Andrew Robb (Goldstein, Liberal Party, Chairman of the Coalition Policy Development Committee) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to speak on the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Bill 2013. The bill proposes to replace the existing model for Commonwealth financial management established through the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 and the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997. It would consolidate under one piece of legislation the governance, performance and accountability requirements for the Commonwealth and relevant entities which are covered currently under both the FMA and CAC acts. The bill would introduce a new financial framework for the Commonwealth, impacting on some 195 entities and around 300,000 individuals who work within them. Such reform must not be taken lightly, nor be driven by undue haste.

This bill stems from the Commonwealth Financial Accountability Review, which commenced in December 2010. The existing financial framework was enacted in 1998 and, while it can be reasonably argued that it is unnecessarily complex and fragmented, all agree it remains workable. It has undergone regular, ad hoc amendment in order to maintain its serviceability as issues have arisen and this has added to its complexity. But, with the current parliament nearing its end, there is nothing to necessitate the passage of this bill before it rises. If anything, this is the type of reform that should now be reserved for the new parliament regardless of its colour or stripe. The importance to get this right is underlined by the remarks of the Auditor General, Mr Ian McPhee, when he said there are few Commonwealth laws that have such broad application. Collectively, the entities it would cover manage and account for revenue and expenses of over $350 billion, assets of over $390 billion and liabilities of over $640 billion.

Most appropriately, this bill has been subjected to an inquiry by the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit. This process has exposed two fundamental concerns with this bill: firstly, the lack of specific detail about how the new financial framework would be actually applied; and, secondly, the unnecessary haste with which it is being brought before the parliament and the need for additional consultation.

During Senate estimates the Secretary of the Department of Finance, David Tune, said he found it frustrating that there was a sense of unease about the bill, but specific areas of concern were not coming through. Well, that is precisely the point. The major issue is that the bill itself largely represents the direction and principles of reform, with much of the mechanical detail to be set out in future rules tailored for individual entities.

The major issue is that the bill largely represents the direction and principles of reform with much of the mechanical detail to be set out in future rules tailored for individual entities. We have progressively found ourselves debating bills that in many respects give you very little idea of how the objectives of those bills will in fact be implemented. We are seeing bills that have up to 70 per cent or 80 per cent of the objects being framed through the regulations. And here we have in front of us today bills of great consequence. The principles and objectives of these bills are in large part agreed by all parties, but the detail of how these bills will be implemented is the fundamental issue. This practice is increasing, with more and more of the legislation that we are debating being basically a shell—a framework; a set of principles; a set of objectives—when the significant operational aspects are left for others to determine via regulation.

We agree that the broad principles behind the bill are not objectionable, namely: government should operate as a coherent whole; public resources are public resources and a common set of duties should apply to all resources handled by Commonwealth entities; performance of the public sector is more than financial and; engaging responsibly with risk is a necessary step in improving performance. We agree with these broad principles. But the major issue is that the bill largely represents a set of directions and principles of reform with so much if not nearly all of the mechanical detail to be set out in future rules tailored for individual entities.

It is also argued that a more simplified financial framework is required as 'the deficiencies in the current framework will, over time, become a drag on the performance of the public sector'. A single act would as far as practicable 'apply a consistent principles based framework to all Commonwealth entities'. It should also be compatible with specific enabling legislation that mandates the establishment and functions of public entities.

The bill also places a greater emphasis on risk management, something that is said to be deficient in the existing financial framework. In principle, this would be applied in a way that accommodates both autonomy, and also personal responsibility, which would be welcomed. We agree with all of these things; these principles; these suggested guiding objectives. What we have not seen, unfortunately, are the very detailed mechanics that would give effect to these objectives and these principles.

For example, according to the explanatory memorandum, 'the bill seeks to bring about cultural change by placing a duty on entities to establish their own appropriate systems of risk oversight and management and by introducing the principle of earned autonomy'. This would draw on the better practice principles for regulators identified by the Productivity Commission, which includes streamlining reporting requirements; risk based monitoring and enforcement; and a graduated response to regulatory and compliance breaches. These are very important requirements that stem from the Productivity Commission.

The existing framework is also described as 'very linear' and focused on straight lines of vertical authority which create hurdles to 'citizen centric service delivery' and to collaborative working practices both across government and between government and other sectors. The framework, it is said, does not seek to alter or impinge the operational independence of entities as set out in their enabling legislation. The RBA, the ABC and the SBS are cited as examples. Again, none of this is objectionable, but what is objectionable is not knowing how or if these principles will in fact be satisfactorily applied. This detail will only be revealed in the specific set of rules, the legislative instruments, that are yet to be drafted let alone sighted by anyone who is being asked to pass this piece of legislation. The general consensus is that these rules will be developed over 12 months.

