Arch Bevis (Brisbane, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Homeland Security) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The Aviation Transport Security Amendment (Additional Screening Measures) Bill 2007 seeks to implement an initiative of the International Civil Aviation Organisation, ICAO, of which Australia is a member country. I think it is worth recalling that the Chicago convention, which established ICAO, was signed by Australia in December 1944 by the then Labor government of John Curtin. So we on this side of the House—as I am sure those on the other side do—regard the regulation of international aviation as an important matter.

The bill amends the Aviation Transport Security Act 2004 by enhancing screening measures to limit the amount of liquids, aerosols and gels that can be taken through an international screening point by people flying to or from Australia and by introducing a new section with general powers for frisk searches. This initiative is intended to allow an additional capacity for screening officers to ask persons passing through a screening point to agree to undergo a frisk search beyond what is currently empowered under section 95B. The ICAO led this initiative after an attempted terrorist incident on 10 August 2006 in the United Kingdom. On that day, security services interrupted an attack involving planned attacks against aviation targets. Analysis of the failed plot revealed an enduring vulnerability in the technical capacity of aviation security screening points with respect to liquid explosives detection.

Security officials at the UK’s Department for Transport said on 24 August that the alleged plot at Heathrow Airport to blow up several US bound planes on 10 August had exposed gaps in the ability of scanning machines to distinguish between ordinary liquids and those that could be used as a bomb. The identified danger has since prompted the United States, Canada and the EU to introduce restrictions on the amount of liquids, aerosols and gels that can be carried on board international outbound and domestic flights.

The International Civil Aviation Organisation, a UN specialised agency, is the global forum for civil aviation. ICAO works to achieve its vision of safe, secure and sustainable development of civil aviation through cooperation among its member states. On 22 November 2006, ICAO considered the report of the 18th meeting of the aviation security panel and agreed that security control guidelines for screening liquids, gels, aerosols and the like should be recommended to states for their implementation no later than 1 March 2007. ICAO journal No. 6 of 2006 says:

In the wake of the planned terrorist plot to sabotage several airliners over the North Atlantic, unveiled by U.K. authorities in mid-August 2006, ICAO has developed security guidelines for screening liquids, gels and aerosol products to be carried in the passenger cabin, and the ICAO Council has recommended that member States implement these guidelines no later than 1 March 2007.

You should remember that date: 1 March 2007. That was the declared compliance date for the ICAO recommendations. ICAO said ‘no later than 1 March’. The bill before the parliament today provides that these provisions will come into force no earlier than the end of March.

When the Howard government wants to fast-track legislation through this parliament, it certainly does not hesitate. In 2005, the government announced its intention to rush through the major antiterrorism bill in one day. It listed the bill for debate in this parliament in the House of Representatives on Melbourne Cup day of 2005. So it not only intended to restrict debate to one day but intended to have that debate on a day when most Australians would be focused on the Melbourne Cup—the day that Australia stops. The Howard government also announced a quickie Senate inquiry into that bill that was restricted to just a one-day hearing.

That was for a bill dealing with a raft of important antiterrorism matters that were complex and had serious issues of privacy and human rights involved. But the government were prepared to rush that through in a one-day debate in the House of Representatives on Melbourne Cup day and give the Senate just one day for a Senate inquiry. In the end, pressure from Labor forced a rethink. That was a very technical, detailed and sensitive piece of legislation. When the government want to act quickly to protect their own political hide, they certainly do it. When they need to act quickly to protect the travelling public, they move with the speed of a sloth.

I welcome this bill. The government’s delay in implementing the ICAO recommendations, though, is a case of serious jet lag. I understand that the threat posed by liquid explosives is real and serious. I also understand that we need affordable solutions to reduce or remove those dangers. On the Howard government’s watch, though, we have seen three drunken men breach security at Perth Airport, wander through the perimeter fence, walk across the tarmac and board a Qantas jet at the international terminal before they were identified and apprehended. More recently, in Sydney at our largest and busiest airport unauthorised vehicles tailgated one another through the boom gates and entered the runway area. Thankfully, they were not terrorists; they were a couple of people involved in an incident of road rage. But that identifies a major flaw in the security of our major airport.

Also at Sydney (Kingsford Smith) Airport, our largest airport, an area under development was secured by nothing more than a loose piece of timber sitting in the tracks on the public side of a sliding door. All someone had to do was lift up that loose piece of timber and the door would open and the person would then have access to the tarmac and the restricted area of the airport. The government, when we raised that in the parliament last year, tried to deny it—until we produced the pictures of the offending door that appeared in the Sydney newspaper. And members and the public will recall the famous ‘camel suit’ incident at Sydney airport in which staff of Qantas managed to help themselves to the baggage and parade around in the camel suit that had been in the luggage of one of the travelling public.

In yet another incident at Sydney airport, an unauthorised person with a backpack wandered across the tarmac until they were challenged not by security staff but by a baggage handler. Thankfully, the baggage handler had his own mobile phone with him. The baggage handler had to ring security to say that there was an unauthorised person with a backpack on wandering across the tarmac in a supposedly secure area. These events occurred last year. In fact, I have raised a long list of problems of this kind over the last 18 months, both inside this parliament and outside it.

Many airport dangers, like the tailgating problem to which I have referred, were also the subject of findings by Sir John Wheeler, the United Kingdom expert appointed by this government to review aviation security. It is difficult to understand how a government that was focused on the problems of aviation security could oversee a continuation of such basic errors. Indeed, we can ask why it took until 2005—four years after the September 11 disaster—for the government to seek a review of airport security. As I have asked in this place before, why is it that the Inspector of Transport Security was not able to do it? Why did we have to get someone from overseas in any event? Labor is yet to receive a rational response from the government on that issue and the others that we have raised. Of particular concern to me, though, has been the failure to scan passengers and cabin baggage on regular flights from regional centres to major airports—also a weakness identified by Sir John Wheeler. Two such examples of dangers from regional aviation were raised in this parliament last year.

