Bruce Scott (Maranoa, National Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Australia would be devastated if foot-and-mouth disease were to ever enter our shores. I know there are some reports that it was perhaps in Australia in the very early 1800s, at a time when there was limited scientific evidence and limited records kept, but we must look at the fact that we have been free of this disease for more than 130 years. Over many decades Australian farmers have built themselves a strong, world-class reputation as producers of clean, green and high-quality pork, beef, veal, lamb, venison and dairy products, but this could all be destroyed if Australia were to experience an outbreak of this devastating and highly contagious disease.

The most severe foot-and-mouth disease outbreak on record happened in 2001 in England. It caused a devastating loss of more than A$19 billion to the British economy and to the farmers. Some five million sheep, 764,000 cattle and 435,000 pigs and goats—a total of more than six million animals—were destroyed because of an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease. On top of the economic loss, it is estimated that the cost to the British government for the clean-up and for compensation for slaughtered animals was A$6 billion. But no compensation can ever replace the genetic potential of the animals that are lost forever, genetics that have been bred up over years and years.

Should an outbreak happen in Australia, the genetics would be lost because the only control method is the total destruction of all affected animals. The devastating aspect of this disease is that, because it is so highly contagious, any animal that comes in contact with infected animals or is believed to have come into contact with infected animals must sadly be destroyed. If Australia were to experience an outbreak, we may find it difficult to contain due to our large feral pig, camel and goat populations. Imagine trying to clean up coastal areas where we have large populations of feral pigs—or feral goats, as is the case further west—during a wet season when you have to deal with the disruption to roads and the flooding that goes on. There is the potential for those feral animals to transport the disease over wide distances. It would be difficult to control and would add to the complexity.

Imagine the loss of the genetic potential of our superior gene stock in Australia. This year in May we had Beef 2009 in Rockhampton—one of the major events for the beef industry. People and breeders from many countries around the world came to Rockhampton to Beef 2009 to look at the superior genetics that we have in our beef herds in Australia—another major export earner for Australia. Of course, if there were a foot-and-mouth outbreak these superior ones would be caught up as well. It does not discriminate; there would be total destruction of all the animals in the infected area.

Just before Christmas last year, when the minister released the Beale report entitled One Biosecurity: a working partnership, I can assure you that word spread as fast as the potential that this disease has to spread that the report recommended the importation of a positive controlled sample of the virus for research purposes and that the Rudd government—and this is from the minister—had given its in-principle agreement to the recommendation. Farmers and their representative bodies, such as AgForce, the Cattle Council of Australia and the Australian Beef Association, were understandably up in arms about the possibility of this disease entering our shores.

One can certainly not accuse them of overreacting. The 2007 outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in England—which came after the 2001 outbreak—was shown to have come from a secure animal health laboratory where the virus was held. After the 2001 outbreak in England the British beef processors were unable to resume trading for five years. Imagine how those affected UK farmers must have felt when in 2007 they were hit with this disease again. Imagine being part of an industry that was probably still repairing the damage done by the devastating 2001 outbreak only to cop it again because of a breach in what was a so-called secure animal health laboratory. It was the only known location in the United Kingdom where that particular strain was held.

A report into the outbreak concluded that the virus had leaked out from drainage at the facility, which contaminated the surrounding soil and then was spread to a nearby farm on the wheels of cars. How easily it can spread—an accidental outbreak occurring from a so-called high-security animal health laboratory! That gives members here an idea of how devastatingly contagious this disease is. In a somewhat fortunate turn for the British farmers, because it was caught reasonably quickly, it was able to be contained to a number of farms. Nonetheless, it was devastating for the affected farmers. According to the President of Britain’s National Farmers Union, Peter Kendall:

The effects of the outbreak were crippling for livestock farmers—milk had to be poured away, herds that had taken generations to breed had to be slaughtered, high quality livestock couldn’t be exported or sold for breeding and instead had to go to slaughter, and animals couldn’t be moved to fresh grazing and had to be left where they were.

