Peter Dutton (Dickson, Liberal Party, Shadow Minister for Health and Ageing) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The National Health Security Amendment Bill 2009 will amend the National Health Security Act 2007 to widen controls over the security of biological agents that could be used as weapons, agents known as security sensitive biological agents or SSBAs. It will enable the Minister for Health and Ageing to respond immediately to secure public health and safety in the event of an SSBA related disease outbreak. It will establish new controls on the handling of biological agents and the responsibilities of those who do handle them by extending the provisions of the legislation to suspected security sensitive biological agents, requiring those dealing with material that is not known to be a dangerous agent but is suspected of being dangerous to treat as if it were an SSBA. Additionally, inspectors involved in monitoring entities and facilities dealing with such biological agents will be given search and seizure powers by these amendments.

The National Health Security Act, passed by parliament in 2007 under the previous coalition government, was the culmination of lengthy consultations and negotiations between the Commonwealth and state governments dating back to 2002. After fatal anthrax attacks in the United States and subsequent white powder hoaxes in Australia, the Council of Australian Governments agreed to review the security of hazardous materials including harmful biological materials. A mandatory national regulatory system was decided upon as the most effective means of minimising the security risks posed by SSBAs. The phased implementation process was agreed and, after legislation was passed in 2007, the first regulation of tier 1 biological agents came into effect at the end of January this year. Security sensitive agents listed on tier 1 include anthrax, botulinum toxin, Ebola virus, foot and mouth disease and ricin, amongst others. Regulation of tier 2 agents is due to come into effect at the end of January 2010. These security sensitive biological agents, the likes of yellow fever virus, cholera and typhoid, are considered less likely to be a threat to Australia.

The amendments to the legislation now before the House are a result of consultations between government and entities that deal with security sensitive biological agents over the 18-month period between the passage of the national health security legislation through the parliament and the introduction of the tier 1 regulations this year. In government, the coalition delivered the National Health Security Act as part of our commitment to enhancing Australia’s capability to protect the health of the nation and to respond to naturally occurring epidemics or to terrorist attacks involving chemical, biological or radiological agents. At the time, it was recognised that further measures would be needed to enable national responses to health emergencies and mass casualty situations.

These amendments respond to some of those difficulties. They will empower the minister to respond immediately to an SSBA related disease outbreak. The minister will be empowered to relax or suspend some or all of the regulatory requirements relating to such dangerous biological agents. The minister will be able to impose new conditions to ensure protection of public health and safety and will be able to take action by legislative instrument which can take effect immediately and be varied or revoked to suit rapidly changing circumstances. It will not be the subject of the usual provisions of the Legislative Instruments Act.

The opposition notes that this does raise some concern about parliamentary oversight of decisions that could be critical not just to the situation unfolding but to the nation as a whole. The Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills has noted this situation and asked the minister to advise how the parliament can scrutinise any emergency arrangements put in place. The committee has also noted that these amendments could have the effect of altering the obligations of an entity without notice or without an opportunity for review and, again, has asked that the minister provide advice on the reasons for these changes.

It should be noted that entities involved with or representing those that handle security sensitive material have voiced no concerns about the provisions of this legislation. The minister’s responses to these questions are expected to be tabled in the Senate today and we look forward to scrutiny of that response. While the legislation provides for immediate action, the fact that the action is pursued via the means of a legislative instrument does allow for parliamentary scrutiny; albeit, in these circumstances, post the event. Neither the act nor the bill makes specific reference to the legislative instruments not being disallowable, and the instruments do not fall within the types of instruments that are not disallowable under the Legislative Instruments Act 2003. On the basis that legislative instruments made by the minister under this legislation would be disallowable, we provide our support to that arrangement.

What must be kept in mind are the circumstances in which these powers would come into play; that is, they would involve a serious threat to the nation requiring an immediate response. The coalition notes that the legislation does provide certain protections. The minister may only make a legislative instrument under this legislation if satisfied on two key matters: firstly, that there is a threat involving such an agent to the health or safety of the public, the economy or the environment; and secondly, that the making of the legislative instrument would help to reduce that threat.

Additionally, the minister must consider relevant expert advice before making a legislative instrument to deal with an SSBA threat. That advice must come from the Chief Medical Officer, the Commonwealth Chief Veterinary Officer and another expert with scientific or technical knowledge of security-sensitive biological agents. And the minister must only act after taking advice from the Secretary of the Department of Health and Ageing that the legislative instrument would help in reducing the threat posed by SSBAs to the public, the economy or the environment.

