Kevin Rudd (Griffith, Australian Labor Party, Prime Minister) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

by leave—I make a ministerial statement relating to national security.

The first priority of government is the nation’s security. Consistent with this priority, I present to the House Australia’s first national security statement. This statement forms part of the government’s long-term reform agenda by setting out our national security policy framework for the future. The government’s reform agenda embraces the full scope of government responsibilities, including how we build:

• a more secure Australia given the complex array of national security challenges we face for the future;
• a stronger Australia given the long-term challenges to our economy;
• a fairer Australia given the levels of disadvantage that continue to exist among us; and
• an Australia capable of meeting the sweeping new challenges of the 21st century, including climate change.

Today is an historic day in the evolution of Australia’s national security policy. For the first time, this country will have a coherent statement of the national security challenges facing Australia into the future, and of the comprehensive approach we propose to adopt in responding to those challenges. Australia cannot afford a short term, reactive approach to national security. Ours must be an integrated approach based on a clear-sighted view of our long term national security interests. Australia must be clear in its analysis of the threats we face, actively manage and address those threats, as well as seize the opportunities we have to enhance our overall national security environment for the future.

What is meant by national security? Freedom from attack or the threat of attack, the maintenance of our territorial integrity, the maintenance of our political sovereignty, the preservation of our hard won freedoms and the maintenance of our fundamental capacity to advance economic prosperity for all Australians.

This statement provides a strategic framework to drive policy development in the various departments of state with responsibilities for Australia’s national security. It provides context for the defence white paper, which will detail the way forward for our defence over the next 20 years. It will inform a regular foreign policy statement to the parliament. It will shape the upcoming counterterrorism white paper as well as guide the development of the government’s first national energy security assessment. It incorporates the recommendations of the Homeland and Border Security Review commissioned by the government earlier this year. In short, this statement begins the process of binding the detailed and diverse work of the national security community into a coherent, coordinated whole.

The need for a regular national security statement is clear, but it has been long overlooked. The global and regional order is now changing so rapidly that we must continue to reassess our evolving national security needs. We need periodically to adjust the lens through which we view the challenges to our security and the arrangements we establish to protect and advance our interests. This requires greater institutional agility than in the past. Increasing complexity and interconnectedness is a fact of life in the modern, global environment. Classical distinctions between foreign and domestic, national and international, internal and external have become blurred. At the same time, Australia is a regional power, prosecuting global interests.

The security environment that we face today and into the future is therefore increasingly fluid and characterised by a complex and dynamic mix of continuing and emerging challenges and opportunities. So, while our national security interests remain constant, Australia needs a new concept of national security capable of embracing and responding to the more complex and interconnected operating environment that we will face for the future.

Of course, not all security challenges we face are by definition national security challenges. Some, such as community safety and low-level criminality, quite properly fall outside the scope of national security. Our state and territory governments have constitutionally mandated responsibilities for these. This distinction allows the Australian government to focus on clear and enduring security interests that transcend the scope of state and territory jurisdictional responsibilities. These include:

• maintaining Australia’s territorial and border integrity.
• promoting Australia’s political sovereignty.
• preserving Australia’s cohesive and resilient society and the long-term strengths of our economy.
• protecting Australians and Australian interests both at home and abroad.
• promoting an international environment, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, that is stable, peaceful and prosperous, together with a global rules based order which enhances Australia’s national interests.

These interests are not only enduring, they are common to most countries that share our values and goals. These interests reflect the fact that nation-states continue to protect and promote their sovereignty, but do so in an increasingly interconnected and interdependent world. The government will strive to advance the national security interests outlined in this statement based on a number of enduring principles:

1. Australia will seek, wherever possible, to develop self-reliance across the range of relevant national security capabilities to ensure an effective contribution to our own security—and to the security of our friends and allies.

2. The United States alliance remains fundamental to Australia’s national security interests—both globally and in the Asia-Pacific region.

3. As our security is linked inextricably to the security of our region, regional engagement is crucial. This includes strengthening our bilateral relationships and effective engagement in regional institutions. It also means seeking to positively influence the shape of the future regional architecture in a manner that develops a culture of security policy cooperation rather than defaults to any assumption that conflict is somehow inevitable.

4. At the global level, we are committed to multilateral institutions, and in particular the United Nations, to promote a rules based international order that enhances our security and economy. We believe those that share the benefits of these systems must also share the responsibilities of supporting and enhancing them.

5. National security policy must also be advanced through the agency of creative middle-power diplomacy—an active foreign policy capable of identifying opportunities to promote our security and to otherwise prevent, reduce or delay the emergence of national security challenges.

6. Australia must also apply a risk based approach to assessing, prioritising and resourcing our national security policy across the defence, diplomatic, intelligence and wider national security community.

7. The Commonwealth must work in partnership with state and territory governments where our national security responsibilities coincide or necessarily complement each other in an increasingly interconnected operational environment.

Our national security interests must also be pursued in an accountable way which meets the government’s responsibility to protect Australia, its people and its interests while preserving our civil liberties and the rule of law. This balance represents a continuing challenge for all modern democracies seeking to prepare for the complex national security challenges of the future. It is a balance that must remain a conscious part of the national security policy process. We must not silently allow any incremental erosion of our fundamental freedoms.

