Jane Prentice (Ryan, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

This inquiry into cabin crew ratios on Australian aircraft was about safety. It was not an inquiry into minimum standards; it was not an inquiry into employment in the sector; it was not an inquiry into commercial imperatives and cost pressures in the aviation industry; and it was not an inquiry into other safety aspects of airlines and terminal security. The committee's terms of reference were quite clear; they included the role of cabin crew in managing passenger safety and security. The committee's first recommendation calls on the Civil Aviation Safety Authority and the Office of Transport Safety to work together to determine an appropriate cabin crew ratio for Australian domestic flights. Australia has an enviable record of safety, and I found it quite ingenuous of some witnesses to claim that a ratio of one to 50 is world's best practice. It may be the world's accepted practice, or indeed the current world standard, but I cannot accept that having fewer flight attendants makes it safer. Indeed, I am quite concerned by claims by the airlines that they actually rely on passengers to assist in times of a crisis.

Whilst there is no doubt an expectation that some passengers can and may assist at the time of an incident, the make-up of passengers varies considerably from flight to flight. Since this inquiry began, I have from time to time questioned passengers sitting in the exit rows. According to some evidence we received, these passengers are seated in this location because they have been identified as passengers who will assist in times of an emergency. However, an older woman who was seated in this row on one of my flights advised me that she had actually paid extra for her seat, which she had booked in advance, because she liked more room. When I asked her whether she thought she could open the emergency door and assist other passengers, she said she would probably need someone else's assistance to open the door, and that if there was an emergency she intended to be one of the first off the plane and had no desire to assist others. In fact it was submitted to the inquiry that there are different types of doors and without training 'most people' would have difficulty. Even last Sunday on my flight to Canberra, the flight attendants were most concerned to find that a handicapped person had been seated in the exit row.

Indeed, while airlines believe their planes are safer and require fewer flight attendants, from my own personal observations there can be no doubt that, if anything, passengers have become more difficult and demanding. I found it inappropriate that CASA granted exemptions to the one to 36 rule on the basis of manufacturer's certifications and claims by aircraft companies such as Boeing and Airbus that their modern aircraft were designed and certified to operate safely with a ratio of one to 50. Those who do not take into consideration the human element do so at their own peril. These days we see many more elderly passengers flying than previously and passengers who do not speak English. There are many more young children and unaccompanied children, and also passengers with a disability and those who need a wheelchair. As well, we often have only one adult with several young children. On a recent flight to Perth, just in the rows around where I was seated there was one family of two adults and three children occupying only four seats, and another family group of a mother with three young children occupying only three seats. If you listen to the airline representatives they would have you believe that other passengers can be relied on to assist in times of an emergency. Now, that flight was particularly full, with nearly 250 passengers. It was fortunate that we did have flight attendants in the ratio of one to 36, because, if that plane had experienced an emergency, we would have needed at least one flight attendant for each of the exits as well as calling on passengers to assist. I still cannot see how they would have evacuated everyone in a reasonable time.

While most passengers will act with the best of intentions, that is not to say that they are not much more likely to get it wrong than a trained flight attendant—even if it is for the right reason—and in fact endanger other passengers. Who can forget the incident at a major international airport where the passenger in the exit row, having carefully listened to the flight attendant's instructions, then decided to open the emergency door just to check it was working properly. This caused major disruption and more than six hours delay to the flight. CASA admitted that Boeing and Airbus had increasingly 'put some dependence on able bodied passengers being able to assist in the evacuation' in their claims that fewer flight attendants are needed.

We also need to consider the cabin crew ratios in terms of assistance from other crew members. Before 9-11 it was not uncommon for the captain to walk down the plane, and he or the flight engineer could be relied on to assist the cabin crew with difficult and/or unruly passengers. Now the cockpit door is locked and crews no longer include a flight engineer, who, as one witness said, was 'replaced by a computer'. So, already, in times of an emergency, there are less professional airline staff on board than in previous years. And, on top of that, in recent weeks we have heard that the sky marshal program is to be wound back.

I was very impressed with the evidence presented by the Flight Attendants Association of Australia as well as Ms Beverley Maunsell's submission and, in particular, airline safety adviser Mr Ken Lewis. I only regret that the TWU chose that particular session to raise other issues about airport security which, although important, were not part of our terms of reference. This reduced the time we had to hear Mr Lewis's expert evidence and discuss other relevant aspects.

Flight attendants are trained for emergency situations. They are trained to assist passengers and identify in advance those who may need assistance and those who may cause trouble. I understand Qantas flight attendants have specific training sessions twice a year. No matter how well intentioned a passenger may be, they cannot provide the same level of assistance in an emergency. We all hope that we will never have to put the cabin crew ratios to the test in real life, but an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.