The government argues that the extreme nature of a threat posed by an SSBA-related incident warrants delegation of legislative power to ensure an immediate response can be made to an emergency disease situation. Commonsense would acknowledge that in the circumstances of a biological threat to our country or any part of it, the government must be able to use all means at its disposal to negate the threat. On that basis, the coalition will support the legislation.

Graham Perrett (Moreton, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to speak on the National Health Security Amendment Bill 2009. Firstly, to do so, I just want to take you back to 1995 and one of the movies that you might have been watching at the time—if you had time to watch movies. Outbreak was a movie that starred Dustin Hoffmann, Rene Russo, Morgan Freeman, Cuba Gooding Jr, Patrick Dempsey, and even Donald Sutherland and Kevin Spacey. I clearly remember the opening scene because it was an interesting way for a Hollywood action film—which is basically what it was—to show something happening when there was actually nothing happening.

The opening scene started with the camera following a virus through the air, up through an air vent, into a cinema and eventually you see someone coughing when they catch the virus. It is a hard thing for Hollywood to show nothing happening. It is sort of like showing paint drying or the National Party embracing climate change. It is hard to see anything happening. But this movie showed it. They subtly introduced the idea of a fictional Ebola-like virus called Motaba and then showed how the military and civilian agencies react to containing its spread.

I will now move away from Hollywood to the legislation before the chamber: a bill to amend the NHS Act to enhance Australia’s ability to secure certain biological agents that could be used as weapons. I am thankful for this legislation because it has added to my collection of acronyms. I will call security sensitive biological agents SSBAs so your collection of acronyms is expanded as well. They are divided into two tiers: tier one agents obviously pose a greater risk, and tier two agents are rated as less likely to pose a security risk. It is a particularly horrible list. It starts with anthrax and goes on to Botulinum toxin—I am sure the member for Banks is not familiar with this Botulinum toxin—which is the most lethal toxic protein. However, when it is purified you can use it as Botox. And I am sure the member for Banks is not familiar with that! There is the Ebola virus, the foot and mouth disease virus, Ricin—a derivative of which, known as sarin, was used on the Tokyo subway by the Aum cult and killed 12 people. Ricin is 500 times stronger than cobra venom. There is also SARS. Smallpox claimed up to 500 million lives in the last century. In 1947, the Soviet Union established a smallpox weapons factory. These things have been around—and on our minds—for the last century or so. They are significant. The plague has taken 200 million lives since the sixth century, having peaked in the 1300s. All school kids would have studied the times when fleas on rats spread along the trade routes, and so the plague struck. More recently, in 1940, the Japanese used it in China and dropped bombs containing fleas. I am not sure how it worked out, but these diseases have been used as weapons. To name but a few, tier two agents include things like African swine fever, sheep pox and goat pox, botulism, lumpy skin disease virus—which I do not know much about, but it does not sound very pleasant—salmonella, other types of cholera, and yellow fever.

The regulatory scheme that the government is proposing for SSBAs currently includes stringent requirements relating to notification of the types and locations of SSBAs, along with standards that must be met by organisations—such as universities and labs—that handle SSBAs. Over the past year and a half, the government has worked closely with these organisations and other experts to ensure a smooth implementation of this regulatory scheme. When you see that list, you understand why. A number of areas have been highlighted where improvements to the scheme might be made, and we have responded accordingly. The proposed amendments enable the Minister for Health and Ageing to respond immediately and appropriately to the challenge of safeguarding public health and safety in the unlikely event of an SSBA related disease outbreak. The proposed changes enable the suspension of certain existing regulatory requirements and the imposition of new conditions to ensure that adequate controls are maintained. In the movie Outbreak you see how a government could overreact in such circumstances. In Australia it is important that we get the processes and regulations right.

The amendments also ensure that the minister has access to all relevant information about how to deal with an SSBA—the right sort of technical expertise, advice from the chief veterinary officer—coming from Queensland, we have seen how important that is with the recent Hendra virus outbreak—the chief medical officer et cetera. The amendments will also extend reporting controls to biological agents suspected to be SSBAs. This measure will clarify the obligations of entities at the early stage when they are handling a biological agent and, after having performed all the usual testing procedures for that biological agent, there is a positive presumptive indication for SSBA. The new provisions will require an entity to report its handlings and transfers of suspected SSBAs. It also requires entities to comply with all the standards for suspected SSBAs. Thirdly, the bill will enhance the investigation powers available under the NHS Act, which means that inspectors can monitor warrants, including seizing evidential material, doing so appropriately and storing material appropriately. The new measure also introduces defence related warrants that provide powers to search premises and seize evidential material.