Today we live at the dawn of the Asia-Pacific century. With it comes the potential for fundamental change in the global order, resulting in both economic opportunities and potential security concerns for Australia. This is a century of crucial significance to Australia; this is a region of crucial significance to Australia. While the likelihood of conflict between the major powers is currently low, their interactions still largely shape the international order in which Australia must operate.

The government believes that the future strategic stability of the Asia-Pacific region will in large part rely on the continuing strong presence of Australia’s closest ally, the United States. The most crucial relationship, in East Asia and globally, will be between the United States and China. For Australia, the relationships between China, the US and Japan will affect our security and our economy, given the importance to us of our relationships with each of these nations and the material impact on the wider region of any significant deterioration in the relations between them. The rise of India will also be an important new factor in the strategic stability of the Asia-Pacific region. India will need to respond to the growing threats of domestic terrorism and manage its relationship with Pakistan. Global growth, trade patterns and financial flows are also being increasingly shaped by India and other emerging powers. South-East Asia will continue to be of great national security interest to Australia because of geographic proximity and the processes of continuing political and economic change. This diverse range of countries will, over time, experience continued economic growth, development and improving governance. But a number will also be faced by ongoing challenges of terrorism, insurgency and communal violence.

Australia will also continue to cooperate closely with New Zealand in the continuing security challenges faced by the island states of the south-west Pacific. This history of cooperation between Australia and New Zealand goes back to the ANZAC spirit forged in the trenches of World War I. Today our two nations continue to strengthen our cooperation, not just through combined military deployments to places such as Timor Leste, Solomon Islands and Tonga, but through a wide range of economic, diplomatic and security initiatives. In response to this changing landscape, we need to both help shape our region through constructive engagement as well as be prepared for any unforeseen deterioration in the strategic environment.

Australia’s national security policy builds on a number of enduring capabilities: first, an activist diplomatic strategy that is aimed at keeping our region peaceful and prosperous; second, making sure that we have an Australian Defence Force that is ready to respond when necessary, in a range of situations from combat operations to disaster relief; and, third, building and maintaining national security agencies and capabilities that work effectively together. It is in Australia’s interests to be proactive about shaping the strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific, and our own future, through regional engagement. Our diplomacy needs to be pervasive, formative and influential and it needs to be resourced for the challenges that Australia faces now and into the future.

Our alliance with the United States will remain our key strategic partnership and the central pillar of Australian national security policy. Closer engagement with the US gives us the tools to better meet the security challenges of the future—both regional and global. The government has also decided to strengthen security policy cooperation with a number of regional partners including Japan, the Republic of Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. I have visited all of these countries and discussed opportunities for strengthening our security cooperation with them. The government also wishes to expand our security policy dialogue with China and our security policy cooperation with India.

We have proposed the development of an Asia-Pacific community by 2020 as a means of strengthening political, economic and security cooperation in the region in the long term. Many of the challenges we will face cannot be addressed by one country alone. Enhancing the regional architecture is an important step in working towards combined solutions. It is also about inculcating and institutionalising the habits of cooperation—as our friends in ASEAN have so successfully done over the years within their community.

In pursuit of our national interests, the government is committed to an Australian diplomacy that will be more activist than in the past—in the tradition of creative middle-power diplomacy. Australia’s national security policy calls for diplomatic resources that are more in-depth and more diversified than currently exist. This must be built up over time. Given the vast continent we occupy, the small population we have and our unique geostrategic circumstances, our diplomacy must be the best in the world. The pursuit of Australia’s international interests and the welfare of Australians abroad also require this commitment, given that at any one time there are about a million Australians abroad—many experiencing a growing number of security needs. These increasing challenges have not been adequately reflected in the historical resourcing of the Australian foreign service relative to comparable governments around the world. Over time, this must change.

Creative middle-power diplomacy must be reinforced by a robust defence policy. The defence white paper is mapping the strategic terrain we will face out to 2030. It will include the emergence of new challenges, such as changing levels of military spending and capability in our region, as well as new threats such as cyber warfare. The defence white paper will identify the military capabilities and force structure that the Australian Defence Force requires to protect Australian interests and, where necessary, operate with our friends and allies. But it must go further than that. We need greater rigour in defence planning. We need greater efficiency in defence spending. And we need greater certainty in the allocation of resources through the defence budget. The white paper will foreshadow a range of reforms that will improve the management of defence to ensure Australia is capable of maintaining a world-class Defence Force for the long term.

The contributions our men and women in uniform are making around the globe today must not go unremarked. In Afghanistan, our objective is to reduce the spread of terrorism by helping Afghanistan build a more peaceful and stable state and so reduce the risk of that country once again becoming a safe haven and a training base for terrorist organisations with global reach. Through these efforts, Australia is also demonstrating its capacity to play an active role in enhancing international security—both with our allies and with the wider international community. In Iraq, we have changed the configuration of our commitment following the professionalism demonstrated by the Australian Defence Force in achieving the mission they were set. We have expanded our program of assistance in Iraq to build a relationship anchored in economic development, personnel training and humanitarian initiatives, to help the people of Iraq recover from the war and hardship of recent years.

