House debates

Tuesday, 19 October 2010

Ministerial Statements

Afghanistan

3:28 pm

Photo of Julia GillardJulia Gillard (Lalor, Australian Labor Party, Prime Minister) Share this | | Hansard source

by leave—A national government has no more important task than defending the nation, its people and their interests. That is why we take so seriously any decision to go to war. The war in Afghanistan is no different. Today I will answer five questions Australians are asking about the war:

  • why Australia is involved in Afghanistan;
  • what the international community is seeking to achieve and how;
  • what Australia’s contribution is to this international effort—our mission;
  • what progress is being made; and
  • what the future is of our commitment in Afghanistan.

Of course, while our troops remain in the field, I must be responsible in how much I say. But in answering those questions, I want to be as frank as I can be with the Australian people. I want to paint a very honest picture of the difficulties and challenges facing our mission in Afghanistan. The new international strategy and the surge in international troops responded to a deteriorating security situation. This means more fighting; more violence. It risks more casualties. There will be many hard days ahead.

1. Why Australia is involved in Afghanistan

Australia has two vital national interests in Afghanistan—(1) to make sure that Afghanistan never again becomes a safe haven for terrorists, a place where attacks on us and our allies begin, and (2) to stand firmly by our alliance commitment to the United States, formally invoked following the attacks on New York and Washington in 2001. Last month we marked the ninth anniversary of al-Qaeda’s September 11 attacks. Before September 11 al-Qaeda had a safe haven in Afghanistan under the Taliban government, a safe haven where they could recruit, indoctrinate, train, plan, finance and conspire to kill. On September 11, al-Qaeda murdered more than 3,000 people—thousands of Americans, citizens of our ally the United States, people from many other countries and 10 Australians, 10 of our own, never forgotten. And millions of people were terrified.

So we went to Afghanistan to make sure it would never again be a safe haven for al-Qaeda. We went with our friends and allies, as part of the international community. We went with the support of the United Nations. The war has put pressure on al-Qaeda’s core leadership—killed some, captured others, forced many into hiding and forced them all onto the defensive. Al-Qaeda has been dealt a severe blow.

But al-Qaeda remains a resilient and persistent network. Our successes against it in Afghanistan are only part of our effort against terrorism. We are working to counter the rise of affiliated groups in new areas, such as Somalia and Yemen, and violent extremism and terrorist groups in Pakistan. That is why we support efforts in those countries, with those governments, to target terrorist groups there as well.

The terror did not end on September 11. Since 2001, some 100 Australians have been killed in extremists’ attacks overseas. Among them: 88 Australians were killed in the Bali bombing in 2002 and four Australians were killed in the second Bali bombing in 2005. Our embassy has been bombed in Jakarta. In each of these cases, the terrorist groups involved had links to Afghanistan. If the insurgency in Afghanistan were to succeed, if the international community were to withdraw, then Afghanistan could once again become a safe haven for terrorists. Al-Qaeda’s ability to recruit, indoctrinate, train, plan, finance and conspire to kill would be far greater than it is today. And the propaganda victory for terrorists worldwide would be enormous. So the goal of Australia and the international community is clear: to deny terrorist networks a safe haven in Afghanistan.

2. What the international community is seeking to achieve: the new international strategy

The international community has been in Afghanistan a long time—nine years.

An incident having occurred in the gallery—

Photo of Harry JenkinsHarry Jenkins (Speaker) Share this | | Hansard source

Order! The gallery will come to order.

Photo of Julia GillardJulia Gillard (Lalor, Australian Labor Party, Prime Minister) Share this | | Hansard source

The Australian people are entitled to know what we are trying to achieve and when our troops can come home. Removing the Taliban government in 2001 and pursuing al-Qaeda in the years since has made a crucial difference in preventing terrorist attacks. From 2001 to mid-2006, US and coalition forces and Afghan troops fought relatively low levels of insurgent violence. The international force in Afghanistan was focused on a stabilisation mission. And there were no Australian units deployed in Afghanistan between December 2002 and September 2005. Through this period, few would now argue, US and international attention turned heavily to Iraq.

Australia’s substantial military involvement in Afghanistan resumed when the special forces task force was redeployed there for 12 months from September 2005 in support of international efforts to target key insurgents. Violence increased further in mid-2006, particularly in the east and the south. Due to significant intimidation and the absence of effective governance in many rural areas, some Afghans turned to the Taliban at this time.

The mission moved to a counter-insurgency focus. Australia’s contribution increased from October 2008 on as we took a growing role in training and mentoring in the southern Afghanistan province of Uruzgan. However, the international counter-insurgency mission was not adequately resourced until 2009. In December 2009 President Obama announced a revised strategy for Afghanistan and a surge of 30,000 US troops. NATO has contributed more. So has Australia. I believe we now have the right strategy, an experienced commander in General Petraeus and the resources needed to deliver the strategy. The overarching goal of the new strategy is to enable transition—that is, to prepare the government of Afghanistan to take lead responsibility for its own security.

