Joel Fitzgibbon (Hunter, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Agriculture) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

When you think about it, there are two things in agriculture policy that rise above all others; there are two things that are paramount. The first is natural resource management and sustainability. The second is biosecurity. As a bill implementing the reform of our biosecurity construct and architecture, this is one of the most important debates this House will have this decade. That is no exaggeration. Indeed, maybe I should have said 'this century'; after all it has been just a little more than a century since we last put our quarantine system into effect.

So this is very much—so far at least—a once-in-a-century proposition. This bill means as much as any defence or national security bill. It is that important. On that basis, it is as deserving of bipartisan support as is any other matter that comes before this parliament. By the way, I have sought to bring bipartisan to the agriculture portfolio more generally, because agriculture is so important. Agriculture is so important to our future, so complex and in need of such long time-horizons—we will always have our disagreements, and any opposition not having its disagreements with the government would not be doing its job to full effect—that we must, generally speaking, strive to take a bipartisan approach to agriculture policy.

It is important to the nation debate because, like defence, it goes to our very existence. Dropping the ball on agriculture policy would be an existential threat, because maintaining our food security—our ability to sustain ourselves independent of any other country—goes to the very survival of our country.

So biosecurity—formerly or more commonly known as our quarantine regime—is of paramount importance to this place. Yet, as the Beale inquiry—a seminal report into our biosecurity system—noted, biosecurity in this place usually only rates a mention when something goes wrong, rather than regularly rating a mention as things almost always go right. That is somewhat a source of disappointment to me and I am sure to many others in this place.

This bill, like the Beale review and other reviews that went before it, is a Labor government initiative. It was churlish, I have to say—departing from the bipartisan tone for just a moment—for the current minister not to acknowledge that fact. Indeed, the Abbott government has now sat on this bill for almost 18 months. It was an initiative of a Labor government. It was progressed and developed by a Labor government. The Labor government was ready to implement the reform when it lost office 17 months ago. Indeed, it was reported that:

Mr Joyce said his northern venture also allowed him to prepare for impending legislative changes, with a comprehensive redesign of the Biosecurity Act on the table.

"The Biosecurity Act has been sitting with us since Methuselah was a young child," he said.

Somewhat of an exaggeration, I think—

It’s an incredibly complicated piece of legislation that we have to completely update for 2014.

He was speaking last year—

In the legislative framework, we’re rewriting the whole Act so in essence it takes into account all of the requirements we have … bringing it into the modern world to deal with modern problems—the problems of 1908 are not the problems now.

I do not disagree with any of that. Again it was rather churlish of him to be claiming this bill as his own when, as we all know in this place, it had its origins with the member for Watson when he was the minister and was progressed right through the tenure of Senator Ludwig, so a long time ago. It was Labor that recognised the importance of upgrading and modernising Australia's biosecurity laws and it was a Labor government that first introduced the bill right back in 2012.

On 19 February 2008 the then minister for agriculture, the member for Watson, announced the comprehensive independent review of Australia's quarantine and biosecurity arrangements to be undertaken by an independent panel of experts and chaired, as I indicated, by Roger Beale AO. The current bill before the parliament is essentially identical to Labor's bill, save for a few minor adjustments, which on face value at least I do not have any great difficulty with, and save for a very big departure—the absence of any guarantee that the Inspector-General of Biosecurity will continue to play a role. I will return to that point.

The bill is about modernising the now 107-year-old Quarantine Act. As Beale points out in his seminal report, the very name change from Quarantine Act to Biosecurity Act in itself reflects changing challenges, aspirations, emphasis and of course methods. There has been a shift away from the isolationist approach that those who were around just after the turn of the century were more familiar with to a seamless, broader—from pre border right through to post border—approach to protection of our clean, green, safe image and therefore the protection of our food security.

The Beale report concluded that we have a very good biosecurity system. Its overwhelming success is testament to that. We have had by any measure a very successful approach to keeping disease and pests out of our food chain. Beale also concluded that the system is not perfect. That is fairly obvious. Sadly and tragically we have seen examples of failures in recent years, including during the equine influenza outbreak and crisis, which by the way had a very bad impact on my electorate where you will find, amongst other things, the horse capital of Australia. Beale also reinforced very importantly the view—and I am sure this is a view shared by every person in this place—that a zero risk approach to quarantine is not a feasible approach, not one that is likely to lead to success and certainly not one we could afford in fiscal or resourcing terms. Rather he reinforced a risk based approach to our quarantine system.

Again this bill this a significant modernisation that has been a long time in the making. It has been a long time from 1908 till now and a long time since the Beale inquiry was first initiated. On that basis the opposition will be supporting the bill—our bill—but I want to spend some time expressing very great concern about the key departure I made mention of—and that is the decision to deny the very important initiative in Labor's bill: the establishment and ongoing existence of an independent statutory officer known as the Inspector-General of Biosecurity.

I am going to invite the minister in closing this debate to clarify for the House exactly what the bill now means in practical and technical terms. It appears to me that now, rather than having an independent statutory officer reviewing the performance of our biosecurity system and all of its players, we will have no less than the minister overseeing these processes. That would be of concern to me and of concern to everyone in this place, I am sure, if they are speaking honestly. It should be of concern to the minister, quite frankly, because it is not a responsibility he should even seek to have. It will certainly in my view be of concern to the broad agriculture sector.

This will not be the first offence. The Labor government already had in place the Interim Inspector-General of Biosecurity. We had proposed also to further strengthen confidence and to build sustainability in the live cattle trade by putting in place an inspector-general for live animal welfare and live animal exports. Sadly, that commitment did not survive the transition to the new government, much to the chagrin of those who are deeply focused on animal welfare, particularly animal welfare in our live animal export market. The minister seemingly, as far as I can see, without any advice—and if he has reasons and good advice, I certainly invite him to share them with us—a little bit like CBH's exemption from the Wheat Board access code, has unilaterally made a decision that this statutory officer is not needed.

The inspector-general that Labor had in mind has, on an interim basis, and would have, reported independently of the minister's view and indeed the view of the department. It is a mistake to remove this position. The position plays an important role in ensuring the integrity and transparency of the biosecurity import risk analysis process. Stakeholders have the opportunity to appeal where they believe there was significant deviation from the biosecurity import risk analysis process which might have adversely affected their interests. Not only does the inspector-general ensure transparency and integrity in the biosecurity system more broadly; the position also establishes a number of powers to ensure transparency in the way the role is carried out. The position of Inspector-General of Biosecurity is a position that was recommended in numerous reviews over the course of the last 17 years, and yet the minister has apparently unilaterally decided that we do not need him or her. By having a dedicated office to review the performance of functions and the exercise of powers by the director of Biosecurity Australia all Australians can expect an efficient, modern and robust biosecurity framework.

The minister's office appears, on the surface, to remain supportive of the Interim Inspector-General of Biosecurity and the continuation of that position for the time being. But given I, as minister, signed off on the interim arrangements, I think in financial year terms almost two years ago, it is my understanding that the interim inspector-general will cease to exist on 1 July this year. It appears to me that, while feigning support and being complementary of the work of the inspector-general thus far, the minister has, without any fanfare, without any sufficient highlight of this fact—certainly I do not think there was any reference to the fact in his second reading contribution but I would need to check that—just decided to let this position expire on 1 July this year. Why, as we strive, I hope on a bipartisan basis in this place, to capitalise on the growing global food demand, taking advantage of our clean, green, safe image and our high quality food—which gives us our competitive advantage—would we now undermine that in any way by taking away a position which, for the last couple of years, has been very effective, as acknowledged by the minister himself?

This was the same issue with live animal exports. The pause has been broadly criticised and it was painful. It was painful and it was regrettable but born out of it was the best animal welfare system in the world—a system which now is allowing us to open new markets; a system which is building confidence in the regime, in the trade, in the broader community and; therefore, a system which allows us to grow and strengthen the sector and to create so many jobs. It is a shame that the minister does not occasionally acknowledge that when he is taking credit for establishing new markets—although, ironically and almost bizarrely, he does recognise that he was able to do so thanks to the implementation of Labor's quality assurance supply chain.

This is the same. We must have full confidence in our biosecurity system, and we must be able to allow the citizens of this country to see that there is a statutory officer there acting independently and protecting that system. As I have pointed out and as Mr Beale pointed out, it cannot be perfect, but the statutory officer is a key component in my view and in the view of, I am sure, the majority of people in this place—if they were being honest—to making sure that our biosecurity system is the best it possibly can be.

Let us not have the minister claim credit for this bill. Let the credit go where it belongs, and that is to the former Labor government. That is not to say that after 107 years a coalition government would not have got around to the same exercise. I have no doubt it would have done, because the globe—every country—is facing new challenges with the ongoing globalisation of our population and the emergence of new disease and new pests et cetera. So I have no doubt that the coalition government would have come around to the same form of reform itself at some point. But let us not promote this idea that this was somehow something Barnaby Joyce dreamt up overnight. We know he often has those dreams, Mr Deputy Speaker Scott. I am told he brings them to work regularly on a Monday morning, and you might have heard the same.

I began by talking about the importance of agriculture. There is no doubt in my mind that over the course of the next 20 years our economy will transform substantially. We are now thinking of the mining boom. We will be then be thinking more about what I like to describe as the dining boom. But the dining boom will not just come to us; we will need to go to it. Despite the growing demand and doubts about our capacity to meet that demand as a global community, there is a lot of competition out there, a lot of people in other countries seeking to capitalise on the opportunities that dining boom presents. For us it will not be about volume; it will be about quality and profits. With our limited natural resources, we cannot possibly triple or increase our food output fourfold or even greater. But what we can do is ensure that our limited natural resources are dedicated to the areas where we will secure the highest return and the highest quality jobs for Australians. Our advantage will only continue to exist if we maintain our clean, green, safe image.

There has also been a little bit of debate more recently about the way that investors in the future, typically those who manage big superannuation funds for example, will be discerning in their investment decisions, taking into account the ethical standards used in particular sectors. And let there be no doubt that in the future the growing middle classes of Asia will be looking for food from sources where all those ethical standards have been maintained. One of those measures will be the way in which we manage our natural resources, the way in which we manage our water and our soils being the two key examples. That is why it just astounds me that this government has not only still not produced a strategic plan for agriculture in this country but also that it laid down terms of reference for a white paper—now months late—that excluded any consideration of natural resource management and sustainability. The biggest challenge in agriculture for us in the future will be the growing challenge of resource sustainability, in particular the ongoing dry nature of our continent. You cannot have a strategic plan for agriculture without having, as part of that strategic plan, an idea about how you are going to tackle those natural resource sustainability issues, particularly climate change and the ongoing heating up and drying out of this continent.

