to our major cities and around our coastline.

That failure of the government in dealing with these matters is in itself alarming. Sadly, it is not the only area of concern and not the only point raised in my second reading amendment to the bill. As well as the careless and widespread use of those single voyage permits for foreign crews, most of the containers that arrive in Australia are not scrutinised or checked. The government relies on a system based on intelligence and the information it gets about containers, ships or ports that containers may have come from that present a risk. That has resulted in 90 per cent of containers coming into this country not being X-rayed or checked.

Members of the government may regard that as a satisfactory situation but I am not sure that people listening to this debate would regard it as satisfactory. Knowing that this government, which makes such a big thing about defence and security matters for its own political purposes, is comfortable with 90 per cent of all containers coming into this country not being checked or X-rayed is something to which I think most Australians would object.

It is something that countries around the world are now starting to question. Hong Kong, one of the major trading ports and, I think, the second- or third-busiest port in the world, is now trialling at two of its nine terminals a system in which 100 per cent of containers will be X-rayed. Legislators in the United States are talking about this trial. They are very interested in the approach being adopted at those two terminals in Hong Kong, because they think that is the sort of security they need in the United States at their major ports to make them safe from the threat of terrorist activity coming through their naval ports. Unfortunately, the Howard government time and again have defended their approach, which is that 90 per cent of containers can come to Australia and we will not bother opening them or X-raying them. That is unsatisfactory.

Even when laws have been passed, the government’s incompetence allows unsatisfactory practices to continue. This bill is supported by Labor, and we hope that maritime security guards will improve the situation on our wharves, notwithstanding the concerns I have about their level of training and the desirability of having fully fledged police officers conducting these sorts of activities. Even when the parliament has carried sensible laws, the government still get it wrong. The parliament some time ago approved arrangements in which all vessels coming to Australia are to advise the authorities of their cargo and crew 48 hours before they arrive in port. In answer to a question in the Senate just recently, the government said that ‘67 per cent of containers that arrived in Australia between 13 January 2005 and May 2005 complied with that provision’—that is, 67 per cent of vessels provided details of their cargo and crew. That is about two-thirds, which means that one-third of all the ships that came to Australia during that period did not comply with the requirement. What did the government do about that one-third? Absolutely nothing. The ships kept coming and arrived at Australian ports.

In fact, again from the evidence the government gave to the Senate in an answer to a question on notice in May last year, 15 per cent of vessels did not bother telling the authorities in Australia who the crew were or what their cargo was until they actually got into port. It is a bit late after the vessels are in port. If there happen to be people on those vessels with ill-intent or, worse, there are explosives and other harmful devices on those vessels, it is a bit late once they are in Botany Bay or in one of the major ports close to one of our large cities to find out that the cargo is not what it is supposed to be or that the crew are not who you thought they were.

In our corner of the world that is an important matter. Few people understand or appreciate that our corner of the world just happens to be one of the worst places on the planet for piracy. The greatest incidence of piracy in the world occurs in the waterways to our immediate north-west—around Indonesia, Malaysia and the Strait of Malacca. On average, two ships a week have reported pirate activities—that is, they were subjected to piracy—in the last year. That understates the real situation, because a number of shipowners do not like to report that their ships have been subjected to piracy. Some think it is not a fantastic advertisement for their operations. So the official figure understates the reality. Not only are two ships a week on average subjected to piracy; last year four ships were hijacked.

So when we talk about requiring ships to give Australian authorities the details of crew and cargo 48 hours before they arrive, it has real meaning. In our corner of the world it is extremely important. The parliament accepted that. The power is there. The government are just to incompetent to administer it. It is all well and good for the government to talk up these questions of security, but it is about time they started to deliver. One of the reasons they are too incompetent to deliver is that they will not swallow their pride and do what everybody in this debate knows should be done: establish an Australian coastguard. If the Labor Party had not said years ago, ‘We think there should be an Australian coastguard,’ I suspect the government would have set one up. But, because the Labor Party has for years advocated the cause of a coastguard, government members think they should not adopt that.

I am quite happy to stand here now and offer that to government members. I suggest to them that they take it up and then we can have a bipartisan view about the establishment of an Australian coastguard. Do it for the benefit of all Australians. Other countries in the world understand this. Other countries in our region understand this. There is a significant list of nations. Whenever the word ‘coastguard’ comes up we think of the United States, but in fact there are many countries in our region that have coastguards—and for good reason.

The government, instead of establishing a coastguard, tries to conduct interdepartmental committees and establishes two-hat organisations where people are responsible to two ministers and two departments. It beefs up Customs, which is not part of the Defence Force, so it has some quasi coastguard role. It tries to beef up Fisheries so that it can do a bit of that as well. The truth is that the government has a patchwork quilt with a few pieces missing—and it has the overlap.

Other countries recognise the problem. Indeed, the international community recognises the problem. The other place in the world that rivals our corner of the world for piracy is off the coast of Africa. The response of the international community there has been to work with the African countries to set up a coastguard for those nations so that they can deal with this threat. It is about time the Australian government swallowed its false pride in these matters and did the same thing.

The other matter that has prevented the government from properly dealing with many of these issues in maritime security is their continuing attitude of dividing responsibility for homeland security across half-a-dozen different ministers. Not every government in the world has a department called the homeland security department. In the UK, they have a Home Secretary, who has traditionally had many of those responsibilities. But it is about time, on this front, as with the coastguard, that the government did what most Australians know should be done and indeed what most commentators in security matters have advocated for some years now—that is, establish one department, with one minister, bringing together the range of responsibilities that make up the web of services to secure our borders and to secure the life of Australians here at home.

Port security is an important aspect of that. This bill will make a minor adjustment, hopefully a positive one. I said earlier that I think the parliament may have to revisit this in the not too distant future, because I remain somewhat concerned that the tasks that are now being provided to maritime security guards to perform do require a little bit more training than a week. But the government is going to persist with that, and we are willing to work along with the government and industry to see how that unfolds in the hope that it does improve the situation.

But, like some of the main players in the maritime industry, we have our doubts about whether or not that will work. We think that there needs to be a specialised police service for the maritime environment, as is now being put in place for the airport environment. It took this government four years after the September 11 disaster and the report of Sir John Wheeler before it accepted the need for properly coordinated airport security officers—Federal Police. I hope it will not take a disaster or any greater length of time for the government to understand the need for the same sort of service in our maritime environment. We will support the bill, although the concerns I have raised in my speech in the second reading debate are significant—they are important. We will continue to press this government to try and fix those loopholes rather than just playing with words as it has been wont to do for so long in this area.

Mrs Bronwyn Bishop (Mackellar, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Is the amendment moved by the honourable member for Brisbane seconded?

Ann Corcoran (Isaacs, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Parliamentary Secretary for Immigration) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I second the amendment and reserve my right to speak.

Debate interrupted.