They had to be left where they were if they were anywhere within the containment area or they were destroyed. I still have visions in my mind of the fires when these animals were being destroyed. They were being burnt in situ, where they were, because that is one of the control measures. I would hate to ever see that sort of thing on our shores.

In accordance with the EU requirements, a total ban on the export of UK animal and meat products from susceptible species was imposed and it was only in December 2007 that the EU export restrictions were lifted. The World Organisation for Animal Health did not reinstate the country’s foot-and-mouth disease-free status until February last year. That outbreak cost the farming industry in the UK some £100 million and insurmountable losses. Imagine if that had happened here in Australia. Imagine if our farmers were locked out of the global trade for even a year. Regional and rural communities would be economically gutted. The Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry estimates that a worst-case Australian foot-and-mouth disease infection would cost between $8 billion and $13 billion of gross domestic product. They are government figures; they are the department’s figures.

The emotional toll on farmers who have long been battling the drought could not be calculated if they were to then have their animals destroyed as a result of an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease. That is why the unequivocal and indefinite rejection of recommendation 59 of the Beale report is so important to the peace of mind of Australia’s livestock producers. I acknowledge that the Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry said that the Rudd government would only allow the importation of a live virus of foot-and-mouth disease if an outbreak in Australia had already occurred. I have got to say that is after the horse has bolted, and that comment also concerned me.

I note that the government intends to replace the 100-year-old Quarantine Act of 1908 with new legislation. I call on Minister Burke to use this opportunity when drafting our new quarantine legislation to make explicit and indefinite prohibition on the importation of foot-and-mouth virus for research purposes or, indeed, any other purpose, regardless of whether or not there has been an outbreak. We do not need to bring a live sample into this country. The Australian government scientists are already involved in offshore research in countries which have foot-and-mouth. We do not need to bring it onto our shores. Our billion dollar agricultural industry cannot afford the risk. (Time expired)

Dick Adams (Lyons, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

It is very good to have a discussion about this issue. I spent some of my youth out in the electorate of the honourable member for Maranoa, in shearing sheds—

Bruce Scott (Maranoa, National Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

That long ago!

Dick Adams (Lyons, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

A long time ago. It was a great experience and I remember it well.

The issue of the report on biosecurity is an important one. It is a report of some good work and it needs the full attention of the parliament and the government. To put the words importer risk analysis and the national interest into some context for the member’s motion, you really cannot have the full national interest of what the cost is to the government and to the country from losing costs and benefits. I think the panel would be quite happy to look at that approach but, of course, it is not consistent with the broader implications. I think the panel that wrote the report noted that the approach would not be consistent with Australia’s obligation under the SPS Agreement with the World Trade Organisation. You start to get into those trade restriction requirements and issues of non-tariff barriers et cetera.

Australia has an important and strong interest in having a less restrictive agriculture trade environment in the world—and we lead some of those fights. The Cairns Group, others and trade ministers have fought those battles and we have a managing role to keep together our trade in the world for not only agriculture but lots of other things that we produce. We are an exporting country; our wealth comes from exports. So we have to really approach these things in a pretty sophisticated manner. I saw the words of the panel in the report on dealing with that full national interest issue and it is an important one.

With the problems with the quarantine system, we looked at border protection since 1901. Keeping things out, stopping everything and zero tolerance have really been our thinking up until now, but that has changed over the last 20 years. People still think that, and our legislation reflects that. There is a need to look at things in a much broader way. We do have to come to grips with risk analysis. We need to look at where things come from in the world and at the risks and then make some analysis. That is the important issue.

All of the problems with the quarantine system, which has been around a long time, have led the Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry to seek an independent review to provide Australia with a more rigorous system to minimise the risk of pests and diseases entering our country. With globalisation and climate change the threats are enormously increased. We need to take them seriously and deal with them. With the present swine flu we think even more so about the increased international movement of people and goods, particularly from the areas that present higher biosecurity risks, and about the complications in identifying the risks at borders.