Australia will also need to continue to guard against espionage and foreign interference on the home front. Australian policy, military and intelligence institutions, directions and capabilities are attractive intelligence targets for foreign powers. And Australia is also seen as a potential alternative source of sensitive defence, intelligence and diplomatic information shared by our allies. Electronic espionage in particular will be a growing vulnerability as the Australian government and society become more dependent on integrated information technologies. Both commercial and state based espionage, while not visible to the public eye, are inevitable. This challenge must be met and will be met with full vigour.

The government’s approach to national security encompasses more than just traditional statecraft and classical military capabilities. Counterterrorism and protective security challenges were catapulted into prominence with the attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States. Of course, Australia had previously been exposed to terrorism through serious terrorist attacks in Australia. This led in the 1980s to the establishment of domestic terrorism protection and response capabilities, which have been refined over time to provide world-class response arrangements to protect our community. But the threat to us from those responsible for the September 11 attacks, and their sympathisers, is different from that of the past. Australia has been explicitly and publicly mentioned as an ‘enemy’ by Islamist extremists, and Australians have been specifically targeted in Bali, Baghdad and Jakarta. Even in the terrorist attacks in Mumbai last week, two Australians lost their lives and a number of others were injured. In our own community, individuals have also been convicted by Australian courts on charges relating to preparing for attacks in this country.

Terrorism is likely to endure as a serious ongoing threat for the foreseeable future. Extremism leading to violence or terrorism continues to pose a direct threat to Australia and Australian security interests. Next year, the government will release a counterterrorism white paper responding to the continuing threat to Australia from terrorism and, where appropriate, make adjustments to our counterterrorism policy arrangements. This will include our bilateral arrangements and capacity-building activities with regional countries. The Australian government is committed to combating terrorism to protect Australians and Australian security interests and to promote international security. Effective mitigation of terrorist attacks involves the combination of an appropriate security response with broader strategies to enhance social cohesion and resilience and lessen the appeal of radical ideology.

Australia’s security and law enforcement agencies are playing a critical role in protecting Australian citizens, both at home and abroad. The government is committed to ensuring that our agencies are resourced appropriately to meet the challenges of terrorist threats. And we will continue to work with the states and territories and with international partners to ensure that our responses are comprehensive and effective.

Beyond the threat of terrorism, concepts of national security have continued to evolve since the end of the Cold War. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including the possibility of such weapons falling into the hands of terrorists, is a threat of increasing international concern. Efforts to strengthen the global nonproliferation regime must focus on both state and non-state actors. The Australian government is strongly committed to increasing Australia’s role in international efforts to strengthen nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, and will work with our friends and neighbours to advance practical, effective steps to achieve this goal. That is why we have established the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament.

Intrastate conflict in our region and beyond will continue to flare. It will be caused by weak state institutions struggling to cope with a complex mix of political, socioeconomic, cultural, criminal and some religious factors. And it will bring disastrous consequences to local communities when it occurs. Australia has made major long-term commitments to help resolve conflict in Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste. But the risk of fragile states disrupting stability and prosperity in our region is an ongoing challenge. The government is committed to a policy of cooperation with the island nations of the Pacific through Pacific Partnerships for Development and, in particular, to helping them to reach the Millennium Development Goals. This is designed to build the basic capacity for long-term economic capacity building—essential to long-term political stability in our region.

The humanitarian implications for the people affected in these conflicts are also of concern to Australia’s national security and foreign policy interests. We expect to make practical contributions in times of crisis, commensurate with our role in the international community. Failure to do so at source also runs the risk of refugee outflows to neighbouring states, including Australia. The humanitarian implications for the people affected in these conflicts are also of concern to Australia’s national security and foreign policy interests. We expect to make practical contributions in times of crisis, commensurate with our role in the international community. Failure to do so at source also runs the risk of refugee outflows to neighbouring states, including Australia.

The list of non-traditional threats or new security challenges is also growing. Transnational crime—such as trafficking in persons, drugs and arms; people smuggling and the illegal exploitation of resources—will remain a continuing challenge. These activities can undermine political and social institutions, inflict economic and personal harm or contribute to other forms of violence. And it is here that the role of non-state actors is critical. The government is committed to deploying all necessary resources to prosecute those criminals who seek to undermine Australia’s border security. We will work with our partners in the region to shut down the illegal operations of people smugglers and see them put in jail where they belong. The government has recently agreed to a series of new measures at a cost of $44.1 million to further combat people-smuggling in cooperation with regional partners.

Organised crime more broadly is a growing concern for Australia, one the government is determined to combat. The Australian Crime Commission has estimated that organised crime costs for Australia each year run at some $10 billion. The government will develop two initiatives in the related areas of border management and serious and organised crime. We will strengthen border management by simplifying arrangements and improving coordination across all agencies. Second, we will clearly define the role of the Commonwealth in combating serious and organised crime and enhance coordination among Commonwealth agencies.

