Stephen Smith (Perth, Australian Labor Party, Deputy Leader of the House) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

by leave—The government is committed to providing regular reports and updates on Afghanistan, including to the parliament. I last reported to the parliament on 12 May, which followed my visit to Afghanistan with the then Chief of the Defence Force to commemorate Anzac Day with our troops deployed in Oruzgan Province and to speak to Afghan and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) partners in Kabul. My report on this occasion follows my attendance at the meeting of NATO and ISAF Defence Ministers in Brussels on 8 and 9 June, the beginning of the northern summer fighting season and United States President Obama’s statement on Afghanistan on 23 June.

This report comes at a difficult time for Australia with the tragic deaths of five Australian soldiers in recent weeks and a further three wounded. This week’s death of Sergeant Todd Langley reminds us again that this has been a tough period for our Army, a tough period for the Australian Defence Force and a tough period for our nation. We pay tribute to his sacrifice, and the other 27 Australian soldiers we have lost and to the 182 wounded in Afghanistan. We offer our condolences to the families, friends, collea­gues and loved ones of our fallen soldiers. Our thoughts are with them. Our thoughts are also with our wounded and injured soldiers and their families. We wish them a speedy recovery.

The terrible loss of our soldiers always sees a focus on Australia’s mission in Afghanistan. It is essential that Australians understand why we are there and why it is important for us to continue to play our part.

Why we are there

The government’s strong view is that it is in our national interest to be in Afghanistan, not just with our alliance partner the United States, but also with 46 other members of an international community assistance force acting under a United Nations mandate. Australia’s fundamental goal is to prevent Afghanistan, especially the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area, from again being used by terrorists to plan and train for attacks on innocent civilians, including Australians in our own region and beyond. To achieve that goal we must help prepare the Afghan government to take lead responsibility for providing security for the Afghan people. To do so we must stabilise the security situation and mentor and train the Afghan security forces. To leave now would be to put at risk the recent gains so hard fought for. To leave now would be to risk opening a vacuum which international terrorism could move into and again flourish.

Progress

The international community now has both the military and political strategy in place, the resources to match it and the people on the ground to deliver it. It has taken the international community too many years to get to this point, but the surge, and our special forces operations, are working. There is no doubt that additional ISAF and Afghan resources have enabled combat and enforcement operations to occur with more confidence and to greater effect. Partnered Special Forces operations have killed or captured insurgent leaders, taking them off the battlefield and disrupting insurgent activity across Afghanistan.

Partnering, training and mentoring—replicated as it is across the country—is building Afghan security forces. The US/NATO/ISAF surge has been more than matched over the same period by a surge of 100,000 in the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), which now number some 300,000. There are more Afghan soldiers and police officers and they are more capable. Australia remains confident that between now and the end of 2014, we will effect a transition to Afghan-led responsibility for security in Oruzgan. As Afghan forces take on more frontline roles, this allows us to perform other tasks, including institutional or niche higher level training.

But while the nature of Australia’s commitment will evolve, it will not diminish. The recent gains, so hard fought for, cannot be put at risk. Our objectives in Afghanistan will not be achieved by a military solution alone, but these military gains are essential in building the pressure on the Taliban to open up possibilities for reintegration, reconciliation and political settlement. Only by keeping the military pressure on will Taliban insurgents concede they cannot win militarily, that time is not on their side and they cannot wait out the international community.

United States drawdown

In 2010, some 33,000 additional United States troops were put into the fight in Afghanistan, along with an additional 7,500 troops from other NATO/ISAF partners. On 23 June, President Obama announced that the United States would commence a drawdown of this surge force. The President announced that 10,000 United States troops will leave Afghanistan by the end of this year. The remaining 23,000 surge troops will be drawn down by the end of the northern summer next year. When the drawdown of the United States surge troops is complete, the United States will still have 68,000 troops in Afghanistan.

The surge has already achieved its intended goals. It has degraded the al-Qaeda network, which President Obama described as now being 'under more pressure than at any time since 9/11'. This has, of course, been reinforced by the death of Osama Bin Laden. It has reversed Taliban momentum. It has also assisted in building Afghan capacity, which will allow responsibility for security to fully transition to Afghan-led security.