In my own state of Tasmania we have had fights about salmon and other things. We are an island on the periphery of this big island. We have fewer bugs and other things than many other areas. Our communities have a very high awareness of the value of biosecurity in securing access to quality-conscious, high-value and niche markets, especially overseas. We have done very well as a state in that area and hope to do well in the future. Being free of certain pathogens and other things in the biosecurity area gives us that opportunity.

We need very tight security across the country to ensure that foreign pathogens do not enter unexpectedly. We must be prepared. I believe we can be. Last year the minister released the Beale report, an independent review on quarantine and biosecurity arrangements. The government’s preliminary response is to accept the recommendations of the review in principle. Minister Burke felt that the report was an important step in this government’s commitment to improve Australia’s biosecurity scheme. It provides a comprehensive blueprint for meeting the biosecurity challenges of the future. While we agreed in principle, further detailed considerations will be critical to implementing the new scheme.

The honourable member for Maranoa raised recommendation 59. There will always be concerns about the implications of importing the foot-and-mouth virus or any other pathogen. However, he may have misinterpreted what the minister for agriculture said. He has already stated that the government would only consider importing live foot-and-mouth virus samples if there was an actual outbreak in Australia and it was advised that importing samples would contribute to the eradication of the disease. He was pretty specific. The report went further to say that, should an import permit application for foot-and-mouth disease virus be proposed, there would be extensive consultation with industry and other stakeholders before lodgement of a formal request. So, although the government’s response may take a while, the in-principle agreement to recommendation 59 should not be interpreted as automatic entry for, or agreement to, the importation of any disease agent, including the foot-and-mouth disease virus.

Currently, there is no such application before government and the government does not intend to support any application at this stage. If we had to deal with an actual outbreak of foot-and-mouth then we might need to allow the Australian Animal Health Laboratory in Geelong to take undertake diagnostic research and be prepared for dealing with the crisis. We know that this has proved valuable in work that was done during the highly pathogenic avian influenza and, in 2008, in the case of the equine influenza outbreak. The Geelong laboratory was able to quickly confirm and identify the virus by using reference strains held in secure storage. The laboratory’s access to virus agents enabled a faster and more effective response than would otherwise have been the case and the rapidity of the response was critically important to Australia’s success in the eradication of the disease.

I understand the member’s concern and I would be one of the first to stand up for the strictest biosecurity regime, but we are still getting dangerous pathogens here, despite all. I do not see that we are going to get rid of those by thinking—(Time expired)

Mark Coulton (Parkes, National Party, Shadow Parliamentary Secretary for Water Resources and Conservation) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I am very pleased to be standing here tonight supporting my colleague, the member for Maranoa, on what is a very important issue. I acknowledge the comments from the member for Lyons as well. There is probably agreement that foot-and-mouth disease poses probably one of the greatest threats if it came through to livestock production in Australia. I believe the recommendation in the Beale report to allow live virus into the country, even though it says ‘after an outbreak has occurred’, sends a mixed message and we need to make sure that we are unequivocal in the stand we take.

Agriculture and livestock, even in this economic downturn, is the one thing that did not reduce in the balance of payments. Indeed, carrying Australia to a large degree at the moment are our agricultural exports. We need to protect these at all costs. In 2006-07 Australian agriculture, fisheries and forestry industries contributed $38.5 billion to the national economy and employed more than 270,000 people in rural and regional areas. The Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry estimates that a worst-case Australian foot-and-mouth disease infection would cost up to $13 billion. Almost all of our animal exports would cease immediately and there would be a huge drop in demand for animal products on the domestic market. The tourist industry has suffered dramatically in every country where a foot-and-mouth disease outbreak has occurred. It goes without saying that we would see widespread losses in employment and Australia’s rural economy would be devastated.