Let me return for a moment to the serious matter of people-smuggling—that is, the organised, unauthorised arrival of people by boat to Australia. The arrangements the government has inherited involve a wide range of government agencies but lack unified control and direction, and a single point of accountability. The government has decided therefore to move quickly to better enable the existing Australian Customs Service to meet this resurgent threat to our border integrity. To this end we will in coming weeks establish new arrangements whereby the Australian Customs Service is augmented, retasked and renamed the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service. This arrangement will create in the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service a capability to task and analyse intelligence, coordinate surveillance and on-water response, and engage internationally with source and transit countries to comprehensively address and deter people-smuggling throughout the operating pipeline from source countries to our shores. This is the challenge faced by many countries. The co-location of agencies and capabilities in this way is a concept strongly supported by the Homeland and Border Security Review.

In terms of other new security challenges, it is increasingly evident that the sophistication of our modern community is a source of vulnerability in itself. For example, we are highly dependent on computer and information technology to drive critical industries such as aviation; electricity and water supply; banking and finance; and telecommunications networks. This dependency on information technology makes us potentially vulnerable to cyber attacks that may disrupt the information that increasingly lubricates our economy and system of government. A number of actors may carry out such attacks, ranging from hackers to commercial entities and foreign states—and this number of actors is growing. The same technology also provides tools for terrorists, who use computers to share information, recruit, communicate and spread their message of hate and violence. They exploit the freedom provided by the internet and the power of tools such as encryption to operate beyond the law.

The government will enhance Australia’s e-security and is considering the recently completed e-security review. The irony of technology today is that while on the one hand we are seeking to invest in sophisticated information, intelligence and military technology, on the other we have to protect ourselves from the extreme use of basic, readily available technology and hardware by terrorist groups. As a consequence of rapid advances in technological capability, Australia must retain technologically and scientifically alert, agile and robust institutions and, through those, anticipate and respond to new and emerging threats arising from the ongoing technology revolution. To achieve this, the government is now developing a National Security Science and Innovation Strategy which embraces the full breadth of national security threats arising from the rapid changes to the technological capabilities of those hostile to Australia’s national security interests.

The impact of globalisation and advances in technology mean that the partnerships between industry, governments and the community that have evolved since 2001 are vital and will remain an important part of any future national security policy. Of course, crises may not be caused by human action alone. Even today, we recognise the potential for disease, especially a pandemic, to have dramatic consequences for the economies and societies of our neighbours and for Australia itself. A pandemic is bound to create real physical and social hardship and policy challenges for Australia, whether it has a direct impact upon us or not.

In addition to these changes, a range of new and emerging challenges such as climate change and energy security, unless properly dealt with by effective policy action, will have long-term security impacts—locally, regionally and globally. Over the long term, climate change represents a most fundamental national security challenge for our future. Less attention has been given to the security implications that climate change could bring to Australia compared with other traditional security threats. Significant climate change will bring about unregulated population movements, declining food production, reductions in arable land, violent weather patterns and resulting catastrophic events. This is an area of emerging consequence which will require the formal incorporation of climate change within Australia’s national security policy and analysis process.

Demographic changes will also affect the region, with total population exceeding four billion by 2020, or 56 per cent of the world’s total. The demographic changes in our region will mean that by 2020, when we look to our north, we will see a very different region to the one we see now—one where population, food, water and energy resource pressures will be greater than ever before.

The government is committed to ensuring Australia’s long-term energy security. We are developing a strategy to make sure Australia has access to adequate, reliable and affordable energy now and into the future. An important step in this process is the National Energy Security Assessment, or NESA. The NESA will provide a comprehensive assessment of critical energy policy challenges per sector and identify how these challenges could affect long-term energy security. This assessment will be an important input into the energy white paper, which will put in place policy settings to ensure Australians enjoy reliable energy security into the future.

Given the breadth, depth and complexity of Australia’s emerging national security challenges and the range of interconnected policy responses to which they give rise, Australia will need to develop a new level of coordination in its national security policy arrangements both within the Commonwealth and across all levels of government.

One of the fundamental assets we have to promote our national security objectives is our underlying strength, resilience and cohesion as a nation. We are the world’s largest island nation. We are rich in physical resources. Australia’s ‘soft power’ assets are also significant. We are a modern, democratic and tolerant country. Our population is relatively small, highly urbanised and educated. Our economy is competitive, outwardly focused and resilient. And, internationally, we have a proud record of contribution to global security and economic stability. We are widely respected for our ideas and our actions. We can, and do, make a positive difference to the world.

Australia also has a wide range of dedicated tools to achieve our national security interests. These include our technologically advanced and well-trained Australian Defence Force and Australian Federal Police, our highly effective diplomatic service and our well-coordinated international development assistance efforts. Our border security and transport security agencies have generally performed well, although there remains a capacity for further improvement. We have well-established and well-integrated intelligence agencies that collect intelligence and assess the implications for our security environment—although once again there remains scope for continued improvement.

Furthermore, legislative, regulatory and administrative oversight measures provide an integral framework from which our overall efforts are empowered. It is also important to recognise that our national security assets extend beyond the Commonwealth government to include the states and territories, who are the first responders to security incidents within their jurisdictions. We have highly capable police services which respond to a spectrum of challenges, from threats to public safety to terrorism, and emergency response organisations that protect the community in our most vulnerable times. The Commonwealth will also provide physical and financial assistance to states and territories during an emergency when requested to do so and coordinate assistance to Australians affected by emergencies overseas.