Under sections 101 to 105, the bill affords quite substantial power and discretion to the finance minister to make rules 'necessary or convenient to be prescribed for carrying out or giving effect to this act'. The government has agreed to subject these future instruments to the scrutiny of the Joint Standing Committee of Public Accounts and Audit, as it should. But given the broad reach of this bill it would, at the very least, have been prudent for the government to have produced a comprehensive set of exposure drafts of the proposed rules for the scrutiny of the entities they would affect, broader stakeholders and parliament itself.

This has not occurred and it increases the suspicion that the bill has been rushed into the parliament to give this government, which has very little in the way of substantial achievements to point to, a superficial symbol of financial reform. This is no different from what we saw in the first instance with the so-called Gonski legislation—pages of pleasant-sounding objectives and principles, with not one skerrick of detail of how these things would be implemented. We have it again in this legislation. We are also seeing it in the 100-plus bills that are confronting this House and that are mounting up for consideration over the next eight days.

The Auditor-General, Mr Ian McPhee, recently told the JCPAA inquiry:

We would feel more comfortable with this legislation if the bill had been subject to a more open exposure process, given the number of entities and officials affected by it and because of the fundamental importance of the legislation, as indicated earlier. We have also had no visibility of the complementary rules which, together with the legislation, will establish the Commonwealth's financial management framework and contribute significantly to it. For these reasons, our support for the legislation is more measured than it may have been under different circumstances and with more time.

That was the Auditor-General speaking. This is the man who played a very significant part in framing the two bills that this piece of legislation will replace. If the Auditor-General feels uncomfortable and believes that there has been a very limited open exposure process and that the lack of consultation has undermined the confidence in this bill, surely that is a red flag to the government to withdraw this bill and come back with it once the mechanics have been detailed so that we as members of parliament with responsibility for making informed decisions in this House can actually find the detail on which we are making decisions.

More significant testimony was given to the recent inquiry. The Auditor-General's view was supported by none other than the Australian Public Service Commissioner Stephen Sedgwick. His testimony stated:

The Public Service Commissioner … is sympathetic to the Auditor-General’s view that it would have been preferable if the bill had been subject to a longer exposure process, given the number of entities and officials affected by it and because of the fundamental importance of the legislation.

The ABC is one of the almost 200 entities that would be covered by the new financial framework and, in testimony before the inquiry, the chief operating officer of the ABC, David Pendleton, said:

I guess the reservation we have about the haste is around clarity on the rules that sit underneath the legislation and the detail that flows with them. That would be our one caution around the timing of the haste of this.

Stephen Bartos, an expert in public sector governance and risk and the former deputy secretary of the Department of Finance and Deregulation, noted in his submission to the inquiry:

It is worth reminding the JCPAA that the processes to replace the Audit Act 1901 with the FMA and CAC Acts took around a decade. They involved a number of hearings of the JCPAA, open consultation, submissions from many Commonwealth departments and agencies, and detailed consideration of the pros and cons. The current Bill deserves the same sort of consideration, not a rushed process.

In addition, Stephen Bartos went on:

The introduction of as yet unspecified rules to give effect to the governance framework relies on a heroic assumption that the Finance Minister (and her/his department) in future will put in place a set of rules that fosters good governance, rather than unnecessary checking procedures and pettifogging compliance.

The bill is not reassuring on this score. Finally, he says:

The public service is too important to Australia to be reformed without more open and searching investigation of the issues. The JCPAA should seek a remit to conduct such an inquiry.

We have just heard the words before this inquiry of the Auditor-General, the Australian Public Service Commissioner, the Chief Operating Officer of the ABC and a former deputy secretary of the department of finance, Stephen Bartos. They have all expressed, as one, their deep reservations about the lack of consultation, the lack of transparency, the lack of any detail. That is the problem. No-one is objecting to the fluffy, furry and acceptable principles that are included in this bill and some of the guidelines as to how the rules will be prepared. About 80 per cent, if not more, of the impact of this bill is in the rules. Here we have major public servants and others who have got or who have had responsibility for these very provisions, for the framing and the operation of these acts, all expressing to a public inquiry deep reservations about the haste and the lack of any detail.