Australia sees no inconsistency between a drawdown of forces starting this year and the strategy agreed to at the Lisbon NATO/ISAF Summit last year to transition security responsibility to an Afghan lead by the end of 2014. As the Prime Minister has said, Australians will want to know what the drawdown means for Australia’s mission in Oruzgan. Australia has around 1,550 troops in Afghanistan. The advice from the new Chief of the Defence Force is that our current troop presence remains appropriate for our mission of training and mentoring the 4th Brigade of the Afghan National Army to take the security lead in Oruzgan by the end of 2014.

As a result of discussions with US counterparts and officials, I do not expect there will be any serious or adverse implications for Australian troops in Oruzgan Province. The detail of the draw­down of US surge forces has yet to be determined and will be decided on by ISAF commander, currently General David Petr­aeus and soon to be General John Allen, with whom I met recently in Brussels. Australian military and civilian officials have already been in close consultation with their US counterparts and will remain in close consultation with them as the detail of the drawdown is worked through.

High p rofile a ttacks

There will of course be setbacks on the way to transition. As recently as last week the Haqqani network launched an attack on the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul. This was a terrible attack. Such attacks are to be expected and we have already seen a num­ber, for example the 21 February suicide attack in Kunduz province, the 15 April killing of the Kandahar police chief, the 18 April attack on the Defence Ministry in Kabul and the 28 May killing of the police chief for northern Afghanistan. These attacks are aimed at achieving a propaganda effect and are aimed at undermining Afghan and international confidence in the progress that is being made on security, governance and development and on transition.

ISAF c ampaign progress

Afghan and ISAF security forces are making progress in Afghanistan. It was clear to me at the recent NATO and ISAF Defence Ministers’ Meeting that my counterparts share this assessment. Together with ISAF, the Afghan security forces are expanding security across the country and forcing the insurgency onto the back foot.

Campaign progress—Oruzgan

Security footprint

Security within Oruzgan itself has improved markedly. This, in part, is due to the successful partnering of the Mentoring Task Force with the 4th Brigade of the Afghan National Army (ANA). It has been instrumental in supporting the expansion of the ANA in Oruzgan. Australian Mentoring Task Force-Two (MTF-2) recently handed over to Mentoring Task Force-Three (MTF-3). During its eight-month deployment, MTF-2 was able to patrol further and supported more ANA elements than any previous Australian task force. It established a strong platform for subsequent Australian forces to concentrate on mentoring and development of the ANA.

Since commencing operations in Oruzgan, ISAF forces have assisted the Afghan forces in expanding the security footprint across Oruzgan with the establishment of over 30 patrol bases and checkpoints across the province. Since 2007, successive Australian Task Forces have continued to support this expansion through the construction of 18 new patrol bases and checkpoints. Of these bases, Australian forces have handed over the control of six patrol bases and checkpoints to the Afghan National Police. Australian forces have also provided 12 bases to the Afghan National Army, of which they are now fully responsible for seven. Australian and Afghan forces jointly man the remaining five bases.

Special Forces o perations

Australia is the third largest contributor of Special Forces in Afghanistan with personnel deployed to the Special Operations Task Group based in Tarin Kowt. Working with their dedicated Afghan partners, the Provin­cial Response Company Oruzgan from the Afghan National Police, the mission of our Special Forces is to target and disrupt insurgent networks in and around Oruzgan Province. The Special Forces mission is also to build the capacity of the Provincial Response Company ahead of the transition to Afghan-led security.

As I have previously advised the House, from time to time our Special Forces are authorised to operate in adjoining provinces on operations that have security benefits in Oruzgan Province. This involves operations to maintain pressure on insurgent leadership in Oruzgan, and its surrounding provinces including Kandahar, Helmand, Zabul and Daykundi. The operations of our Special Forces and their Afghan partners are currently focused on targeting insurgent networks known to be operating in Oruzgan Province and along key access routes into the province and region, to disrupt insurgent fighting preparations in Oruzgan.

National Interdiction Unit

Following a request from the Afghan government, Australian Special Forces have commenced the provision of enabling support—such as cordon security, logistical and medical support—to the Afghan Nation­al Interdiction Unit (NIU) as it conducts counter-narcotics operations to disrupt the Taliban’s revenue stream from narcotics trafficking. Australia’s support to the NIU has reduced the insurgency’s ability to fund itself by targeting the sale of narcotics. This support, commenced at Afghan government request, has subsequently led to a series of successful operations in and around Oruzgan.