I wish to place on record my appreciation to the committee secretariat and in particular Julia Morris and James Nelson and their team for their professional support and assistance. As the report quotes from Beverley Maunsell's submission, 'You cannot separate occupational safety, operational safety and security, because they are all so intertwined.' As recommendation 7 states:

The 1:36 cabin crew ratio should be retained until such time that it can be demonstrated that a change to any other ratio in Australia will not result in reduced levels of safety or security.

Mike Symon (Deakin, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

As a member of the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Infrastructure and Communications, I am pleased that this report has now been tabled and I definitely speak in support of its recommendations. I certainly agree with the contribution from the member for Ryan. This was a particularly interesting inquiry, and I found that the further we went into the inquiry the more I went searching for information, because it actually came across as something that was happening right now, a real-life situation. In particular, I will talk about recommendation Nos 6 and 7, which refer to the one to 36 ratio of cabin crew that Australia currently has. I have no doubt that when it comes to cabin crew ratios Australia leads the world.

I think it is also important to say that at the inquiry not one piece of evidence was presented that proved that a ratio of one cabin crew to 50 passenger seats was safer than Australia's current ratio of one cabin crew to 36 passengers. Although there were such claims in submissions from various airlines and CASA, no-one was able to provide this proof to the committee.

We then heard lots of stories about world's best practice and various other things. At the time I found a rather interesting article in the Courier Mail of 30 May by Robert MacDonald. The article is titled 'Practice may make perfect, but calling it world's best is meaningless'. In the article—and I will only quote a few sections—he said it is time to call an end to world's best practice. He went on to say:

The airlines argue the present ratio of one crew member for every 36 passengers should be increased to a ratio of 1:50 on the basis, in summary, of world's best practice.

He then said:

How can that be, at least if you are a passenger? How can reducing staff numbers possibly be an improvement in the current state of affairs?

He then said:

The Australian and International Airline Pilots Association takes some exception to these arguments: "What this term means is not explained. There is no documentation to suggest that transition to the new ratio actually enhances aviation safety and therefore 'world's best practice' cannot be in relation to safety outcomes."

As noted in the report, proposals to change the one to 36 cabin crew ratio have been dealt with by the parliament and its committees previously. On each occasion the change to the one to 50 ratio was not accepted. Of great concern to me was CASA's granting of exemptions to the one to 36 cabin crew ratio, despite the previously expressed views of parliament over many years. These exemptions continue today. There are at least 12 exemptions currently operating to this ratio; for airlines such as Qantas, Jetstar, Virgin, Sunstate, Cobham, Air North, Alliance, Tiger, Strategic and Skywest. This practice of granting exemptions is widespread. The more I read and heard about this issue, the greater my concerns became that the proposed change in ratios, and the existing exemptions, may not be as safe as what should be there in the current one to 36 ratio.

The committee had three public hearings and we had some very knowledgeable witnesses at each of the three public hearings. As the member for Ryan said, one of our regrets was that we ran out of time. We could have spent a lot more time talking to some of these witnesses about their knowledge of the situation. They brought some great experience along to the committee. I would like to refer to some of those committee hearings. The first one was in Sydney on 19 May this year. We received a submission from Ms Beverley Maunsell and on reading it we saw that it was in a private capacity but when we delved a bit further we found she had been trained by Qantas as an air safety investigator. She believed at the time of her departure from Qantas that she was the only cabin safety specialist employed by an airline in the world. She went on to say that she presumed she was still probably the only one to hold that position.

To have someone like that present to the committee gave us a great opportunity to really flesh out some of the questions that had been asked of both CASA and the airlines. As the member for Ryan said, the changing mix of passengers on airlines to me presented a great concern. Many of us in this place use airlines very frequently and we do see a lot of what happens around us. Over the many years I have been flying I have seen an increase in the number of children, an increase in the number of passengers with disabilities and even an increase in the number of passengers who need wheelchairs to get on and off planes. This seems to be happening more and more. Around holiday time the number of children on planes is huge. That of course comes down in many cases to cheaper fares. These days it can be cheaper to fly the family interstate than in previous times, when people might have driven. I asked Ms Maunsell at the 19 May public hearing about her observations over the years of the change in the number or percentage of passengers with a disability and the number of unaccompanied children on planes. She replied:

Not personally. I know that there are a lot more people with disabilities travelling. There are a lot more people with disabilities in the general day-to-day meeting with people now. The flight attendants association would most probably be best to tell you this.

She then said, 'I certainly would not want to be on one of the flights up to Coolangatta in the school holidays!' which did reinforce my own particular view of that.

There was also another hearing on 25 May, in Canberra, and we had the Flight Attendants Association come along to that. We took evidence from Ms Jo-Ann Davidson of the association, who told us:

The current exemption for the Jetstar airbus A321 aircraft within the Qantas group has removed the cabin crew member responsible for the forward right primary floor level exit. Given the exemption, there is only one cabin crew member responsible for the two forward emergency exit doors.