But our vital national interests, in preventing Afghanistan being a safe haven for terrorists who attack us and in supporting our ally, do not end with transition. Our aim is that the new international strategy sees a functioning Afghan state become able to assume responsibility for preventing the country from being a safe haven for terrorists. Australia’s key role in that mission, training and mentoring the 4th Brigade of the Afghan National Army in Uruzgan, is expected to take two to four years. And President Karzai has said the Afghan government expects the transition process to be complete by the end of 2014.

But let me be clear—this refers to the Afghan government taking lead responsibility for security. The international community will remain engaged in Afghanistan beyond 2014. And Australia will remain engaged. There will still be a need for Australians in a supporting role. There will still be a role for training and other defence cooperation. The civilian-led aid and development effort will continue. And we will continue to promote Afghan-led re-integration of former insurgents who are willing to lay down their arms, turn their backs on terrorism and accept the Afghan constitution. We expect this support, training and development task to continue in some form through this decade at least.

Our mission in Afghanistan is not nation building. That is the task of the Afghan government and people. With international aid and development, we will continue to help where we can, but entrenching a functioning democratic Afghan state could be the work of a generation of Afghan people.

The new international strategy is comprehensive. It is focused on:

  • Protecting the civilian population—conducting operations together with the Afghan National Security Forces to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency.
  • Training, mentoring and equipping the Afghan National Security Forces—to enable them to assume a lead role in providing security.
  • And facilitating improvements in governance and socioeconomic development—working with the Afghan authorities and the United Nations to strengthen institutions and deliver basic services.

The new strategy promotes efforts towards political reconciliation. It also includes a greater focus on partnership with Pakistan to address violent extremism in the border regions that threatens both Pakistan and Afghanistan. And the new international strategy is well resourced.

The international strategy is implemented by a combined civilian and military effort under the International Security Assistance Force, ISAF. This involves 47 troop-contributing nations, working alongside a host of international bodies and aid agencies, with and at the invitation of the Afghan government, and under a United Nations Security Council mandate—a mandate renewed unanimously just this month.

This coalition includes many longstanding friends and allies of Australia, including the United States and New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, Canada and France. Singapore and Korea, among other Asian countries, contribute. And several Muslim countries are involved, including Turkey, Jordan and Malaysia.

At the Asia-Europe meeting, I spent some time with Malaysia’s Prime Minister Najib. I was particularly struck by what he said was one of Malaysia’s most important contributions to Afghanistan: doctors—doctors who are Islamic women. They are able to work with Afghan women as few foreign medical professionals can.

We are part of a truly international effort in Afghanistan. To ensure the new international strategy can be delivered, last December the United States committed to a military and civilian surge in Afghanistan. The elements of this surge are now reaching full strength. Once fully deployed, this will take coalition force numbers to roughly 140,000. US forces on the ground have tripled since early 2009. The total force now has the resources required to deliver a comprehensive international strategy focused on counterinsurgency and designed to deliver transition.

3. Australia’s contribution to the international effort

Australia’s involvement makes a real difference in Afghanistan. The government supports the new international strategy and we have supported the surge. Australia has increased our troop contribution to Afghanistan by around 40 per cent in the past 18 months. We now have around 1,550 military personnel deployed in Afghanistan. Our military force is complemented by around 50 Australian civilians.

Earlier this year we took over leadership of the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Uruzgan to spearhead our civilian efforts, and increased our civilian commitment to Afghanistan by 50 per cent. In fact since 2001 we have committed over $740 million in development assistance to Afghanistan.

The main focus of the Australian effort in Afghanistan is directed towards Uruzgan province. It is a difficult job. Uruzgan province lies in southern Afghanistan. Around half a million people live there. It has roughly the population of Tasmania, across an area about one-third the size of that state. Nearly three-quarters of the land is dry and mountainous. Most of the people live in a few major valleys alongside the rivers. Subsistence agriculture and poppy farming are the main ways to earn a living. Water is a precious and highly contested resource and overall economic prospects are poor. School attendance is low, and illiteracy is high. In fact, the female literacy rate in Uruzgan is less than one per cent. For men it is only 10 per cent.

In Uruzgan, Australia’s soldiers and civilians are part of Combined Team-Uruzgan. Combined Team-Uruzgan is a new structure that brings the military, policing, political and development elements of our assistance under a single command. The team is commanded by a senior United States military officer, Colonel Creighton, and the senior civilian official is an Australian diplomat, Mr Bernard Philip. I met them both during my visit. We are lucky to have them.

The team is built around an Australian-US partnership, with contributions from a number of countries including New Zealand, Singapore and Slovakia. Combined Team-Uruzgan was established following the Dutch drawdown in August. We appointed our senior civilian representative to lead the Uruzgan Provincial Reconstruction Team and coordinate all ISAF civilian activities in the province.

The government has worked closely with the Dutch and US governments to ensure Australian soldiers and civilians have every support they need through the period of this handover. I welcome the Dutch government’s decision to extend their attack helicopter support. This is part of a broader ISAF contribution from which Australia and all contributing nations benefit. Australia’s contribution of two Chinook helicopters is part of this.

