Anthony Byrne (Holt, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise with a great deal of pleasure to discuss this report. My speech will be somewhat overshadowed by that very passionate contribution by the member for Lingiari on the previous report. It is one that a very close relative of mine who lives in the Northern Territory would probably endorse. The member for Lingiari is a very passionate Territorian and one who is very committed to his electorate and to the Northern Territory and, as my very close relative would say, he is a person who represents his electorate splendidly.

In rising today to note the report of the Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security titled Review of the re-listing of Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidaynor the TQJBR—(the al-Zarqawi network) as a terrorist organisation, I would like to raise a few points. As deputy chair of this committee, I would like to acknowledge this bipartisan report and the efforts of the committee members, including the chair of the committee, the Hon. David Jull, the member for Fadden, and particularly the hardworking secretariat. I would like today in particular in this chamber to acknowledge the incredibly hard work of the retiring committee secretary, Margaret Swieringa, whom we will all miss.

As outlined by the chair of the committee in his statement to the House last week, this organisation was considered for listing in 2005. This committee reviewed this regulation and reported to the parliament on 25 May 2005. It did not recommend disallowance of the regulation at that time. In reaching its recommendation, the committee concluded:

It is evident from the Attorney-General’s statement of reasons that TQJBR—

the al-Zarqawi network—

has committed violent crimes in pursuit of their objectives. The group has kidnapped and murdered civilians and attacked Multi-National Forces and members of the Interim Iraqi Government.

The Committee strongly condemns the violent acts of TQJBR. The proscription of TQJBR in Australia is potentially useful insofar as it prevents Australians from assisting the organisation either financially or personally.

The recent relisting inquiry was advertised in the Australian newspaper and by other electronic means in February 2007. There were no submissions received from the public but a private hearing was held in Canberra on 23 March 2007. That hearing was attended by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, the Attorney-General’s Department and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. At this juncture, it is important to note that this committee sought a contribution regarding the relisting of this network from the Office of National Assessments. As the chair noted in his contribution, the reason that the committee was looking forward to this contribution was that the strategic analysis and the type of information that it supplied to senators in Senate estimates or was supplied by the director in his public speeches might assist the committee in reaching a deliberation.

Members of our committee, however, were disappointed when this request was refused on the grounds that the ONA apparently plays no role in the listing process and was unable to share the contents of assessments as it is apparently prohibited from doing so under the Intelligence Services Act. That particular decision has two interesting facets. The first one is that, within it, it has an open source unit which is utilised by other forms of government. The second point is that the committee feels that the interpretation of the relevant section of this act—section 29 of the Intelligence Services Act—by the director of the ONA needs to be evaluated by the committee itself, given its implications for the capacity of the committee to exercise its statutory responsibility of parliamentary oversight of the ONA. If you look at the extension of the interpretation provided by the director in this particular instance, it could, if you followed its natural extension legally, prohibit an inquiry like the one that was conducted on the weapons of mass destruction, which the committee reviewed in a previous incarnation in 2003. If it does so, in my view, and if that legal opinion was upheld, it provides a direct threat to the committee’s capacity to oversight the ONA, and that is a cause for concern. Thus, I believe the director’s opinion needs to be examined, and will be examined, by the committee independently.

With respect to the reassessment of the listing of the organisation, it is clear that, on the statement of reasons and other open source information, this organisation has used and does use extreme violence in pursuit of its objectives and that, with respect to its activities in Iraq subsequent to its proscription on the first occasion—and I will detail some of them in terms of reports such as attacks on mosques, the killing of two soldiers, and four Russian diplomats who were taken hostage and executed—there is a very clear case for the proscription of the organisation.

Additionally, Australia and Australians are seen as a target by this organisation. This was demonstrated by its claim of responsibility for an attack against an Australian defence convoy in Baghdad on 25 October 2004, and an attack near the Australian embassy in Baghdad on 19 January 2005. Additionally, the committee believes that there appears to be no amelioration of its activities and, notwithstanding the death of its leader, al-Zarqawi, it has not lessened its operations, notwithstanding that, at least in a public sense, it has been subsumed into a larger coalition of groups.

I would like to briefly touch on some issues which have arisen consistently when the committee examines the listings and relistings of organisations for proscription under the Criminal Code—that is, basically, concerns about the consultation and the period of time that it consults with the state and territory governments, the method of informing the community of a proscription, and the publicly available information which is put forward to justify a proscription. In some cases, in some of the proscriptions there is a belief that some of the material put forward is fairly scarce, particularly when trying to justify publicly the proscription of an organisation. In considering this, the committee believes that, in justifying the proscription of an organisation, ASIO itself has used benchmark criteria to justify it, and it has done so publicly. I refer to the engagement in terrorism, the ideology and links to other terrorist groups or networks, links to Australia, threats to Australian interests, proscription by the UN or like-minded countries, and engagement in peace and mediation processes.

In this particular case, it is abundantly clear that this organisation should be proscribed, although I would note, in terms of the more recent material provided to the committee regarding the proscription, that there is a small amount post its initial proscription in terms of its activities that is publicly sourced and a lot about its previous activities. I think what the committee deserves, rightfully, is more open source information that is germane to this listing rather than the fairly scarce amount that has been provided, particularly in this report.

The key concern is this: the public must have a measure of confidence in an organisation like ASIO when an organisation has been proscribed as a terrorist organisation. There needs to be some process so that the public can believe that there is enough information to justify its proscription. In fact, the issues surrounding proscription and the use of the proscription power are being evaluated by the committee, and a report on this matter will be tabled later in the year.

This committee, as I said, is a good, hardworking committee that is reviewing a number of legislative items. In closing, I would like to again acknowledge the work of the retiring committee secretary, Margaret Swieringa, and I commend the report to the chamber.

Debate (on motion by Mr Neville) adjourned.