Yet the government goes on in the arrogant way that it had been going on in so many areas of legislation in this place. It is like a conveyor belt of legislation going through the guillotine without any opportunity for this side of the House to really have any impact. They have a tin ear, not just to our side of the parliament but to so many of the stakeholders. In this case the stakeholders are the public servants themselves. In many cases none of the departments have had any substantive input into this bill. Certainly there has been no substantive input into the rules which, by their own admission, have not even been prepared yet. This is again another black mark on this government. It is starting to become endemic in terms of the insult that is served up in so many pieces of legislation where we are expected to put our hands up and go along with a whole lot of fluffy, good-sounding sentiments and objectives without the benefit of knowing exactly how these things will be implemented. Invariably everyone is disappointed. If you do not confer, if you do not consult with those who do know the operation and are in fact responsible for carrying out and working within the confines of these pieces of legislation, in this case the public servants, then if you have not conferred with them in a proper manner and it has not had a proper airing and consideration, it is no wonder these things end up being inadequate and not doing the job.

A separate transitional and consequential amendments act will also be required to ensure consistency between this bill and existing legislation and regulations which apply to those entities covered. The substantive provisions of this bill would commence on a date to be fixed by proclamation or on 1 July 2014, whichever happens first. The Auditor-General has also suggested that a six-month delay of this bill would not necessarily mean that the start date would have to change.

In conclusion, the words of Rob Elliott, the General Manager, Policy, and General Counsel, Policy and Advocacy, for the Australian Institute of Company Directors, are most salient. I quote:

When governments are considering new laws there should be appropriate consultation and full transparency of all aspects of the proposal, including for associated regulations. This will ensure that issues of principle, unintended consequences and practical problems can be identified and addressed. Delay seems prudent, given the lack of imperatives for this bill to be passed by this parliament.

I would like to thank in particular colleagues Senators Dean Smith and Anne Ruston for their work in relation to the bill on the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit. Their conclusions were widely reinforced by the comments that I have just referred to, and many more in that inquiry. I also thank Senator Arthur Sinodinos and his staff member John Adams for their contribution.

This is a very important matter that is before the House. It goes to the administration of the Public Service and related bodies. If it is not passed, nothing will change. It will be business as usual and the entities covered under the existing framework will continue to function without any negative impact on taxpayers in the broader community.

We have had what are called 'pious amendments' moved in this place for a long time. They are often moved by the opposition which is not in a position to lead to a change in policy. They are an expression of intent. So 'pious amendments' have become a common practice in this place for good reason, especially for an opposition which is not the government of the day and cannot impose its will on the parliament.

What we have now is what I would call 'pious legislation' starting to become the feature of this parliament. Pious legislation is legislation which is full of fine-sounding sentiments but actually gives no effect to what those objectives seek to give effect to. It is becoming a ridiculous situation; it is irresponsible. It is shifting the responsibility that should be very much that of people in this parliament back to individual ministers and their advisers. It is unacceptable. It is a recipe for bad government and bad public policy. Future administrations of whatever colour or stripe need to be alert to this growing practice of what I would term 'pious legislation' arriving in this parliament. It is for these reasons that the coalition stands opposed to the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Bill 2013 in its current form.

Paul Fletcher (Bradfield, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I am very pleased to rise to speak on the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Bill 2013. This is a bill which deals with a very important subject matter, which is the performance of the Commonwealth government and its agencies. If you look at the explanatory memorandum there are some very bold ambitions established for the reform program of which this bill forms part. We are told, for example, that 'all governments will need to consider often fundamentally the ways in which public services are delivered and outcomes are measured'. We are told that 'the objective of CFAR'—that is, the Commonwealth Financial Accountability Review—'is to improve performance, accountability, risk management and service delivery across government.' We are also told that the CFAR process:

…identified opportunities for reform to remove red tape from the public sector; enhance the public sector's potential for innovation; improve the performance of the public sector in meeting the government's goals; gain the best value for money spent on any particular purpose; promote high standards of stewardship and accountability; and enhance transparency.

Nobody could disagree with those objectives. Indeed, on this side of the chamber we think they are very important objectives and we think this is an area where the present government has performed conspicuously poorly, as I will speak about in a little detail in a moment.