That then leads back into the problem that the member for Ryan described. How does someone who has not been trained and so does not understand how to operate a piece of equipment even in relaxed circumstances then go on to perform that action, and succeed in doing it first time, in an emergency? I cannot see from any background of training how that can be achieved. I asked later on in that hearing:

… how hard is it to open an aircraft door and what sort of training is required for someone who has no knowledge to be able to do that?

Ms Carol Locket replied:

Cabin crew are trained extensively to open aircraft doors. They are certified by CASA through emergency procedures, either every six months or every 12 months. Technique is quite important in that there are certain types of doors where it would not matter how hard you pushed them; if you have not put the handle to the correct position in the first place, they will not open.

I then asked:

Therefore, a passenger with absolutely no training, if called upon in any situation to be able to do that—what chance do you think they would have of being successful in that operation?

Ms Locket replied:

I would say that they would have a very reduced chance of opening that successfully.

I think that is a real concern for anyone who travels on an airline in Australia or with those sorts of rules anywhere in the world. We take safety, especially in Australian airlines, as a right, and we should. There is certainly a very good record in this country. And I do not see any case for undermining our safety record just on the basis of airline manufacturers' calculations on how their planes could be used. Australia does have the worldwide reputation of having a safe airline industry.

There are many, many other things that came up through the course of the inquiry. Our third hearing was in Canberra on 1 June. Many of the same people came back to the inquiry, because it was a follow-up public hearing. At that hearing I asked questions about the capacity of passengers to understand what was required of them in case of an emergency evacuation if they had to operate the door themselves. I asked this question of John McCormick, the Director of Aviation Safety at CASA. I asked particularly how it could be done, because I still did not get a proper understanding of how someone who had had a card waved in their face could then perform that action. It was not a straight answer, I must say. We just could not really get to the admission that a trained person would do the job better than an untrained person. But it was clear to me—and other committee members will speak for themselves—that in an emergency situation I would much rather be in the hands of a trained professional than a conscripted volunteer, who might have absolutely no idea of what they had been called upon to do. We also discussed airline evacuation tests, whether they had actually been done and what the results were. We came across some rather disturbing evidence there too, because these were not full evacuations; they were only partial and they were pre-notified. People were put on and told what was going to happen. Furthermore, in relation to the passengers, Mr McCormick said at the 1 June hearing:

They are all able-bodied, I will say that, but there has to be a certain percentage above a certain age, there has to be some that are above 60 years of age, they have to have two dolls to represent infants—they are not counted under two years of age in the seat count.

Mr SYMON: Dolls are rather compliant, aren't they? Infants are not.

Mr McCormick: Quite correct.

That goes back to the contribution of the member for Ryan, who said that the mix of passengers on planes is not reflected in a theoretical piece of paper that was written up in the early seventies—or before that, in many cases, as the committee heard. The reality of what is there now needs to be reflected. Everyone knows that there are many, many people on planes who simply are not able—or in some cases not willing—to perform those functions. Again, those functions need to go back to a trained professional.

That was taken up by many members of the committee and asked several times of several people who came to present evidence to us. I left each and every one of those public hearings unsatisfied that a change to the ratio of cabin crew to passengers in Australia would be for the better for the Australian public. The committee has now considered and tabled the report, and nothing since those public hearings has caused me to change my mind on that. I am certain that when it comes to world's best practice, however it is described, Australia is at that level. It is actually up to the rest of the world to catch up to us. I thank the House.

Michael McCormack (Riverina, National Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The October 2011 report of the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Infrastructure and Communications on cabin crew ratios on Australian aircraft could not have been more aptly titled: Finding the right balance. The committee had been asked to consider a question of public policy, raising issues of public safety, security and cost. Within the committee's terms of reference, the report has certainly found the right balance. That question is whether the legal minimum requirement for the number of cabin crew in certain passenger aircraft should be a ratio of one to 50 or one to 36. Australia currently has the ratio of one crew member to 36 passengers. This requirement has remained unchanged since 1960. Whilst it is unclear exactly why this ratio was adopted, Qantas believes the one to 36 requirement was introduced to ensure that the Fokker F27 aircraft had two cabin crew members. The one to 36 requirement is unique to Australia and is the most rigid in the world.

In February 2010, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, CASA, issued a notice of proposed rule-making on cabin crew ratios, which proposed an amendment to a civil aviation order to permit aircraft operators to assign cabin crew according to a ratio of one crew member to a maximum of 50 passenger seats for aircraft fitted with between 36 and 216 seats. For international flights operating via Asia or the Pacific, the one to 36 requirement applies for the entire journey, not just the segment operating out of Australia. For co-share flights, the cabin crew requirements are those of the major airline's home country.