As I said, we do not like to think about these diseases being used for improper purposes, but unfortunately there are some people out there in the world who would consider it. In fact, when you go through the list of countries that have dabbled in using these agents for warfare, it is quite scary. Importantly, this increase in investigation powers provided to authorities in Australia is complemented by necessary safeguards to ensure that there is a proper use of those powers. This includes safeguards such as authorisation by a magistrate and provisions governing return of seized property and compensation for any damage.

This bill also makes some less significant but equally important amendments to improve the operation of the legislation and provide greater clarity for those people who have to work with SSBAs. I am particularly interested in this because in my electorate of Moreton, at Coopers Plains, Queensland Health Scientific Services—which used to be called the John Tonge Centre—will be at the front line should anything happen such as an outbreak of SSBAs. These changes relate to requirements to report certain events involving SSBAs to local police, any minor changes to annual and biannual reporting of information recorded on the national register, new capacity to cancel the registration of an entity or its facility if they are no longer handling SSBAs, and amendments to the definition of biological agents so that bacteria and viruses that do not have the capacity to spread rapidly but may still be highly dangerous are captured. The proposed changes have been the subject of extensive consultation with relevant experts, including entities working with SSBAs, intelligence—which is very important, obviously—security agencies, the public, animal health laboratories, and state and government agencies. I commend the legislation to the House.

Luke Simpkins (Cowan, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to speak on the National Health Security Amendment Bill 2009. I do so because I believe very much in the best possible security for the health of Australians, especially with regard to any biological agents that could be used as weapons in the future. This bill’s intent is to amend the National Health Security Act 2007 in order to widen the controls over the security of biological agents, known as security-sensitive biological agents, or SSBAs. The National Health Security Act was introduced to the parliament by the coalition. It was passed in 2007. That act was designed to provide a national system of public health surveillance in order to enhance the capacity of the Commonwealth and the states and territories to identify and respond to public health events of national significance. That included the occurrence of certain communicable diseases as well as certain releases of chemical, biological or radiological agents, or the occurrence of public health risks or overseas mass casualties. Specifically, the act and the lengthy consultations that preceded it originated from the 2002 anthrax attacks in the USA. It was through that act that the National Notifiable Disease List was established. That was to comprise diseases that would constitute a public health risk if they broke out. The federal minister must consult with the Commonwealth Chief Medical Officer and each state or territory health minister regarding that list.

It is worthwhile to reflect on the security-sensitive biological agents that have been included in tier 1, under part 3 of the National Health Security Act 2007. As I understand it, the agents in tier 1 are abrin; Bacillus anthracis; botulinum toxin; Ebola virus; foot-and-mouth disease virus; highly pathogenic influenza virus, infecting humans; Marburg virus; ricin; rinderpest virus; SARS coronavirus; variola virus, also known as smallpox; and Yersinia pestis, the plague. Most of those are familiar to us here in Australia because they are all extremely dangerous and have been reported at various times in the media. By way of example, Ebola virus first emerged in 1976 in Zaire and Sudan. In Zaire the mortality rate for that outbreak was around 90 per cent. Transmission occurs when bodily fluids are transferred. In Africa the virus spreads quickly within communities because of mortuary rituals and hygiene issues. However, due to the difficulty of moving around Africa, the Ebola virus does not spread easily beyond the initial communities affected. Sadly, most people die before they can come in contact with other communities.

Another example is the SARS coronavirus, or severe acute respiratory syndrome, which between November 2002 and July 2003 spread from Guangdong Province in China to 37 other countries. It was described as being near pandemic, killing almost 800 of the more than 8,000 people who contracted SARS. Unlike the Ebola virus, which affects everyone who comes into contact with the bodily fluids of the infected and which has a common morbidity rate of between 50 and 90 per cent, 50 per cent of those who died from SARS were actually over 65 years old, while just one per cent of the deaths were of those under 25 years of age.