While in Afghanistan and Europe I met with: Colonel Creighton, commanding Combined Team-Uruzgan; General Petraeus, commanding the International Security Assistance Force; NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen; and the then caretaker Prime Minister of the Netherlands, Jan Balkenende. In each of these meetings, I emphasised the strength of my view, my government’s view, that continuing this support was necessary. So I was glad to receive confirmation of the Dutch decision after my return.

Our advice is that the planned arrangements for support following the full Dutch draw-down will see equivalent support to Australian forces. While lighter in absolute numbers, the American support available to our forces is agile and highly effective in pursuing our common mission. In addition, Afghan forces in Uruzgan have increased from around 3,000 to 4,000 in the past 18 months, meaning total troop numbers are larger now than when Dutch forces were present. As Prime Minister, I am satisfied that our troops have the right support. And, of course, this is a matter we keep under constant review.

In Uruzgan, Australia’s substantial military, civilian and development assistance focuses on:

  • training and mentoring the Afghan National Army 4th Brigade to assume responsibility for the province’s security;
  • building the capacity of the Afghan National Police to assist with civil policing functions;
  • helping improve the Afghan government’s capacity to deliver core services and generate income-earning opportunities for its people.

As well as our efforts supporting transition in Uruzgan, Australia’s special forces are targeting the insurgent network in and around the province, disrupting insurgent operations and supply routes. While not part of Combined Team-Uruzgan, the Special Operations Task Group contributes to the province’s security. Our Special Air Service Regiment and our commando regiments are the equal of any special forces in the world. They will make a difference to the outcome of the war.

I know all this is very dangerous work for our soldiers and civilians. I give you my firm assurance that this government will listen to the professional advice and provide every necessary protection and support for our soldiers and civilians in Afghanistan. Over the past 12 months the government has announced more than $1.1 billion for additional force protection measures for Australian personnel. This includes upgraded body armour and rocket, artillery and mortar protection. The continuing and evolving threat posed to our troops by improvised explosive devices has seen us pursuing the right technologies to ensure our troops can detect these devices. Our troops are protected through hardened vehicles and other protective equipment. And, of course, we will keep these force protection measures under constant review.

I have spoken to Air Chief Marshal Houston, the Chief of the Defence Force. I have spoken to Major General Cantwell, our national commander on the ground. Their advice to the government is that, as we stand today, our force structure—the number of troops on the ground and the capabilities they have—is right for our mission in Afghanistan. As Prime Minister, I want to be very clear. The government receives the advice on this decision. But we take the responsibility for this decision.

There has also been some debate about the rules of engagement for our soldiers in Afghanistan. Of course I will not comment on the particular case which is subject to current proceedings. I do, however, want to respond to some of the public comments on the rules of engagement generally. Those rules of engagement are properly decided by the government. They are consistent with the guidance provided by General Petraeus. They are consistent with the International Security Assistance Force’s rules of engagement. They are consistent with the international law of armed conflict. As with troop levels, we take the advice, but we take the responsibility.

As Prime Minister, let me say I believe the rules of engagement are robust and sufficient for the mission in Uruzgan. The Australian Defence Force is a professional military force, respected in Australia and around the world. They operate under strict rules of engagement. That is what they do. Rules of engagement are central to the mission of the ADF. Strict rules of engagement are in the long-term interests of our troops in the field. But, more than that, they are the difference between us and our enemy. As much as anything, what marks us from them is precisely this. We respect innocent civilian life. I believe Australians would not have it any other way.

4. What progress is being made nationally

The new international strategy is in place. The elements of the surge to support the strategy are now reaching full strength. The hard work is underway. We will monitor events closely. The NATO Lisbon summit in November will assess further progress against the International Security Assistance Force’s strategy. Mapping out that strategy will be a key focus of the summit. Afghanistan is a war-ravaged country that faces immense development challenges.

While the challenges are huge, I can report tentative signs of progress to date. The Afghan National Security Forces are being mentored and trained. The Afghan National Army reached its October 2010 growth objective of 134,000 ahead of schedule, and the Afghan National Police is also ahead of its October 2010 goal of 109,000. The Afghan National Army is becoming increasingly capable and supporting coalition operations more effectively. Nearly 85 per cent of the army is now fully partnered with ISAF forces for operations in the field. Afghan forces are now in the lead in Kabul.

The ability of the Afghan government to provide services to its people is being built. In primary education, enrolments have increased from one million in 2001 to approximately six million today. Some two million of these enrolments are girls. There were none in 2001. Nothing better symbolises the fall of the Taliban than these two million Afghan girls learning to read. In basic health services, infant mortality decreased by 22 per cent between 2002 and 2008 and immunisation rates for children are now in the range of 70 to 90 per cent. In vital economic infrastructure, almost 10,000 kilometres of road has been rehabilitated and 10 million Afghans now have access to telecommunications, compared to only 20,000 in 2001.

With the increase in troop levels, the fight is being taken to the insurgency. Insurgents are being challenged in areas, particularly in the south and east of the country, where they previously operated with near-impunity. Indeed, much of the increase in violence this year is attributable to the fact that there is a larger international and Afghan presence pursuing the insurgency more aggressively.