Training and mentoring

The ADF remains on track to complete its mission and hand over complete operational responsibility for Oruzgan to Afghan security forces by the end of 2014, as part of the Inteqal, or transition, process. The ADF is making progress in training the 4th Brigade of the Afghan National Army in Oruzgan. There are now almost 5,000 Afghan security forces in Oruzgan, of which over 2,000 are serving in the ANA 4th Brigade. Australia has provided a wide range of training for our ANA partners in core military skills, as well as headquarters planning and combat enabling support. The arrival of 6th and final kandak in February has also improved the 4th Brigade’s operational capability. Australia commenced mentoring this kandak in late June, with a full mentoring team also partnering on lower level tactical operations.

Even more encouraging, the ANA has increasingly assumed the lead for the planning, preparation and execution of tactical operations, allowing Australian forces to concentrate on partnering Afghan command and control and combat support functions. One of the Afghan kandaks that Australian forces partner in Oruzgan is now close to being able to conduct fully independent operations, with the others making steady progress. Australian forces will be in a position to move from their partnering of ANA tactical operations to broader assistance, such as logistics and service support, in the first quarter of next year. This is as Afghan security forces assume further responsibility for the provision of security across Oruzgan.

Transition outlook

The process of transition is a reality and Australia is confident that we are on track for the transition of security responsibility to Afghan security forces in Oruzgan by the end of 2014. We very much welcome President Karzai’s March announcement of the first tranche of seven provinces and districts that would transition to Afghan-led security. The transition in those seven provinces and districts is scheduled to commence this month, and will see Afghan forces lead and conduct security operations in all provinces by the end of 2014. It is anticipated that later this year, a second tranche of provinces and districts will be announced as ready to commence the transition process.

Transition will progress across Afghan­istan as conditions allow. Transition will not be an even process, it will be district by district, province by province. Australia does not expect that Oruzgan will be among the first districts and provinces to transition. Australia stands ready to assist Oruzgan in this process. We will remain closely engaged with our partners involved in the first tranche of transitioning provinces and districts—to learn from them and inform our own transition of lead security responsibility for Oruzgan to Afghan forces by the end of 2014. Patience will be necessary. As the Prime Minister has said, there is no point in transitioning out early, just to transition back in again.

Post- t ransition

Transition does not mean the end of the international community’s support to Afghanistan. At the NATO/ISAF summit in Lisbon in November last year, ISAF partners welcomed the signing of an enduring partnership agreement between Afghanistan and NATO. This provides a framework for NATO-led assistance to Afghanistan beyond the conclusion of the transition process. The recent NATO/ISAF Defence Ministers’ meeting in Brussels reaffirmed this internat­ional community commitment to Afghan­istan in the longer term. Australia expects to remain in Afghanistan following the transition to Afghan-led security. This could be with Special Forces, security overwatch, capacity building, institution building or training roles.

The recent NATO/ISAF Defence Minis­ters’ meeting in Brussels also agreed that it was now timely to start a conversation about our post-transition objectives, mandate and structure. In this context, preliminary work has commenced, studying possible configur­ations of our continuing civilian and military presence in Afghanistan following transition in Oruzgan and beyond 2014.

Reconciliation and reintegration

At the London Conference on Afghanistan in January 2010, the international commun­ity committed itself to the principles of reconciliation and reintegration. At that conference, I said that the conflict in Afghanistan would not be ended by military force alone and that a long-term solution in Afghanistan also required political dialogue and, ultimately, reconciliation between the people of Afghanistan. The Taliban will only come to the negotiating table when they are under military pressure to do so and when they realise that they cannot simply wait out the international community. It is clear that the Taliban is under military pressure. Keeping military pressure on the Taliban will reinforce the need to reconcile and reintegrate.

Australia supports an Afghan-led reconciliation and reintegration process. Reconciliation and reintegration are a matter for the Afghan people, and must be led by the Afghan government. The Afghan government has laid down the conditions for reintegration and reconciliation—individuals must renounce violence, sever links with terrorist organisations, and respect the Afghan Constitution. There has been very early movement towards political discus­sions as recently made public by then US Secretary of Defense Bob Gates.

Detainee management update

Australia takes its responsibility for detainee management very seriously. In December last year, I announced the details of Australia’s detainee management frame­work in Afghanistan following the Dutch withdrawal from Oruzgan Province on 1 August 2010. In developing our detainee management framework, Australia has had two priorities in mind: first, the critical need to remove insurgents from the battlefield, where they endanger Australian, ISAF and Afghan lives; and, second, the need to ensure humane treatment of detainees, consistent with Australian values and our domestic and international legal obligations.