What I would like to focus briefly on tonight is that Australia is uniquely at risk. If foot-and-mouth disease came to Australia, we would not be able to control it. In the United Kingdom and other countries where foot-and-mouth disease has been in the past, they are relatively intensive, tightly managed agricultural units. The biggest threat that we have is if it got into the wild pig population. We are at risk. It would only take a seaman at Kooragang Island in Newcastle Harbour to throw the remains of his sandwich overboard with a bit of salami or something that he has brought with him from Brazil or wherever he has come from, and it could be picked up by the wild pigs.

Just in my own area, north-west New South Wales, and from my own personal experience, I know that several neighbours and I, employing a helicopter, have shot up to 500 pigs in one morning. That is without having any obvious signs; you never see them. The other thing about wild pigs is that they will travel 20 to 30 kilometres in one night in search of food, so they would spread this rapidly. There is no part of Australia, except maybe in the driest of deserts, where they are not a problem. I see the member for Solomon and the member for Flynn here, and I am sure they are very well aware of this and that, even in the tropical paradises that they come from, wild pigs would be a huge problem.

Dick Adams (Lyons, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Mr Adams interjecting

Mark Coulton (Parkes, National Party, Shadow Parliamentary Secretary for Water Resources and Conservation) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Not in Tassie. The member for Lyons would probably have the ability to turn them into a delicious treat of some sort. But I digress. In the United Kingdom there is a commercial vaccine production company that has the full nine strains of foot-and-mouth disease on file. They can have up to half a million cattle-equivalent doses for each of the nine strains, and if an outbreak were to occur we would have access to that within a matter of hours. While I understand the words the minister has said—that this would only be imported if an outbreak occurred—I think that is a slightly wavering message, and I would urge that they reword point No. 59 in the bill report so that there can be no mixed messages on the point that the live virus of foot-and-mouth disease should not be imported into Australia.

Chris Trevor (Flynn, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Firstly, for the record, I say that the Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Tony Burke, has clearly stated that there is only one case in which the government would consider importing live foot-and-mouth virus samples, and that is if there were an actual outbreak in Australia and the government were advised that importing samples would contribute to the eradication of the disease. It is no secret that the Australian Animal Health Laboratory in Geelong already holds a limited number of exotic viruses that it has used for a number of years under strict conditions for diagnostic research and disease preparedness. The Australian Animal Health Laboratory is the only facility in Australia which has the appropriate biocontainment capacity for handling the virus. Professor Alan Bell, chief of CSIRO Livestock Industries, has recently advised that the laboratory has no plans to seek permission to import live foot-and-mouth virus for research purposes.

It should be noted, however, that the government has been advised that it may be useful to have imported pure strains to produce test antigens depending on the size of the response required. Some have suggested that the government could rely on the overseas laboratory in Thailand to carry out all necessary work related to FMD. However, that laboratory does not possess every possible known strain of FMD. Therefore, with respect, it is an act of gross vandalism by the opposition to suggest that the government rely on the work done by a foreign government to respond to an FMD outbreak in Australia. This motion—specifically clause 3—states quite clearly that we should not do all we possibly can to respond in the most effective way to an FMD outbreak.

Again, with respect, the coalition’s record on quarantine and biosecurity is terrible. Let us take some examples. Firstly, there was the equine influenza outbreak. Despite many warnings from the horse-racing sector and veterinarians, the Howard government presided over a quarantine system which was dysfunctional, leading to the equine influenza outbreak in August 2007. Indeed, in the past 10 years alone, on the coalition’s watch we saw white spot disease in prawns in Darwin in 2000; black sigatoka in bananas in 2001; fire ants in 2001; small hive beetle affecting bees in 2002; sugarcane smut in 2006; equine influenza; and citrus canker disease in 2004 in my electorate of Flynn, in Emerald.

Citrus canker, an exotic bacterial disease of citrus and other related plants, was detected in the Emerald district in June 2004. As the member for Maranoa will recall, it had a devastating impact on the Emerald community, which he once served. A pest quarantine area was established in July 2004 to prevent further spread and facilitate eradication of the disease. During 2004 and 2005 all high-risk host plants of citrus canker were removed from the pest quarantine area. Australia produces close to 700,000 tonnes of citrus each year. Citrus production is valued at $420 million annually. Major markets for Australian citrus include Hong Kong, Malaysia, the United States, Singapore, Indonesia, Japan, New Zealand, Taiwan, Canada and Korea.