Finally I will speak of the variola virus, also known as smallpox. It was estimated that in the 20th century as many as 300 million to 500 million people lost their lives to the disease. However, in December 1979 the World Health Organisation declared that the smallpox virus had been eradicated through successful and long-term vaccination programs. It remains the only human infectious disease that has been completely eliminated, and that is a testament to the efforts of medicine and science. Nevertheless, given the history and deaths involved with smallpox, vaccinations continue and some places in the world appropriately keep watch for its re-emergence.

It is because of the risk of transmission and the potency of these agents that the National Health Security Act 2007 was deemed necessary, following the review of hazardous biological materials by the Council of Australian Governments in April 2007. Following on from the act and the regulations, security-sensitive biological agent standards were developed and released last year. The standards of handling security-sensitive biological agents are, of course, of vital importance because, as we have seen in the past, there have been examples of laboratory errors that allowed unplanned exposures to these agents.

In 1979 in the USSR city of Sverdlovsk, now Yekaterinburg, what has now been described as an accidental release of anthrax infected 94 people, with 68 dying. In 1978 the last person to die of smallpox was a medical photographer who contracted the disease at the University of Birmingham’s medical school. In March this year in Germany a female scientist accidentally pricked her finger with a needle used to inject Ebola into mice. She was given an experimental drug, and the incubation period passed, luckily, without her showing any symptoms, although it is uncertain as to whether she actually contracted the Ebola virus in the first place. What these and many other incidents show is that scrutiny of handling procedures and scrutiny of research or storage facilities is critical to ensure that these agents are contained safely whilst also recognising the need to conduct research into vaccines and better understanding the threat involved.

Within that context, I will now turn specifically to the National Health Security Amendment Bill 2009. The bill is meant to change three points in the current legislation: firstly, to empower the ministers to suspend regulations to deal with an emergency health threat; secondly, to extend current regulations to suspected SSBA, if required; and thirdly, to provide search and seizure powers for inspectors. With regard to the first point of empowering the minister to suspend regulatory obligations of the National Health Security Act 2007, this amendment is needed in order to provide an appropriate and immediate response to an emergency disease situation. This change will permit the minister to make a legislative instrument if there is a threat involving a security-sensitive biological agent that would impact upon the health or safety of people, the economy or the environment, where that legislative instrument would help in the reduction of that threat. The amendment would also allow the instrument to be varied or withdrawn immediately if required.

The second main point of the amendments is to allow control to be placed upon agents that are suspected of being security-sensitive biological agents. This change will bring in mandatory reporting, testing to confirm the agent and destruction requirements by the laboratories that deal with the suspected security-sensitive biological agent. The fines involved for failing to conform or failing to destroy suspected agents will be similar to those for not acting on known agents.

The final main point of these amendments is to allow coercive and extensive powers for inspectors under the National Health Security Act. Currently they have powers under the Gene Technology Act 2000 to obtain search and seizure warrants, but this amendment will allow similar powers under the National Health Security Act. It will allow inspectors to seize material and be assisted by other persons such as the police, all the time using necessary and reasonable force. It will also allow them to ask questions and ask for the production of documents, which will involve those being asked to answer and produce those documents. Warrants regarding the investigation of suspected offences can be obtained over the telephone or via fax from a magistrate in times of critical circumstances.

Considering the risks and threats posed by security-sensitive biological agents, I certainly appreciate the need for this bill and I support it. The reality is that Australia is at some risk from all tier 1 listed agents and we must constantly review the threat and our procedures. I say ‘some risk’ because, when you examine the aspects of each of the listed agents with regard to exposure, modes of infection, treatment and prevention as well as biological warfare or terrorist applications, they all have limitations. Nevertheless, by being ever vigilant and strengthened by a strong inspection and compliance regime, we can further reduce the threat levels.

This is all the more necessary because, as we know through the events of recent history, in the same time frame in which we seek to defeat these biological and toxic threats through science and medicine, somewhere around the world there are terrorists who are looking to use these agents to their own advantage. I say again that we will always be in need of maximum vigilance and I am pleased to support this bill, as I will any future bill that supports the safety and health of this nation and its people.

Craig Thomson (Dobell, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

This morning in the House I spoke on amendments to the Aviation Security Act 2004. Those amendments were about enabling regulations to be made to designate security-controlled airports, a particular category of airport according to their risk profiles; allowing unannounced inspections of businesses involved in air cargo; allowing the secretary of the department to enter into enforceable undertakings with the aviation industry participants as a remedial measure; and expanding the scope of compliance-control directions to cover the operation of security-controlled airports and screening authorities. Right now I am speaking on another important piece in the policy jigsaw that helps to ensure our nation’s security, the National Health Security Amendment Bill 2009.