In Afghan politics, efforts are being made to convince elements amongst the insurgents to put down their arms, to renounce violence and adopt a path back to constructive and purposeful civilian life. And although we know democracy remains rudimentary and fragile, Afghanistan has a free press and a functioning parliament. Last month parliamentary elections took place—elections with real and widely publicised problems—but elections did take place. And the international community is working closely with Pakistan. Stability in Pakistan, and the uprooting of extremist networks that have established themselves in the border regions and terrorised both countries, is essential to stability in Afghanistan.

Let me turn more specifically to the progress of Australia’s mission in Uruzgan. Our Mentoring Task Force is training the 4th Brigade of the Afghan national army. The 4th Brigade, as our commanders on the ground told me during my visit, is proving to be an increasingly professional force, fighting better and becoming more capable at conducting complex operations. The brigade’s recent efforts in successfully completing a series of resupply missions between Tarin Kot and Kandahar has demonstrated improving capability. Since late last year, they have moved from observing and participating, to planning and leading these activities. The brigade also recently provided security for parliamentary elections in the province.

Our civilians are making a difference in Uruzgan. Our AFP contingent has trained almost 700 Afghan national police at the police training centre for the province. It has also contributed to the successful targeting of corrupt officials and the tackling of major crimes. We are helping build local services. In Tarin Kot township, business is flourishing at the local bazaar. There are two bank branches, crime is down, and the town is becoming a genuine provincial trading hub. I visited our trade training school on the Tarin Kot base, which is turning out 60 graduates each quarter in basic trades such as plumbing and carpentry, most of whom then contribute to reconstruction and development in the province.

Our aid to Uruzgan is increasing to $20 million in 2010-11. Already we have supported 78 school reconstruction projects and the disbursal of over 950 microfinance loans. We have helped refurbish the Tarin Kot hospital and assisted the rehabilitation and operation of 11 health centres and 165 health posts. We are constructing a new building for the Department of Energy and Water, and building a bridge crossing to connect to the Tarin Kot-Chora Road. Our civilians are working to build capacity within the provincial administration and support the reach of central government programs into Uruzgan.

We are taking the fight to the insurgency. On the C130 flight into Afghanistan, a map of Uruzgan spread out on his knees, our national commander Major General John Cantwell briefed me on our work in the field. Valley by valley, we are gradually making a difference to security. He told me about the agriculture-rich Mirabad Valley, a strategically important region with a history of violence in recent years, just to the east of the provincial capital Tarin Kot. Mirabad was dominated by the Taliban for the last seven years. It was a place where the provincial government had no influence. But over the last two years the Afghan security forces, in partnership with the Australian, Dutch and now US forces, have methodically expanded their permanent presence into the valley with the establishment of three patrol bases. Insurgents, clearly threatened by the growing reach of the Afghan national army, attacked the bases unsuccessfully a number of times during construction. Now the bases, combined with two nearby outposts, will allow the Afghan national army to better protect Mirabad’s communities. Mirabad is far from a success story yet. Progress in development, education and democracy is yet to begin. But in the specific mission we have given our forces in Uruzgan—to train the Afghan national army to take the lead in security—we see progress being made. That is the beginning of transition.

General Cantwell also told me about Gizab. It is an isolated township in the far north of Uruzgan province that had long been a Taliban safe haven, and one which the Taliban used as a base to launch attacks against the Chora district. Earlier this year, in April, the local community rose in revolt against the Taliban and, with the assistance of Afghan and Australian forces, captured the local Taliban commander and expelled the insurgents. Gizab now has a local police force and a new district governor, and the provincial government is beginning to make its presence felt. Again, it is a place where progress is painstaking and incremental, where there will be new setbacks and where consolidation is needed. Again though, it is a place where the seeds of transition are being sewn.

I have shared some positive stories about the beginnings of transition. There are many stories which are not so positive. We should be realistic about the situation. Progress, even in security, is highly variable across the province. Any gains come off a low base. Any advances made are fragile. The challenges that face Uruzgan, and Afghanistan, are immense. But I do believe we should be cautiously encouraged.

5. The future of our commitment to Afghanistan

Australia’s national interests in Afghanistan are clear. There must be no safe haven for terrorists. We must stand firmly by our ally, the United States. There is a new international strategy in place—focused on counterinsurgency, designed to enable transition. Australia’s commitment to Afghanistan is not open-ended. We, along with the rest of our partners in the International Security Assistance Force, want to bring our people home as soon as possible. The Afghan people want to stand on their own. But achieving our mission is critical to achieving both these things.

The international community and the Afghan government are agreed on a clear pathway forward. The Kabul conference in July welcomed the Afghan government’s determination that the Afghan National Security Forces should lead and conduct military operations in all provinces by the end of 2014. At the upcoming NATO/ISAF Summit in Lisbon the international community and the Afghan government will assess progress against the international strategy. Mapping out the strategy for transition to Afghan leadership and responsibility will be a key focus of the summit.

Transition will not be a one-size-fits-all approach. It will be conditions based. It will happen faster in some places and slower in others. It will be a graduated process, not an event or a date. There is no ‘transition day’. International forces will be thinned out as Afghan forces step up and assume responsibility. In some places the transition process will be subject to setbacks. We need to be prepared for this. My firm view is that for transition to occur in an area the ability of Afghan forces to take the lead in security in that area must be irreversible. Our government will state this as a simple fact in discussions before and at Lisbon. We must not transition out, only to transition back in.