While we have had 17 months of policy inertia, in other words 17 months without an agriculture policy in this country, our competitors are on the march. They are already working in Asia with their plans; they are already taking advantage of their natural competitive edge. In the meantime, we are just jogging on the spot, marking time. It makes me angry when I see what were very good Labor initiatives, like the one before us today, being undermined by a decision like that going to the position of the Inspector-General of Biosecurity without any real effort to explain the decision, without any real effort to highlight that decision before this place and certainly without any effort whatsoever—in fact, arguably just the opposite—to alert me, as Labor spokesperson on this question, to that initiative and the likely verification of that initiative.

I invite him, when he returns—that is, the minister—to now highlight that point, to provide the sources of advice for his decision and to share with us what he sees on balance as the positives and negatives of that decision. There will always be some of those, I am sure. I welcome the fact that he might be able to come up with some good reasons why it is not necessary to have the inspector-general, but if he does so he needs to also concede that there are real problems with that decision and then attempt to argue that it is a net positive. I do not think he will be able to do that. In fact, I am very sure he will not be able to do that because (1) I have looked at the issue and taken my own advice and (2) I know that if he was confident in this decision, I know that if he really thought this was a good idea, it would have been writ large in the briefings to me and it would have been writ large in his earlier contribution in this place.

Maybe he was rolled; maybe this was not his idea. Maybe this was not his idea and he is not proud of it and he wants to sweep it under the carpet. He does not want to talk about it; he knows the adverse consequences for agriculture. I can understand that. Many of us in this room have been ministers and we know how difficult the challenges can be. But for all that Barnaby might be—sorry, the minister—I did not think he was a guy who lacked courage. I would have expected that, even if he did not agree with the cabinet decision, he would have come in here and alerted all those in his constituency who rely so heavily on our biosecurity regime, that he would have come in here and explained the situation to them. The very fact that he did not do any of that confirms in my mind that this is a bad decision, and he needs to come back in here and explain himself. There will be a Senate inquiry into this bill, and the minister can be sure that we will pursue this issue in great detail in the other place. He has an opportunity to save everyone a bit of time and come in here, on closing this debate, and explain it to everyone in the agriculture sector as well as everyone in the Australian community who are relying upon us to have the best biosecurity system we can possibly have for the future growth, wellbeing and wealth of this country.

I finish where I began: this bill and our biosecurity system are as important as anything else we discuss in this place. It does go to our food security, and beyond that it goes to how wealthy we are likely to be as a country in the coming decades. We cannot grasp that wealth, we cannot make the most of those opportunities without the best biosecurity system in the world. I believe very sincerely that all those who participated on the panel of review would say that the bill Labor had before the House provided the very best biosecurity system we could possibly have. I am not convinced the bill that is before the House, simply because of the exclusion of an ongoing role for the Inspector-General of Biosecurity, is a bill that provides us with the very best biosecurity regime we could possibly have. There is plenty of time for the minister to reflect on that; there is plenty of time for the cabinet to reflect on that; there is plenty of time for the Prime Minister to reflect on that as he contemplates some of his necessary changes in the coming days and weeks, if he lasts that long. There is an opportunity here either to explain and justify it or to reinstate Labor's very important initiative.

The Inspector-General of Biosecurity might cost some money—I know he does—but on any cost-benefit analysis it is hard to see how what would be very small savings in the context of a billion-dollar budget is justified given the risks that would be posed by not ensuring this bill is as strong as it possibly can be and therefore not ensuring that we have the strongest quarantine and biosecurity systems this country can possibly have. So there is our qualified support. Other than for the inspector-general issue, we very strongly support the bill. Now it is over to the minister.

David Gillespie (Lyne, National Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The legislation currently governing biosecurity, the Quarantine Act, was enacted in 1908. At that stage Australia had only five million people and two passports. The goods arrived under steam, or still occasionally under sail, and the Wright brothers had only flown a plane five years earlier. Now we have 17 million passengers arriving by plane each year and we have supertankers and container ships arriving daily carrying massive volumes of commodities and goods. We have A380s arriving with freight in their cargo bays. Trade has taken off around the world, to Australia and from Australia, as a result of the world's population explosion.

The Quarantine Act has been amended on 50 different occasions since 1908, so it is not unreasonable at all that we have up-to-date and modernised legislation fit for purpose. As the member for Hunter outlined, the purpose of this biosecurity and quarantine legislation is to maintain the security of our $35 billion a year exports in the agricultural and horticultural sector, and to protect the growth of that sector. We have a massive industry in exporting commodities because of our clean and green brand, which is as a result of our disease and pest free status. That has been generated not just by our geographical isolation but also by our quality production methods and agricultural practices. To maintain a our nation's biosecurity in the face of massive volumes as a result of the marked increase in trade, in trading partners and product, we physically need to get our act together. There is no way we as a nation can check every single container or every bag of produce that comes through our ports or airports. We need to have a process that will isolate high risk areas. We need to be worried about noxious weeds, about beetles in wood, fruit fly, fire ants and fire blight. We do not want to put at risk our disease free and pest free, clean and green, image. Fire ants alone could damage $8.9 billion worth of product over the next 30 years. Our remaining fruit industry and horticulture would be at risk if fire blight ever took root here. Our marine industry and fisheries, which produce $2.5 billion worth of product, is at risk. Our biosecurity processes have moved towards an extensive import risk analysis process, and, in essence, the higher the risk and the higher the bar, the greater the monitoring and analysis that is required. Then we direct our biosecurity interventions towards those high risk areas.

As the member for Hunter outlined, the Biosecurity Bill was introduced into the parliament in 2012 but it has languished in the wings of the legislative process for too long. I am pleased to see it has finally come before the House. It has been through the Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Committee, it has had the Beale review and there has been an enormous input from forums. There was a legislative forum in 2014. It has been to every state and territory government, to primary producers, to over 440 organisations, and to importers and exporters. It has been reviewed by our international trading partners to ensure that we can still manage to export and that we meet our requirements under various trade agreements. All those obligations have been addressed. The legislative forum in October 2014 was extremely well attended and there were voices from all stakeholders. As I mentioned, the Biosecurity Bill 2014, the Biosecurity (Consequential Amendments and Transitional Provisions) Bill and the associated companion bills replace the 1908 bill. The charges levied by these bills will now be collected under this umbrella bill.

The member for Hunter spoke about a few issues that he was concerned about. I point out to the House that the Inspector-General of Biosecurity will still be created, but through this legislation under delegation from the minister, not by way of its own stand-alone bill. The main thing is that we have an inspector-general, that the inspection goes on and that the risk process is thorough and exhaustive.

There was concern about the inadequacy of warrants, but the biosecurity enforcement officers will still have multiple warrant provisions to do their jobs. I will just list some of them. There is a monitoring warrant; an investigation warrant; a biosecurity risk assessment warrant; warrants for response zones and monitoring zones; an adjacent premises warrant; a conveyance possession warrant; and a premises possession warrant. This legislation certainly has a lot of teeth behind it. But, if we are going to protect our pest-and-disease-free status and our clean-and-green image amongst the recipients and consumers of our produce, we need to have a vigorous and effective legislative response.

There are many notices that can be issued—enforcement orders and revocation of licences to import. There is a fit-and-proper test that can be applied by the enforcement officers and by the department. There is an associate test, so that anyone who has been guilty of inadequate biosecurity measures and has fallen foul cannot automatically come in the back door by using an associated person to gain entry. The warrants definitely remain in place. Entering property to check on biosecurity issues is allowed.

There is another matter that I should mention to the House. We are all familiar with the horror and the trauma of the Ebola outbreak in central Africa. There are human biosecurity implications as well, and there are human biosecurity orders that can be issued by the Director of Human Biosecurity that will be created by this legislation, so that, if there is a person at risk, control-and-isolation orders and advice can be given to mitigate and control the risk that is represented by that person. These are all very sensible initiatives, because, in an outbreak, an epidemic, of a disease like Ebola, it is the contact tracing and the isolation that will bring the epidemic to its end more quickly than anything else. These biosecurity orders will be very wisely applied, I am sure.

The other issue that has come up in discussion about this legislation is how we are treating ballast water. As you know, all these freighters that travel around the world have refuse—food product, all sorts of waste—and their ballast water can represent a portal of entry. So there are very exhaustive and prescriptive regulations that are embraced by this legislation that mean all the ballast water is treated by processes and is monitored to reduce the risk to as low as physically possible. This includes pre-arrival reporting by planes and freighters. Forewarned is forearmed, so to speak. The legislation also empowers biosecurity officers to enter receiving installations efficiently and in a timely manner.

The rules in this legislation extend to our 12-mile limit and they extend to our external territories. So we have a new situation in Australia now with this legislation. It will allow an efficient focusing of the biosecurity risk analysis so that the actions can be targeted where the risk is highest. It covers all the concerns that have come through in the most extensive, broadly based canvassing of opinions from all involved parties—importers, exporters, producers, transporters—and it is targeted. I extend my recommendation to the House that this legislation be passed. It is timely, it is appropriate, it is extensive and it is incredibly thorough. I commend these bills to the House.

Alannah Mactiernan (Perth, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I also rise to support the Biosecurity Bill 2014 and the associated legislation. The member for Hunter set out very comprehensively our position. I note that the member who spoke just before me talked about how timely the bills were. I do not think we could really describe their introduction by the government as being particularly expeditious, because the work had been done, fundamentally, under the Labor government, and these modernising provisions were introduced in 2012. One would have thought, given the Abbott government's claim that they are very focused on the agricultural sector, that they might have moved with a little more expedition to get these important, modernising bills through. I do not think any of us would contest the importance of biosecurity, of ensuring that our agricultural sector is safe, that we can be a haven of food production and that many of the diseases that are endemic in many parts of the world, affecting both plants and animals, are kept as much as possible from this country. That will enable us to make a greater contribution to solving the increasing problem of global food supply, but at the same time it will also provide us with a great competitive advantage and enable us to market our product around the world as something that is clean, green and safe.

Quite clearly, the quarantine legislation which has been used in the past has been very antiquated, not keeping up with the degree of global interaction that we now have and, indeed, the science that has enabled us to provide greater scrutiny of these diseases and risks and pests that can potentially infect our agricultural product.

There is no doubt that we need this legislation. We have already reflected on our concern that one aspect of the legislation that we had proposed has not been continued with, and that is the proposal to create the inspector-general of biosecurity as a statutory provision rather than the powers being retained by the agriculture minister. Whilst we have an interim inspector-general, which the Minister for Agriculture says he is happy with, that person will continue to operate in a position that is under direction. The reviews that were done made strong recommendations about this being an independent position with full statutory authority. We think this is an unfortunate dumbing down of the protective infrastructure. The independence that perhaps would have seen some more appropriate action has now been lost.