I would like to emphasise two other assets, outside of government, which make an important contribution to our national security—they are business and the general community. In some areas, up to 90 per cent of our critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector. Our economy and our future as a trading nation depend on our ability to protect national assets such as our airports, ports, bridges, and water and power facilities from catastrophic failure. We will work with the private sector, and state and territory governments, to protect this infrastructure and the people visiting our national icons and monuments and other places where large numbers of people gather. This is a difficult and enduring challenge.

The business community has a great deal of knowledge and expertise and plays a vital role in our combined efforts. The wider community also plays an important role in our national security. The government knows that it is essential to engage with the Australian people on the threats we face and the role the wider community can play in responding to those threats. Through community engagement we can achieve important national security outcomes ranging from sustaining support for our forces deployed overseas, undermining the influence of violent ideologies and preserving the s

Anthony Albanese (Grayndler, Australian Labor Party, Leader of the House) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I move:

That the House take note of the document.

I ask leave of the House to move a motion to enable the Leader of the Opposition to speak for 40 minutes.

Leave granted.

I move:

That so much of the standing and sessional orders be suspended as would prevent Mr Turnbull (Leader of the Opposition) speaking for a period not exceeding 40 minutes.

Question agreed to.

Malcolm Turnbull (Wentworth, Liberal Party, Leader of the Opposition) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

One of the fundamental tests for any government of this country is to be able to say to the people of Australia that the policies it has adopted and the actions it has taken have given all Australians every confidence that they and their families will remain safe and secure. It is the primary responsibility of the national government to ensure that our borders are strongly, securely protected; to ensure that our people can live and work freely, untroubled by threats; and to ensure that the lead agencies on which we rely to safeguard Australians and their interests are well run, well managed and properly resourced.

On our side of the House, we are proud that the coalition government left Australia stronger and more secure. We invested massively in our armed forces and security resources, which had been neglected by our predecessors in government. We secured and strengthened key alliances. And when we left government last year Australia was stronger, better defended and more respected around the world.

It is in the interests therefore of all Australians that this government, like its predecessor, proves itself to be capable, vigilant and sure-footed in its exercise of these heavy responsibilities, and that is why we have in Australia the tradition of a bipartisan approach wherever possible to the vital questions of protecting Australians and their interests from any threats that may emerge. As opposition leader, I am therefore ready and willing to pledge our support whenever and wherever we can to those in our armed forces, police and other agencies of whom we ask service and sacrifice in the performance of their very difficult and dangerous jobs, and to ensure our national security arrangements are in the very best working order so that Australians can continue to go about their lives with confidence and security from threats.

The critical underpinning of national security is rigorous analysis and assessment of those threats now and into the future and the setting of clear priorities in determining our policy responses on how best to manage and minimise those threats. It means ensuring that all of our security agencies are aware of the scope of their mission and their responsibilities, each in its own specialised area, working efficiently, in partnership, in the national service. It also means consolidating and strengthening our key international partnerships to ensure that we can work with like-minded nations and governments to reduce the threats to free societies such as our own. Security in a globalised world is indivisible.

The most effective means of advancing and protecting Australia’s interests in the world is to leverage off our nation’s strengths and work energetically through international partnerships with our major allies—the United States, Japan, China, Indonesia, India—and of course our kindred allies, our historically closest allies, such as New Zealand, the United Kingdom and Canada.

Whether the threat of terrorism, the proliferation of mass destruction, the challenges of climate change or the need to advance global free trade, Australia can engage best in strong, principled action when, alongside allies and partners, it can build the critical mass for an effective international approach. For Australia’s security, its economic, political, military and security ties with the United States are of fundamental importance. Today we have a new president-elect in the United States and we wish him well. It is a critical time for consolidating this alliance and ensuring the world’s leading democracy remains engaged in the stability and the security of the Asia-Pacific region. On all of this, the Prime Minister and I will heartily concur, as I am sure all members of this House will.

I must, however, raise the very critical issue of the Prime Minister’s management of our alliance with the United States. It is deeply troubling and perplexing to all Australians how and why the Prime Minister’s office involved itself directly in the leaking of details of a private conversation with the President of the United States. This false story, both a breach of confidence and a breach of trust, was fed deliberately and cynically into the public domain to make the Prime Minister appear the font of all knowledge, a know-all, a diplomatic encyclopaedia, and to make the President of the most powerful nation in the world look ill-informed or worse. It breached all of the accepted protocols and practices of international diplomacy. It raised serious question marks over the Australian government’s reliability and trustworthiness not only among Americans, whatever their political persuasion, but across the wider diplomatic community.

There is a sense of bewilderment around the world that an Australian Prime Minister would undertake this course of action. We have had no explanation for it, no apology. The Australian newspaper, which published the Prime Minister’s self-serving account of his conversation, has never been asked to publish a correction or a retraction. There is no doubt at all that this self-serving story, so demeaning of our strongest ally, our greatest ally, was fed into the Australian newspaper completely heedless of the consequences it would have for our relationship with America. This is simply no way to conduct diplomacy with any nation, let alone our most important ally, and I fear Australian ministers and prime ministers will be reminded of this breach of faith for many years to come when they go to Washington. It was a tragic error.