It should be noted that Australia does accept that the one to 50 requirement meets appropriate safety standards. Planes manufactured in the United States of America must meet Federal Aviation Administration regulations to be certified. This requires that a full evacuation of the aircraft can be undertaken in 90 seconds using the one to 50 cabin crew ratio. This process acknowledges that a seat ratio of one to 50 offers acceptable safety standards by approving the aircraft to operate in Australia. However, when operating in Australia the plane requires a passenger ratio of one to 36. In practice, this means that a cabin crew of five is required rather than four. By changing to the international standard ratio, costs will be lowered in what is only a small bit of good news for regional Australian airlines, which in July 2012 will be facing three major issues which will only cost them more. The impact of the carbon tax on the aviation industry is of serious concern. The aviation excise for domestic fuel use will be increased as part of the Labor government's carbon tax regime. In the first year alone, 6c a litre will be added to the cost of aviation kerosene, and just over 5c a litre will be added to the cost of avgas—and it just goes up and up from there.

The aviation industry has already made significant gains in becoming more efficient and reducing fuel usage. That is to be expected, as it is in the industry's commercial interest to decrease costs while at the same time maintaining safety. That is what the Finding the right balance report is all about, and it is a key factor of it. For an industry that cannot readily reduce fuel use any further in the absence of new technologies and is already struggling to cope with higher costs and very minimal margins, the introduction of a carbon tax is a new and serious impediment that has the potential to wipe out some operators.

The carbon tax is not Labor's only attack on the regional airline sector. The en route navigation charges rebate scheme for regional airlines is a $6 million per year program. It will be axed from 1 July next year, the same date the carbon tax comes into effect. It is yet another cost that will make even more regional air service operations more marginal. It is frustrating to hear some policy makers say that a change in government policy will add only a few dollars to the cost of a ticket from one airport to another. The route viability calculations are more complicated than that. If it were as simple as adding a few dollars to a ticket, companies would have already done that to increase profits for their shareholders and expand their business.

The coalition is committed to working with the aviation industry to ensure that the policy settings are right to guarantee the ongoing viability of the industry. Further, changes to regional aviation security have the potential to have a major cost impact on smaller carriers as regional airports try to pass on the cost of essential capital upgrades. These changes have been brought forward and will also come into effect from 1 July 2012. I note that the government has provided funding of up to $650,000 for each airport that is required to introduce screening. However, I understand that preliminary figures indicate that this will be woefully inadequate to cover the upgrade costs in airports. In some cases, the capital cost of the required upgrade will be several million dollars—not to mention ongoing operating costs of about $1 million per year. Some small airports with regular public transport services will have to add hundreds of dollars to the cost of air tickets if they hope to achieve cost recovery.

This certainly is of great concern to me and the people in my electorate, as one of the finest airlines in regional Australia—Regional Express—is homed in Wagga Wagga. It is the main operator for flying for most of my region. Rex has its roots firmly in the bush and in country Australia. Its tagline boldly affirms, 'Our heart is in the country.' Rex believes that the bush needs and deserves a quality air service that provides good connectivity with capital cities at affordable prices—and certainly the company does that. However, this Labor-Greens alliance is constantly throwing out challenges that affect Rex's margins, which affects the way Rex does its business. But, like all regional people and organisations, Rex will not be discouraged. Regional people are very resilient people, as I am sure the member for Gippsland would agree.

When it comes to aviation, nothing is more important than safety. Certainly this report indicates that safety is paramount. Australia has very high aviation standards. I have to say that the government recently funded a very good instrument landing system at Wagga Wagga Airport, and I commend that initiative. An instrument landing system is essentially a ground based approach system that provides precision guidance to an aircraft approaching and landing on a runway. It uses a combination of radio signals to enable a safe landing during meteorological conditions such as low cloud or reduced visibility due to fog or rain. The Wagga Wagga ILS is a key component in the success of aviation education and training within the region. However, the Wagga Wagga ILS also provides significant safety and operational benefits for the airport, coupled with significant economic benefits and job creation for the entire region. Perhaps even more importantly, however, the Wagga Wagga ILS provides an opportunity for the commercial pilots of the future to be trained at an airport, a regional airport, which boasts the latest technology of category 1 ILS equipment, without the need to fly further afield to gain access to an ILS.

Building on these strengths, aviation related education and training in Wagga Wagga has grown in response to industry needs. The emergence of a strategic partnership-based skills network between Wagga Wagga City Council, Regional Development Australia, federal government agencies, tertiary education institutions, industry skills councils and the private sector will continue promoting and growing Wagga Wagga's advantages in aviation education and training—which is known by some there as 'the Wagga Wagga initiative'.