I want to use this as an opportunity to again express my concern at the conduct of the Department of Agriculture in relation to the Western Australian biotech company Serana. In the past, I have set out the circumstances of how the cavalier attitude—that is probably the best way to describe it—of the Department of Agriculture affected this very successful Western Australian company, which employed 16 Western Australians in regional WA, had a turnover of $20 million a year and growing, and were about to double the size of their business and employment in creating new biotechnical products. Through this most unfortunate set of circumstances, they have been hounded out of Western Australia. I can assure you that we have not yet heard the end of this.

I was very interested to see the answers to questions I got in parliament. I am pleased that I actually have some answers. There are some ministers who fundamentally refuse to answer any questions. The inquiry, which has achieved absolutely nothing, other than to close the company down, has not been able to produce one piece of evidence that any product was brought into Australia unlawfully or that the company had used anything other than Australian bovine serum. It has cost so far—not counting any staff overtime; just pure add-on costs—in the order of $235,000. Legal fees alone are $220,000. There were 20 return airfares to Perth from the eastern states. It is very curious. We have a presence for the federal Department of Agriculture in Western Australia. Indeed, they have been routinely, every six months, auditing the performance of Serana and every audit has proved satisfactory. If you look at the scoring rate of Serana, you will see that it has continually improved. It went from 93 per cent to 95 per cent to 97 per cent—a quite extraordinary compliance performance. The people who were monitoring this company—they monitor all biotech companies—were very happy with their performance.

For reasons that we have still not had explained, we find that the gentleman who was engaged in the investigation started with the department only a few months before the investigation started. Guess what: as soon as we started asking questions, the gentleman left the department. He appeared like a supernova on the landscape, came in, charged off, closed the company down and then moved on. We now find that he was not a general investigations officer; he was an investigations officer for the Central East region. We ask: how was this gentleman selected to be the one who was going to do an investigation into a Western Australian company? Put aside all the logistics of this, such as flying teams of people over from the east to Western Australia. Why was this person, whose job was in the Central East, given the investigation in Western Australia? Bear in mind that there is considerable evidence that behind the inquiry have been complaints and the conduct of a competitor that has ruthlessly gone in, in our view, to bring down the Western Australian company.

The company announced that it was no longer going to operate in Western Australia, notwithstanding the facts that there had been no finding against it and that all 64 tests of its bovine serum had proved that it was not illegally imported; it had Australian or New Zealand provenance. Nevertheless, the campaign of harassment continued until the company announced it was closing down. A short time after that, the competitor went in and signed contracts with the suppliers who formerly supplied the company. I think there is something incredibly dodgy about this.

I am very concerned about the conduct of the minister in this. When this matter first came to my attention I presumed, quite rightly, that a minister could not be expected to have known about this, and so I simply wrote to him, outlining the circumstances and asking if he could undertake an investigation. Unfortunately, I did not realise at that time that it had already been raised with him. The minister's office sought to dissuade us from following up on this inquiry, which we did not. It seems to me from all the statements that have been made by the minister, that he has just completely lacked the ability to scrutinise independently or to exercise any independent judgement about this matter and to see the manifest injustice of what has happened to this company, Serana.

Again, going back to biosecurity: one of the things that is truly appalling here is the claim that, 'We were scared that these people were bringing in product that came from banned countries and could have had foot-and-mouth disease. We were really concerned'. So they came in, tied up the whole premises—even those things that have nothing to do with bovine serum—and then they did not test it. They just left it there. It was left there for a couple of months. There was no testing done. It was not until this matter went before the Federal Court and the Federal Court absolutely lambasted the department and the way they conducted themselves, and their failure to conduct any test, that they then went off and tested this product that they were allegedly so concerned about. They were allegedly so concerned about foot-and-mouth disease, but had this stuff in quarantine for two months and failed to do any testing of the product. They said, 'Oh, it was quite hard to test the product.' But, of course, once the Federal Court judge had reflected so negatively upon the department, they actually found, 'Oh, we can get the product tested in New South Wales. Oh yeah, we'll get it tested.' They had it tested and, of course, it proved that there was no evidence whatsoever that this material had been brought in from companies that were banned from the importation of this product.

So here is this company that has absolutely dedicated itself to creating a great Australian business, and they have been systematically disadvantaged and dealt with appallingly by the Department of Agriculture and Food and, I do say, by the minister. I am very concerned that in a media interview the minister alleged that these people had been importing this product when in fact he has absolutely no evidence that that is the case and that the evidence is to the contrary.

Our pursuit of this matter is not going to go away. Our end objective is to try to persuade this company to return to Western Australia and to re-establish their business. We are working really hard to try to secure that outcome. But, of course, they are not prepared to come back until the department of agriculture are prepared to acknowledge that they have got this wrong or, indeed, are prepared to acknowledge that this company will be treated decently in the future. One of the very alarming aspects of this is how, at the same time that this investigation was going on, there was a whole range of matters of Customs that were used. This company, that had been importing various plastic tabs for five years to use on their product, suddenly had those things held up in Customs. It would appear that across a number of related entities within this there was a concerted campaign of harassment, designed to intimidate this company and to make them realise that there was no place for them to operate.

We have put all these matters before the ombudsman, who is taking quite some time to complete a report on this matter. But regardless, you can rest assured that we are not going to let this matter go. This has been a gross injustice and has led to—as I said—16 people in Bunbury losing their fantastic jobs— (Time expired)

Angus Taylor (Hume, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to speak on the Biosecurity Bill 2014 in this cognate debate. It is intended to ensure that we continue to provide a strong regulatory framework to manage biosecurity risks here in Australia, both now and into the future.

This bill, if enacted, will provide the legislative means to manage the risk of pests and diseases entering Australian territory—an island nation, which has of course been extremely good in our history at managing these biosecurity risks. Of course, these risks cause harm—or, at least, have the potential to cause harm—to animals, plants, humans, the environment and the economy. The bill will also support access to fast-growing export markets which are sensitive to biosecurity risks. This is increasingly important as we as a government work to reduce trade barriers through our various free trade agreements which, as farmers in my electorate know, are an extraordinary opportunity for Australia and for Australian farmers. We must remember that we cannot allow tariff barriers to be replaced with nontariff barriers through concerns about biosecurity.

This legislation has been developed over many years. There has been significant consultation with industry, state and territory governments, environment groups, health professionals, the general public and our trading partners for those all-important export markets I mentioned earlier. Indeed, over 440 organisations have been consulted over the past six years in reference to these changes. Those consulted include organisations that would be regulated by the legislation, such as shipping, petroleum, logistics and research organisations, and those who have an interest, such as the environment groups, as I said before, and farmers.

I will speak a little later about agriculture, but I said earlier that one of the focuses here is risk to human health. When we think of biosecurity, most Australians will think immediately of the catastrophe of Ebola and the extraordinary suffering of the West African people. In August of last year the World Health Organization declared the Ebola virus outbreak a public health emergency of international concern. The Australian Department of Health confirmed widespread and intense transmission continuing in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Of course, the situation deteriorated and by October last year there were 9,000 clinically compatible cases reported in West Africa, and 4,500 people had tragically died. Health authorities are closely monitoring the outbreak overseas, and our border protection agencies are alert to watch for people who are unwell in the air and at airports. All airport border agencies have been provided guidance by the Department of Health to identify passengers who present Ebola-like symptoms in flights or at airports. The health of people who have originated their travel from affected parts of West Africa is being closely checked. It is a quarantinable disease in Australia and it can be controlled and eradicated through a range of quarantine measures.

In another recent example of risk to human health, the outbreak of avian flu, or bird flu, in Asia resulted in 121 deaths across mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao and Malaysia.

Biosecurity risks are ever present—as we see with those examples—and that is why vigilance, through appropriate legislation, is absolutely paramount. It is well known that we lead the world on biosecurity. Our reputation as a clean, disease-free, pest-free island nation is built on scrupulous standards. Being an island nation, diseases prevalent elsewhere have been prevented here for many years, and this must continue for our human health, our animal health and our export industries.

Australia works across the full continuum of quarantine with pre-border, border and post-border measures. Surveillance and monitoring of risk areas is critical, along with border control activities which focus on intercepting and quarantining potential threats. Our quarantine laws require that the captain of an international aircraft or vessel must report any passengers or crew who display certain symptoms—as I said earlier, with the illustration of Ebola—and who are ill with particular quarantinable diseases. Our strict laws extend to the importation of certain goods, and that ensures that the biosecurity risk to Australia's agricultural industries and the risk to our unique environment is minimised. As many of us know, when you return home from overseas travel—and I have done this many times—there is a long list you have to declare on arrival: food, dairy, egg products, meat, poultry, seafood, seeds, nuts, fruit and veg, plants, animals and animal products. When you declare these items, they are checked by a department of agriculture officer, who will determine whether they are allowed into Australia.

The bill before the House is designed to better manage those public health risks posed by serious communicable diseases I have outlined and to align our measures with modern science. It contains human health biosecurity measures, which can be not only used to address the risk posed by the disease but also tailored to accommodate an individual's circumstances, and to ensure at the same time that individual liberties are considered and protected.

Quarantining in the early days of our colonial history was strict and resolute, and this goes right back deep into the early days of our European history, where quarantine and biosecurity management was extraordinarily important to our success as a country. The quarantine stations on the Australian mainland have been standing since the 1830s, and they were there as a first line of defence against highly contagious diseases. North Head quarantine station in Sydney was the first safe anchorage point inside the Heads to off-load passengers and crew into New South Wales who were contaminated or suspected of contamination. The site was sufficiently isolated and judged to be a safe distance from the centre of Sydney, with natural spring water to ensure that there was good, reliable, drinkable water. After an average of 40 days, most passengers were released to settle as Australian residents. For smallpox, the period of quarantine was 18 days, and seven days for yellow fever, plague or cholera.

Given how important immigration was to the history and fabric of this nation, that process was extremely important. The University of Sydney academic, Alison Bashford, wrote in 2004:

… the Quarantine Act of 1908 defined quarantinable disease as small pox, plague, cholera, yellow fever, typhus fever, or leprosy. In 1927, encephalitis and mumps were added. Dengue fever was added in 1935 and influenza in 1951.

The act required the master of any vessel to notify authorities of an outbreak of disease—just as much as we need to today—and any disease which included 'fever or glandular swellings, or any disease suspected to be a quarantinable disease'. Ms Bashford continues:

…from 1947, a person who could not satisfy a quarantine officer that he or she had been successfully vaccinated could be quarantined. There were actual bodily inspections to determine whether passengers had a vaccine scar, from the smallpox vaccine. You could only move from what was understood to be an infected zone into a healthy zone if you had a vaccination scar.