Passengers in Ballina and Dubbo are not screened with any metal detectors before entering the tarmac and boarding the aircraft—unless it is a jet—even though their flight is a direct flight to Australia’s largest airport, Sydney airport. In 2006 I tabled photographs showing that secure areas at Ballina airport were left open and unguarded whilst the passenger and baggage screening area was closed. At Dubbo airport photos showed an old farm gate that was part of the security fence, which had been left open and unguarded, giving not just pedestrian access but vehicle access to the runway for anyone who wanted to take it. And Dubbo airport is a major regional airport that has regular flights directly to Sydney.

We have the absurd situation where the government’s aviation regulations actually prevent hand-held metal detectors being used at many regional airports, even if they have the equipment and they want to use it. We have the absurd situation where taxpayers’ funds have quite sensibly provided many regional airports with hand-held metal detectors—the wands that we are all familiar with—with staff at those airports trained in their use, but the government has in place a regulation that prohibits their use. That makes it unlawful for the people in those airports to actually use those hand-held detectors and check passengers before they get on the plane. So these hand-held wands literally sit in cupboards in airports, locked away—unable to be used because, having been bought by the taxpayer, having been paid for by the government and the taxpayer, the government has then put in place a regulation that says staff are not allowed to use them unless they get a specific instruction from the department to use the things. That would be like closing the gate after the horse has bolted, because the explanation the government has given is that they would only use them in a period of high risk. That is fine, but that is after the event has happened! What a stupid, absurd position that the government has followed in relation to that screening procedure.

The failure to screen passengers at those regional airports has caused problems in recent times. A failure of those procedures following a flight from Wagga Wagga to Sydney at the very end of 2006 resulted in part of Sydney airport being evacuated so that everyone could be properly screened again. But still the government fiddle at the edges whilst failing to address the real dangers. The Howard government’s indifference and lack of competence has placed travellers at an increased risk. The Wheeler review is clear about this. It says:

... in the current environment, consideration should be given to more comprehensive security control over regional flight passengers when arriving at major airports such as Sydney because of the risk to larger aircraft and facilities when passengers disembark at the apron.

The Wheeler report also said:

... the Review noted the vulnerability of current arrangements as they relate to  unscreened passengers on some regional regular public transport aircraft arriving at major airports such as Sydney and Melbourne with access to the apron and parked jet aircraft prior to screening.

The government have been warned by their own expert that they brought over here from the UK, they have been warned by Labor for years about this problem—and yet they fail to act to ensure that passengers involved in flights directly to our major capital city airports and our major counterterrorism first-response airports have any screening done whatsoever. The simple truth is that anybody could hop onto one of those aircraft with a weapon, with a bomb, and they would never be checked. They would never be screened. And when they hopped off in the secure side of Sydney airport they would then present a serious danger. Sir John Wheeler knew that. He made reference to it in a couple of places in his report. And here we are, a couple of years later and still the government fail to do anything about it. The public are entitled to ask why these basic mistakes continue to occur five years after 9-11 and a year after the Heathrow incident. Is this really the aviation security system that Australia needs and deserves?

After the 2006 Heathrow incident Michael Chertoff, the US Department of Homeland Security chief, said the plot had the hallmarks of an operation planned by al-Qaeda, the terrorist group behind the September 11 attacks in the United States. He said:

We believe that these arrests (in London) have significantly disrupted the threat, but we cannot be sure that the threat has been entirely eliminated or the plot completely thwarted ...

I know that the government want to talk tough about aviation security, but the truth is that they are flapping wildly away on airport runways and taking far too long to do far too little. It is all show and no result, as with so many things—as with the bill that was just before the parliament and the comments I made in relation to that. We see a government that readily wraps itself in the flag, ministers who seek every opportunity to have a photo shoot with members of the Australian Defence Force around them and government machinery that tries to put a political spin on issues of national security for their political benefit, when in fact the basic security decisions that need to be taken by the government to protect the Australian travelling public have been overlooked. Those decisions have been overlooked in an environment in which it is not just the Labor Party that has been raising concerns about these matters, and not just the industry that has been raising concerns about these matters; the government’s own expert, Sir John Wheeler, has told them that they need to take action, and yet they continue to fail to take that action.

Labor supports this bill because it goes some way to improving security and it is in line with the ICAO recommendations arising from the incident in London, to which I referred, involving liquid explosives. But the government’s record in these areas is appalling. For those reasons I move:

That all words after “That” be omitted with a view to substituting the following words: “whilst not declining to give the bill a second reading, the House condemns the Government for its failure to provide necessary air-security and protect Australians, including:

(1)

failure to meet the implementation timelines for counter-terrorism protections against liquid explosives as recommended by the International Civil Aviation Organisation;

(2)

mismanagement of the Aviation Security Identification Card (ASIC) system;

(3)

failure to properly upgrade security at regional airports;

(4)

failure to establish adequate security measures for charter flights; and

(5)

the Government’s insistence on splitting security, intelligence and border protection functions over a number of departments inviting overlap, wastage, confusion and missed opportunities”.

Alex Somlyay (Fairfax, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Is the amendment seconded?

Robert McClelland (Barton, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I second the amendment and reserve my right to speak.

Arch Bevis (Brisbane, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Homeland Security) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I just wish in conclusion to make a couple of comments about one aspect of that second reading amendment that I have not touched on so far, and that deals with the aviation security identification cards. These are the cards that people who work in the aviation industry are required to have as a security clearance. They involve extensive and invasive background searches by the Federal Police and ASIO of those individuals to ensure that they present no security threat. They work in sensitive and secure areas of the airports. The ASIC system is important; we on this side of the House support it. We supported its introduction; indeed we have called for improvements in the system on a number of occasions. The government, however, have not provided the management of this system that is necessary.

In the short time in which those aviation security cards have been in operation, there have been somewhere in the order of 12,000 to 14,000 cards issued. In that short time the government have administered a system in which about 400 of those cards have been lost—unaccounted for. These are high-security cards. These are cards that allow people access to the most sensitive areas of our airports, and in the first two years that the system has been operating they have already lost 400 cards. It makes one wonder what is going to happen with this national access card that the parliament dealt with earlier today. If they lost 400 high-security cards, imagine what is going to happen to 15 million access cards. Anyone who thinks that access card is somehow going to reduce identity theft needs to have a look at this government’s mismanagement of these matters.