On Japan too, our biggest trading customer, our biggest trading partner and an increasingly significant partner in other fields of endeavour—security, environmental matters and so forth—there has also been serious mismanagement. The Prime Minister neglected to incorporate Tokyo in the first of his many overseas trips. And then he unleashed his environment minister, Mr Garrett, for a series of over-the-top PR stunts against the Japanese government, a number of which he has had to retreat from subsequently. Nonetheless, they were as offensive to Japan as they were ultimately futile and humiliating for Australians.

And what of the bundle of absurd contradictions that is Labor’s policy on the mining and sale of uranium which is holding back closer economic and strategic relations with India? Even in China, where the Prime Minister undoubtedly has special experience, our relationship has not been all plain sailing. What possessed the Prime Minister to be so extravagant in his language as to describe China’s investments in its military as ‘part of an arms race in Asia’, a remark that earned a very swift rebuke? Likewise, his grand plan for an Asia-Pacific community has fallen flat in capitals around the region, not least because he sprang it on everybody—including, it would appear, his envoy, Mr Woolcott—by surprise and without consultation.

As to his plans to secure a seat for Australia on the United Nations Security Council, I simply make the observation that perceptions often become reality in international politics as they do, indeed, in domestic politics. It would be very troubling indeed if others came to perceive Australia’s recent change—the decision by the Prime Minister to change Australia’s longstanding position by voting on two resolutions against Israel at the UN General Assembly—as having something to do with our need to garner support for a Security Council seat. I have to say that in many circles that is how it is perceived. The Prime Minister will need to address that at some point. I make these criticisms more in sorrow than in anger—indeed there is no anger at all. I make these criticisms constructively because I believe errors have been made, it is our job to hold the government to account and they need to learn from these errors.

It is a fundamental reality of Australia’s role in the world that to have a significant influence we must have a significant voice. That will be determined by the quality of our ideas and the expertise of our diplomatic representatives. Critical to this is that we not come across as presumptuous or too big for our boots. There is a fine line between boxing above your weight, which is what Australia has always sought and almost invariably been able to do, and being seen to be presumptuously or pompously lecturing the world. There is a very careful balance involved in this.

One good example in recent times, from last year, where we were able to make a significant difference in matters relating to our neighbours, particularly Indonesia, with a high-quality idea was the Global Initiative on Forests and Climate, where we brought together advanced technology, satellites and radar, to help ensure the development of sustainable forestry in the developing tropical rainforest countries both in our neighbourhood and around the world. That was a case where the quality of our ideas was well respected. We did not have the muscle as a middle power to enforce a scheme like this on the world, but it was the quality of the idea and the technology that we were able to offer that saw it taken up. I note that the new Rudd government have continued this initiative, although naturally they rebranded it so that not too many people imagine it had its origins with their predecessors.

In the 21st century Australians have every reason to be secure, confident and self-assured about our place in the world. We are one of the top 15 world economies and in the top 10 for average per capita wealth. We are one of the world’s oldest and most successful democracies, proud of our commitment to political and economic freedom. We have a well-educated workforce, thriving cities, an independent judiciary, a robust free press and a society very strengthened and enriched by its diversity. That is one of our greatest strengths, of which we have often spoken in this place—and I know the Prime Minister and I have the same view on that. We are a significant country in science, commerce, medicine, sport and the arts. There is a great deal to celebrate, and we should do so. Very often I think Australians are too hard on Australia. We should often speak more positively about our achievements. There is much to protect—and that, therefore, is the key responsibility of those we elect to govern us.

The government has taken more than a year in office to produce this statement delivered by the Prime Minster in the House today. It has taken the government more than a year of protracted deliberations to identify and articulate its priorities. As an opposition we have been prepared to wait patiently for a well-considered and well-constructed outline of policy. We have been prepared to wait patiently for the Prime Minister to display the command that he reminds us he has of all things international. We have been prepared to wait patiently for him to deliver on his big promises. As I said, these matters should be, wherever possible, bipartisan. But I must say—again in a tone of constructive criticism—that prime ministers who seek bipartisan support for matters of national security should be prepared to be open. Only last week my office contacted the Prime Minister’s office to seek a briefing on the statement that he intended to deliver on these vitally important issues for our nation’s wellbeing. We received no briefing, and I simply note without comment that this 40-page document was handed to my office just after the stroke of 9 am today.

As to the statement itself, we note that the Labor Party has abandoned its election pledge to create a department of homeland security. This is one broken promise for which we can all be very thankful. It was a very poorly conceived idea—a cheap copy of an American experiment. It was crafted more to capture campaign headlines than as a serious public policy reform. But before we give the final last rites to the Prime Minister’s department of homeland security let us recall the critique of our, the coalition government’s, national security apparatus by the then opposition spokesman on homeland security, Mr Arch Bevis. I quote him from 3 October 2007. Mr Bevis said:

New threats have emerged that demand a rethink of our nation’s strategic and tactical response.

