House debates
Thursday, 15 May 2008
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment Bill 2008
Consideration of Senate Message
Consideration resumed from 14 May.
Senate’s amendments—
(1) Clause 2, page 2 (table item 8), omit the table item, substitute:
8. Schedule 1, items 38 and 39 | The day on which this Act receives the Royal Assent. | |
9. Schedule 1, item 39A | At the same time as the provision(s) covered by table item 3. | |
10. Schedule 1, items 40 to 43 | The day on which this Act receives the Royal Assent. | |
11. Schedule 1, item 43A | 1 July 2008. | 1 July 2008 |
12. Schedule 1, items 44 to 46 | The day on which this Act receives the Royal Assent. | |
13. Schedule 1, item 46A | 1 July 2008. | 1 July 2008 |
14. Schedule 1, items 47 and 48 | The day on which this Act receives the Royal Assent. |
(2) Schedule 1, items 3 to 5, page 3 (lines 13 to 22), omit the items, substitute:
3 Subparagraph 9A(1)(b)(ii)
After “telecommunications device”, insert “or particular telecommunications devices”.
4 Paragraph 9A(1A)(b)
After “telecommunications device”, insert “or telecommunications devices”.
5 Subsection 9A(1A) (note)
After “telecommunications device”, insert “or telecommunications devices”.
(3) Schedule 1, item 6, page 3 (lines 26 and 27), omit “any telecommunications device”, substitute “a telecommunications device or telecommunications devices identified in the warrant”.
(4) Schedule 1, item 6, page 3 (line 28), after “sufficient to identify the”, insert “telecommunications device or”.
(5) Schedule 1, item 7, page 3 (line 31) to page 4 (line 2), omit the item, substitute:
7 Subsection 9A(3)
After “telecommunications device”, insert “or telecommunications devices”.
(6) Schedule 1, items 8 to 10, page 4 (lines 3 to 11), omit the items, substitute:
8 Subparagraph 11B(1)(a)(ii)
After “telecommunications device”, insert “or particular telecommunications devices”.
9 Paragraph 11B(1A)(b)
After “telecommunications device”, insert “or telecommunications devices”.
10 Subsection 11B(1A) (note)
After “telecommunications device”, insert “or telecommunications devices”.
(7) Schedule 1, item 11, page 4 (lines 15 and 16), omit “any telecommunications device”, substitute “a telecommunications device or telecommunications devices identified in the warrant”.
(8) Schedule 1, item 11, page 4 (line 17), after “sufficient to identify the”, insert “telecommunications device or”.
(9) Schedule 1, item 12, page 4 (lines 20 to 22), omit the item, substitute:
12 Subsection 11B(3)
After “telecommunications device”, insert “or telecommunications devices”.
(10) Schedule 1, items 13 and 14, page 4 (lines 23 to 28), omit the items, substitute:
13 Paragraph 16(1)(aa)
After “telecommunications device”, insert “or telecommunications devices”.
14 Paragraph 16(1A)(b)
After “telecommunications device”, insert “or telecommunications devices”.
14A Paragraph 16(2)(a)
After “telecommunications device”, insert “or telecommunications devices”.
14B Paragraph 16(2)(b)
Omit “that device”, substitute “the device or devices”.
(11) Schedule 1, item 20, page 5 (line 33) to page 6 (line 1), omit “any telecommunications device”, substitute “a telecommunications device or telecommunications devices identified in the warrant”.
(12) Schedule 1, item 20, page 6 (line 2), after “sufficient to identify the”, insert “telecommunications device or”.
(13) Schedule 1, item 21, page 6 (lines 4 and 5), omit the item, substitute:
21 Subparagraph 46A(1)(d)(ii)
After “telecommunications device”, insert “or particular telecommunications devices”.
(14) Schedule 1, items 23 to 25, page 6 (lines 8 to 16), omit the items, substitute:
23 Subsection 46A(1) (note)
After “telecommunications device”, insert “or telecommunications devices”.
24 Subparagraph 46A(2)(a)(ii)
After “telecommunications device”, insert “or particular telecommunications devices”.
25 Subsection 46A(3)
After “telecommunications device”, insert “or telecommunications devices”.
(15) Schedule 1, item 31, page 7 (lines 19 and 20), omit “any telecommunications device”, substitute “a telecommunications device or telecommunications devices identified in the warrant”.
(16) Schedule 1, item 31, page 7 (line 25) to page 8 (line 3), omit subsection 59A(3).