Friday will be the eighth anniversary of the September 11 attacks on the Twin Towers in New York and the Pentagon in Washington. I happened to be in New York a week before September 11 and went and saw the Twin Towers. Like most people, I will never forget what happened on September 11, and I felt a particular connection because I was there only the week before. Next month will be the seventh anniversary of the terrible Bali bombings that killed 202 people, including 88 Australians. The threat of international terrorism to our nation and our way of life remains very real. It was only a month ago that a plot was uncovered that allegedly involved an attack on Holsworthy barracks in Sydney.

We require a comprehensive and flexible policy response to the ever-changing nature of international terrorist organisations. Terrorism does not confine its targets to life and property. Terrorism is an attempt to terrorise, to destroy a public sense of security and confidence. Residents on the Central Coast, where my electorate is, need to have confidence in the security of their nation and the integrity of our borders. This bill today is a part of the policy response required to hamper the will of those evil few that wish to cause harm to Australian citizens and our way of life. The Attorney-General’s portfolio Security environment update 2007-08 outlines the government’s approach to the threat of terrorism and says:

The Australian government is working to ensure our national security framework remains comprehensive and adaptable to changes in our security environment. Terrorism remains a serious threat to Australia’s security. Strong cooperation between the Commonwealth, State, Territory and local governments is vital to countering this threat, but businesses and the broader Australian community also have an important role to play. To ensure that Australia’s security framework continues to achieve the goal of protecting Australia from terrorism, our arrangements must be sustainable and supported by appropriate resources.

The National Health Security Amendment Bill 2009 amends the National Health Security Act 2007 to make arrangements for the safe handling of security-sensitive biological agents, SSBAs, that could be used as weapons. Three main changes to the act are proposed, along with a number of less significant but important changes.

The bill amends the NHS Act to enhance Australia’s ability to secure certain biological agents that could be used as weapons. The regulatory scheme for SSBAs currently includes stringent requirements relating to notification of type and location of SSBAs, along with standards that must be met by organisations handling SSBAs. Over the past year and a half, the government has worked closely with organisations that handle SSBAs and other experts in the field to ensure smooth implementation of the regulatory scheme. A number of areas have been highlighted where improvements to the scheme might be made. This bill enhances the regulatory scheme for SSBAs in three important ways.

First, the proposed amendments enable the Minister for Health and Ageing—who I acknowledge is here at the moment—to respond immediately and appropriately to the challenge of safeguarding public health and safety in the event of an SSBA related disease outbreak. The proposed changes enable the suspension of certain existing regulatory requirements and the imposition of new conditions to ensure that adequate controls are maintained. The proposed amendments also ensure that the minister has access to all relevant information, including advice from the Secretary of the Department of Health and Ageing, the Chief Medical Officer, the Chief Veterinary Officer, and others with scientific or technical expertise in SSBAs.

Second, the amendments will extend reporting controls to biological agents suspected to be SSBAs. This measure will clarify the obligations of entities at early stages of handling a biological agent when, after having performed all the usual testing procedures for that biological agent, there is a positive presumption of identification of an SSBA. The new provisions will require an entity to report its handling of suspected SSBAs including transfers of those agents and will require entities to comply with new SSBA standards for suspected SSBAs.

Third, the bill will enhance the investigation powers available under the NHS Act. The NHS Act currently provides inspectors with monitoring warrants which do not extend to seizing evidential material. This new measure introduces offence related warrants that provide powers to search premises and seize evidential material. Importantly, this increase in investigation powers is complemented by necessary safeguards to ensure proper use of the powers. This includes safeguards such as authorisation by a magistrate and provisions governing the return of seized property and compensation for damage.

The bill also makes some less significant, but equally important, amendments to improve the operation of the legislation and provide greater clarity for those working with SSBAs. These relate to requirements to report certain events involving SSBAs to local police, minor changes to annual and biannual reporting of information recorded on the national register, new capacity to cancel the registration of an entity or its facility if they are no longer handling SSBAs, and amendments to the definition of biological agents so that bacteria and viruses that do not have the capacity to spread rapidly, but may still be highly dangerous, are captured.