The detainee management framework draws on applicable international standards and advice from international humanitarian organisations. Under the framework, detain­ees apprehended by the ADF are transferred either to Afghan custody in Tarin Kowt, or US custody at the detention facility in Parwan, or released if there is insufficient evidence to seek prosecution through the Afghan judicial system. Arrangements are in place with both the Afghan and US governments that include assurances on the humane treatment of detainees and access to those detainees by Australian officials and humanitarian organisations to monitor their ongoing welfare.

During my visit to Afghanistan in April, I again visited the ADF Initial Screening Area and was briefed by the team who run the facility. They remain committed to supp­orting the removal of insurgents from the battlefield while ensuring the humane treatment of detainees. In the period 1 August 2010 to 3 July 2011, Australia apprehended 788 detainees. Of these, 93 have been transferred to Afghan authorities and 46 to US authorities. The remainder have been released following initial screening.

Since 1 August 2010 to 3 July 2011, 23 allegations of mistreatment from 21 detainees have been made against the ADF. Of these allegations, 18 have been thorough­ly investigated. They have been found to have had no substance and were dismissed. Five more recent allegations remain under review. Any allegation of detainee mistreat­ment is promptly investigated and the outcome is reported in full to ISAF. Over the same period, from 1 August 2010 to 3 July 2011, the ADF have captured six people who were subsequently released, then recaptured. Four of the individuals in question were released as there was insufficient evidence to warrant their continued detention. In the case of the fifth and sixth individuals, the second time each was apprehended there was sufficient evidence to provide a link to the insurgency. In accordance with Australia’s detainee management framework, the fifth detainee was transferred to the detention facility in Parwan and the sixth to the National Directorate of Security in Oruzgan.

In my March and May reports I updated the House on a number of detainee matters. In the case of the investigation into allegations that the ADF Initial Screening Area team in Afghanistan did not adhere to administrative procedures, I am advised that I will soon be provided with the investigative team’s report. The outcomes of the investigation will be made public in due course. I am also advised that there have been no further issues with the closed circuit television system at the Initial Screening Area and that the system is functioning and continuous footage is being recorded and archived.

The government has considered and reaffirmed the appropriateness of the require­ment for an initial detainee monitoring visit to occur within 72 hours after a detainee is transferred from the Australian Initial Screening Area to US or Afghan custody. The government continues to consider arrangements on the length of detention in the Australian Initial Screening Area to enable the collection of further information by Australia. The government is also considering the implementation of conting­ency arrangements for the management of detainees captured on operations outside of Oruzgan.

I will continue to provide regular public updates, including to the parliament, on Afghanistan.

I table a paper in conjunction with my ministerial statement. I thank the House and I ask leave of the House to move a motion to enable the member for Fadden to speak for 20 minutes.

Leave granted.

I move:

That so much of the standing orders be suspended as would prevent the member for Fadden speaking for a period not exceeding 20 minutes.

Question agreed to.

Stuart Robert (Fadden, Liberal Party, Shadow Minister for Defence Science, Technology and Personnel) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to respond to the statement on Afghanistan by the Minister for Defence. Once again I thank the minister for keeping his word on provid­ing regular updates to this parliament on the war in Afghanistan. To his credit, this is the minister's third update to the House this year, building on his previous reports from 23 March and 12 May. It is important to restate that the opposition continues to strongly offer bipartisan support to the government for the prosecution of combat and reconstruction operations in Afghanistan and for wider security operations in the Middle East Area of Operations. This bipartisan support, while strong and vocal, is not a blank cheque, however. We continue to reserve our right as an opposition to constructively keep the government account­able in any and all areas of the prosecution of these operations. It is also noted that we respect the role of the Chief of the Defence Force as the principal military adviser and commander of Australian forces and have the utmost faith in General David Hurley's abilities and capacity to provide the best advice to the government on the prosecution of these operations.

I thank the minister for this constructive approach to the bipartisan support the coalition offers, especially through the provision of information and advice when required and facilitating regular visits into the Middle East Area of Operations for the coalition to ascertain events firsthand on the ground. Consequently, this report to parlia­ment from the coalition is provided with the backdrop of my recent return from Afghanistan after an extensive week's visit in mid-May which included Al Minhad Air Base, Tarin Kowt and going out into the badlands to the patrol base at Musaza'i, to Kandahar and to Kabul, including the green zone, and meeting with representatives of the Afghan parliament. This was my third visit into theatre in the past 24 months as part of our commitment to a fully informed bipartisan support to the government for combat operations. It is our expectation that the coalition will continue to have semiregular access into the Middle East Area of Operations as part of our constructive approach to bipartisan support, and I thank the minister for his work in making this happen.