In conclusion

Australia will do everything in our power to ensure Afghanistan is never again a safe haven for terrorists. Australia will stand firm in our commitment to our alliance with the United States. The international community understands this. Our enemies understand this too. I believe that the new international strategy, backed by the surge in military and civilian forces, is sound. Protecting the Afghan people, training the Afghan security forces, building the Afghan government’s capacity, working with the international community, Australia is making a real difference in Afghanistan. Delivering on the international strategy in Uruzgan province—and supporting transition in the country as a whole.

Australia will not abandon Afghanistan but we must be very realistic about the future. Transition will take some years. We will be engaged through this decade at least. Good government in the country may be the work of an Afghan generation. There will be many hard days ahead, but I am cautiously encouraged by what I have seen.

I believe this debate is an important one for our people and our parliament. That is why today I announce as Prime Minister that I will make a statement like this one to the House each year that our Afghanistan involvement continues. This will be in addition to the continuing ministerial statements by the Minister for Defence in each session of the parliament.

Attending funerals for Australian soldiers is the hardest thing I have ever done. And it is nowhere near as hard for me as it is for the families. There is nothing I can say to change their long walk through life without a loved one. A loved one, lost for our sake. In the ultimate, I can promise them only this: we will remember them. Their names are written on the walls of the War Memorial in Canberra. Their names are written in the walls of our hearts. When I think of these Australians we have lost in Afghanistan, I think of the Australian poet James McAuley’s words:

I never shrank with fear

But fought the monsters of the lower world

Clearing a little space, and time, and light

For men to live in peace.

I know the professional soldiers of the Australian Defence Force are proud people. They offer their lives for us. They embrace wartime sacrifice as their highest duty. In return, we owe them our wisdom. Our highest duty is to make wise decisions about war. I look forward to the deliberations of this parliamentary debate on Afghanistan. I hope we do our duty as well as they do theirs. I present my statement.

4:05 pm

Photo of Stephen SmithStephen Smith (Perth, Australian Labor Party, Deputy Leader of the House) Share this | | Hansard source

by leave—I move:

That so much of the standing and sessional orders be suspended as would prevent Mr Abbott (Leader of the Opposition) speaking for a period not exceeding 36 minutes.

Question agreed to.

Photo of Tony AbbottTony Abbott (Warringah, Liberal Party, Leader of the Opposition) Share this | | Hansard source

May I begin by congratulating the Prime Minister on her statement and expressing the hope that I can do equal justice to this important cause. This Afghanistan debate matters. It matters to the families and the friends of the dead and wounded. It matters to every Australian who is concerned about the wider world and our role in it. And it matters to our coalition partners who are looking for reassurance that others will still do some of the heavy lifting in the struggle against Islamist extremism. It is right that the parliament should now debate our commitment, first, because something as grave as a serious military campaign should be justified to the parliament; second, because our major coalition partners have been rethinking their own troop numbers and their campaign objectives; and, finally, because the increased tempo of military operations has almost doubled Australian combat deaths in just four months.

Compared to the United States’s 80,000 troops, Britain’s 10,000 and even Canada’s 2,800, Australia’s military commitment is relatively modest. Still, our 1,550 soldiers have the lion’s share of security responsibility in a province that has long been the Taliban heartland. Twenty-one combat deaths and 152 combat injuries so far make this our most serious fight since Vietnam, and Afghanistan has been the central front in the most important civilisational struggle of our times.

This is also a critical time in Afghanistan itself. The Karzai government is probably the best available amalgam of local legitimacy and concern for human rights, but it is hardly a model of incorruptible efficiency. The American-led military surge of the current fighting season has challenged the insurgency but at a very high price in coalition casualties. After nine years of inconclusive fighting the risk is that the PR war will be lost at a time when the ground war is finally starting to go better. Immediately at stake is the cause for which those 21 Australians have given their lives. Ultimately at stake is the West’s ability to assert itself against deadly threats before they have materialised into another September 11 style atrocity or something even worse.

This debate should honour the Australian battle casualties so far. We owe it to those who have died to remain confident that the cause has been worthy of their sacrifice. Even so, this debate is not just about them; it is also about the 10 Australians who died in the World Trade Centre, the 88 killed in the first Bali bombing and the eight killed in other acts of Islamist terrorism. Our soldiers are in Afghanistan because terrorists train there, ultimately targeting innocent people, including Australians. It is true that the fall of the Taliban in the retaliation following September 11, 2001, ended al-Qaeda’s sanctuary in Afghanistan. These days, terrorists are as likely to have trained in neighbouring Pakistan or in the Horn of Africa as in southern Afghanistan. Even so, the return of the Taliban government would swiftly restore that country to its former position as terror central.

At nine years and counting, compared to just six years for World War II, the Afghan campaign has lasted for what seems like an eternity, but it is not a conventional war. It is not a war against a government but against the violent manifestations of a pernicious ideology. A case could doubtless be made for relying on stand-off weapons to suppress any renewal of terror bases, like the no-fly zone that used to be enforced over Northern Iraq. It may not be very effective in stopping organised terror and plenty of Afghani civilians could be killed in misdirected air strikes but, at least in the short term, fewer coalition soldiers would die.