The fact is that 400 of these high-security aviation industry cards cannot be accounted for. Four hundred out of about 12,000: that is a pretty ordinary record. I have raised this in the parliament before, and I see ministers who have got up at the dispatch box and said: ‘Well, people lose things. People lose their drivers licences. Members of parliament might even lose their IDs.’ Those things are true; of course people lose things. But we are not talking here about losing your drivers licence or your MasterCard. We are talking here about losing a document that is the subject of quite extensive security clearances. Frankly, you do not have a security check to get a drivers licence. Your drivers licence is not a security clearance card, and the ASIC is. Pretending that we do not need to worry about 400 lost ASICs because people lose cards like that is an indication of the total arrogance and lack of interest in the security mechanisms at our airports. For a minister, as has happened on a number of occasions, to stand at this dispatch box in reply to my concerns about this with those comments is damning of their own either ignorance of the situation or arrogance.

Frankly, the government’s management of aviation security has not been up to standard. The government should spend more time getting the practical measures right and less time worrying about the political spin: less time wrapping the flag around itself, less time getting photo opportunities with our defence personnel and more time doing the things that make Australians safer.

This bill is a good bill, and it will assist in ensuring that those who travel on international flights can travel with a greater degree of safety. It will involve people undergoing pat-down searches. The bill provides that they will be voluntary. Of course, if you refuse to undergo a pat-down search it is very likely you will be refused entry to the plane. But in the current situation, where we do not have reliable technologies to identify liquid explosives, this is a prudent and proper course to be followed. But here again the government have simply not matched their political spin with reality. The political spin they would have Australians believe is that they are on top of these issues and doing a good job. The reality is the International Civil Aviation Organisation said to all of the member countries: you need to have these in place no later than 1 March. We will not have these laws in place; the government do not intend them to operate before 31 March at the earliest, and it may in fact be later than that. But the earliest these will operate is 31 March.

The Australian travelling public are going to be exposed to a risk for the month of March, and perhaps longer, that they should not be. For at least one month, the Australian aviation industry will not be applying the standards which the International Civil Aviation Organisation recommended. We should have world’s best practice in these matters. This is a wealthy country with a well-developed aviation industry. We should not be dragging the chain; we should not be following other nations with these matters. We should be out there in the forefront, providing the best security that is available. Frankly we have not, as a nation.

This government has not administered this area well, and even in this small matter being dealt with by this bill it still could not get its act together to implement these safety procedures in line with the International Civil Aviation Organisation’s recommendations. The government deserve to be condemned for their failures in those areas set out in the second reading amendment. That said, the bill is an improvement on the laws and we will support it.

Dennis Jensen (Tangney, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to support the Aviation Transport Security Amendment (Additional Screening Measures) Bill 2007. The Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Transport and Regional Services has already outlined the basic reasons for the unfortunate necessity of this bill. Before discussing the merits of this legislation itself, I would just for a brief moment like to set the scene, to illustrate why these measures are necessary. First of all, like it or not, we are currently engaged in a war against a very real enemy: the terrorist. This enemy, either because of twisted ideologies or pure unadulterated hate, especially for the West and all it represents, has been clearly exposed as prepared to go to any length to further its destructive agenda. Unfortunately, unlike that celebrated terrorist attempt under the Houses of Parliament in London in 1605, the mechanisms for carnage and destruction today are somewhat more difficult to spot than a large stack of wooden kegs full of dynamite.

In the last hundred years, the nature of one’s enemy has changed even more dramatically. We have seen the creation of groups like the Irish Republican Army, the Baader-Meinhof gang, the Japanese Red Army and various groups associated with anti-Israeli or anti-United States agendas. Some of these groups are fortunately fairly transitory and small, but one or two successful plots can cause damage, destruction and heartbreak for many families. Perhaps, had there been tougher screening processes in place nearly 20 years ago, Pan Am flight 103 might have continued safely on its journey instead of exploding in midair near Lockerbie in Scotland. All 259 people on board and 11 people on the ground died. That awful event remains Britain’s largest mass murder. There were explosives on the plane and the rest is a tragic entry in our history books.

Until this century, terrorist acts were considered to happen ‘over there’—mainly in Europe and with the odd instance in Asia. Bali changed all that. Beautiful Bali, whose name, immortalised by Rodgers and Hammerstein, conjured up lovely beaches, lush tropical scenery and happy, smiling Balinese people, suddenly became shorthand for the terrible day in October 2002 when terrorism hit Australians. Australians were clearly the target; thus this was a deliberate act of violence against Australia and Australians. We had joined the growing list of countries to become terrorist targets.

We only have to look at the London Underground bombings to realise that terrorists can now be home grown. Therefore, the logical conclusion is that it is not unthinkable that someone—even a resident of this country—could attempt to board a plane to commit a terrorist act. We have also entered the era of a whole new type of terrorist group. Previously they had been fairly localised and/or small in number. Their very extreme nature—limited resources, localised aims and cruel and callous acts—has also served to limit the size of these groups. Now, however, we are seeing terrorism typified by Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda become a global threat. They have a very clear world view, ideology and agenda. They have very clear objectives. They are also extremely well funded and have a potential recruiting base of millions of young people.

The Middle East, especially Iraq and Afghanistan, is the real front line of the war on terror. With Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan, the world watched two state based terrorist regimes. The focus of al-Qaeda and other similar organisations is, by necessity, Iraq and Afghanistan. This has the benefit of keeping the front line off Australian soil. The bloodshed in Iraq today is largely occurring despite, and not because of, the presence of coalition forces. This is a battle between Iraqis who have had their first taste of freedom and democracy and those fundamentalists who want to deny them the freedom we so often take for granted.

The terrorist attacks elsewhere in the world are illustrations of the terrorists’ determination to try to scare decent, freedom-loving countries such as the United States, Great Britain, Australia, Japan and others from helping Iraq forge a new destiny. You can never appease terrorists; you fight or you lose. There will be no ‘peace in our time’ delusions and no imagining that we can walk away and stay safe. It worked in Spain. If you kill some people, the politicians will cave in. Not here, not this government, not this Prime Minister.