I also join the minister in his condolences for and reflection on the five soldiers killed in action and wounded in Afghanistan since the last ministerial statement on 12 May and the 28 soldiers killed in action and the 182 soldiers wounded in action since the start of combat operations at the end of 2001. Theirs is a terrible loss, borne especially by family and friends but certainly felt by our nation. Freedom has a price; it is not free. It is borne by so few for the benefit of so many of us. As I expressed yesterday with the Minister for Defence, the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition as we lamented and eulogised the loss of Commando Sergeant Todd Langley, this parliament will ensure families left behind and those suffering will not be forgotten and will be cared for.

The minister rightly states that the loss of every soldier raises questions within the community as to the legitimacy of our ongoing combat operations in the theatre of Afghanistan. We went into Afghanistan with parliamentary bipartisan support at the end of 2001 to ensure that Afghanistan could never again be used as a training, financing, supporting, indoctrinating and operational ground for terrorism that would impact on Australia and its interests at home and abroad. To this end, we stay in Afghanistan to ensure that is achieved. The death of Osama bin Laden has prompted some to question the continued need for Australia's involvement in the Afghan war, many arguing that we went to Afghanistan only to destroy al-Qaeda and bin Laden and that that appears to be done. The reality of course is that the strategy in Afghanistan is much bigger than simply destroying one man or one terrorist organisation. The strategy is to ensure that the insurgency across Afghan­istan, which is made up of at least 10 separate organisations, including the Afghan Taliban, does not once again control Afghanistan, thereby allowing that country to be used for training, resourcing, financing, equipping, indoctrinating and assisting terrorists.

Whilst it is true that some of the so-called Taliban moderates reconciled with the Afghan government long ago, the remaining Taliban, particular the southern Taliban, have splintered into several antagonistic groups, ironically each more extreme than the other. Other insurgency forces, like the Quetta Shura and the Haqqani network, at times are little more than opportunistic criminal families or factions, though they are organised, ruthless and brutal, as evidenced by the recent attack on the Hotel Inter-Continental in Kabul.

In war, perceptions tend to lag behind reality by a considerable distance. That was the case in the early years, up to 2005, when the West re-engaged in Afghanistan and, at the opposite end of the spectrum, I believe it is also the case now. This can go some way to explaining President Obama's announce­ment of the withdrawal of 33,000 troops by summer 2012, tempered by the fact that this is also the number of extra surge troops that were committed in 2009 and that were always going to be removed at some point in the future. As the minister said, at the end of the surge withdrawal by summer 2012 the US will still have some 68,000 combat troops in theatre.

The message is that the counterinsurgency strategy is working, and I agree with the minister that there is a degree of cautious optimism. The strategy is more than just hearts and minds and includes a range of commonsense precepts about applying well-calibrated kinetic activity with building up economic activity. The Pashto-speaking Major Jim Gant's treatise, entitled One Tribe at a Time, describes part of the approach that is working. Furthermore, while provincial reconstruction still has a long way to go, the level of economic activity, and thus some degree of legitimacy of the government over that of the Taliban, is slowly improving. The International Council on Security and Development, an organisation long critical of US policy in Afghanistan, is echoing the US sentiment that, as a result of the surge and refined strategy, many of the Taliban's long-time safe havens in Helmand and Kandahar have been destroyed. Mid-level Taliban commanders and their networks have been disrupted, dismantled or destroyed by special forces, with General Petraeus telling the US armed services committee in March 2011 that, in a typical three-month period, 360 insurgent leaders were killed or captured. According to observers, the average age of Taliban has dropped from 35 to 25 in the past year, with most senior commanders now choosing to live in Pakistan in relative safety and issuing orders to those beneath them to take up the fight.

We all recognise within the realm of strategic operations that we cannot kill our way to victory in Afghanistan. Whilst judicious and lawful use of kinetic activity is certainly required to disrupt, dismantle and destroy insurgent networks, there is a greater need to protect civilian populations for the provincial reconstruction to occur and the economic life of that community to continue unabated. This is certainly part of the key to the effective withdrawal of combat forces by 2014. The standing up of the Afghan National Army is taking time, but I agree with the minister that it is working. Whilst Tajiks are overrepresented in the officer corps and Pashtuns from the south are grossly underrepresented amongst the rank and file, the overall composition of the Afghan National Army remains reasonably ethnically well-balanced.