Cruise missiles and drones, though, cannot make the case for democracy. They cannot make the case for pluralism and they cannot make the case for the universal decencies of mankind. In a way that even the smartest weapons cannot, soldiers on the ground can distinguish between people who are hostile and those who are not, between those who may not themselves accept Western customs but have no particular axe to grind against us and those convinced that the Western way of life is a satanic perversion. If properly trained and supported, soldiers on the ground can be peacemakers as well as war fighters. They can be builders as well as warriors. Trying to keep Australians safe from terrorism does not just mean killing terrorists; it means engaging with societies that may otherwise be terrorist breeding grounds.

Australia’s mission in Afghanistan is still to suppress the threat of terrorism. It is still to be a reliable member of the Western alliance, but it is also to help build a society where merely to be different is not to risk death. By resisting those who would impose on all a particular version of Islam our soldiers are asserting the universal right to a society where women are not discriminated against, dissent is not a capital crime and religion is more a reproach to selfishness than an instruction manual for everyday life. That young Australians should die, even for the best of causes, is tragic beyond words. The idea, though, that an end to Australian involvement would inspire the lion to lie down with the lamb or swords to be beaten into ploughshares is, at best, wishful thinking. A premature end to our involvement would tell the Americans and the British that Australia is an unreliable ally and a fairweather friend. It would tell the Afghani people that our commitment to human rights is more rhetorical than real and certainly does not extend to protecting them where we can. It would announce to the world that very little, certainly not the protection of the weak or the promotion of what is right, is worth a significant price in Australian lives.

No country should lightly commit its armed forces to combat and a democratic electorate would almost certainly punish any government that did. Still, a country that was not prepared to defend itself against an aggressor could hardly be taken seriously. And, if self-defence is justifiable, might not the defence of others be even more so? War should never be glamorised or idealised but might there not be at least some nobility of purpose to a military campaign defending other people from their persecutors? We should not forget that the military expedition to East Timor, for instance, was to stop defenceless people from being brutalised. It is hard to see the moral difference between our military campaign there and the campaign in Afghanistan just because the latter is yet to come to a more or less satisfactory conclusion. Of course, to qualify as a just war under the traditional ethical theory there had to be a reasonable chance of success. Time and time again, as we know, Afghanistan has proved impossible to conquer but that, it needs to be stressed, is not our aim. Our objective is not to impose a foreign government and an alien system. Rather, it is to help the Afghani people choose their own government as freely as they can without, as far as possible, the coercion of warlords or the indoctrination of religion.

Our objective is to allow Afghans to choose what they think is right for them. The Taliban’s objective is to impose what it regards as the one right system. We are prepared to accept choices by the Afghan people that we do not like. Our key stipulation is merely that Afghanistan should never again become a base for international terrorism. By contrast, the Taliban, and even more so their al-Qaeda allies, insist that their version of Islam is not only right for Afghanistan but mandatory for the whole world. It is not enough for them to execute women in a sports stadium for moral transgressions; this is the law by which they think the whole world should be ruled.

So it is not the coalition partners that are the imperialists in this conflict; it is the Taliban, actually, through their alliance with al-Qaeda, who are trying to impose their values on others and who are at least as dependent on foreign fighters as the Karzai government. However imperfectly, it is the West that is fighting for freedom—that of the Afghan people, no less than our own. It is the Islamist extremists, not us, who are fighting to export a particular set of values and to impose a particular set of judgments on everyone, wherever they can find a hold.

Twenty-one homes around our country ache with loss because the Australian government has deployed our armed forces against a serious enemy. As things stand, each bereaved family knows that the Australian people respect their loss and value their sacrifice. We have honoured their deaths by continuing their campaign. How worth while would these deaths now seem if the Australian government were to abandon the cause for which they died? How would those families feel if the Australian government were to conclude that the task is now too hard or should never have been undertaken in the first place?

No rational government should enter or sustain any conflict without first counting the potential costs. But to enter a fight and then to abandon it before the objective is secured would mean that we had never really been serious, or that we had been defeated in the field of battle—and this is not a judgment that anyone should wish to see pronounced against our country. Afghanistan may never be a Western style pluralist democracy. In any event, it is for Afghans, not for outsiders, to re-engineer their society from the feudal to the modern. Our broader mission is merely to foster effective governance, at least by Afghan standards, and to ensure that Afghanistan never again hosts training camps for international terrorism.

Australia’s particular mission in Oruzgan and the surrounding provinces is to strike at active Taliban units and to mentor the Afghan army’s 4th Brigade into an effective military unit, loyal to the central government. In much of Afghanistan, but certainly in Oruzgan, there have recently been signs of progress in the struggle with the Taliban. A year ago coalition forces tended to emerge from their bases, engage the enemy and then withdraw, leaving the countryside largely under Taliban influence. Under General Petraeus, coalition forces have adopted the clear hold, build and transfer approach to counterinsurgency that characterised the successful surge in Iraq.

