Alan Griffin (Bruce, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Veterans' Affairs) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The Australian men and women who serve in our Defence Force are called upon to brave immense personal risk in the service of our national interest. This is something we should never take for granted. On 2 April 2005, Shark 02, a Sea King helicopter operating a humanitarian relief mission to the quake stricken Indonesian island of Nias, crashed into a football field and burst into flames. Nine brave Australian men and women died. As we approach the second anniversary of this horrific accident, we honour those who died and remember their sacrifice. It is also an opportunity to reflect on what justice has come of this tragedy and what lessons we should learn from it.

In response to the accident, a military board of inquiry was established in September 2005 to determine the cause of the accident. Its findings are due to be delivered in April this year. While we cannot speculate about the report’s findings until it is released, I wish to bring to the House’s attention an article in yesterday’s edition of the Bulletin entitled ‘The fatal journey of Shark 02’ and flag key issues that the Labor Party will hold the government to account for. According to the Bulletin, the final report of the military board of inquiry has been finalised and is with the Royal Australian Navy’s Maritime Commander, Rear Admiral Davyd Thomas, and the defence minister, Brendan Nelson. I look forward to its release and hope that it will provide the families of victims, as well as the broader community, with much needed answers and a clear sense of what lessons will be learned to ensure that, as far as possible, it will never occur again.

The Bulletin article states that the report will likely confirm that the specific mechanical cause of this crash was a loose castellated nut and a missing split pin, but the systemic factors along the chain of command were the foundation of this tragedy. Ms Haila McCarthy, the mother of squadron leader Paul McCarthy, a military doctor who died in the crash, is quoted by the Bulletin as saying that the inquiry:

... uncovered issues of poor maintenance practices, a litany of errors and omissions, mismanagement and a lack of resolve and responsibility by middle and senior officers. It also uncovered bureaucratic bungling and inaction over the non-implementation of the Bamaga Board of Inquiry recommendations regarding the installation of crashworthy seats and harnesses for passengers.

The article in the Bulletin reminds us that similar safety and maintenance issues were identified following the Sea King crash at Cape York in 1995. Seating problems were highlighted and shoulder harnesses were recommended, apparently to reduce the risk of head injury in crashes. The article also notes an admission by one of the four counsels assisting the inquiry, Captain Michael Slattery, that in March 2003 senior officers knew of noncompliant and lax maintenance practices at 817 Squadron, where the Navy’s remaining six Sea Kings are housed. The article claims that these systemic failures were not addressed by the current government and continued up to and even after the crash on Nias in April 2005.

The inquiry report will be a critical test of two things. First, it will test the effectiveness and adequacy of an internal board of inquiry as a form of military justice. Will there be a frank and reliable assessment of what went wrong? Will responsibility be appropriately apportioned, or will we see scapegoats? The operation of this particular military board of inquiry has been recognised as more open and accessible to families of the victims and to the media; nonetheless, concerns were expressed that conflicts of interest persisted and attempts were made by individuals to cover up the extent of poor practices.

Second, it will test the government’s ability to taked responsibility for addressing problems that it has known about for 11 years. Following the 1995 crash, the government had a precious opportunity to implement the lessons learned on safety for the Sea King helicopters. Now it has that opportunity again—and it should be taken without hesitation. Malcolm Brown reported in the Age on 17 February 2006 that: ‘After several years of deliberation, a decision was made not to transport passengers. But that was reversed in 2003 on the grounds that it was too difficult and costly to make changes and the risk would have to be accepted.’ Yet, while these safety concerns were known, a Sydney Morning Herald article written by Cynthia Banham on 21 April 2005 entitled ‘Sea King inquiry to focus on reliability’ quoted the Prime Minister as saying, ‘There’s no suggestion that this aircraft wasn’t other than very airworthy.’ The then defence minister indicated that the issue of crash worthiness was ‘not relevant’.

The question that will arise over this issue is: where does the buck stop? The Bulletin suggests that the inquiry report will place responsibility with low-rank mechanics and a few senior naval commanders. However, the government’s inaction to date speaks volumes. In view of the government’s poor response to this issue, responsibility must also be apportioned further up the chain of command. The Howard government must answer for 11 years of inaction and denial on this issue. Will the government commit to implementing without delay the findings of the report and those measures necessary to prevent a repeat of this tragedy? The brave men and women of our Defence Force deserve nothing less.

I would also be remiss not to mention that our thoughts are with Cynthia Banham, whom I have mentioned—the well-known journalist from the Sydney Morning Herald who was severely injured in the recent crash in Indonesia. We wish her all the very best in her recovery and we honour her work in this area.