Those stations evolved over 150 years, growing during periods of infectious disease and shrinking during periods of general population health. There is an extraordinary history, one which has been important to the foundation of Australia as a nation. The Biosecurity Bill 2014 is a modern and effective regulatory framework built on the learnings and experiences of hundreds of years of immigration in this country.

I want to turn now to agriculture—having talked much about human health—and the extraordinary importance of biosecurity in agriculture. It sounds like an esoteric topic, but it is far more important to the future of this nation than is widely understood. As I said many times in this House and many times before I came to this House, one of the extraordinary opportunities we face as the mining boom comes off and the mining investment boom slows is in exports of agricultural products. I have spent much of my career identifying and helping organisations into these markets, and I have never seen opportunities like we are seeing at the moment.

Indeed, farmers in my electorate will know what an extraordinary increase in beef prices we saw in the lead-up to and following Christmas this year—an incredible tribute to the work that has been done by this government in reopening the live export trade, to the work that has been done by this government in entering into these free trade agreements, for which beef is absolutely central. It is a very tangible example that every farmer in my electorate—most of them do produce some beef—understands and sees as an illustration of extraordinarily good government.

New powers within this bill allow for the management of a wider range of pests and diseases already present in Australia and for the management of the biosecurity risk posed by the ballast water and sediment held on board domestic and international ships. The reality is that, if we are not able to demonstrate to countries we export into that we are disease free in these critical exports like beef, we will lose those markets. You only have to look at what has happened to the South American exports of beef because of foot-and-mouth disease to understand what an extraordinary impact failure to manage biosecurity risks would have on our exports and our prosperity. The legislation has been designed to support Australia's export markets by sustaining current market access and, most importantly, by ensuring that tariff market barriers which are coming down now with these free trade agreements are not replaced by non-tariff barriers.

I want to focus on one industry in particular. It is very important to many of my constituents around the Young region. That is the cherry industry. Improved biosecurity measures for the export of cherries have the potential to support doubling of exports alongside our free trade agreements from 25 per cent of all cherries produced to 50 per cent of our total national production. That of course will increase the revenues per kilogram of cherries exported and will also provide the foundation for growth of this all-important industry in my electorate. Exporting cherries is a specialised market requiring attention to detail and cultural sensitivities, biosecurity, packaging, market access and entry and transportation. Cherry Growers Australia are engaging in their own biosecurity protocols—a self-regulated biosecurity management programme—to provide full confidence to all international markets that Australian cherries are not only free from disease and pests but are also of absolutely exceptional quality. Their plan is to take a holistic approach; it combines control measures and checkpoints for ensuring cherries are free from pests, and the plan supports expanding market access for cherries regardless of the growing region in which they are produced. We have a growing season which extends across our summer, which fits a gap in the market because there are not other Southern Hemisphere producers who can provide cherries into that window.

The majority of concern revolves around Queensland fruit fly and Mediterranean fruit fly. Within the Australian cherry industry, the programme that I have talked about has the endorsement of all growers and exporters as the direction required to achieve and increase in exports of the magnitude I have already talked about and also to allow an increase in air freight access as a priority for all importing markets. One of the things we can do that other countries cannot is export fresh cherries on aeroplanes up into these fast-growing Asian markets.

The Australian government's activities in managing fruit fly are focused on regulating the Australian border and managing the risk of exotic fruit flies entering and establishing themselves. We are also involved in fruit fly surveying and response activities in Northern Australia through the Northern Australia Quarantine Strategy, in the Torres Strait through the Torres Strait Fruit Fly Strategy and in Australia's near neighbours through the International Plant Health Program. These programs are delivered in partnerships with state, Australian government and international agencies.

Fruit flies are a global agricultural issue with all regions of the world having different native fruit fly species; these different pest species can and do invade other regions. For Australia, the threat of offshore pests entering and establishing is substantial.

Human health is paramount to our success as a country, but agricultural opportunities are paramount to our future. This bill will provide the support we need to manage biosecurity risks in this country.

Lisa Chesters (Bendigo, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Ensuring that Australia keeps its disease-pest-free, clean-and-green image I believe is one of the most important acts a government can do. Yes, agriculture is important. It is important because it does not just help feed us in this country; it is an important export market. There are a lot of jobs in agriculture and in food production that we currently have in this country that would be put at risk if there were to be significant disease or pests coming into this country and infecting our local product, our local industry, our local agriculture. In my own region of Bendigo we have multiple growers and operations that rely on having a strong and robust biosecurity regime in place. It is one of the reasons why when Labor was in office it introduced the Biosecurity Bill 2012 to update and modernise legislation underpinning Australians' biosecurity framework and to support the implementation of a risk based biosecurity intervention framework.

Some speakers have spoken about the importance of ensuring visitors, travellers and people returning to Australia do not bring their own human diseases into this country. That is important, and our staff working at our airports make sure that those environments continue to be clean and that people coming in do not carry those diseases. What I want to focus on, though, is what would happen in our agricultural and food production industries if we do not act to ensure that we continue to have a high level of biosecurity within this country. I mentioned Hy-Line Australia, which is a manufacturer in my electorate, which is the largest company in Australia providing day-old chicks, laying chickens and fertilised eggs. It is just outside of Bendigo, in Huntly, and it is the largest supplier of those products here in this country.

When you go there to visit it is not like turning up to a heavy metal manufacturing site where you just have to make sure that you have your steel cap boots on, your fluoro vest and a hard hat. When you go to this facility for a briefing or for a tour, firstly your car has to go through a wash. Then when you get to the site, you yourself have to completely strip down and wash yourself and then go through into the quarantine area and put on a new outfit—new clothes. Your glasses or anything that you may have with you needs to go through another space to make sure that you have not picked up any diseases on your glassware. Then you are ready to go into the actual facility. After that there is a quick briefing on how to maintain the biosecurity of the plant. You can see when you go into the barns, where they have thousands and thousands of birds and the eggs that they lay, why it is so necessary.

When I was there at the end of last year they took me into the shed where the hens laying eggs are actually producing our flu vaccination. It is what they use in our flu vaccinations. That is why it is so important for this facility, just outside of Bendigo, that we have the strongest possible biosecurity measures in place. And it does not just happen at the facility; no person who works in that facility is allowed to own bird life. They forgo having any pet birds of their own, just in case they pick up an unwanted disease and bring it into the facility. The council in the local area of the City of Greater Bendigo has just agreed to amendments to ensure the protection of a buffer zone of a thousand hectares. It is designed to minimise the potential conflict between intensive animal industries, like we have outside of Huntly at Hy-Line, with new residential developments. Huntly is on the other side of the highway, where we have the growth of Bendigo going on. So, our local government is onboard and ensuring at a local level that we are doing our best to ensure the biosecurity at this facility. At a state and federal government level it is also incredibly important. This act becomes so important with regard to the importing of birds, to ensure that whatever product comes in does not bring diseases that could affect the operations and production of this facility in Bendigo.

The poultry industry in the City of Greater Bendigo is worth over $55 million a year. I should also mention Hazeldene's, which is another major manufacturer of chicken and chicken products and also has its own broiler farms and hatcheries. Again, they go from the farm gate to Woolworths and Coles with RSPCA approved chickens; they control every level of operation. Hazeldene's say that one of their major risk concerns is what would happen if there was a biosecurity risk; what would happen if there was a break-out of disease? They always share the experience of when they had an infected bird in one of their hatcheries and they had to destroy the entire flock. It is not just about the cost associated with what happens when we have a biosecurity risk; it is the ongoing cost of rebuilding if you have to basically destroy your entire stock.

Biosecurity is integral to Australia's green, clean, safe food image that we are trying to promote overseas. It has been the talk of why we needed to rush to sign these free trade agreements. On that: if we are going to go down the path of these free trade agreements, we need to make sure that here in this country we can continue to market the product of clean, green, safe food. Other industries in my electorate that have raised concerns about protecting and ensuring that we continue to have that clean, green image is our beef producing industry. Currently, Hardwick's in Kyneton export about 30 per cent of their product to the Middle East—chilled beef and lamb products. They also talk about the importance of biosecurity when it comes to the safe slaughter of product, but they also talk about it in terms of the product that they receive in their food processing works in Kyneton. Another industry to raise it with me are KR Castlemaine. They are the largest employer in Castlemaine, if not Central Victoria. They currently employ over 1,200 people at that facility. They use a range of pork to make our bacon and our smallgoods, and most of it is imported. Where we have rules around biosecurity for importing ham on the bone, that in fact is Australian pork. That exists because of regulations we have and ensures that with the product that they are using there continues to be a market through that Australian pork range. I asked them: if there was to be a change, would they move to a situation where they would just use imported product?—just to put it out there—and they said no, that they are happy with the quality of the product that they get from the Australian piggeries because it really helps with their image. They find that marketing Australian pork, as in Australian clean and green, is the best market label that they have.

B&B Basil is another one of our local manufacturers that spoke to me about the importance of maintaining a strong biosecurity regime. Their business focuses on those microherbs that you get as garnishes, and they have developed an operation and a system outside of Bendigo where they can grow them quickly and get them from the initial seeding phase to being on your plate in China, Japan or Hong Kong within days. They said that what has helped them build their markets overseas is the fact that Australia has a strong clean, green, safe food reputation.

I want to touch on what can go wrong when we lose control of our borders and the lessons from the Victorian wine industry over a century ago. Today Central Victoria, including Bendigo, is known for its wine. Over 100 years ago, it was also known for its wine, but there was an outbreak of a disease, which came over from California, that got into the grapes and into the vines. That came in and completely destroyed over half the crops, half the vines, we had in central Victoria. The governor at the time made an offer to the other winemakers and grape growers: 'We'll give you a subsidy to pull out all your vines just so we can get on top of this disease problem in our vineyards and vines in central Victoria.' Pretty much all of the growers did that, and we lost our wine industry. So it is important to learn the lessons—and learn from the mistakes—of 100 years ago about what can happen if we do not have strict biosecurity measures in place.

What disappoints me the most about this bill is that, when we all know this and we all agree that we want to have a strong agricultural sector, a strong food production sector and a strong wine sector—which rely on a really strong, robust biosecurity regime—and when the majority of the work had already been done by the former, Labor government, it took this government so long to bring it forward. That is my concern about where we are at. It has taken 18 months to bring this bill forward for debate, even though all the hard work had been done by the former government. It was Labor that recognised the importance of upgrading and modernising Australia's biosecurity laws and it was the former, Labor government that first introduced this legislation back in 2012. The current bill before the parliament is essentially identical to that original bill, which was introduced in the last parliament. That is why it is so unfortunate and so disappointing that it has taken so long for this bill to be introduced.