The Federal Government saw the importance of combining critical security agencies under one command in the lead up to the Sydney Olympics, yet it has avoided the difficult decisions in restructuring its own departments to provide a similar single structure for homeland security.

The Howard Government’s continuing insistence on splitting these functions over a number of departments invites overlap, wastage, confusion and missed opportunities.

The logic of those who argue that civilian security should be administered in separate departments responsible to various ministers is reminiscent of those who argued forty years ago, that Australia should maintain separate Ministers for Army, Navy, Air Force and Supply. No one today would disagree with the decision in the early 1970’s to create a Defence Department with a single Minister for Defence. The same clear sighted vision for non military security agencies is required today.

He concludes this trenchant assault on the Howard government’s mismanagement of national security by saying:

Interdepartmental committees are not a substitute for a single minister with clear responsibility for a Department of Homeland Security …

So that was to be the template for a Rudd revolution to overhaul in its entirety our national security establishment. According to Labor’s critique, the coalition had been putting Australians in harm’s way by allowing each of our security agencies to operate within its own area of specialisation. Labor’s answer was to bring it all into one gigantic superbureaucracy, and today the Prime Minister himself has exposed that proposition as the hoax it always was. The truth of it is that what Labor was proposing was a wasteful and costly exercise in bureaucracy. It would have meant reinventing well-established patterns of cooperation and coordination between our key security agencies and confusing and complicating the existing practice of reporting lines within and between those agencies.

So it is welcome that the Prime Minister is prepared to jettison one of the key planks—possibly the key plank—of the national security policy he took to the last election. For this we can thank the sound, determined and intelligent advice of our professionals in the field. The Prime Minister was strongly advised as far back as July, in the report by the former Secretary of the Department of Defence Mr Ric Smith, that he should not go ahead with his plans for this Rudd security revolution. It took the Prime Minister a long time to swallow this particular medicine, but the fact that he has now agreed to the unceremonious dumping of this centrepiece of Labor’s national security policy is a victory for common sense.

So what is now the centrepiece of this national security policy? What are the policy breakthroughs that will fortify our nation against future threats unknown? First, we have a reannouncement of the defence white paper, which the minister promised would be delivered by the end of this year but which is now not expected until as late as May. Then we have an undertaking by the Prime Minister to commission a white paper on counterterrorism to be delivered at an unspecified date next year. Let me just note that the Howard government released a white paper on terrorism less than four years ago: Transnational terrorism: the threat to Australia112 pages of detailed, state-of-the-art analysis of the threat posed by global terrorist groups, an exploration and discussion of what motivates their murderous attacks on free societies like our own and a wealth of rigorously researched policy responses across domestic, regional and international arenas, incorporating all agencies seeking to meet that challenge. So we have to ask whether this announcement of a new white paper on counterterrorism is not simply a response to the inevitable wake-up call from last week’s murderous assault in Mumbai. Was it then that the Prime Minister realised that his own national security statement had been caught rather light on in how it dealt with the central challenges of counterterrorism? So, to disguise the lack of energy and application he has devoted to this, the main contemporary threat to free societies such as our own today, he is asking for another leave pass to have another go at it and make yet another statement.

In his statement, the Prime Minister says that Australia’s diplomacy must be the best in the world—and we agree with that, and to achieve that capability it must be properly resourced, but our security agencies are critical to protecting Australians at home and abroad—and that his government is committed to ‘ensuring that our agencies are resourced appropriately to meet the challenges of terrorist threats’. We would all say amen to that, but let us measure the Prime Minister’s rhetoric against the reality. In his first budget, the Rudd government cut $1.3 billion over five years from government departments and agencies involved in national security. Four hundred and twenty-one million dollars has been cut through the application of the government’s one-off two per cent efficiency dividend. Nine hundred and thirteen million dollars was stripped from departments and agencies by the Minister for Finance and Deregulation’s razor gang—that includes $680 million from the Department of Defence and $232 million from the Department of Immigration and Citizenship. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has lost nearly $120 million over five years from its budget, including 305 jobs from the section of the department ‘whose outcomes reflect the department’s primary responsibility for developing and implementing foreign and trade policy on matters of international security, trade policy and global cooperation that advances Australia’s national interest’. This is despite the Prime Minister saying he wants Australia to be more involved with the Pacific, that he wants to step up engagement with Asia, that he wants to pursue a seat on the Security Council and that he wants to create a European Union-style Asia-Pacific Union. The Prime Minister has simply not put his money where his mouth is.

When we look at the Australian Federal Police, it is much the same story. Labor in opposition promised to fund an increase in Federal Police numbers by 500, yet we find in the Australian Federal Police’s annual report that the AFP had an operating loss for 2007-08 of $43.5 million. How can it be argued that this government is providing sufficient support to Australia’s premier law enforcement agency, which is on the front line of the counterterrorism effort?

Then we have the finance minister’s attack in parliament only last week over what he said was an oversupply of computers to public servants. The finance minister was critical of public servants having two computers on their desks. What the finance minister appears not to understand is that those working within our security apparatus often have a legitimate need for two computers or more. If the government begins stripping agencies of computers for their offices, how will this improve our agencies’ security and intelligence operations?