In Oruzgan the number of military outposts has roughly doubled in the past 12 months. Supported by Australian forces, the 4th Brigade has been clearing Taliban fighters from the rural areas and from the villages between forward operating bases, leaving police detachments in each village with sufficient army support to maintain military superiority. The thinking is to give local people the on-the-spot security they need if they are to resist an insurgency accustomed to wiping out whole families for cooperating with the government. Australians on the ground report that local people tend to prefer coalition forces to the Taliban, for whom their way of life is usually insufficiently Islamic. For understandable reasons, though, villagers need to be convinced that their protectors will outstay the insurgency, which is why these operations are increasingly Afghan led.

Progress is necessarily family by family, village by village, district by district. It is dependent upon the effectiveness of Afghan security forces and the ability of provincial governments to provide tangible prospects of a better future. None of this can be relied upon. Even the Oruzgan provincial capital is too dangerous for Westerners to travel around without heavy escort. Still, fragile advances seem to have been made. In Oruzgan the recent national election was largely undisrupted. In a remote part of the province, as the Prime Minister earlier reported, several villages have recently driven out the local Taliban and invited support from coalition special forces.

This northern summer, it seems, higher casualties have been more the result of an aggressive coalition campaign than a more effective insurgency. In Oruzgan the Taliban’s greater use of roadside bombs seems to be the result of its reduced ability to move openly around the country. This is nothing like victory, of course, but it is success. It has been dearly bought, which is why it should not lightly be squandered. It should be built upon, not jeopardised by new doubts about the mission and its sustainability.

Australia can never be as committed to the welfare of the Afghan people as they are themselves. If our mission is to succeed, at some stage it has to be locally sustainable. The assessment of the Australians on the ground is that turning the 4th Brigade into a military force capable of independently securing and defending Oruzgan will take two to four years. The new government in Britain has recently stated its intention to end combat operations within five years. And the Obama administration has said that it expects the Afghan government to start to take the leadership in security matters from the middle of next year. The coalition’s commitment to Afghanistan cannot be entirely open ended, because that would excuse the Afghan people from taking responsibility for their own country. It would amount to a Western takeover. On the other hand, withdrawal dates cannot be set in stone either, because that just reassures the Taliban that they can win by waiting.

The best exit strategy is to win. For Australia, this means completing the task of training the 4th Brigade and playing our part in ensuring that the central government is capable of containing and defeating the insurgency. There may be other tasks that Australia can or should usefully perform once the current ones are completed. After all, washing our hands of Afghanistan and its problems once two to four years are up would hardly be a sign of friendship. A commitment to Afghanistan that lasts longer than this would hardly be excessive if it continued to deny sanctuary to an imperialistic version of Islamist extremism. The containment and the defeat of the Taliban would be worth a drawn-out struggle if it helped to keep the world safe from September 11 scale terrorism and helped to prevent neighbouring Pakistan, a nuclear armed state under enormous pressure, from itself succumbing to Islamist extremism. An enduring security commitment to Afghanistan seems improbable but no more perhaps than Britain’s more or less solo effort over 12 years to overcome the Malayan emergency or Australia’s budgetary commitment to PNG, which is still continuing 35 years after independence.

With Afghanistan it is easy to construct gloomy scenarios around the theme of a Vietnam-style quagmire, with the conclusion that it is better to withdraw now before a bad situation gets worse. The underlying assumption is that Western forces are largely provoking the problem rather than helping to contain it. Australians on the ground, for instance, report that local extremists can easily stir up trouble by starting rumours that coalition forces are burning the Koran. Difficult though it undoubtedly is, such a volatile situation is unlikely to be calmed by the withdrawal of those forces most committed to building civil society and least likely to be themselves involved in atrocities.

No less than the advocates of continued commitment, the advocates of withdrawal must be ready to accept the consequences of their policies. It would be impossible to advocate in good faith an Australian withdrawal without also supporting the departure of Western forces more generally. But a premature withdrawal would almost certainly mean the collapse of the Karzai government and its replacement by the Taliban or the further rise of local warlords. Either way, Afghanistan would again risk becoming a base for terrorism with the daily life of its people further impoverished. In turn, greater disorder in Afghanistan or a restored Taliban government would almost certainly cause further unrest in Pakistan, with the prospect of a renewed military autocracy or an Islamist takeover.

For the West, a regional meltdown could be a far worse outcome than an indefinite military commitment in just one country. Fewer Western military casualties in the short term could mean far more local deaths and the prospect of escalating unrest spreading into the Subcontinent, the Middle East and Central Asia. If the king had never been deposed, if Russia had never invaded, if America had not armed the mujaheddin, if Pakistan had not aided the Taliban, if the West had not been preoccupied in Iraq, the prospects in Afghanistan might be less daunting and the choices less difficult. Still, serious countries and their leaders have to deal with the world as it is, not as they might prefer it to be. There are no quick solutions and no painless options here; there is just the near certainty that the wrong choice will be disastrous and the likelihood that the harder choice now will turn out to be the better choice for the future.

The opposition supports the Australian government’s commitment to Afghanistan and the Western commitment more generally. In farewelling Australian forces to Iraq some years ago, the then leader of the Labor Party said that he supported the troops but not their mission. Now, as then, the Liberal and National parties have no need for tortuous distinctions. We fully support Australian troops and we fully support the mission on which they are engaged.