The Abbott government needs to start focusing on putting our agricultural industries first by ensuring that legislation like this is not delayed. It is important that this government starts to restore funding to the CSIRO, which is so important if we are serious about biosecurity. It is not enough to, finally, bring these Labor bills before the House; this government needs to reinvest in the CSIRO, the scientists and the research body, to partner with our industry to ensure we are meeting the biosecurity challenges that this country faces.

We also need this government to finally release its white paper on agricultural industries. It was promised within 12 months of their taking office, and we are still waiting for it. If the government are so keen to make sure that our agricultural industries mean future job creation for us in this country, if they are so keen to get those trade agreements signed, if they are so keen to say that agriculture will be the new growth industry, then why is it taking them so long to release their agriculture white paper? If the government were serious about biosecurity, then they would continue to invest in this area. They would invest in the science and research. They would bring industry together in a more cooperative way. They would ensure that there was a white paper on agriculture that picked up on this issue, and it would be released sooner rather than later.

In a meeting of the Bendigo Manufacturing Group that I attended on Friday, we spoke a lot about the importance of Bendigo food production and food manufacturing, and the number of jobs that is generated by food manufacturers in our region. There are over 6,000 people directly and indirectly employed because of our food manufacturing in Bendigo. If there were an outbreak of disease at Hazeldene's, Hy-Line or KR Castlemaine, or at any of the companies that feed into these manufacturers, thousands of jobs would be at risk. That is why it is so important that we get serious about biosecurity.

Keith Pitt (Hinkler, National Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to speak on the Biosecurity Bill 2014. Having listened to the member for Bendigo and the member for Hunter, I would like to make a brief comment about their contributions. I would like to point out that the Labor Party were in government for six years, last time I checked—and that they had a seemingly endless bucket of taxpayer funds—and I would have considered that that was adequate time to put out this legislation. However, to give the member for Hunter his due, he has provided qualified support for the bill and I certainly thank him for that.

This is an incredibly important bill for our agricultural, forestry and fishery producers, and it aims to strike the correct balance between our trade obligations and, of course, unnecessary burdens on both our producers and our enforcement agents. In 2012-13, we had 16 million people arrive as international passengers, and there were 1.7 million sea cargo assignments. If you went back and spoke to the dairy producers of the 1960s and 1970s, I guarantee you none of them would have thought that we would be exporting fresh milk from Sydney to China by plane. World trade has changed substantially, and this bill puts in place what is required to ensure that we move with it. There is still work to do. Clearly, there are more documents to write, and obviously this bill will be subject to continuous change as long as it is around. Biosecurity threats will continue to change over a long period of time.

But we have a great advantage here, in that Australia is an island—a great advantage. We are separated from our trading partners by a very large expanse of ocean. But it is also great disadvantage: such a large continent has a very open border, particularly with regard to the incursion of pests and disease.

Can you imagine an Australia that was free from foxes, or free from rabbits or rats? That is something that could have been achieved if some of our forefathers had had the foresight to consider just what damage these animals might do. To give you a bit of an idea, foxes in my area at the moment are diabolical for the loggerhead turtle, an endangered species which breeds in only two locations in the world—one of which is at Mon Repos Beach in Bundaberg. So bad has it become that we have brought in professional fox-hunters with dogs to try to sniff out their lairs to thin them out. The foxes get down on the beach; they dig out the turtle nests and eggs and destroy them.

The National Party was in Wodonga last week, of all places. I was walking through the streets of Wodonga in mid-afternoon with my National Party colleagues and, lo and behold, there was a rabbit having a feed in the middle of a roundabout, completely unconcerned about the passing traffic or us walking past. Rabbits are absolutely detrimental to our environment. They are an absolute disaster.

In 2013-2014, there was $53 billion worth of agricultural production. This is an incredibly important bill for our agricultural producers. We currently have no rabies in this country and at the moment there is no foot-and-mouth. I am someone who has been an agricultural producer for over a decade and who comes from a farming family—my parents actually still harvest almost 20 per cent of mill supply in the Bundaberg region with their harvesting contracting business. I was a canegrower myself for many years; I can tell you just how devastating it is to have a disease outbreak. I farmed during the orange rust outbreak; I farmed during the cane smut outbreak. There is nothing more disappointing than walking through your crop, which should be green and looking beautiful, and coming out the other side covered in orange. You were literally orange. It was just devastating. One of the fortunate things about orange rust is that it particularly affected just one variety of cane, which was Q124. Unfortunately about 50 per cent of the district was Q124; but over time you can get rid of it and you can survive. If 50 per cent of your crop is still able to be grown without damage then you are economically viable. However, when sugarcane smut broke out, it was a devastating disease. There were losses of up to 70 per cent. You literally have your crop reduced to a couple of sticks which are thin and black in colour with no green top; it simply does not grow. This is a disease which is incredibly communicable. It travels vast distances as a fungal spore; it is black in colour and just destroys the green top. As a grower, when the disease breaks out the decision you have to make is how you survive. Quite simply, many varieties are not smut resistant and that is the only option. The only alternative is to take out your entire crop and give your farm to the bank, so tough decisions have to be made. Those decisions include whether to take out new rotations and risk that you will produce something or to talk to your bank and extend your overdraft. These are the situations people find themselves in right now as a result of disease and pest incursions.

This bill is based on risk based systems. One of my concerns, and it has been one of my concerns for some time, is around the risk profile we use. We use the WTO risk calculator and, as someone who has used hundreds of different types of risk calculators, I have some concerns about that. However, that is a requirement under our WTO agreements. I congratulate the department of agriculture and those that do the assessment—they are definitely detailed.

There will be no fiscal impact. There will be a $6.9 million a year decrease in costs, in fact. But the most important thing is that the decisions based around this legislation, when we look at our potential for incursion, are based on science. They certainly cannot be based on political interference. This was recently seen with a risk assessment for ginger, which was incredibly difficult for growers in my region. However, fortunately we have looked at the science and the government has gone back to reassess that assessment. Hopefully that will give us a good outcome.

There is also a range of new enforcement options. They include the ability to issue a biosecurity control order, the ability to establish a biosecurity zone and the ability to act across jurisdictions. One of the most difficult things to do is cross state boundaries and still be able to enforce Commonwealth law. That will require people with enforcement powers in different areas.

This bill has been several years in the making. It is one of the most important bills we have on the table at the moment. Our nation is definitely reliant on agricultural production. And it is timely; look at the outbreak at the moment of the cucumber green mottle mosaic virus in the Northern Territory. This is a disease which has wiped out the melon crop in the Northern Territory. It has resulted in growers having to plough in their crops and burn them, never to use that land for melons again. It has cost some $65 million in the last 12 months from just one incursion. It looks like that has potentially come from seed; if that seed has spread across all growing regions—and my region in Hinkler is one of the largest producers of heavy vegetables including watermelons, rockmelons and honeydew—the impacts will be absolutely devastating for my community, which is doing it tough right now.

This is a bill which is designed to operate free of political interference. It is based on science, and I commend the bill to the House.

Justine Elliot (Richmond, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I also rise to speak on the Biosecurity Bill 2014 and the associated quarantine bills. We have heard many speakers today from both sides talk about the importance of keeping agriculture in Australia disease-free and why that is so important across a whole range of different industries and sectors. We have also talked a lot about the need to maintain our clean and green image; that is very important in terms of our future agricultural production. Indeed, those from this side of the House who have spoken have talked about the importance of the need for bipartisanship when it comes to these matters and the strong importance of biosecurity. As the shadow minister and member for Hunter said, one of the most important aspects that a government faces is how it manages biosecurity. While we have raised some of our concerns and criticisms, we have stressed from this side the need for bipartisanship in terms of being able to work together to make sure we have a biosecurity framework in place that is beneficial for our entire community.

This bill will effectively modernise the legislative framework and provide for the effective management of a broader range of biosecurity risks. It will also reduce the regulatory complexity for both industry and government. These changes are important to ensure we have that very strong and robust agricultural sector. The three quarantine bills will ensure there is an appropriate legal structure to support the recovery of costs associated with indirect services under the biosecurity bill. These changes to our biosecurity framework are vitally important and it is for this reason that Labor first introduced an upgraded and modernised biosecurity bill in 2012.

As many speakers from this side have said, this bill before the parliament is essentially identical to and reflects Labor's initial bill. However—unfortunately and regrettably—the Abbott government has not continued to support a very important part of that original bill, the independent Inspector-General of Biosecurity. They have decided to give those powers to the minister instead. We raised the point that this was the wrong decision and called upon the current minister to reflect upon that, because we do feel that this position should be in place.

The primary objective of this bill is to manage biosecurity risk. This requires powers to identify, assess and manage biosecurity risks in relation to goods, conveyances and onshore pests and disease incursions. We certainly have heard of some of the incursions and devastation that they can bring. The overview of the bill is broadly divided into three distinct sections: firstly, operational chapters that support day-to-day biosecurity business; secondly, stand-alone chapters that support specialised biosecurity situations; and thirdly, general administrative chapters that support other necessary functions and powers.

Managing biosecurity is vitally important as it relates to the management of pests and disease entering Australia that could potentially cause harm to animals, plants, human health and the environment. That could have a damaging effect upon our economy as well. All of that could be quite devastating. That is why we keep reiterating the importance of managing biosecurity effectively. Essentially, this Biosecurity Bill will help sustain the integrity of our national environment and increase the productivity of Australia's agricultural, fishery and forestry industries, whilst protecting the health of Australians.

This bill is necessary for the ongoing challenges that a nation like Australia faces. As we have heard, the maintenance of a pest-free agricultural industry is so important, and that can only be achieved by making sure that we adhere to this very strong, modern, robust biosecurity framework. These issues are also very important in areas like mine—the north coast of New South Wales—where we have a very large variety of agricultural sectors that are always calling for a strong biosecurity framework. Very important industries like bananas, sugar and dairy—to name just a few of those—need to be protected by having in place a very strong framework. That is vitally important.

Our unique position in the world as a relatively pest-free environment—and I say 'relatively' pest and disease free—is indeed the envy of the world, and we must work hard to keep that. Our general health and wellbeing, the environment we live in and our native flora and fauna are all beneficiaries of successive and successful policies in this area. This hard-fought position has allowed our agricultural industry to leverage-off a very clean and green status, as we have heard many people talk about. This is giving Australian products a much needed advantage in an ever-competitive world, which is very important when we talk about the many free-trade agreements in place. We need to be focusing on that clean and green status. Quite rightly, our agricultural image to the world is not just clean and green but also of very high quality.