The fundamental proposition that we put to the House this afternoon in considering the bill before us is that the bill the government is asking the parliament to pass today does not live up to these bold and sweeping ambitions. In fact, it presents only a very modest amount of detail. It is largely a statement of sweeping, high-level principle—in itself not objectionable—but it does not do the job which it claims to do. That is the reason, fundamentally, why on this side of the House we are not disposed to support the bill and to support it being passed at this time. We believe that the task in this area is so important that the time needs to be taken to do a proper job.

I want to make three points in the time available to me this afternoon. Firstly, that there is simply too little detail in the legislation before the House this afternoon. Secondly, that there are very few downsides if we delay passing this bill to take the time to get its content right. And thirdly, that the stakes are very high; that there is no more important objective than an efficient, productive and highly-performing public sector. We are a very long way away from that now, and if we are to work towards achieving that very important objective, then one of the things the parliament needs to be satisfied of is that the new financial accountability and governance mechanisms—purportedly contained in this bill, but in fact the detail is not there—are up to this very important job.

Let me turn, firstly, to the fact that what we have before us is lacking in the requisite detail. As Mr David Tune, the Secretary of the Department of Finance and Deregulation told a parliamentary committee, the key element of this bill is the rules, which 'sit below' the general principles outlined in the bill. At the time he was speaking to the committee, Mr Tune admitted that the drafting of these rules had not yet begun and that with the operational provisions of the bill not due to commence until 1 July 2014 then there is plenty of time for further development.

That is all very well, but on this side of the House we want to see the further detail. We are not satisfied with some broad, high-level assurances. The subject matter of this bill is so important that we want to see the detailed mechanisms which will apply to give effect to the stated objectives of this bill. We have not seen them and we do not think that is satisfactory. As the Auditor-General noted in his submission to the parliamentary committee:

… many of the provisions of the Bill rely on the making of rules to operate effectively. … currently there is no visibility around the content of the rules that will need to be drafted prior to the proposed date of proclamation of the Bill.

In other words, the key elements of this bill—the provisions that do the work that it purports to do—are not available to the parliament to consider. On this side of the House we say that that is not satisfactory. Until we can see the detail of how it is going to work we are unpersuaded that the case has been made for this bill to be passed.

More importantly, so too would it seem, from the disquiet that they have expressed, are key officers of important agencies and statutory authorities. For example, the Chief Operating Officer of the ABC said,

I guess the reservation we have about the haste is around clarity on the rules that sit underneath the legislation and the detail that flows with them.

If we do not have the detail that is required for the parliament to give proper consideration to the mechanisms which are proposed to give effect to the worthy stated objectives of this bill, then the question arises: ought the parliament to proceed to rush to pass this bill into legislation? Or ought we to send it back and say, 'Let's take the time to do a thorough job'?

In considering that question I come to the second point that I wanted to make in the brief time available to me today, which is that there are very few downsides to delay. If the case has not been made out to rush this through, then you need to ask yourself, 'Well, if we don't do anything, if we pause and say, "No, not good enough; come back when you've done a better job," are there any material downsides from not rushing the bill through in its present form?' The answer to that is clearly 'no'. And do not take my word for it; please take the word of the government, stated in the explanatory memorandum:

The current financial framework is not broken, but it does creak at times, …

The Auditor-General noted in his submission:

… the existing framework remains sound, …

In other words, we do not have an urgent, pressing problem needing to be solved. There is no particular case for rushing this through now.

We are in agreement on both sides of the chamber that it is timely and appropriate to review the accountability and governance framework that applies to the public sector in this country. We are in agreement! But on this side of the House we say, 'If you haven't done a proper, adequate job, then do not pass it'. Go away and do the detailed work and then come back to the parliament and tell the parliament, 'Here are the provisions which put in place the detail of the accountability mechanisms, and here is the detail on which you as parliamentarians can base some confidence that the claimed improvement in the efficiency and output of the public sector is going to be delivered'.

I want to turn, thirdly, to the proposition that the stakes are very high; that efficiency and productivity in government—objectives that we are told will be aided by the passing of this bill—are not where they should be and that any government should have as a priority improvements in this area. We know, for example, that there is steady growth in the size of government. From 2006-07 to the current year, Commonwealth staff numbers are up by nearly 20,000. The number of government bodies is growing. The Australian newspaper recently reported that the total number of Commonwealth agencies has risen from 87 to 107 in the last five years.

I have asked every cabinet minister a question on notice: how many new entities have been created within their portfolios since the Rudd government was first elected to office?

Not all have responded but, of those who did, there were some 34 different bodies identified with the total staff across them numbering 4,700.