Bipartisan support for the Afghanistan commitment is not the same as agreeing that nothing could possibly be improved. Our support is for the commitment, not necessarily for every aspect of the government’s handling of it. As supporters of the commitment, the opposition have a duty to speak out if there is evidence that it could be made more effective. As well, we have a duty to stand up for Australian soldiers if there is a possibility that the government might have let them down. My colleague Senator Johnston recently asked the government to consider sending some extra forces to Afghanistan after a soldier blamed the death of his colleague on a lack of fire support. After assurances from senior commanders on the spot, the opposition accept that our troops have sufficient artillery, attack helicopter, fighter-bomber and light armoured vehicle support.

Since the mid-year withdrawal of most of the Dutch forces in Oruzgan, Australian troops’ responsibilities have increased. Our forces are now stretched, but not, it seems, beyond their capacities. The progress they have made is real but fragile. The coalition accept senior commanders’ assessment that the current force strength is sufficient for current tasks. Without access to the latest security assessments and the comprehensive military advice, it is impossible for the opposition to be prescriptive about troop numbers or force composition. Our role is to question in good faith what the government is doing rather than to try to run the country from the wrong side of the parliament.

Given the pressure our forces are under and the importance of their mission, we would never be critical of a government that erred on the side of giving them more support. In fact, given the critical stage of the military campaign and the capabilities of Australia’s armed forces, our instinct would be to do more rather than less. Still, we accept that this is necessarily the government’s call, not ours. On my recent visit senior officers said that additional helicopters would make their military operations more effective, and the Prime Minister seems to have agreed after her own visit that more helicopters would help and that others might supply them.

Senior officers also said that it was important to be able to detain suspects beyond 96 hours, as the Americans and the British can. I asked the government to consider giving our forces in Afghanistan the ability to detain terror suspects for at least as long as authorities already can here in Australia. As well, the government should regard our commitment to 1,550 personnel in Oruzgan as an average to be maintained over time rather than as a limit that is never to be exceeded regardless of the military situation on the ground.

Supporters of Australia’s commitment should understand the dauntingly difficult operational environment in which our troops work. Our soldiers are no more infallible than those of other nations. Even so, no-one should rush to condemn the actions of soldiers under fire operating in the fog of war. The opposition has not criticised the laying of charges against three Special Forces soldiers over an incident in which civilians were killed, because there have to be rules, even in war. Our questions were for the government, which needs to explain what it has done to ensure that these soldiers have the best possible defence. After all, a government’s commitment to our soldiers should be no less strong than our soldiers’ commitment to our country.

In his official history book, Charles Bean said of the soldiers of the 1st AIF:

What these men did nothing now can alter. The good and the bad, the greatness and the smallness of their story will stand. Whatever of glory it contains nothing now can lessen. It rises, as it will always rise, above the mists of ages, a monument to great-hearted men; and, for their nation, a possession forever.

Our troops in Afghanistan are worthy successors of the original Anzacs. I regret that I have not yet been able to observe them on operations, but I have seen them at their base in Tarin Kowt and at services for the fallen, here in Australia. John Howard began the recent tradition of prime ministerial attendance at military funerals. Please, God, that our casualties do not mount to the point where this is impracticable, because it is a poignant reminder of the dangers into which we have sent them. We should weep for the fallen—good tears—for those who have served their country in the company of their mates.

It is right that every member of parliament should now have the chance to reflect on Australia’s mission in Afghanistan. War should never be popular, but it can sometimes be right. Our job is not to persuade people to like the work our armed forces are doing, but they need to understand it and be able to support it. Winning hearts and minds in Australia is no less important than winning them in Afghanistan if this mission is to succeed. Our challenge this week is to be just as effective and professional in our tasks as our soldiers are in theirs.

4:32 pm

Photo of Stephen SmithStephen Smith (Perth, Australian Labor Party, Deputy Leader of the House) Share this | | Hansard source

I move:

That the House take note of the document.

I seek the leave of the House to move a motion concerning suspension of standing and sessional orders.

Leave granted.

I move:

That so much of the standing and sessional orders be suspended to allow Mr S. F. Smith (Minister for Defence), Mr Robert, Mr Rudd (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Ms J. Bishop (Deputy Leader of the Opposition), Mr O’Connor (Minister for Home Affairs), Mr Keenan, Mr Wilkie and Mr Bandt to speak on the motion for 20 minutes and for all other members to speak on the motion for 15 minutes.

Question agreed to.

Photo of Harry JenkinsHarry Jenkins (Speaker) Share this | | Hansard source

The question is that the House take note of the document.

4:34 pm

Photo of Stephen SmithStephen Smith (Perth, Australian Labor Party, Deputy Leader of the House) Share this | | Hansard source

On indulgence, and not prejudicing my right to take part in the debate, for the convenience of the House could I indicate that it is proposed that the debate commence tomorrow morning after the introduction of bills and, possibly, one or two first speeches. I thank the House.

Debate (on motion by Mr Stephen Smith) adjourned.