Citrus canker was declared eradicated from Queensland by the national management group on 23 January this year. All other states and territories have agreed to remove all citrus canker related movement and market access restrictions. As with the system that eradicated citrus canker, the Rudd Labor government recognises the importance of a rigorous system to minimise the risk of pests and disease, particularly as globalisation and climate change increase these threats. The government is now working towards implementing the reforms outlined in the Beale report, which are aimed at building a better system which fosters partnerships, improves governance structures and targets risks.

Nola Marino (Forrest, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I am extremely concerned at the Rudd Labor government’s decision to allow foot-and-mouth disease virus to be imported into Australia in any circumstances. We need to draw a very firm line on this issue. There should be no equivocation on foot-and-mouth disease. As soon as the Beale report was released, the government immediately announced its in-principle support for all of the 84 recommendations, which included recommendation 59, to import foot-and-mouth disease virus. This was announced without industry consultation and effectively places Australia’s foot-and-mouth-free status at unnecessary risk. A decision to allow the import of foot-and-mouth disease virus for experimental purposes, even after an outbreak, will overturn years of government objection to its import. Australia’s livestock industries have always vigorously resisted attempts by scientists to allow the virus into the Animal Health Laboratory in Geelong.

Foot-and-mouth disease is widespread across the world. According to the World Organisation for Animal Health, 51 countries reported incidences of infection between 2007 and 2008. I discussed this issue with Senator Chris Back, a qualified veterinarian who has very serious concerns with this decision, some of which I will mention. Australian agriculture, especially but not exclusively the animal industries, would be devastated should foot-and-mouth disease become established in Australia; others could tell us the very immediate impact of that on GDP. If FMD got into Northern Australia, the most likely route of infection, it is probable we would never get rid of it from the feral camel population and the several million—and increasing—feral buffaloes, as well as rangeland cattle and feral pigs—you name it. We are an island continent. Our strongest protection against diseases such as FMD is to preserve our disease-free status as long as we can. Prevention is the most effective risk treatment measure in this case. There is no basis for us introducing the live FMD virus.

The Pirbright laboratory in the UK was regarded universally as a benchmark laboratory, but it was from this very laboratory that the virus escaped in 2007, with the resultant devastation of Britain’s agriculture. The facility at Geelong is probably one of the best facilities of its type in the world, but this is no reason to allow a live virus into Australia. If we get the disease into Australia through biosecurity failure or other means, that is still no reason for us to bring the virus into the country. Australia already pays at least one overseas laboratory, if not two, to undertake diagnosis of serotypes et cetera and to produce quantities of vaccine in volumes far greater and quicker than any lab in Australia could. CSIRO scientists already work with overseas colleagues on FMD and other highly infectious diseases. Senator Back also said he could not believe there is or would be a scientifically valid reason for bringing the virus onto the Australian mainland. If there ever was a need to work with the virus on ‘Australian territory’, such work could be conducted on the Cocos Islands, where the federal government already owns assets.

From a risk management viewpoint, the only sensible course of action is prevention and I really cannot think of any reason why we would voluntarily introduce the FMD virus. We just need to look at the devastation the disease has caused in other countries, in Brazil and in the United Kingdom where 6 million animals were culled, causing financial losses of more than A$19 billion. It cost the UK government the approximate equivalent of A$6.1 billion in compensation for slaughtered animals and payments for disposal and clean up costs. And Western Australia produces a wide range of meat products. We have sheep, cattle, right through to pigs, export and domestic productions. These industries provide major employment and regional economic benefits.