The installation of the Wagga Wagga ILS was completed on 16 December 2010. Construction included the installation of a localiser antennae array, near-field monitor and equipment building at the 05 end of runway 05/23 and a glide path antennae, earth mat and equipment building at the 23 runway end. Power and communications cabling was installed from the air traffic control tower for both the localiser and glide path installations, which required several under bores including both runways, the parallel taxiway and a road. There was also a need to construct a permanent diversion of the airport perimeter road and installation of drainage culverts.

The opening was a grand occasion for Wagga Wagga. I welcomed the input of the Department of Regional Australia, Regional Development and Local Government into that whole process. The minister, Simon Crean, sent his representative, Gordon McCormick, there. He was certainly very much welcomed and the minister's input was noted by me on that occasion.

The Rex pilot academy is another wonderful institution that Wagga Wagga has, and is very lucky to have. It was officially completed in May 2010, although training had started in July 2009. Regional Express is Australia's largest independent regional airline, operating a fleet of more than 40 Saab 340 aircraft on some 1,300 weekly flights to 35 destinations throughout New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Queensland and Tasmania. Wagga Wagga was carefully selected as the site for the Australian Airline Pilot Academy as it possesses ideal training conditions not found anywhere else in Australia. The Wagga Wagga flying training area is one of the largest in Australia and encompasses an area of approximately 540 square nautical miles with an aerobatic area of approximately 90 square nautical miles. As I said, Wagga Wagga is also one of the few regional airports in Australia equipped with an instrument landing system. The latest graduation from the Australian Airline Pilot Academy was conducted just last Friday, with eight graduates getting their wings. They will be very much welcomed into aviation circles and certainly they will go on to bigger and better things.

I commend this report to the House, especially the final recommendation, No. 7:

That the 1:36 ratio be retained until such a time that it can be demonstrated that a change to a 1:50 cabin crew ratio in Australia will not result in reduced levels of safety or security.

As I said before, safety is paramount in aviation, and may that long continue.

Ed Husic (Chifley, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I appreciate the opportunity in the parliament to be able to participate in a range of standing committees. They provide breadth in terms of the scope of policy that you get to look at, the types of issues that confront the general public and legislation that is being considered before the House. These are things that you would not necessarily look into, have experience in or need to investigate, but as a result of this experience you do build a greater understanding of issues in various industry sectors.

Being involved in the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Infrastructure and Communications, which prepared this report, was very illuminating on a number of levels. In particular, when you consider the serious public safety issues that are covered by this report, you get a greater appreciation of what is at stake and what needs to occur in the way of reform. We had the opportunity to be involved in this inquiry from March following a referral to us by the Minister for Infrastructure and Transport. It is worth noting that cabin crew ratios in this country have been a matter under regular consideration from time to time, sometimes prompted by unfortunate incidents that have required governments of both political parties to take action to clearly outline their policy position on this issue. The term 'cabin crew ratios' effectively refers to the minimum number of cabin crew members or flight attendants needed on an aircraft as a proportion of the number of passengers or passenger seats, depending on the context. This is important because many people would consider that it is the passenger seats or the passengers themselves who have bearing on what is required, from a safety perspective.

More than anything else, the issue of safety was the critical focus of the committee. This was not an issue of whether or not there would be passenger amenity or comfort, though these are important factors on flights. The necessity of the ratio in its most important element refers to the issue of being able to evacuate passengers quickly in the unfortunate event of an emergency requiring quick evacuation.

Currently, the ratio on single aisled aircraft with 36 to 216 seats is one crew member to 36 passengers. An aircraft with more than 216 seats, or with twin aisles, would require a minimum of one crew member for each floor-level exit. It is believed the origins of it are connected with the introduction of the Fokker F27 Friendship in the fifties. We discovered through the course of the inquiry that this has been a longstanding ratio. But what also became apparent of the ratio is that no-one could point to a legislative instrument or requirement—something that existed in a tangible form to say, 'This is what we followed when.' It has become part of the accepted operating procedures or has been worked towards over many years.

There have been attempts to water down the ratio. But there was a well-publicised security incident—and the report picks up on this—on a QantasLink flight from Melbourne to Launceston in 2003, as a result of which the then transport minister, the Hon. John Anderson MP, took quick steps to rule out any change. He was asked by then opposition leader Simon Crean, in light of the events, to confirm whether or not CASA was considering changing regulations to permit fewer flight attendants after being lobbied by the airlines to do so as a cost-saving measure. Mr Anderson was asked whether he would rule that out. He did, categorically—on the spot.

I mention it because this move, this public position, back in 2003, was a clear expression by both sides of the House. The then opposition, the current government, had spoken out on this matter and had expressed its view that these ratios should not change. The then government took a similar position, clearly signalling to the regulator, to the airlines, that the ratio, as it stood at that time—the one in 36 ratio, which is currently being discussed before the House—should stand. There was no equivocation.