We have to maintain that for future growth to make sure that there is confidence in our agricultural sector and confidence in our very high standards of agricultural export industries. This is very important for a whole variety of reasons, particularly when we look to regional and rural economies and how much they depend upon maintaining strong agricultural sectors and jobs in these areas. It is also very important as demand increases, with many growing economies around the world looking to us and our food production and sourcing that. There is a variety of very important reasons why we have to maintain that.

It is also important to note that whilst the Commonwealth manages Australia's biosecurity at the border, biosecurity issues within the Australian territory, by and large, are managed by the states. The Biosecurity Bill would provide the Commonwealth with necessary powers if a biosecurity incursion crossed borders and different state approaches were hindering an effective response. There may be conditions when a nationwide approach is called upon, so it is certainly good to have that in place.

Australia's biosecurity management is regulated by the Quarantine Act 1908, and this bill replaces that. The need for a modernised, effective regulatory framework has never been more imperative in today's changing world; we need to manage our changing circumstances. We are seeing much larger passenger movement occur daily between continents, with the movement of millions of people, and where increased trades in goods are assisted by better, faster transport systems. With that change in circumstances we have to approach it differently, and we have to look at the challenges that are in front of us now in policing our biosecurity threats.

Whilst the Quarantine Act may have been effective in the past, in certain areas, it has been amended more than 50 times in reaction to changing circumstances and has become quite complex. Unfortunately, all of these minor changes have led to the creation of a highly complex set of legislation, which brings with it the inevitable difficulties of interpretation, and overlaps as well, which can create some difficulties. This calls for the modernisation of the bill.

It was the former Labor government that introduced the Biosecurity Bill 2012 to upgrade and modernise the legislation underpinning our biosecurity framework and to support the implementation of a risk based biosecurity intervention framework. This bill was introduced to parliament in November 2012 together with the Inspector-General of Biosecurity Bill, which was also in the 2012.

These bills were in response to the Nairn and Beale reviews and provided for the framework that replaced the previous Quarantine Act. Both bills were jointly referred to the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee but subsequently lapsed. The reintroduction of the bill provides the strong framework that will enable the management of the risks in a very modern and responsive manner to enhance our capacity to manage those risks into the future.

I am concerned that the Abbott government has sat on this bill since coming into government and that there was no action sooner. The majority of the work on this bill was under undertaken by Labor in government. It is quite incredible that it has been almost two years that we have been waiting for these important Labor reforms to be adopted by the current government. The concern is that we may have been missing opportunities worldwide; we may have been missing opportunities to redefine and re-evaluate our framework. I suppose it is a reflection of the chaos and debacle that we have seen, but it has taken a long time to get here.

I do have concerns that sometimes the Abbott government has not been properly focusing on those challenges and opportunities facing the agricultural sector. We certainly see this reflected in the long awaited white paper, which has been promised but we have not seen. In fact, prior to the election the now Prime Minister and then opposition leader promised that his government would deliver the white paper within 12 months of office. I will quote from The Coalition's Policy for a Competitive Agricultural Sector from August 2013, which says:

The White Paper will be conducted by the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet and will report within 12 months. Our White Paper will also provide a clear, well-defined and transparent strategic approach to ensure the agriculture sector remains a significant contributor to the Australian economy and local communities.

We have seen that that has not happened—another broken promise. It is a broken promise that could potentially have quite serious consequences.

The fact is the agricultural sector deserves to know when the Abbott government will be delivering upon this white paper. We know that the Prime Minister's website is stating that it is set now for completion in 2015, but there is no specific date. So we have some real concerns about that. What the sector needs is to have clear policy, strategic guidance and direction from the Abbott government at a time of great change and of many challenges for them. But they are not getting that. So it is a concern, and another broken promise. Certainly, many on this side of the House have reiterated how we need to have that white paper there and how there have been massive delays. It is really disappointing for those sectors in relation to agriculture, fisheries and forestry—they are all looking for that guidance.

Of course, adding to this frustration are delays caused by many of the cuts the Abbott government has made to the biosecurity budget—including the cuts to the CSIRO, which, of course, limits their research capacity. There are a number of concerns about many of the unfair budget cuts that have occurred within the agricultural sector and the impacts of that generally, right across the area. We look at the cuts to Landcare as well—over $480 million to Landcare. Also, there were $80 million in cuts to Cooperative Research Centres; over $146 million to the CSIRO, which would cost about 500 jobs; $11 million to the Rural Industries Research and Development Corporation; and the more than $6 million from the scrapping of the National Water Commission. So we have had all of these cuts and have not seen the white paper. There is a lot of concern within the agricultural community about this government's inaction when it comes to those areas and its severe funding cuts.

I did find the previous speakers very interesting—like the member for Hinkler, who outlined some of the very serious concerns within his electorate. Yet, at the same time, he and other members of the National Party sit by whilst the agriculture minister brings about all these massive cuts to that area. They are a party to those massive cuts that are really harming so many of our regional and rural communities. In fact, their minister, the member of the National Party, is the one who is making those cuts, and they are assisting him. They come in here and talk about all of the challenges that they face, when they should be going back to their communities and talking about how they, as the National Party as part of the government, are the ones making these decisions that are harming regional and rural communities—and harming them quite severely.

We also had the Abbott government promising to make agriculture one of the five pillars of the economy. But, as I have said, we are yet to see their plan for how they will achieve this. That is particularly disappointing, as I have said, because we do want to see this in place. The government should be focusing on the growing opportunities for the agricultural sector. That is what they should be focusing on, not their own infighting. There is so much to be done in this field. There are so many areas that have to be delivered upon, because there are so many opportunities for agriculture sectors domestically and internationally in relation to the free trade agreements, in relation to growing rural and regional economies, and in relation to employment growth. But we need a government that is going to be focusing on that. And it does not, obviously, appear to be happening. It is disappointing for all of those sectors, because this should be one of the government's highest priorities. I said at the beginning that, without a doubt, making sure we have that robust sector should be right at the top of their list in terms of the action that they take. With all the chaos and disunity, it does not seem to have been there. Our clean, green and safe image is the agricultural sector's greatest advantage. It really keeps our competitive edge there. That is why this bill is of such incredibly critical importance.

As I have said, we have raised some of our concerns about this bill, particularly the parts in relation to the need for the Inspector-General of Biosecurity—and I would ask that the minister certainly take that into consideration. But as others on this side have stressed—and, indeed, the shadow minister, the member for Hunter, has said—we support this bill. We believe it is important to have a bipartisan support when it comes to any of the opportunities for our agricultural sector. But we would like the minister and the government to take onboard some of the concerns that we have had, because we just cannot be missing some of those worldwide opportunities that are there. We need to have that in place, and we do support it, because we do have to have a very strong and robust biosecurity framework.

Don Randall (Canning, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I am pleased to speak on the Biosecurity Bill 2014 as a cognate bill. As the previous speakers mentioned, this is a bill that is replacing a bill that is almost 100 years old; it was enacted in 1908. There is no doubt of the importance of ensuring the sustainability of Australia's biosecurity, particularly as Australia moves forward into a new era. The proposed legislation protects a range of stakeholders—agricultural stakeholders, businesses and every single individual who enjoys a life relatively free from arange of exotic diseases. These amendments are critically important to ensure that legislation is current and equipped to cope with modern challenges faced by modern Australia.

The coalition seeks to make improvements in four key ways. They are protecting our agricultural industry , increasing efficiency , improving compliance , and further protecting the Australian people from public health risks. By maintaining and improving current protections, we will be ensuring that Australia stays competitive in the current export market while also pro viding a simpler, more effective way of doing business with our import market. We want to be able provide a safety net for all Australians in the event of a communicable disease outbreak, such as the Ebola pandemic that was witnessed last year. We also want to ensure that compliance with biosecurity measures is as high as possible . S o we are creating a number of tools that can be used to assess applications, administer legislation and provide for penalties that reflect the risks Australia i s exposed to.

Ongoing management of biosecurity risks, including that of human disease, is not only an environmental concern but also an economic requirement. This is highlighted by the fact that, in 2013-14, the gross value of Australian production to the Australian economy was some $53 billion.

In my electorate of Canning, I have had the pleasure of working with a group called HOIG, the Hills Orchard Improvement Group. The organisation represent $40 million worth of farm-gate industry in the Perth Hills, in Western Australia. I have spoken a number of times in this parliament about HOIG and the work that they do both in and out of my electorate, but I feel as if I need to mention them once more to our Minister for Agriculture, because I do not think he has still got it in relation to HOIG. I just want to remind him that they would also benefit from improved biosecurity measures, particularly against Mediterranean fruit fly, known scientifically as Ceratitis capitata.

Once upon a time, they had an efficient and effective protection to adopt called fenthion, which eradicated the Medfly from larvae. However, a series of unfortunate decisions led to this protection being banned due to concerns around the safety of its usage. The APVMA, or Australian Pesticides and Veterinary Medicines Authority, felt that a 30-year-old report containing questionable data at best—in fact, back to the 1970s, as I understand—was enough to ban the use of fenthion, which was the only mechanism to stop the Mediterranean fruit fly. That was all because the APVMA does not, and is not required to, consider studies undertaken by other international bodies. This was the best it could source. This was looked at during the Senate inquiry, and the Senate inquiry found that there was no valid reason to ban fenthion, because there was no example anywhere in Australia or the world which justified that.

The disappointing fact of the matter is that they still saw fit to import fruit from overseas sources that use fenthion as a matter of course. This seems to contradict the APVMA's argument that fenthion, used in low dosages to prevent Medfly, poses a substantial enough risk to the consumer that it is justified in causing such havoc to the livelihood of my constituents who grow pome and stone fruit for domestic and international consumption. This is particularly true when considering the fact that Vietnam has since stopped issuing import permits for fresh Australian fruit, much as Japan did with Australian blueberries in 2011. The spokesman for HOIG, Brett DelSimone, in my electorate, has informed me that this decision could effectively close the gate on this $40 million worth of exports. I am certain that growers in my electorate would rather have enjoyed the benefit of ensuring their own biosecurity through the very moderate use of fenthion spray.

It has already been stated by the minister that Australians enjoyed the company of 16 million international passengers during the 2013-14 year. Also in my electorate of Canning, I am fortunate enough to have the Mandurah and Peel region, an area which provides so many examples of what makes Western Australia such a unique place to live. It is referred to by the Peel Development Commission as one of the fastest-growing regions in WA, and it is expected to have a population of some 300,000 people by 2050. In 2013, approximately two million people embarked on a day trip to the Peel region. I would imagine that, with the increasing accessibility of the area, this number will continue to grow. By speaking in support of strengthening biosecurity measures, I hope to continue to assist in protecting not only the beautiful environment and the local fauna but also the approximately 113,000 people who currently call Peel home. Around 65 per cent of this number resides within the boundary of the City of Mandurah itself.