(17) Schedule 1, item 35, page 8 (lines 10 to 12), omit the item, substitute:
35 Paragraph 60(4)(aa)
After “telecommunications device”, insert “or telecommunications devices”.
(18) Schedule 1, item 37, page 8 (lines 15 to 17), omit the item, substitute:
37 Paragraph 60(4A)(b)
After “telecommunications device”, insert “or telecommunications devices”.
(19) Schedule 1, page 8 (after line 23), after item 39, insert:
39A Paragraph 60(5)(b)
After “a particular device”, insert “or particular devices”.
(20) Schedule 1, page 9 (after line 4), after item 43, insert:
43A Paragraph 100(1)(ec)
Repeal the paragraph, substitute:
(ec) in relation to all named person warrants issued during that year on application made by each agency or authority:
(i) the total number of telecommunications services intercepted under those of the warrants that did not authorise the interception of communications made by means of a telecommunications device or telecommunications devices identified in the warrant; and
(ii) the total number of telecommunications services intercepted under those of the warrants that did authorise the interception of communications made by means of a telecommunications device or telecommunications devices identified in the warrant; and
(iii) the total number of telecommunications devices by means of which communications were intercepted under those of the warrants that did authorise the interception of communications made by means of a telecommunications device or telecommunications devices identified in the warrant; and
(21) Schedule 1, page 9 (after line 10), after item 46, insert:
46A Paragraph 100(2)(ec)
Repeal the paragraph, substitute:
(ec) in relation to all named person warrants issued during that year:
(i) the total number of telecommunications services intercepted under those of the warrants that did not authorise the interception of communications made by means of a telecommunications device or telecommunications devices identified in the warrant; and
(ii) the total number of telecommunications services intercepted under those of the warrants that did authorise the interception of communications made by means of a telecommunications device or telecommunications devices identified in the warrant; and
(iii) the total number of telecommunications devices by means of which communications were intercepted under those of the warrants that did authorise the interception of communications made by means of a telecommunications device or telecommunications devices identified in the warrant; and
10:11 am
Robert McClelland (Barton, Australian Labor Party, Attorney-General) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source
I move:
That the amendments be agreed to.
I will make a few brief comments. The amendments that were agreed to by the Senate respond to recommendations made by the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs. They do so by removing the provisions in the bill that would have enabled devices to be added to device based named person warrants after they are issued and, secondly, strengthening the reporting requirements of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act by requiring more detailed reporting in relation to services intercepted under a named person warrant as well as additional reporting on the total number of devices intercepted under a named person warrant.
This legislation is complex. It involves bringing our law enforcement techniques into line with modern technology, and having regard, in particular, to how those who would threaten the safety of Australians, either by committing crimes or through potential acts of violence motivated by reasons of political or religious extremism, are dealt with in the context of their access to and use of these technologies on the one hand and, on the other hand, providing for the legitimate privacy interests of Australians.
The other issue that the legislation needs to carefully balance is the realisation that increasingly we are connected with the rest of the world necessarily electronically, through the internet in particular, with the need to realise that we—that is, our government agencies, be they military, intelligence or law enforcement or agencies dealing with critical infrastructure—are vulnerable to electronic interference and, indeed, electronic espionage and electronic attack, whether that be by way of the unleashing of viruses or the unleashing of trojans that are then placed in the recipient computer to feed back on an ongoing basis information that is contained in those computers.
It would be naive in the extreme for legislators—and indeed commentators and people in business—not to recognise that reality. There would be very few people, I believe, who did not have a problem on their home computer at least, if not their office or business computer, with a virus and who did not do a basic computer check to discover that there had been any number of ‘cookies’—to use the vernacular—planted on their computer. It is a reality. In the context where 90 per cent of critical infrastructure in Australia is privately owned, it is entirely reckless for us to ignore that that infrastructure should be protected from the prospect of electronic attack. These are complicated issues. The bill as amended by the Senate provides for our intelligence and law enforcement agencies, that is, internet supervisors of those agencies, to have access to communications coming into those agencies for the purpose of determining whether their internet network has been the subject of attack, and addressing that. That is important and supported by the Senate.
But where we need to go in terms of work in progress involves balancing what is a clear and pressing need to have regard to measures that are required in the private sector to enable the private sector, particularly those corporations that have or are involved in the administration of critical infrastructure, to have sufficient means to protect their infrastructure and indeed their interconnectivity and their own internal networks from electronic attacks. So, the purpose of my comments is to indicate that this is a work in progress for the purpose of further consideration over the next 18 months. (Time expired)
Question agreed to.