Moving to the specifics of the bill, it is necessary to tighten screening requirements for liquids, aerosols and gels because of the events in the United Kingdom in August 2006. The UK police arrested a number of persons who were planning to smuggle improvised explosive devices onto aircraft using liquid explosives disguised in drink bottles. We have already seen apparently well-planned attempts to use various substances, such as liquids, aerosols and gels, in terror attacks. This threat is real, and had it not been for the efforts of law enforcement agencies in the United Kingdom we would be counting bodies instead of our blessings.

The use of these substances presents a whole new array of problems for agencies charged with the task of detection of dangerous substances and those dedicated to the protection of the general public. The enhanced screening measures for liquids, aerosols and gels are consistent with measures adopted by the United States, Canada and the European Union. Therefore, although Australia, along with those countries and entities I have just mentioned, is at the forefront of the fight against terrorism, there is an international campaign to ensure that air travel is safe as is humanly possible.

There is a broad agreement to support the measures proposed by the federal government. There are only two small amendments that are necessary to the ATSA. The first widens the power to write regulations under the ATSA to be sure that the regulations can address liquids, aerosols and gels. At present, there are regulations which broadly cover those and other substances, but the government wants to make it quite clear that these materials are indeed included. The second amendment writes in a general capacity to allow screening officers to ask passengers to agree to random and continuous frisk searches to supplement the enhanced screening regime. This amendment is necessary to assist screening officers to ascertain the possession of dangerous substances. More importantly, it will give the airline officials the ability to use refusal to permit a search as a valid reason for not permitting a person to travel on the aircraft.

The amendments to the ATSA will be followed by amendments to the Aviation Transport Security Regulations 2005 to set out the detail of liquids, aerosols and gels. The core feature of the liquids, aerosols and gels measures is a restriction on the maximum container size that can be carried through an international screening point. The maximum container size is 100 millilitres, which is roughly equivalent to 100 grams. All containers presented for inspection must fit comfortably within a one-litre transparent resealable plastic bag.

There is a limit of one bag per passenger. This bag is to be presented to the screener for visual inspection. The bag will also be X-rayed. There will be exemptions for items such as baby products and medical necessities for use during the flight. The amendments respond to the vulnerability highlighted by the UK terror plot to use liquid explosives on board aircraft. They are part of the Australian government’s ongoing commitment to securing the aviation industry and keeping the travelling public safe.

As I have already observed, these measures are not excessive or draconian. They are consistent with similar restrictions introduced in the United States, Canada and the EU. Industry has been consulted in the development of the proposal and broadly acknowledges the need to deal with the vulnerability caused by liquids, aerosols and gels. The Australian government is making every effort to engage and advise industry groups, such as the airline industry and the travel agent industry, so that passengers can be advised of the changed requirements before they arrive at airports. Initial implementation of the new requirements may cause some difficulty and potential delays for passengers on inbound and outbound international flights.

The fact that the restrictions apply to carrying apparently safe items like bottled water through a screening point makes the restrictions seem unnecessary. Being an island nation, our aviation services and centres assume even greater importance than those of countries in a less isolated geographic position. What this bill seeks to do is to enhance the ability of Australian agencies to detect such substances when they are being taken through aviation centres in Australia. On 8 September, the Prime Minister said that, as is the case in the United Kingdom, ‘the focus of preventative detention is primarily about stopping further attacks and the destruction of evidence’.

By the very nature of the offences we are trying to prevent, ascertaining the success of such measures is difficult because when they are successful things do not happen. But these measures are putting another brick in the wall of counterterrorism. This measure on its own will not stop the terrorists. But, added to the other measures introduced by the Howard government since the appalling international watershed of September 11, these amendments can make it just a bit easier for our officers to protect us and just that much more difficult for those with malevolent intent to harm us.

I would like to add that I am sure that members opposite will agree to these amendments, which are only being proposed in order to protect the lives of Australians and visitors to our shores. There will of course be the usual suspects who will wring their hands about civil liberties. I agree that protecting standard civil liberties is very important—up to a point. But I hold that our greatest and most important civil liberty is the right to live. When others are deliberately trying to take away this most basic of all liberties we need to take whatever effective measures we can to protect our citizens.

I have also heard the term ‘scare campaign’ being bandied about over some of this government’s actions. I remind all members that this is no smart, slick, spin-doctoring exercise. This is not making some ill-founded or baseless prediction about something which will probably never happen, such as the non-existent mass sackings under Work Choices which were predicted by the ACTU. This is about preventing the deaths of more Australians and others at the hands of callous mass murderers. I support this bill.

Michael Hatton (Blaxland, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I am happy to follow the member for Tangney. He gave a very considered speech. The first part of his speech dealt with the broad situation in regard to Iraq and Afghanistan and the problems of terrorism generally. The latter part of his speech dealt with the particularities of this bill and the necessary situation we face as a result of potentially one of the most enormous attacks on people travelling by air—a series of attacks that, if they had come off, would have had a greater impact than what we saw on 11 September 2001.

Equally, I am happy to follow the shadow minister and support every single one of Labor’s amendments to this bill. I say at the start that we support the two specific provisions of the bill but there are key questions to ask about how the government has gone about this.

I just do not understand this mob sometimes and why they make decisions in the way they do. If you have a look at the second reading speech by the member for Dawson on the Aviation Transport Security Amendment (Additional Screening Measures) Bill 2007 and compare it to the explanatory memorandum you find an interesting difference. The first two paragraphs are fundamentally the same, but I would like to know, from whoever is going to make a response to this, why we have a government which, when they put this bill forward, say in the explanatory memorandum:

The International Civil Aviation Organization recommends the introduction of security control guidelines for member countries, by 1 March 2007. The Australian Government has taken the decision to introduce these measures for international inbound and outbound flights from 31 March 2007.

As far as I know, everyone in the world has complied with the 1 March 2007 deadline. As the shadow minister said in his speech, there will be one month more of insecurity for Australians. Why leave a window of opportunity for terrorists in the year in which we are hosting APEC, the biggest set of meetings for the Asia-Pacific that one can imagine? Those meetings are not just held in September when the 35 leaders roll up and have the summit at the end of that APEC process; in the month beforehand, ministers, ministerial officials and departmental officials will meet to prepare for that summit. In fact the process has already started. We have already had meetings in Perth. There have been Comcar drivers going over there from here to undertake work. They will be doing that all over Australia. Australia is the centrepiece of the Asia-Pacific this year. So in the war on terror—and we have just dealt with the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Amendment Bill—we have had to wait five years for the government to bring these matters to the parliament. That delay is utterly unconscionable.