The ANA have also assumed security responsibility in Bamyan province, the first of the 48 provinces, and over half of our patrol bases within Oruzgan province are manned solely by ANA soldiers. As the minister has reported, by month's end the Afghan government is looking for transition in up to a further seven provinces. Retention rates within the ANA are slowly rising, albeit from a low base. Pay rates have gone up US$140 a month for a raw recruit; and of course the average wage in Afghanistan is only $40 a month. The ANA is on track to reach its November 2011 goal of 171,000 personnel, which will increase to 260,000 by 2014. There have been similar increases in Afghan police over the past year, to an expected 134,000 by the end of 2011. There will be 303,000 personnel in the ANA and ANP by the end of 2011.

By way of reflection, in 2001, 10 years ago, Kabul was a ghost town and home to 500,000 repressed, cold—because no heating worked—and oppressed people. There was no music, no dancing in the streets, no cinemas and little entertainment. It is now a thriving city of some three million people—cafes, shops, cinemas, music, girls and boys at school. In fact, two months ago when I was there, driving through the main street of Kabul it was refreshing to see little boys and girls skipping to school, playing with tyres, playing with dodgy toys, chatting on the sidewalk. It was great to see people milling around in their thousands, to the point that it reminded me more of a somewhat busy and crowded Asian city.

In 2001, 9 per cent of Afghans had access to basic medical care—just 9 per cent. Today it is 85 per cent. In 2001, less than 1 million boys went to school; today, seven million young Afghans go to school, one-third of whom are girls. In 2001, you struggled to find a phone. Today, one in three Afghans have a mobile phone. That is staggering. In 2001, only the Taliban's Voice of Sharia hit the airwaves; today there are over 100 active press outlets in Afghanistan. Afghan GDP growth today is 22 per cent, with almost $1 trillion of mineral wealth believed to be in the dirt, including rare metals such as lithium. By way of comparison, and this is for comparison only, each year, currently, more people are killed in Russia and Mexico because of political and criminal violence then are killed in Afghanistan from military, criminal and political violence, notwith­standing the size of those communities. This reflection is simply to point out that the change in 10 years in Afghanistan has been significant—significant for the lives of the Afghan people; significant for the destruc­tion of criminal and insurgent networks that would seek to do us harm.

We must not forget that Afghan politics continues to be, in our view, corrupt, although in a federalised system the provinces simply look to the President for security and the odd gift, otherwise the strongly independent provinces ask to be left alone. There is substantial work going into governance issues within the Afghan government, and that needs to be encouraged and further developed. Previous moves to strike a deal with the Taliban have proved fruitless and the intensity of attacks has certainly increased, with the 8,000 insurgent incidents—IED, small-arms fire and rocket, mortar and suicide attacks—in 2008 doubling to more than 17,000 in 2010. This is, more than anything else, representative of the intensity of the ISAF and the Operation Enduring Freedom activity and the need for the Taliban to try to hold their own against inevitable defeat. Despite this, negotiations with the Taliban continue in the hope of brokering a way forward with a deal, and to that end I remain cautiously hopeful.

I join the minister in expressing careful optimism, having been in theatre three times in the past 24 months and having seen substantial improvement on each of those occasions. Most notably, to share an example with the House, I was in Tarin Kowt in October last year with the Leader of the Opposition, Tony Abbott. Around seven kilometres from Tarin Kowt, as Tony and I stood there in theatre, a massive military operation was underway with efforts by the MTF to put a patrol base in the Mirabad Valley, a mere seven kilometres from the fire support base at Tarin Kowt. So vicious was the fighting that it went over many hours and days. Fast jets were called in, and a section 2IC seeking to resupply the MTF, fighting on a small mound above where the patrol base was taking such a degree of direct aimed fire, had to lie doggo to show the enemy that he was dead so fire would be lifted and he could resume his resupply run—a vicious, brutal fight on a peninsula off from the valley base.