We trust that the appointment of Mr Duncan Lewis as the Prime Minister’s national security adviser will see the Minister for Finance and Deregulation quickly disavowed of this superficial analysis of that question. We warmly welcome Mr Lewis into his new role. He is an experienced professional and has long been an outstanding contributor to our national security effort. Indeed, there will be a considerable continuity between the job he has been doing for some years and this new title role that he is being given. We must also note that this appointment appears to signal the centralising of the national security responsibility in the Office of the Prime Minister. We remind the Prime Minister of the onus this places upon him. The buck will certainly stop with him. The opposition will reserve judgement of much of the detail in this document until we have had a chance to fully explore it and, hopefully, had the benefit of the briefings we sought and were denied only last week.

I note that there are several instances of rebadging about to happen. That is a common theme with the Rudd government—in particular, the renaming of the Australian Customs and border protection service. What does this mean for the existing agency, known as Border Protection Command, which is currently led by a rear admiral and coordinates defence, Customs and fisheries. Is the Navy about to become an appendage of Customs? One would think not. How is that going to work? The paper says that it will create a capability to task and analyse intelligence and to coordinate surveillance. Border protection command already does this, and very capably, with assets such as Coastwatch, Navy and Customs patrol vessels. In other respects, this statement offers a precis of the widely accepted realities of Australia’s strategic outlook—the rise of China and the emergence of India as the two key dynamics of shifting power balances in our world. But it continues the Rudd government’s tradition of deferring action into the future. There is a foreign policy statement to come, a defence white paper to come—I could have said that it is coming like Christmas; but it is going to come well after Christmas—an energy white paper to come, a counterterrorism white paper, a new one, to come, along with the National Energy Security Assessment.

The Prime Minister says officials need ‘greater institutional agility’, and yet his paper adds new layers of management and centralises activities, without stating what problems exist or what benefits centralisation delivers. The Prime Minister has touched in passing on a number of threats to security in our region. He made some remarks about climate change, the consequence of climate change on developing countries and the impact that may have for national security. I would say to the Prime Minister that there are very serious issues associated with drought—and water scarcity, in particular—across the region. The impact of climate change is there. But there has also been massive and unsustainable overexploitation of water resources in the two largest countries in our region, India and China. There is considerable evidence, for example, that the agricultural production capacity of the North China Plain, which feeds 400 million people in China, will be severely diminished by the depletion of the groundwater resources there. What are the implications for China—for its political stability, for its relations with the rest of the region—if there are very significant reductions in its capacity to produce the food to feed its population?

Similar comments could be made about overexploitation of water in northern India. And this is why, when we were in government, we went to great pains to ensure that we worked closely with our neighbours—in particular, China—on these issues of water scarcity. Because, while we must collaborate in terms of climate change mitigation and achieving an effective global agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, we must also recognise that achieving the adaptation to climate change and to problems like water scarcity internationally can be just as important for us. Of course, we delivered a world-leading initiative here in Australia with the previous Prime Minister’s National Plan for Water Security. It may be that, in the decades to come, water scarcity in China and India will be as significant an issue for Australians as water scarcity in our own country is. That is why the cooperation that we initiated has been so important.

This underlines an element that I believe was missing from the Prime Minister’s statement on national security and that is this: it is a vital element of our national interest—as well as, I believe, being in our interests to play a constructive role in our region—that Australia maintains, and indeed enhances, its capacity to produce food. We must recognise that food security is going to be a critical issue. It is perfectly plain that a larger global population will need more food. It is equally plain that a wealthier global population will need a bit more food and, in particular, more grain because of the growing inability to afford meat. It is also clear that in many regions, as I have stated, the ability to produce food is diminishing because of water scarcity. We must be clearly focused on ensuring that Australia’s ability to produce food is not diminished. That is why we differ from the government in its approach to the implementation of our National Plan for Water Security. Too much emphasis is being given by this government on buying back water entitlements and not enough is being given to improving the efficient use of water and enabling us to produce more food with less water—in other words, to make every drop count.

This is not simply a domestic issue; it has very significant international ramifications. That is why we should be very focused on ensuring that we, prudently and in an environmentally sustainable way, are able to expand agriculture in the north of Australia, where, of course, we have most of our nation’s water resources. Having said those things, we must reserve our judgement on much of the content of the Prime Minister’s statement. Much of it, of course, is uncontroversial, but there are a number of initiatives, as I have noted, that we will need to look at more carefully and on which we will need to obtain a briefing from his officials.

This statement is a lengthy one, but it is not by any means a bold or particularly clear step through the intellectual fog. Not even the Prime Minister would describe this as swift and decisive, although he may well do so—he is very fond of doing so. I can see that the Prime Minister is thinking to himself, ‘Watch me, mate; I’ll do that.’ The statement does not adequately and unequivocally describe what the government intends to do about the main security challenges facing us in the years ahead. So much of it is thrown into the future, into new structures, new reviews and new reports. As yet, it has not offered us—and we would encourage the government to do this—a clear and concise explanation of the strategic doctrine to which the Rudd government is working, if indeed such a doctrine exists.

Debate adjourned.

Ordered that the resumption of the debate be made an order of the day for the next sitting.