If you look at the member for Dawson’s contribution, you see that she does not actually make the point that it was recommended for 1 March 2007. She says instead that on 8 December the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Transport and Regional Services announced that from 31 March there would be enhanced security measures to limit the amount of liquids, aerosols and gels that can be taken through an international screening point by people who are flying to or from Australia. Why is there that difference of a month? It is unimaginable. The airline business is international in scope, and Australia is entirely dependent upon it. You have a network that in fact works together.

In the aborted attempt by terrorists, and there were up to 50 of them, to use liquids and gels to blow up a whole series of intercontinental aircraft from a series of American providers—US Airways, American Airlines and Continental Airlines—we know that action was immediately taken by the homeland security chief of the United States. We know that, despite the fact that the President was on vacation, the US acted. We know that, despite the fact that Prime Minister Blair was on vacation, the plot was foiled because of fundamental antiterrorist work in the United Kingdom of the highest order and quality. We know that they tracked up to 50 people, some in the area of High Wycombe. They were not yet on planes; they were at the point where they were moving towards the execution point for this plot.

The government entities moved quickly. They still could not be sure, even after they had arrested people and put them into secure circumstances to interrogate them, that they had got everyone because the number of people involved was substantial. The British acted. There was complete and utter chaos at Heathrow. There was chaos in the United States, in Singapore and worldwide. I thought, ‘Why aren’t we taking the same sorts of measures here in Australia on our inbound and outbound flights at the same time?’ We can only guess that they made their minds up and said, ‘Well, they were headed from Britain to the United States so they wouldn’t have been planning anything here, would they, so we really don’t need to worry too much.’ You have to ask: why have Australians been put at risk through all that period of time? Is it because they think they nabbed everyone in one quick go?

We know that in 1995 or so Ramzi Yousef had a go at blowing up a plane. He had some liquid on him. He attempted to blow up a plane. He was nabbed and taken into custody. So there was a bit of a trial run there. Then there was the case of Richard Reid the shoe bomber. After the al-Qaeda attacks on September 11, Richard Reid was grabbed on a flight—I think it was a flight out of Manchester, from memory; I could be entirely wrong, that is not novel—bound for the US. People grabbed him because he had a lighter and was down at his feet trying to light his shoes. He was going to not only blow his feet off but also blow the bottom out of the aeroplane. He was taken into custody. He had come from a mosque in London that was a haven for people—as we have certain havens here in Australia—with a fundamentalist bent. These people are hell-bent upon destroying not only the West as we know it but also the Islamic countries as we know them in order to set up an older version of what life should be like—fundamentally a medieval approach to what the world should be like: a caliphate. They want to do that in the Asia-Pacific. One of the methods they use is blowing up planes. We know that in the Lockerbie incident there were plastic explosives hidden in a transistor radio. That destroyed the lives of hundreds of people. It did immense damage to families across the world.

So what are we faced with here? As the member for Tangney pointed out quite rightly, and I think he understands this better than the Prime Minister does, the war in Afghanistan is absolutely fundamental. This government has taken its eye off the war in Afghanistan. In fact it cut and ran from Afghanistan and left Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda and the Taliban to rebuild their capacity on the border with Pakistan with the tribal groups that have supported those terrorist organisations and to build back up towards the Taliban taking control again. The southern regions are extraordinarily difficult to monitor. The Australian soldiers who are there now, and the Australian soldiers going into Afghanistan, have a much harder job because of the excursion that the Bush administration took to Iraq—and he took the British and the Australians with him in that excursion. That is the dumbest thing I can ever imagine anyone doing. There was zero understanding shown of the creation of Iraq in 1924 from disparate elements, which would naturally shatter and fragment once you took the stopper out of the top of the bottle. Since then we have faced a situation of civil strife and civil war. That has endangered not only Iraqis but also our troops who are there.

The concentration on Iraq, whether it was for oil, for HallHalliburton getting control of the contracts or for whatever reason—at least the Yanks had five declared reasons; this mob over here, the coalition government, had one—was dead wrong. In 1991-92, sure, Saddam had a lot. In, I think, the greatest con job in modern history, for 12 years he convinced everyone that he had the big show—the chest punched out and the gorilla beating the chest—that, yes, he had all these sorts of things. How poor was our intelligence with regard to that? How appallingly bad is our understanding of that region? Well, maybe it is not ours. Maybe it is the US administration. Maybe it is their blinkered view. Maybe it is this government and this Prime Minister and his cabinet who just do not understand the Middle East and do not fundamentally understand what drives terrorists. I hope that ASIS, ASIO and the Federal Police have a better handle on it than this mob.

There are measures involved here with regard to aerosols and other carry-ons. We still remember the transparent bags people had at Heathrow, not just the lines. For some people, the worst thing they faced was the fact that their personal computer was in the back of the plane or their iPod was gone for eight hours. People could not even take a book on board. But the danger was so clear and present that extraordinary measures had to be taken. What is most instructive about this was the scale of the activity—dozens of people, if not up to 50 or so and possibly more, prepared to undertake their journeys on a series of flights. It was not one person wandering on board, like Richard Reid with his shoelaces ready to go, and it was not like Ramzi Yousef. This was a coordinated attempt to put a number of different people on a plane in different places. One person would have an aerosol, another person would have a gel and another person would have a computer or an iPod. The actual weaponry to destroy the plane would be dispersed across the plane, and it would be brought into effect only by the combination of those items when people got together on the plane. Then they would be able to obliterate everyone on the plane.