The proposed changes have been subject to extensive consultation with relevant experts including entities working with SSBAs, intelligence and security agencies, public and animal health laboratories, and state and territory government agencies. Powers of entry, by occupiers’ consent, to search premises, and anything on premises, for evidence that inspectors reasonably suspect may be on the premises are also captured in this bill. There are also powers allowing entry, by offence related warrant, to search premises and gather the kinds of evidence specified in the warrant—and, if inspectors find that kind of evidence, there is power to seize, inspect, examine, measure and conduct tests on, or take samples of, such evidence. There are also certain powers to operate electronic equipment on the premises relating to obtaining evidence, such as seizing equipment and disks, tapes and other storage devices; putting evidence into documentary form and removing such documents from the premises; and transferring evidence onto tape, disk or other storage device which can be taken off the premises.

It is noted that inspectors under this act are not law enforcement officers. It is recognised that exceptional circumstances should exist before granting non-law-enforcement personnel, such as inspectors under the NHS Act, significant powers associated with offence related warrants. It is considered that such exceptional circumstances exist in this case because the biological agents that are the subject of this legislation are, by their nature, highly dangerous. There are significant security issues that arise from breaches of the SSBA regulatory scheme and any breaches have the potential to cause extensive damage to public health and safety, the environment and the economy.

It is proposed that the services of the inspectors appointed under the Gene Technology Act 2000 will be retained for the purposes of the NHS Act. These inspectors already exercise powers related to offence related warrants under the Gene Technology Act 2000. They are experienced in cautiously and appropriately exercising such powers. To further ensure the powers are exercised with care, the Department of Health and Ageing will develop an internal governance framework for inspectors made under the SSBA regulatory scheme addressing issues relating to accountability, training, resources and risk management strategies.

While it is acknowledged that where such powers are conferred to non-law-enforcement officers it is important that there be processes built in to ensure proper accountability for the exercise of these powers, it is noted that such processes have, in fact, been built into the act and the bill. For example, it is noted that under sections 63(1) and 63(3) of the act itself anyone appointed by the secretary, in writing, as an inspector must be a person who is appointed or employed by the Commonwealth and whom the secretary is satisfied has appropriate experience and skills. Under section 63(2) of the act, an inspector must comply with any directions of the secretary when performing functions or exercising powers under the act. Another example is that, in such circumstances, an inspector is, and would continue to be, required to show his or her identity card to occupiers of premises.

It is also noted that there do not appear to be provisions specifically about challenging the exercise of inspectors’ powers in the bill. However, this may be explained by reference to the context in which such inspections would occur: highly dangerous biological agents with a potential for extensive damage to public health and safety in the event of a breach of the SSBA regulatory scheme. It is also noted that the government has stated that DoHA will develop an ‘internal guidance framework’ for such inspections which will address such matters as accountability and risk management strategies.

In conclusion, the legislation is part of the government’s ongoing response to the national security threat facing our nation. Residents of my electorate on the Central Coast need to have confidence in the security of their nation and in the integrity of our borders. This legislation is part of a comprehensive strategy to achieve both real security outcomes and confidence in our security structures to keep our citizens safe. I commend the bill to the House.

Nicola Roxon (Gellibrand, Australian Labor Party, Minister for Health and Ageing) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I am pleased to have been given the opportunity to briefly sum up today’s debate on the National Health Security Amendment Bill 2009. I want to thank the members for Dickson, Moreton, Cowan and Dobell for their contributions to the debate. As you can tell from the member for Dobell’s contribution, it is an important issue and people are concerned to make sure that we can respond to new and emerging threats. In fact, that is exactly what this bill does, to ensure that we enhance Australia’s obligation to secure certain biological agents that could be used as weapons.

I think that in his presentation the member for Dobell summed up the three main purposes of the legislation, so I do not need to go back over that ground other than to say that the government is determined to make sure that we are well prepared and able to take action. These changes ensure that the minister responsible will be able to respond immediately and appropriately to any challenge which requires the safeguarding of public health and security in the event of an outbreak, whether it is ebola virus, foot and mouth disease, or some security-sensitive biological agent in the future. The changes enable the suspension of certain existing regulatory requirements and also the imposition of new conditions to ensure that adequate controls are maintained, but the appropriate flexibility is provided.

We welcome the opposition’s support for this bill. We think that the measures introduced appropriately enhance the existing regulatory scheme and underline the government’s commitment to protecting all Australians through maintaining controls on biological agents that could be used as weapons. I commend this bill to the House.

Question agreed to.

Bill read a second time.

Ordered that the bill be reported to the House without amendment.