Australia is foot and mouth disease free. It certainly needs to stay that way. A Productivity Commission report in 2002 indicated that a major outbreak could cost Australia over $9 billion in lost export earnings—and you can imagine what it would be now. That was 2002. The beef industry would be the most affected and there are several major abattoirs and butchering operations in my electorate as well as the state herd, total 2.3 million head in 2007-08. They are very important industries. I support the motion by the member for Maranoa and I, too, call on the Labor government to recognise that because of the risks associated with such importation there needs to be unequivocal recognition of this issue. It is too important and the government must reject recommendation 59 of the Beale report.

Damian Hale (Solomon, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I acknowledge the member for Maranoa for putting this motion to the House and I am happy to add my contribution to the points he has raised. I would like to reiterate what the speakers on this side of the House have already said and that is that the Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry has clearly stated that there is only one case in which the government would consider importing live foot and mouth virus samples and that is only if there was an actual outbreak in Australia and if the government was advised that importing samples would contribute to the eradication of the disease.

Recently I had the privilege of hosting the Prime Minister’s country task force in my electorate of Solomon. We had the pleasure of meeting with many primary producing industry groups. One of the groups we met with was the NT Cattlemen’s Association. NTCA Executive Director, Luke Bowen, does a fantastic job in representing the industry and I know the industry speaks very highly of the Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry and the work that he has done. They say that he is possibly the best ag minister they have ever had and that includes the member for Wide Bay.

I am passionate about this issue because members of the NT Cattlemen’s Association successfully manage in excess of 62,000 square kilometres or 9.6 per cent of the Australian landscape. The pastoral industry generates over $300 million in direct benefits and flow-on benefits worth more than $800 million to the local NT economy. That is about 75 per cent of the NT’s gross value of agricultural production. Last year over 330,000 cattle were exported live through the Port of Darwin, a figure I know the NT Livestock Exporters Association is very proud of.

The significance of the cattle industry to the Territory is not something new to the proactive Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry. In fact, I know the minister thoroughly enjoyed a very rewarding experience at a cattle station up in the Territory recently and only last week he was in the Kimberley opening new export yards and promoting Indigenous Australians in primary industry. The Beale review is an independent review of Australia’s quarantine and biodiversity arrangements. The report is an important step in our government’s commitment to improve Australia’s biodiversity system. It provides a comprehensive blueprint for meeting the biodiversity challenges of the future and in principle we have to accept the recommendations of the review.

The Chief of the CSIRO Livestock Industries, Professor Alan Bell, has advised that there are no plans to seek permission to import live foot and mouth disease virus for research purposes and also only after an extensive consultation process with industry and other stakeholders would they lodge a formal request should an import permit application for foot and mouth disease virus be required. In opposition, Labor expressed grave concerns about Australia’s quarantine and biodiversity arrangements. As an example, despite the many warnings for the horse racing sector and veterinarians the previous government were in control of a quarantine system which was dysfunctional. It led to the equine influenza outbreak back in 2007.

The then agriculture minister, the member for Wide Bay, ignored written warnings from the Australian Racing Board not to downgrade post-arrival equine quarantine inspections in 2004. He even wrote to the Australian Racing Board declaring that the outbreak could not occur under the current AQIS post-arrival protocols. Unfortunately for Australia’s racing industry and all the others affected, we did have the outbreak. History will tell us that he was wrong. And, fair dinkum, now we have this private member’s motion effectively wanting this government to state on record that if we were in the unfortunate position of an actual outbreak of foot and mouth disease in Australia, the member for Maranoa wants us to do nothing—just like the member for Wide Bay did nothing in 2004.

The Rudd government recognises the importance of the rigorous system to minimise the risk of pests and disease, particularly as globalisation and climate change increase the threats. This government takes biosecurity seriously. This government listens to experts and industry, and this government takes decisive action. I have a lot of respect for the honourable member. In his first speech in 1990 he said:

This Government has the responsibility to put in place legislation which not only deals with today’s issues but also has a beneficial effect on our children’s future. Today’s children are tomorrow’s adults. Their future rests with today’s decision-makers.

Surely this is a responsible thing to do to guarantee the future of our children. As a government, we do all that is possible to make sure that we can respond to threats to Australia’s biosecurity in the most effective way.