The fundamental thing we need to understand is the amoeba-like changes that will affect us in terms of national security and antiterrorism. What the terrorists have done before they will not do again—at least not in the time frame we expect. Part of the enormous problem our security agencies have is that we have to cover the entire field, and that is extraordinarily difficult. That is where we need the cooperation of every person in the travelling public. I know that a lot of people will not like that aspect of this bill and the idea that people could get frisked. The member for Tangney talked about random frisking on a continuous basis. I think that is a bit over the top. If you look at the bill you will see that if an officer is of the opinion that, after initial screening, someone needs to be frisked then there are a series of provisions in the bill, and we can support these because they go to sensibly dealing with this situation. Firstly, the officer would have to have the apprehension that there is something that is very wrong and, secondly, the permission of the person to be frisked would have to be sought, and if that is not given then they would not get the go-ahead. Proper protocols would have to be undertaken. Whether or not it is a bit over the top, people do not like the idea of that being in the bill, and they certainly do not like the idea of being impelled to do things in a dramatically different way. But, if their life depends on it, people will make these changes and they will be more willing than they otherwise would be because of what we saw on September 11: the enormous carnage of people who were entirely innocent. The victims of these fundamentalist terrorists are just that: innocent, voiceless victims. We have to never forget that fact when we are dealing with this problem.

We also have to understand what drives these terrorists. We have to cut off, as the shadow minister and I did in the last debate, money laundering and the ability to shoot funds from one end of the world to the other. It has taken five long, full years to bring that into this place, which is extraordinarily dilatory and extraordinarily dangerous for the Australian people. This legislation is quick compared with what they did with that. But we need to be aware of this as well: as these changes are made, and the disparate materials that could be used are identified, we need a better, upgraded screening process—and that has been hard enough to achieve over time. As the shadow minister and others have pointed out—we have two shadow ministers here: the member for Batman and the member for Brisbane—our regional airports still do not have adequate screening, and that is dealt with in this amendment.

We have the farce of the 400 missing aviation security cards, the very basis of the new regime for trying to ensure that people working at our airports and ports are the people who they say they are. You do not readily accept that these things will go missing. It is not like forgetting your Medicare card when you left it to make a claim, or your licence or a series of other relatively unimportant things; they are important enough, because someone can nick your identity. But when you are going to Sydney (Kingsford Smith) Airport you want to be assured, given what we know has happened before, that everybody in that joint has been through the screening process and that security officers know who they are. As I have pointed out time and time again, this government cannot be sure of that, because it has allowed private security operators in. It is like taking a head rent: you lease and sublease and sublease under that. With whoever has the security contract, the people they finally employ are way down the track, and we have no certainty about who the casuals are who work for them. That is a glaring security hole that has to be fixed, and it has not been done. There is an easy way to fix it: sack all the private security people and put Commonwealth government employees into our airports and ports to secure Australia’s national interest.

A government that were not just concerned about benchmarking and auditing—and they do not even do that very well, I have to say, on looking at the previous bill that I spoke on and this one. We need to be as sure as the Americans are that the people who are working in and securing these places can be relied upon as much as they can, that their identities are secure and that they are directed towards helping their fellow citizens. So it is vitally important that this is gone about in the right way. That is why Labor’s amendments are forceful and strong.

The implementation of civil aviation safety is enormously important. We still have not fixed the regional airports. Bankstown Airport, which is close to KSA and close to the CBD, is still not secured strongly enough. We know not only that the September 11 people got a run at this in terms of doing their training at GA airports like Bankstown but that you can pick up an aircraft there and fly it into any building you want to relatively easily. We need to do a hell of a lot more there because of its proximity.

We also need to be aware that we have to be flexible and fleet-footed, and we have to rely very strongly on the Australian community at large, particularly those elements of the community in which people have their ear to the ground. They are close to the people who are potentially our home-grown terrorists—as were the terrorists in the United Kingdom. That plot was about people who were home-grown, people who had grown up in Britain, people whom they should not otherwise have suspected. They were from a different background to others who had been previously involved.

Our fundamental security rests upon the willingness of an engaged citizenry to protect themselves. That goes to the very core of the Muslim community in Australia. The vast majority of those people want to do exactly that because they know that they will be under attack or they will be under pressure unless they help other Australians to secure themselves. They want their families to be secure when they travel. We need people, particularly those from other language backgrounds and with access to the community, to be our eyes and ears.

We all need to do this. Whatever has been done in the past, terrorists will try a whole range of other things. We need to have our intelligence feelers out and to have them as strong as possible. That is a measure that should be introduced on 1 March 2007. We should not have one extra month of uncertainty, delay and insecurity in 2007, which is the year of APEC. That is dumb. It is another example of the government quixotically doing something. We do not even understand why. Let them answer now. Let the parliamentary secretary tell us, after the member for Batman has finished, why the government has imperilled the community for another month. (Time expired)

Martin Ferguson (Batman, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Transport, Roads and Tourism) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I am pleased to be able to speak in support of the Aviation Transport Security Amendment (Additional Screening Measures) Bill 2007. This bill will strengthen Australia’s national security and in doing so enhance, as the member for Blaxland said, the protection of Australian travellers and workers within the air services industry. We should not forget in debating these issues that a number of us travel frequently, but the people most exposed are the workers in the industry. It is therefore very important from a health and safety point of view that we attend to these issues on a regular and rigorous basis, because those people will potentially be putting their lives on the line every day of the week if we do not get this security regime right.

When you think about it, air travel in years gone by was seen as a glamorous pastime reserved for the rich and famous. The only fear associated with flying then was about coming to grips with the gravity-defying suspension of a metal projectile several kilometres above the earth. How times have changed. This debate signifies just that, and what a great challenge we have as a global community. The fear associated with flying has been redefined in the 21st century as the global community comes to terms with the threat of terrorism that, in the six years since September 11, has changed all our lives for the worse. It has manifested itself in congestion, longer waits, closer scrutiny and screenings that any passenger on both domestic and international travel finds themselves subjected to if they want to travel by air. We all have to appreciate that we have to put up with this and be patient with the workers who have responsibility for carrying out these vital duties. Unfortunately, sometimes when you go through airports some passengers are not sufficiently patient about what is a very difficult task. It is about time some of them learned to respect the difficult job being carried out by ordinary workers in trying to secure our safety in the air.