What has occurred in the meantime is that, in effect, we have had airlines lobby the regulator to change the position through exemptions. I will discuss this later on. The argument for the change was that there was established what is referred to as 'world's best practice' that would have diluted the ratios. It became apparent that the Qantas Group argued that a one in 50 ratio constituted world's best practice, but this was criticised by the Australian airline pilots association who said that there was no documentation to suggest that one in 50 enhanced safety. This is entirely relevant here. There clearly needs to be an evidence based approach or some sort of evidence that can demonstrate that changing these ratios enhances safety, and there is not. It can be argued by the airlines that this does not exist with one in 36, but it can also be argued that there is nothing to suggest one in 50. Some people, and certainly the airlines looking at the manufacturers, claim that there are processes whereby this has been tested out and the one to 50 deemed to be a safe operating mechanism. Their view is that the manufacturers themselves, as a result of the regulators in the states requiring it, set a test and that we should follow—that is, just because a regulator in another jurisdiction, in another part of the world, deems it okay, we should just carte blanche accept that that regulation should suit here. I do not for a moment disparage the view—and I think it needs to be clear—that when regulation works elsewhere and there are things that can be learnt from those experiences in our own backyard we should by all means do it.

But when it comes to safety I think there is a greater expectation that local regulators will go the extra step to assure themselves about safety when there is any move to change regulations. From a public perception it can water down safety. That is what would be weighing on the minds of a lot of passengers if they were asked whether they would be comfortable about going from a one to 36 ration to one in 50. Passengers want to be assured that safety is protected. In my personal view, not enough has been done to demonstrate that.

John McCormick, from CASA, explained to the committee his view that he was not convinced that one in 36 provides a higher standard of safety than one to 50. But he said:

I agree with you that there is absolutely no reason why Australia cannot have a higher safety standard in some areas, or any area, for that matter. We should have the best safety that we can, commensurate with commercial reality and what the level is.

I accept that this can cut either way. This reference to the term 'commercial reality' would make people take a step back and reconsider. Obviously, you do not want to do something that is so above and beyond that it places significant commercial pressure on the operators. At the same time, people do not want to have their safety compromised, or to have the perception that their safety is being compromised, in pursuit of lower costs. From my perspective, it seemed odd that the airlines were arguing that this was not about cost. They said world best practice would allow for them to go to one to 50, but when asked what restoring the one to 36 ratio would do, they instantly reacted on the basis that it would add to cost. So I think they need to be a lot more transparent about what motive exists, from their perspective, for advocating a watered down ratio.

In terms of this point about the one to 50, what became clear was that exemptions were being granted by CASA to go to the one to 50 ratio despite the fact that, as I said earlier, back in 2003 the then Howard government, via its minister, had expressed a firm view that it would not entertain any watering down of the ratio. This position was supported and advanced by the current government when it was then in opposition. It was clear that both sides of politics took the view that the ratio should not be diminished. However, CASA, as a result of lobbying by the airlines, watered down this ratio through these exemptions and in effect created a new standard. When parliament caught up to the fact that this had occurred, its ability to take a position on it was limited. However, fortunately we have had this reference to the committee and we have been able to investigate it. But one thing that has become clear is that, if both sides of parliament have indicated a clear policy position, regulators should not be entitled to in effect defy the expressed will of the government or the opposition in the parliament about what is to be expected, particularly with something as important to safety.

As I have said before, on this issue there needs to be a focus on evidence. It is important to note that it has been admitted that the evacuation demonstrations that are used to establish the ratio are partial. That is what the report refers to. It says that a partial evacuation demonstration requires that part of an aircraft is populated with passengers, crew are placed on board, 50 per cent of the doors are made available and the lights are switched off to replicate a possible evacuation scenario. Passengers and crew are not to be aware ahead of time of which doors are unavailable, and the airline—and by that I mean the manufacturer—is requested to demonstrate that the aircraft can be evacuated safely within 90 seconds. For safety purposes, the passengers disembark via stairs. In this controlled environment you do not use the slides, the reason being that in that controlled demonstration use of the slides present an OH&S risk. But this is the very risk that we are trying to investigate through the manufacturer's demonstration of the ability to crew aircraft to ensure that there can be safe evacuation. It has been pointed out that the demonstrations have a pass-fail criteria and that some of the operators had failed at two attempts and had had to wait several months after a full investigation of the unsatisfactory result to then try again before the demonstration has been deemed successful.