Much of the current legislative framework was established in a very different society that faced exceptionally different challenges. I am talking about the historical legislation. It was developed in a time where international travel was so arduous that it was sometimes only undertaken once in a person's lifetime. The import-export market was virtually nonexistent. Communicable diseases that have since been mostly eradicated through immunisation and the Quarantine Act were at the forefront of policymakers' minds, and the entire population of Australia was just under double that of Western Australia's present population.

This is not to undervalue the current act. It has served us well for an exceptionally long time and has been used as the framework to establish Australia's current unique biosecurity status. This is not a case of replacing something that is broken; it is a case of updating something that will increasingly struggle to keep up with modern demands—in other words, modernising it. The bill is an update that takes into account modern technology and reflects the capabilities of that technology.

Almost 50 amendments over the course of the act's lifetime mean that the legislation has become difficult and incompatible with global demands. Overlapping provisions and powers have made the Quarantine Act and its accompanying regulations unnecessarily very complicated to administer. A more streamlined approach, as this bill has, is needed.

This bill has been designed to manage biosecurity risks, including those of human diseases, which may enter or emerge in Australian territory and to prevent their establishment or spread in Australian territory. This bill is the culmination of 100 years of experience and extensive consultation with a wide range of stakeholders such as primary producers, importers, exporters, state and territory governments, environmental groups, the general public and our international trading partners. They are all having an input. This bill seeks to ensure that legislation is clear and laid out in a way that makes provisions easy to find. This allows for clear definition of the role of those being regulated as well as the roles of those administering the regulations.

This is what the coalition is all about: streamlined processes, increased efficiency and cutting away unnecessary red tape, as is always called for. This is an example of how we are doing it. This bill is a reflection of those principles. It seeks to reduce the impact of regulation while still achieving the best outcomes for the future of our biosecurity. Estimates show that deregulation can save up to something like $6.9 million a year, just in those small areas. This is done by reducing unnecessary duplication and allowing businesses to come to a single arrangement with the Department of Agriculture in the management of biosecurity risks. The current system requires a single business to enter into multiple arrangements with the Department of Agriculture. To remedy this, there are provisions for a broader range of activities allowed under one agreement with the department—so not what we experience now.

Presently the act prevents goods, despite not posing a biosecurity risk, from being unloaded automatically when they arrive in Australia. In the new biosecurity bill,    unnecessary delays for importers are avoided by allowing a business to apply for a standard permission of entry into Australia ports only when it is known that goods being transported do not pose a threat to Australian biosecurity. This is another unnecessary delay which has been avoided in the day-to-day operation of business. So rather than sitting on the ports, we can actually get an arrangement in place on goods that we know, or have a precedent almost, are coming into this country without any problems.

As is the case with any legislation, its level of success is directly proportional to its level of compliance. This bill includes a number of arrangements that allow effective and efficient targeting of those who do not comply with biosecurity arrangements. One of the many ways this is done is by applying a fit and proper person test, taking into account an applicant's or business's history of compliance and whether any known business associates have breached this compliance at any time.

Biosecurity is everyone's responsibility, and the measures in this bill reflect that. The bill also allows the Commonwealth to exercise penalties based on the level of risk that Australia was exposed to. Penalties include, but are not limited to, infringement notices, enforceable undertakings, or civil or criminal proceedings. It is very well known that prevention is better than cure. By having provisions which allow biosecurity officers to enter premises and manage an identifiable risk, potential issues are mitigated before they cause irreversible damage to the Australian environment, economy and/or its citizens.

Despite the prevalence of the medfly, which I mentioned earlier, within my electorate, there are many pests and diseases that are quite common around the world but are absent within Australia's borders. As the only registered beekeeper in this parliament, I want to talk about the Varroa mite. It has not reached Australia, and we need to continue to make sure that does not happen. This is an example of what I am talking about today. This bill protects this status, which will hopefully maximise Australia's agricultural output. There are also provisions for a wider range of pests and diseases already in Australia, such as medfly, again, which poses threats to industry, our environment and our agricultural produce. The bill extends existing powers, in conjunction with current arrangements with state governments, so that these pests can be effectively managed.

Provisions regarding communicable diseases take into account individual liberties as well as the responsibility of the government to ensure all risks to the greater population are minimised. The bill ensures that the management of any risks also reflects Australia's international obligations. While I am sure we all hope that these provisions are rarely needed, no-one can argue against the importance of such provisions in this day and age where venturing overseas has never been easier.

In conclusion, as I have stated previously, this is simply a case of making sure the legislation can be modernised. Our friends in the opposition, as we know, would be jumping for joy, as this is one of the few pieces of legislation that is not being fixed due to their need to regulate and legislate. We know that we have bipartisan support. It makes the good better.    The purpose is clarity, efficiency and effectiveness. In encouraging compliance, we create a safer environment for our agricultural industry, our unique environment and the broader community, as I have mentioned.

This legislation makes it clear to those who are bound by it what is expected of them and what biosecurity officers are authorised to do.    It also makes penalties fairer by ensuring that the punishment fits the crime and that the level of risk is reflected in all sanctions. The bill ensures that individual rights are respected when managing human disease but also that unnecessary risk is not tolerated.

I cannot stress the importance of this legislation enough in terms of Australia being seen with its clean, green image. When I was on a delegation to Japan and Korea, Australia is seen as a country of great health, and we are lauded for our clean status. Just to give you an example: in the hotels of Japan and Korea they describe Australian beef as 'free range', because they are out in the paddocks rather than in feedlots. They see it as a big plus for us, and we need to maintain this positive image in the light of all the competition that we are getting from everyone else.

We do not need another medfly in this country or, dare I say, a cane toad. We do not want an outbreak of Ebola, bird flu or swine flu on Australian soil, or foot-and-mouth disease or anything like that—equine influenza for our race horses, those sorts of things. Australia has been too well quarantined to take a punt on those issues.

We want the freedom to travel. We want our agricultural industry to be competitive, successful and the best. This is why the coalition seeks to pass this biosecurity bill and its accompanying amendments. I recommend the bill to the House.

Nola Marino (Forrest, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

As a farmer, as well as a member of parliament, I am particularly pleased to speak on the Biosecurity Bill 2014 today. I really understand how important biosecurity is. It is vitally important—something I am passionate about defending. I have spoken repeatedly in this House about the need to protect Australia's environmental and agricultural resources. It is a priority for this government. However, I want to raise a personal note of caution and concern about the status of biosecurity in recent years and to look at how changes to the definitions we use have changed the way we manage the process.

Since 1908 we have had a quarantine act. The word 'quarantine' derives from a Latin and later Italian reference to 'forty days'—the period of time one spent in isolation. Today its meaning is much broader, and Webster's dictionary describes it as:

the period of time during which a person or animal that has a disease or that might have a disease is kept away from others to prevent the disease from spreading

the situation of being kept away from others to prevent a disease from spreading

I would ask members to take note of the words 'prevent the disease from spreading'. Today we are debating the replacement of the Quarantine Act with the Biosecurity Bill. The explanatory memorandum of this bill says the following:

The Biosecurity Bill 2014 will provide the primary legislative means and a modern regulatory framework for the Australian government to manage the risks of pests and diseases entering Australian territory and causing harm to animal, plant and human health, the environment and the economy.

The bill is designed to manage biosecurity risks, including the risk of listed human diseases entering Australian territory or emerging and establishing themselves or spreading in Australian territory or a part of Australian territory. The bill will also enable the management of risks relating to ballast water and sediment, and biosecurity emergencies. Quarantine is designed to prevent the spread of a disease, of a plant or of an invasive animal species. It has an authoritative ring that demands action to prevent incursion. The modern meaning of biosecurity is to 'manage the risk' of such incursion. This alone suggests a downgrading of the target from a measurable standard of action to a qualitative opinion of risk. Please note the difference.

Regional Australia, which is where I live and work as many in our farming sector do, and especially our agricultural sector have long been concerned about the level of protection given our environmental and agricultural assets. It is something I have heard a lot about for a lot of the years that I have been a farmer.

The Beale quarantine and biosecurity review that was commissioned by the previous Labor government called for hundreds of millions to be spent on AQIS and quarantine annually to provide proper real protection to our nation's borders. But in government Labor failed to act, except to spend two and a half years after its release running it down and stripping out its assets.

Australian agricultural and food producers rely on our clean image and high quality produce to find markets and to retain markets. Agricultural and food production in this country drives $155 billion a year in economic production, generating around 1.6 million Australian jobs and $32 billion a year in farm exports. And it is happening out in regional Australia.

Cheaper foreign food products are often underpinned by cheap labour or low quality control. That means our producers rely on the perception of higher quality, safety and of an ethical reputation. Around the world Australian produced food is regarded as safe, clean and high quality, and it is essential that we maintain that reputation.

Australian farmers and food manufacturers are some of the best in the world and they know that our greatest marketing and health asset is our virtual disease free status, and it is too valuable to lose. As I said, it is a food safety issue also. This is particularly important in this debate because of the cost advantage that most of our competitors get, especially on labour. Australian producers and manufacturers have to rely on quality and safety to compete effectively in the marketplace, be that domestic or international. In addition, Australia's status as a premium international tourist destination makes vigilance in pest and disease protection paramount. Our native plants, animals and ecosystems are a major part of the attraction that brings tourists here and brings them back, and protecting them should be a government priority.

It should be noted by the parliament that the previous Labor government had a poor record of defending Australia's borders and maintaining our quarantine and biosecurity. Labor consistently stripped funding and personnel from all of the Commonwealth law and border enforcement agencies. This included: over $1 million from the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity; 750 staff cut from Customs from 2009-10; $64.1 million cut from Customs in the 2011-12 and 2012-13 budgets; $264.5 million and 97 staff cut from the Australian Federal Police; $22.2 million and 144 staff cut from the Australian Crime Commission; $15.2 million and 35 staff cut from Austrac; $8.7 million cut from CrimTrac; and $1.2 million cut from Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity. Labor's 2009 federal budget also slashed $58.1 million from the quarantine and biosecurity budgets, reducing the inspections of arriving passengers and cargo and leading to the loss of 125 jobs.

Veterinarians, scientists and other experts in the field know that if we have a poor focus on biosecurity and border protection, the next major outbreak of an industry-crippling exotic disease or foreign pest or weed incursion is not a matter of if, but when. They know this, because the aim of Biosecurity Australia has too often been not to prevent the entry of exotic diseases and pests, but instead to calculate and minimize the risk of diseases or pests entering with other products. This simple statement means that it becomes a numbers game—and this bothers me very much as a farmer in this nation.