I say that because the threat is not imaginary, and that is what this debate is about. Unfortunately for the global community, terrorist networks continue to have an active interest in undermining aviation. This week, for instance, Australia’s top transport bureaucrat revealed that the terror threat to the aviation sector was high and that an attack would devastate the economy, with the potential to wipe out $30.1 billion from our economy over two years. So it is not just a threat to our own security as human beings; it is also a threat to our economic prosperity as a nation. Just think about potentially wiping out $30.1 billion from the economy over two years. That would equate to a loss of two per cent of Australia’s GDP and 146,000 jobs if terrorists were successful in destroying an Australian airliner. This bill, the Aviation Transport Security Amendment (Additional Screening Measures) Bill 2007, appropriately seeks to enhance airport security and ultimately goes some way to trying to stem this growing global concern, a growing global threat to our own security as human beings.

The bill results from the thwarted terrorist attack at the United Kingdom’s Heathrow Airport on 10 August 2006. Security officials at the United Kingdom’s Department for Transport revealed on the arrest of 21 main suspects in the planned attack that, if carried out, the plot would have committed mass murder on an unimaginable scale. That was the objective: mass murder on an unimaginable scale. The planned attack was sophisticated and international in its scope and is thought to have involved up to 50 people. It also revealed a key weakness in the world’s airport security, with the terrorists planning to use liquid explosive disguised as beverages and other common products and detonators disguised as electronic devices. The liquids and the devices would have been assembled airside, having been taken through passenger and cabin baggage security, and then the explosions would have detonated aboard the trans-Atlantic aircraft whilst in flight.

The cunningness of the plot is frightening. It involved comprehensive planning and understanding of the air security processes and, unfortunately, an extensive network of willing participants. Perhaps what is most worrisome is that, whilst this particular terror threat originated out of the thwarted United Kingdom attack, the framework and mode of operation governing its design was not home-grown by those apprehended; the vast majority of those arrested in the United Kingdom were of Pakistani origin, which means that the threat is by no means confined to the United Kingdom or even Europe.

An attack similar to that thwarted by the United Kingdom’s security services in August could be mounted any time in the world, and this poses very serious challenges to the global air community. That is why the opposition stands in support of this bill as a needed measure to deal with a threat that, while not conceived of even six years ago, has been brought about by the rapidly changing world in which we live.

The bill will enhance screening measures to limit the amount of liquids, aerosols and gels that can be taken through an international screening point by people flying to and from Australia. It also introduces a new section to allow an additional capacity for screening officers to ask travellers through a screening point to undergo a frisk search. These changes will come into effect on 30 March of this year and will apply to international travellers to and from Australia. It is a huge challenge for our community.

Last year we welcomed 5.5 million visitors, of whom incidentally 29 per cent arrived on Qantas planes alone, while 4.9 million residents departed Australia for an overseas holiday. This means it will potentially affect over 10 million air travellers, which is a significant number of people, and needs significant planning for successful implementation. In that context, I congratulate the airlines and the airport owners and the associated contract security companies for the practical and responsible manner in which they have conducted themselves in negotiations with the department to put these changes in place. It is a huge challenge to the industry and it also requires us, the travelling public, to work with the aviation industry to implement this successfully because there will be problems in the initial implementation.

The amendments conform to the recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organisation, ICAO, and have been adopted in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and the European Union. This bill will ensure that Australian screening procedures will harmonise our airport security regulations with the actions already being taken worldwide. It will obviously mean some disruption to passengers’ habits when travelling internationally, as they can now only carry on liquids in containers of no greater than 100 millilitres which are to be contained within a resealable plastic bag of maximum capacity not exceeding one litre. This requirement that liquids be stored in a transparent bag may seem an oddity; however, its benefit is that liquids will be easy to display and inspect and hence it will overcome, wherever possible, unnecessary delays at security points at airports.

The new regulations reflect the simple fact that present-day screening machines cannot distinguish one liquid from another quickly enough to allow for an efficient airport screening process. So, while it will be inconvenient for some passengers accustomed to taking on board their own beauty products, soft drinks, gels and deodorants, if the current regulations remained it would result in even lengthier disruptions and longer queues. It is a practical way forward.

The disruptions caused as passengers familiarise themselves with the new regulations are also anticipated to be minimal and will soon be seen as normal practice when completing airport security screening, just as we have adapted to all the other changes over the last five to 10 years. As a community, Australia continues to demonstrate its ability to adapt for the right reasons to new situations, and Australian travellers have matured as a travelling public to one that now accepts that increased security measures are in the best interests of everyone’s safety. Overseas experience in the EU, the United Kingdom and the US show that the regulations can be adopted relatively easily with careful planning and good consumer education. The planning and community education component of the new guidelines will be critical if they are going to prove successful at keeping delays to a minimum while also delivering improved security.

Remember: this is not going to be easy, because the effects of this bill potentially impact on over 10 million people. For that reason this week I welcomed the minister for transport’s announcement that 1,900 security screeners will start training in threats to air security from liquid explosives. This is a new challenge to the workers engaged at the coalface in carrying out and accepting these additional responsibilities. They are not ordinary security guards operating at a hotel in the city or a bank in the suburbs; these people have huge responsibilities and they should be respected and paid accordingly. The four-hour training will hopefully ensure smooth airport security processing of passengers post-31 March 2007. Additional staff will also be present at airports on the day of introduction to help ease any delays, and the Federal Police have been given briefings on liquid bombs.

This preparation within the industry, and the community education, hopefully will help avoid the chaotic scenes of Heathrow immediately after the August 2006 thwarted attack that saw thousands of holiday-makers facing severe delays with massive queues snaking through airport terminals. I also welcome the commitment demonstrated by airlines—and they have spoken to me about this—in willingly adopting new security measures that will increase their workload and heighten the responsibility of care for passengers.

The issue of terrorism has placed huge and additional responsibilities on airlines and airport owners. The nature of airline travel has changed radically not only for passengers but also for airlines with respect to how they operate and the responsibilities of their staff. And remember this: it is the staff who will have to accept responsibility for implementing these new regulations. In recent years, by way of example, Qantas have invested over $260 million in increased air security measures to close down loopholes that could have posed possible terrorist threats. As the Wheeler report noted, security at our airports pre-September 11 was at times dysfunctional, lax and impeded by a lack of effective policing. We have come a long way since then, but we must always remain vigilant to overcome any weaknesses in the system.