I have already referred to a recent report in The Australian. Remarkably, according to that report, the precise number of Commonwealth bodies is currently not even known. The most recent list was prepared by the department of finance four years ago at which point there were 930 federal government 'bodies and governance relationships'.

The fact is the public sector size has grown and expenditure in the public sector has grown. Indeed, according to the Review of the Measures of Agency Efficiency report of March 2011, between fiscal 2001 and fiscal 2009, Australia's GDP grew by 64 per cent after correcting from improved terms of trade, while expenditure administered by government grew by 98 per cent—well ahead of the size of GDP growth.

The government is growing in its expenditure, the government is growing in terms of the number of people employed and it is growing in terms of the number of bodies and agencies. There is clear and substantial—and under this government—unchecked growth in government. Of course, that does not prove that we have a problem with public sector efficiency and productivity but it certainly raises a suspicion. That suspicion is reinforced by, amongst other things, some of the difficulties that one finds in identifying in one single place a number as to the total number of Commonwealth employees. For example, the Australian Public Service Commission Statistical Bulletin reports 168,500 staff as at 30 June 2012. The budget quotes Commonwealth staff numbers as at this date as 256,000 and that includes ADF personnel and statutory authorities, but even this number does not include contractors and it does not include employees of government corporations such as Australia Post and NBN Co.

Another interesting data point that suggests that we have a significant problem with efficiency and productivity in government is the 2010 review of public service arrangements conducted under the chairmanship of the then Secretary of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. That review found that there were 63 agencies with fewer than 500 employees and noted that this suggested real scope for rationalisation—for example, through sharing corporate services. It gave one example which I think is quite telling: an agency with an annual budget of $15 million of which fully one third went on corporate costs such as finance and human resources.

The evidence suggests that there are significant problems in the very areas where the bill before the House this afternoon is supposed to deliver improvements: the productivity and the efficiency of the Commonwealth Public Service of Commonwealth agencies. If you are serious about improving productivity and efficiency, then you need to take the time to carefully examine these provisions and examine the entire regime for financial accountability. It is uncontested that what we have in the bill before us today is not a comprehensive regime but only a skeleton, only an overview, with the detailed rules yet to be drafted. Because of the importance of the issues at stake, until we have that comprehensive explanation of the new regime which is proposed, it is unwise and premature to pass this legislation.

If you care about the government doing a good job; if you believe that there are some things that the public sector is better equipped to do than the private sector; if you believe that the demands of the community on government are only going to increase, if you believe in a government which serves the people; and if you believe in doing more with public resources for the things we care about, then you must care about the efficiency and productivity of government and therefore the reform direction that this bill supposedly deals with is the first importance.

There is no doubt that the demands on the public sector are ever-increasing; for example, a recent Grattan Institute paper argues that there is growing demand for government services in areas like health, the age pension and other welfare programs, and this will significantly increase pressures on government in coming years. There is no doubt that more is expected of the public sector by citizens, not just in Australia but all around the world. To quote from a recent paper by PricewaterhouseCoopers:

… the public sector is increasingly required to redefine its role, strengthen its customer focus and build integrated service-delivery models … these models must be based on meeting customer needs more efficiently and more effectively.

Another reason we must all care about improved public sector productivity and efficiency—purportedly, the matters that will be secured through the passing of the bill before the House this afternoon—a that of Australia's national productivity agenda. We all know that productivity is not what it needs to be. We need to get productivity growth and yet, remarkably, in Australia productivity measures effectively ignore the public sector. Public sector productivity is assumed to stay constant. Let me quote consulting firm McKinsey which argues:

The public sector is the largest employer in all advanced economies, yet its slow productivity growth has long made it a drag on the economy.

There is no disagreement on this side of the House that the issues at stake that this bill purports to address are of the highest importance. What we dispute is this: we say this bill does not do a good enough job of getting to grips with the issues of accountability, scrutiny and oversight of the public sector. It is a mere statement of high-level principles. It does not give the detail; we want the detail, so we say, 'Go back, do a better job and come back when you have done that better job'.

Robert Oakeshott (Lyne, Independent) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Very quickly, I speak in support of both the process of the formation of this legislation and the legislation itself. The Commonwealth Financial Accountability Review is an important reform for Australia's public sector and it certainly looks to be broadly supported by key stakeholders and political parties, despite some of the words in this debate.