Further, what is of concern to me is what I would describe as risk shift—that is, the assumption that, for example, passengers will share a greater burden of both security and evacuation assistance. By security, I mean that there is an expectation that passengers will keep an eye out for what in their own view presents a security risk and that they may intervene or assist in times of evacuation. Obviously, people by their nature will attempt to help people in distress or need. However, in these circumstances it is incumbent on the operator to not make that assumption—that, as a bare minimum, they will have levels of crewing that can ensure safe evacuation. They should not build into that the expectation that passengers will by their very nature assist in evacuation.

There was, from my point of view, certainly a concern throughout the course of this inquiry that there will be an unsaid expectation that passengers will assist in times of evacuation, when in actual fact there will be people of various requirements in terms of their physical capabilities who will need more assistance, specialised assistance and that not every member of the public will be able to necessarily help: the disabled, the elderly and people who have mobility issues. I certainly think that the airlines are expecting too much.

I would make two points: one, that the airlines have gone behind the back of the parliament to reach this revised ratio and, two, that they are not being transparent with customers about that. Finally, the regulator, despite the expressed will of the parliament, has set, in effect, a new standard, and certainly the recommendations in this report require something that is better, something that is more transparent and something that involves the public but, importantly, is much more evidence based than what occurs at the current time.

Paul Fletcher (Bradfield, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I disagree with the views that have been expressed by the member for Chifley and with the report of the committee. In my view, the inquiry has offered no satisfactory basis for Australia persisting with a one-to 36-cabin crew ratio when a one-to-50 ratio is recommended by major aircraft manufacturers Boeing and Airbus, and is the regulatory requirement in the United States, Europe and other jurisdictions.

The member for Chifley spoke about reaching a decision based on an assessment of the evidence and that is a good principle. I think all of us on the committee have a very strong incentive to be satisfied as to matters or aviation safety and security. In this business, we spend as much time in aircraft as people in just about any other occupation. Therefore, we all have a very strong interest in getting the best possible aviation safety and security outcomes. That was certainly very much at the top of my mind as I considered the evidence before the committee. In my assessment, the right way to frame the question which faced this inquiry was to ask whether there is any good reason for the cabin crew ratio used in Australia to diverge from the one-to-50 ratio, which is used in other developed nations and recommended by the aircraft manufacturers. In thinking about this question it is also relevant that the Commonwealth specialist regulator in this area—the Civil Aviation Safety Authority—proposes a one to 50 ratio. It is relevant that single-aisle aircraft in the relevant size range, such as the Airbus A320 and the Boeing 737, are designed on the basis of a one to 50 ratio. And it is relevant that in the US and Europe—and, in fact, in all International Civil Aviation Organisation jurisdictions except Australia and Canada—one to 50 is the ratio used.

Let me be absolutely clear: if there is persuasive evidence that countries which use the one to 50 ratio have inferior aviation safety or security outcomes to those in Australia or if there is any tangible evidence that Australia's use, to date, of the one to 36 ratio has delivered tangible and practical benefits for safety or security, then we should have no hesitation in continuing to apply the one to 36 ratio. In my view, however, if there is no such evidence, we should adopt the international practice of the one to 50 ratio.

As I weighed up the evidence it was clear to me that the committee received no persuasive evidence that using the one to 50 ratio produces inferior safety or security outcomes. At the outset let us recognise that Australia has very high aviation safety standards. And that reflects many different factors, including maintenance practices, pilot training and quality, aircraft age and quality, air traffic control systems and weather. The number of cabin crew is one factor in a complex mix. It will be relevant in some situations, particularly where there is an accident which requires a rapid evacuation.

The committee asked the regulator—the Civil Aviation Safety Authority—whether there is evidence, to its knowledge, of systematic differences between aviation safety in Australia and other countries due to the different cabin crew ratios. In its submission and the evidence to the inquiry the authority noted that it had not been able to find any evidence and it had no knowledge of any accident or incident investigation in a country that uses the one to 50 ratio that has recommended an increase in the cabin crew ratio. CASA noted that it is not aware of any studies into cabin safety that have recommended an increase in the cabin crew ratio. It noted the absence, to its knowledge, of any evidence supporting a link between the Australian requirement for one cabin attendant to 36 passengers and Australia's aviation safety record. And it noted the absence, to its knowledge, of any situation where it has been demonstrated that the effective management of an event was enhanced as a consequence of the cabin crew ratio on that flight being one to 36.