It is therefore of continuing concern to the opposition—and we have continually raised this since September 11—that the screening of luggage at regional airports is inconsistent. Late last year more than 67,000 regional flights were unchecked in Australia. That is a huge loophole. These are serious issues, Mr Deputy Speaker Quick, as you know as a Tasmanian. You only have to go to Burnie to see this gaping hole in aviation security. I believe that people flying out of these regional airports are not provided with the necessary air travel protection, and it is about time the government got serious about doing something to close this loophole.

Community education on the new regulations is just as imperative. The rollout of the department’s marketing campaign must occur as scheduled because, let’s face it, 31 March is not far away. As a frequent traveller, I often speak with other passengers and I am acutely aware that the community’s understanding of the new regulations is currently far from adequate. The great majority of Australians would have no understanding of the complexities of the bill before the House today.

The government have advised the opposition that brochures will be sent to travel agents, airlines and airports. I only hope that this is enough. It is their responsibility to make sure not only that they put legislation in place but also that the workers undertaking the duties are adequately trained in partnership with the airline industry, airports and security companies. The government need to go that one step further and educate the travelling public about the inconvenience that will be caused by these necessary regulations. I say that because there is a lot of community confusion out there about duty-free items in particular. I urge the government to ensure that a community education campaign clarifies how the new regulations will impact on duty-free purchases.

Some people are unaware that they can purchase duty-free goods such as spirits, perfumes and beauty care products once they have cleared security. Items purchased beyond the screening points are subject to separate security controls and are deemed safe for passengers to take on board only when they are disembarking from the plane they have boarded as their final destination—that is, they do not have any connecting new flights. If they are travelling to a new destination on a new plane, they are required to clear security again, when any duty-free products may be confiscated. For example, if I were flying to Los Angeles from Sydney or Melbourne, and LA was my final destination, then I could purchase duty-free items; however, if I were connecting to a domestic American flight, I would not be able to do so.

These issues have been raised with me by the airline industry. We have to make sure that the travelling public is aware of these difficulties or there will be major concerns when people have purchased such duty-free products. Obviously there will be some exceptions to the new regulations—for example, mums needing milk for their babies or people with illnesses who require medication.

I welcome the department’s liaison with community groups on the implementation of the new regulations. In particular, the Cancer Council is keen to ensure that sick people are not discriminated against. The government has also indicated that investigations are underway on whether the new regulations will be applied to domestic flights. I understand from my frequent consultation with the industry that there is some concern with this proposal. Federal Labor will monitor this situation very carefully.

I say in conclusion that national security is a priority for the opposition, but it is not interested in unnecessarily burdening travellers in the air travel industry with regulations that do more to appease our notional fear than to improve security. It is about getting the right balance. As a party we are committed to optimising security and responding quickly to any new threat, yet the industry’s tolerance and ability to absorb the increasing list of regulations must be considered on the way through.

This brings me to a further criticism of the government in respect of this bill. The ICAO recommendations, adopted largely worldwide, stipulate the need for the new regulations to be brought into effect by 1 March—a date that will lapse tomorrow. There can be little doubt that the safety of air travellers and workers within the air travel industry, including flight attendants, pilots and crew, has been diminished with the emergence of this new threat. Planes have always been vulnerable terrorist targets and, whilst the resistance has been fortified, terrorists intent on causing harm and destruction will always think of another avenue of attack. That is why the government needs to respond quickly to this new threat and to not wait another month before implementing the necessary new regulations.

An ICAO letter to all member states, including Australia, highlighted that success for mitigating and eliminating all threats to civil aviation could be achieved only through the concerted effort of everyone concerned, in a close working relationship between the national agencies of member states, which includes Australia. Unfortunately, as reflected in the member for Brisbane’s second reading amendment, it seems from time to time that the government is suffering from jet lag on this front. For a government that supposedly prides itself on national security, this is an oddity. Could it be that, like so many other issues nationwide, the Howard government has grown tired from 11 years of government and it is unnecessarily potentially placing the Australian community at risk? The opposition simply say that Australia must pursue aviation security with the diligence it has shown in the past. We also ask that the Australian community have regard to the very serious issues covered in the opposition’s second reading amendment. This is not about debating and playing games with the government; it is about reminding the government that it must always be vigilant, that there are potential weaknesses in security at regional airports and we expect the government to fix these gaps. It is the government’s responsibility. We obviously would relish the opportunity to do it, because we think we can do a better job. I commend the bill to the House. (Time expired)

Greg Hunt (Flinders, Liberal Party, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Foreign Affairs) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

In rising to sum up on the Aviation Transport Security Amendment (Additional Screening Measures) Bill 2007, I want to commence by thanking members on both sides of the House for their comments and contributions to the debate on this bill. I respect the contributions made and, whilst respectfully disagreeing with some, I think the general proposition has been well argued.

Aviation security is a high priority for this government and is under constant review to ensure that the regulatory framework is responsive to changing threats to the Australian aviation industry. This bill makes amendments that are necessary to the Aviation Transport Security Act 2004 to better manage vulnerability in the technical capability of aviation security screening points with respect to liquid explosive detection. The aim of the proposed amendments is to enhance the screening measures to limit the amount of liquids, aerosols and gels that can be taken through a screening point by people flying to or from Australia.

The bill amends the power to write regulations under the act to cover liquids, aerosols and gels. As a necessary enhancement, the act is also amended to allow for appropriate frisk searches at screening points. The government has paid careful attention to the issues raised by the Australian aviation industry at consultative forums and is incorporating these comments into the implementation of the new restrictions. Overall, this bill facilitates screening for liquids, aerosols and gels. This is necessary to protect Australians and the Australian aviation industry. I commend the bill to the House.

Harry Quick (Franklin, Independent) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The original question was that this bill be now read a second time. To this the honourable member for Brisbane has moved as an amendment that all words after ‘That’ be omitted with a view to substituting other words. The question now is that the words proposed to be omitted stand part of the question.

Question agreed to.

Original question agreed to.

Bill read a second time.