A patrol base at Musaza'i now stands where that battle took place. Two months ago I flew in there with Colonel Creighton, the commander of Combined Team Uruzgan, the CTU. The helicopter landed and we walked across the low-lying hill down to the patrol base, crossing the scene of that battle with thousands of expended ammunition shells across the ground. We walked down to the patrol base, met with the men who were manning the patrol base at the that time, 5 Battalion MTF2, and we then spent the next 90 minutes with the local shura, a meeting of the local elders. For those 90 minutes we were sitting down with 20 or 30 Afghan elders from the Mirabad Valley, not once was it suggested that we needed to do something about security in the area. Questions were asked: 'When is the road coming? Thank you for the mosque but can we have some access? When is health care coming? Thanks for some education; can we have more?' Not once was the question of national security asked. The difference between October last year and May this year in the lower parts of the Mirabad Valley speaks louder than any words possibly could. I note that Australia, in the minister's words, is committed to a metrics based, command judged drawdown; valley by valley, patrol base by patrol base. For this it has the overwhelming support of the coalition.

As so many nations flocked to withdraw forces and announce forced withdrawals on the back of the US announcement, I applaud the minister for holding his nerve and not making a political announcement, but sticking to the very sensible approach of a metrics based, command judged drawdown. He has overwhelming coalition support on a sensible approach to the withdrawal of troops as we move towards 2014. I note that of the over 25 patrol bases—forward operating bases out there in the valley—that at least half are manned solely by the Afghan National Army, proving the minister's point that we are already beginning a drawdown in terms of valley by valley, patrol base by patrol base, with some oversight by MTF forces. It is our expectation, Minister, that as we move to actual withdrawal of combat troops from the theatre the coalition will be informed of the metrics based, command judged approach to that withdrawal as it happens.

I take on face value the minister's statement that our drawdown is on track towards 2014. I also acknowledge the minister's statement that post drawdown we will continue to have a degree of overwatch forces in place that may include elements such as special forces, training components and reconstruction components. I thank the minister for his update on the mentoring task force where Lieutenant Colonel Darren Huxley, a classmate of mine, has withdrawn the 5th Battalion Royal Australian Regiment to be replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Smith with the 2nd Battalion. I note the great work of the 5th Battalion—over 2½ thousand patrols, 100 contacts by elements of the MTF, over 100 IEDs found, and 380 weapon and cache locations discov­ered. It was one of the most successful winter operations ever conducted by Austr­alian forces within the combat area. I thank and give praise to Lieutenant Colonel Darren Huxley for the great work he and his battalion did in trying and difficult circumstances.

I welcome the rotation of the 2nd Battalion Royal Australian Regiment under Lieutenant Colonel Smith with the MTF 3. Lieutenant Colonel Smith, you are going into a hard fight. The fighting season is well and truly upon you, as the SOTG and other elements have warned so harshly over the last few months. It is necessary that we continue the hard work with the mentoring of Afghan national forces in support of the kinetic disrupting and dismantling work of special operations to drive home the peace that we currently hold on to.

The provincial reconstruction team has now grown to over 189 staff, ably led by a great Australian. With funding increased to over $30 million this financial year, on top of the over $100 million from the Australian budget for the wider Afghanistan, it is already making a significant difference. When I landed in Musazai base, Colonel Crichton the head of the PRT, who was also on the same helicopter as me, jumped off to travel with some local Afghans to look at a bridge that needed to be fixed in the area. It just goes to show the provincial recons­truction, civilian and military teams working together.

I continue to praise the work of the Special Operations Task Group, commanded by another colonel colleague of mine who took over my platoon, the 3rd Battalion Royal Australian Regiment. He is doing tremendous work in leading his men incredibly well. They are the third largest special forces group and their work with training the provincial response company of the ANP is proving of enormous benefit.

I reiterate to the minister that a political cap of 1,550 people should be able to be flexible and that the commander should be able to use judgment to use wider forces within the MEAO to affect command and judgment and effects on the ground. As we head into a difficult fighting season, I wish all the men and women who fight within the Middle East area of operations the best of luck. They enjoy our thoughts and our prayers.

As the 2nd Battalion takes over the Mentoring Task Force, and the bulk of the Special Operations Task Group is comprised of the 2nd Commando Regiment based on 4RAR, we now ostensibly have the old 2nd/4th Battalion back in operation again—this time in separate MTF and the SOTG forces. The coalition wishes them the very best. We will monitor their progress with great interest. We will support them to the hilt and we will continue to offer bipartisan support to the government to ensure our fighting men and women have everything they need to effect victory within Afghanistan.