I understand we are going to have a division shortly, and my understanding is that that is with regard to a level of nervousness in the timing of this legislation being presented to the parliament and a level of nervousness in the transition from the general concept of reform and the principles based legislative framework that has broad support to that next stage of the detailed rules.

I concur with some of the nervousness raised that these stages of transition need to be handled carefully, with ongoing time for listening to and talking to all the 196 affected Commonwealth entities and that that is an ongoing process and priority, also ensuring that this parliament is fully informed over the coming stages. There have been commitments given by the finance minister and the finance department regarding the development of the rules in detail along with ongoing consultation that has many nervous. Those commitments are acknowledged by government and the finance minister. They acknowledge that it will be critical to the success or failure of these important reforms that there is ongoing consultation and ongoing consideration of this transition from the principle based legislative framework through to the detailed stage of rules and regulations.

I am not one to stand in this chamber and try to have it both ways. I am not going to stand in this chamber and say there is a problem with efficiency and productivity in Australia's public sector and I am not going to stand here and say I want fewer regulations, I want better regulations, I want better risk management, I want greater autonomy in the 196 agencies in Australia's public sector and then vote against it. I am going to vote for it. I am going to place markers certainly in this chamber to say that, yes, we want to make sure we remain engaged in the process and that all agencies and bodies remain engaged in the process. But the principles are broadly supported by every single person in this chamber and therefore I cannot understand why we are about to have a division. If it is about nervousness then stay engaged in the process of transition.

This chamber regularly deals with pieces of legislation that are about the principles, about the framework, with the regulations and the rules that then follow on from that. This is no different. So I would encourage the chamber to stay engaged with this legislation as it passes through this House as the start of the process of a better Public Service, fewer regulations, better regulations, better risk management, greater autonomy and everything that I hear debated in this chamber on a daily basis. Let's stay engaged in that process, but let's not kill the process because of some sort of nervousness that people have not been engaged in the finer detail to date. I say: let's support this legislation and keep government honest in the delivery of it.

David Bradbury (Lindsay, Australian Labor Party, Assistant Treasurer ) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I thank all members who have contributed to the debate on the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Bill 2013. The bill is the cornerstone of a broader reform agenda that commenced in December 2010 as part of the Commonwealth Financial Accountability Review. The review started because of concerns about the efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector and a recognition that a dollar saved on process is a dollar that can be spent on better services to our citizens.

The review process has involved extensive consultation both within and outside of government. These consultations have indicated broad support for the reforms which seek to modernise government and create a streamlined and adaptable Public Service that is able to meet Australia's changing needs into the future. The bill recognises that, while the existing framework was best practice when it was introduced and has served governments well, it is now outdated and our APS is falling behind the expectations of government and the community. We are aiming to put the APS back at the forefront of public sector performance and governance. Specifically, we are putting the management of risk and performance at the heart of government operations.

The bill has been amended to take account of the views of the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit. I wish to express my appreciation to the committee for its speedy review and reporting on the bill to allow for this debate to proceed. I thank the member for Lyne for his contribution as the chair of that committee. As noted in correspondence to the committee from the Minister for Finance and Deregulation, I would also like to reiterate on behalf of the government our commitment to a transparent and accountable process for developing the rules that will underpin this bill. This includes that the government will consult widely on the development of the rules, with extensive consultation within government but also with other sectors and interested stakeholders; specifically, this will focus on the not-for-profit sector and the business sector and also academia and professional stakeholders.

Once the rules are settled by government they will be made publicly available for no less than 30 days for public comment and further consultation with government entities to ensure that they are rigorously tested. The rules and explanatory memorandum will be made available on the Department of Finance and Deregulation's website. Following the public consultation phase, the rules will also be made available to the JCPAA for scrutiny. The government will await a report from the committee prior to tabling in the parliament. The government expects and encourages the committee to have a strong and ongoing role in the formation of the rules, reflecting its position in the parliament. This is a more rigorous and transparent process than under current arrangements.

Finally, the rules are disallowable instruments and so, following their tabling in parliament, there is a further opportunity for scrutiny. This process will ensure that the workings of this bill are fully accountable to the parliament and that the processes are transparent and inclusive. Parliament's role is further enhanced through the inclusion of a review provision which requires the act to be reviewed after three years. This process addresses a specific recommendation in the JCPAA report. The committee's report has added to the quality of the bill and will ensure that the parliament will have an active role in the review of the legislation and its operation. I commend the bill to the House.

Ms Anna Burke (Speaker) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The question is that this bill be now read a second time.