I take from that—consistent with the principle rightly advanced by the member for Chifley that we ought to adopt an evidence based approach—that an evidence based approach does not provide support for Australia diverging from the ratio recommended by manufacturers and the ratio used in most comparable jurisdictions of one to 50. Of course, as has been noted, since 2006 CASA has given exemptions to a number of operators, allowing them to operate using the one to 50 ratio—so this is not merely a hypothetical matter; we actually have evidence of the practice in Australia—and we received no persuasive evidence, based upon that practice having been in place for the last five years, of any materially adverse safety consequences. One of the other issues that were thrown into the terms of reference for this review was aviation security. In answer to the question of whether it was correct that the aviation security considerations do not assist us and do not point in either direction—that is to say, do not point in favour of either one to 36 or one to 50—the advice from the senior officer of the Office of Transport Security who appeared before the committee was as follows: 'On the evidence that is available, that would be a fair assessment.' In my view, therefore—based upon the evidence that I had the opportunity to hear and to read as a member of the committee—it is clear that there is no persuasive basis for concluding that the use of a one to 50 ratio delivers any inferior safety outcome as compared to a one to 36 ratio.

There were a range of other arguments put to the committee and for completeness they ought to be addressed here. The first argument put as to why we ought to maintain the one to 36 ratio was because that is the ratio that Australia has historically had. I do not think that that is a very good argument. I do not think that it is a very good argument to say, 'We've always had one to 36 so we should maintain one to 36.' In my perception, that was the subtext of some of what was argued. But it is a poor basis for reaching a conclusion on this important question of public safety and security.

We then heard a range of arguments from the Transport Workers Union and the Flight Attendants Association of Australia. I am mystified as to why the Transport Workers Union was even called to appear before this committee. When the Secretary of the Transport Workers Union, Mr Tony Sheldon, appeared before the committee, I sought some guidance from him as to the particular expertise or competence that the Transport Workers Union might have on matters of aviation safety and security. I asked what role the members of the Transport Workers Union perform on an aircraft and Mr Sheldon, under questioning, conceded that there are no TWU members who have any in-flight role. It is therefore quite unclear to me why the committee heard from the Transport Workers Union.

Any citizen and any group or association is welcome to put submissions to parliamentary committees—of course they are, and that is to be encouraged. But the question is whether the views of the Transport Workers Union are infused with any particular expertise. My conclusion on this matter is that they are not and I can only speculate as to the arcane arrangements and relationships between the Australian Labor Party and the Transport Workers Union that led to us hearing such extensive evidence from the Transport Workers Union.

We also heard from the Flight Attendants Association of Australia. I acknowledge that the Flight Attendants Association presented arguments based on safety and security considerations. As I noted in my minority report, I found those arguments less persuasive than the evidence provided on the same points by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority and the Office of Transport Security.

There is one other issue that I would like to address before I conclude my remarks on this important topic, and that is the question of whether it is a bad thing that the airlines, in seeking this change, were motivated by the fact that it would deliver cost savings if the regulations were changed so that they were required to comply with a cabin crew ratio of one to 50 rather than the previous requirement of a ratio of one to 36. The majority report, at paragraph 1.71, speaks of the 'challenges in assessing operators' motivations in seeking exemptions to the one to 36 ratio'. It notes that the operators agreed that their motivation had been primarily for cost reasons. This is presented in the majority report as if it is in some way prima facie evidence of guilt. The paragraph seems to suggest that it is in some way a matter for concern that operators have been motivated by cost savings. Let me make it clear that I disagree. Safety must be the primary objective. Operators must not do anything that compromises safety. Safety is an absolute good in the conducting of an airline business. However, if cost savings can be obtained without compromising safety then I see no objection at all to operators pursuing cost savings. This is a question to be assessed on the evidence. Does the adoption of a one to 50 ratio rather than a one to 36 ratio cause detriment to safety and security? In the absence of evidence that it does then I for one see nothing inherently wrong with the pursuit of cost savings.

Let me make the point that if cost savings are obtained from this measure or indeed from anything else—and again emphasising that the absolute objective must be safety and that savings should be only sought and obtained if safety is not compromised—then among the benefits that might follow are lower airfares, making it affordable for more Australians to fly. It is possible that cost savings might improve the break-even economics of particular routes to particular destinations, particularly in rural and remote areas. It therefore might allow services that would not otherwise be possible. The other possibility is that the cost savings obtained by changing the cabin crew ratio might be used to fund other initiatives that have a greater safety and security benefit than is gained from diverging from the international standard ratio of one to 50 by continuing to use the once-off and stand-alone Australian ratio of one to 36.

This is an important question of public safety and security. It is a question that should be assessed based upon the evidence. I am pleased to say that all sides are in agreement on that proposition. Where we are in disagreement is on the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence. As I heard the evidence and as I read the submissions and in the questions that I asked of witnesses, the test that I sought to apply was whether there is any persuasive evidence that countries that use the internationally standard of one to 50 have inferior aviation safety or security outcomes compared to those in Australia or, conversely, evidence that Australia's use to date of the one to 36 ratio has delivered tangible, practical benefits for safety and security. I found no such evidence. On that basis, I was very comfortable in concluding—as somebody who spends quite a lot of time on airlines—that Australia should move to adopting the international standard of a one to 50 ratio.

Debate adjourned.