Even with low statistical risk, when enough products are imported a breakdown will eventually occur. The maths makes it inevitable. So we need to constantly question the balance of prevention of incursion with management of risk. In the modern trade environment, certainty of border protection has become a thing of the past. There is no such thing as guaranteed quarantine. And because Australia is a massive exporter of primary produce we need to recognise, acknowledge and understand why this is so.    '

However, it is also important not to give up our natural environmental and agricultural advantages that our relative disease-free and pest-free status provide. There is no dollar amount that can quantify these. We have an obligation to ensure prevention where possible—and I for one would feel more secure if Biosecurity Australia had this at the forefront of their policy and action agenda.

This bill has taken some time to get here. The Biosecurity Bill was first introduced in 2012, referred to the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Committee and lapsed when parliament was prorogued. There were areas of concern identified during that inquiry that have been addressed in the new legislation.

One great interest is that of regional differences of biosecurity status. This is of particular importance to Western Australia and my electorate in the south-west. Many pests and diseases found elsewhere are not found in my region, and it is essential that regional exclusion remains a key focus of governments both state and federal. The issue of regional differences was raised by a number of stakeholders during consultation on the 2012 bill. Some stakeholders considered that the original legislation did not include appropriate consideration of regional differences during risk analysis processes. This issue was further explored during consultation on the IRA examination. To address concerns, the provisions in the Biosecurity Bill 2014 have been strengthened to include a note in the provisions for conducting biosecurity import risk analyses, which explicitly states that the department can and will consider areas of different pest or disease status when conducting IRAs under the Biosecurity Bill 2014.

Australia does not use the words 'regional difference' in legislation, because it is not a term defined in relevant international agreements or standards. The Biosecurity Bill 2014 uses the words 'part of Australian territory' to enable the important consideration of 'regional differences'. This wording has been included in addition to the definition of biosecurity risk, which is defined as: 'The likelihood of a disease or pest: entering Australian territory or a part of Australian territory or; establishing itself or spreading in Australian territory or a part of Australian territory'.

As I said when I started, all of us who are engaged in the primary sector—in farming, in food manufacturing, in exporting—understand the opportunities that will arise out of the free trade agreements. But a key part of that opportunity is and will remain a very vigilant approach to biosecurity, which is why I will continue to take a direct interest in this issue.

Eric Hutchinson (Lyons, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

It is a pleasure to rise and speak on this legislation. I note that I am following two Western Australians. I note the member for Franklin is in the chamber. Whilst we sometimes have had differences with Western Australians, in this area I think we do have similarities. Western Australia is divided from much of mainland Australia by the Nullarbor, as Tasmania is separated from mainland Australia by Bass Strait. Therefore, the concept of all of the things that biosecurity brings to our nation in terms of the image and the reputation that Australia rightly enjoys in terms of being a producer of things clean and green—our pest-free status—is enhanced somewhat by those regional differences that the member for Forrest was highlighting. It truly is our nation's competitive advantage. It is what distinguishes us. We are an island—indeed, in the case of Tasmania, an island within an island. That gives us a competitive advantage in terms of biosecurity and our capacity to market our products to countries around the world. It is important, and that is why this legislation is so significant.

I note that this bill was introduced into parliament in 2012 but was subsequently referred to the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee, and that committee was still making its findings when the election of 2013 occurred. I think there is acknowledgment on both sides of the House as to the importance of this legislation. That is why the inquiry received 80 submissions from a range of different stakeholders. In large measure, the concerns that were raised have been addressed.

In the case of Tasmania, our reputation is absolutely critical to where we stand and the quality of the food that we produce. It is doubtful that Australia will ever be—as is sometimes misleadingly said—a food bowl for Asia. That would be a gross exaggeration, and something that is far beyond our capacity. We are really a minion in terms of what we actually produce and consumption—even in a large country, like China for example. If Australia is perhaps the supermarket, Tasmania perhaps could better be described as the delicatessen part of that supermarket. It truly is the very best of what we are able to do.

I note recently the 'Restaurant Australia' campaign, which is promoting Australia as not only a travel destination but also a food destination. Many tourists that come to our shores are surprised by the quality of the food here. Tasmania was chosen as the feature for the 'Restaurant Australia' presentation that highlighted food from all around Australia, and particularly from my home state of Tasmania.

Biosecurity is particularly important not only to our nation—also particularly within some of the sectors where my state of Tasmania has a real competitive advantage; one of those is the salmon industry. Again I note the member for Franklin in her electorate—as in the member for Braddon's electorate and also in my electorate—these are important businesses. They are globally competitive businesses. They are very much part of the brand that makes Tasmania very special. There are not too many Australians that would not have enjoyed the quality of Tasmanian salmon. It is highlighted at the very top end of the restaurant trade. For example, Tetsuya's restaurant in Sydney has made an art form of Tasmanian ocean trout, which has become his signature dish.

Biosecurity is critical in this sector. It is critically important. The aquaculture and salmon industries in both Chile and Norway in recent times have been all but wiped out through disease incursions. There are challenges that face the aquaculture industry in Tasmania. We think of Tasmania as being an island to the south but, if you look at where salmon is produced in the Northern Hemisphere, the equivalent latitude would be Heard Island in the Southern Hemisphere. It is a unique business in Australia that produces the quantity and the quality of salmon in largely what is a Mediterranean environment. It is critical also that we maintain the biosecurity of that sector. It is so important to our state.

The commitment to biosecurity has allowed Australia and particularly Tasmania to protect our unique natural habitat but also the health of our people while at the same time maintaining an advantage in primary industries. We cannot take this status for granted at all. I have mentioned the salmon industry but it is true also in the case of apples. There are clearly risks, and they were identified through biosecurity incursions after apples from New Zealand were allowed to be imported into Australia. Once the testing started it was shown that the processes that they had put in place were in fact inadequate and unable to guarantee the safety of those apples being imported into Australia.

A number of global trends highlight a significant change and the growing complexity relating to biosecurity challenges pointing towards a future where existing biosecurity processes may not be sufficient. I refer to the CSIRO report titled Australia's biosecurity future. I want to make a couple of points out of that very worthwhile report. One relates to obviously something we all understand. The number of international tourist movements that occur around the world—and that is true also in Australia—is continuing to increase. It is true of the vessels and the trade that we see in a very much globalised world.

The figure that struck me recently was that, in 2013, 100 million Chinese people left China to travel for pleasure. Admittedly, the majority of them went to places like Hong Kong and Macau. Less than one per cent of those Chinese tourists chose Australia as a destination. That 700,000 or thereabouts is predicted to double by 2020. I think that not only is a very good illustration of the communicable disease risks—they may be able to be moved much more easily than they once were—but highlights the infrastructure challenges that this country has in terms of bringing that increasing and large volume of tourists into Australia. That is why I am very pleased to see the government has invested a record amount of money in infrastructure. I welcomed the announcement in Townsville recently, as I welcomed the announcement of the Hobart airport being upgraded—with a $38 million contribution in this year's budget.

Indeed there is also the challenge we have in urban populations. I guess those living in the urban centres around Australia and indeed all around the world are now more than two generations away from the family farm. I guess that that disconnection from primary industries sees demand for a whole range of different products. That may not have been the case in the past.

Australia's economy, its people and the environment benefit significantly from a strong biosecurity system. Australia's unique pest and disease status helps to protect our way of life, including our environment, human health, as we have mentioned, and the wellbeing of our domestic plants and animals. This unique status means that our agriculture industries, our environment and communities remain free of many pests and diseases found elsewhere, giving Australia a real competitive advantage in export markets. This is true absolutely in Tasmania and even in respect of mainland Australia. For example, cherries are able to be exported to the Japanese market. The phytosanitary and the processes that are put in in terms of managing those disease risks are such that Japan is happy to accept cherries from Tasmania. This is an important and valuable industry.

Australia's biosecurity risks have changed significantly since the Quarantine Act, which this Biosecurity Bill intends to replace, was first drafted more than a century ago. In the intervening 100 years there have been more than 50 amendments to that legislation. This new bill I think more accurately reflects the reality of the world we live in, the goods and products that are traded and the increased movement of people in different modes of transport. Shifting global demands, growing passenger and trade volumes, increasing imports from a growing number of countries, and new air and sea craft technology have all contributed to a new and challenging biosecurity environment.

Science plays an important role in the work that the department of agriculture does. It is the foundation of productive, competitive and sustainable agriculture, fisheries and forestry industries. The department has embedded within it a wealth of scientific expertise which is generally readily accessible.

The regional differences within Australia are important. They have been considered in the submissions that were received and have been, I think, to large measure appropriately considered within the drafting of this bill. As I mentioned before, perhaps nowhere more than in Western Australia and certainly Tasmania, we appreciate the benefits that come from the isolation that we both enjoy. Of course it presents challenges from time to time in getting goods to market in a cost-effective way, not least of all across the most expensive piece of water perhaps in the world—that is, Bass Strait. That is a challenge for us and something that I am committed to improving.

The benefits that our state enjoys in terms of market access are not inconsiderable and are very much part of the brand and the reputation that Tasmania and Tasmanian agricultural producers enjoy, whether it be cherries, salmon, red meat or horticultural products in terms of berries and other things—even in the case of wool, an industry that I was involved in for many years. The quality and biosecurity status of wool from Australia are well recognised. We have a reputation for safe and high-quality food—something that we should at all times be aware of and be diligent in making sure that we continue to protect.

Fiona Scott (Lindsay, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise today in support of the Biosecurity Bill 2014 together with the package of supportive bills relating to biosecurity and quarantine. This bill replaces the original act introduced to this parliament in 1908, over 100 years ago. I think it is fair to say it is well and truly time for a dust off, rethink and rework. On the enormity of the task, I would like to congratulate the member for New England, the Minister for Agriculture, and the CSIRO for their focus on our nation's biosecurity.

Late last year, while releasing a green paper on agricultural competitiveness, the minister said that biosecurity presented 'the greatest risk to the future of Australian agriculture' and that 'investment in our biosecurity should never be compromised'. I could not agree more. Being a continent island we have a wonderful natural barrier of protection to this land but it is also one of our greatest threats. At the heart of this 605 page bill is a plan for risk management and preventing risks to human health, not to mention a plan to protect Australian industry, especially the ongoing viability of agriculture, and in turn securing our food production.

European settlement has seen nature send warning salvos across our bow loud and clear. In the initial years of colonisation it was the very coughs and colds our convicts brought to Australia from England. The then isolated Indigenous population had not been exposed to anything like this and on some communities the impact was devastating. Then there were the outbreaks and people were quarantined for fear of all kinds of harmful and deadly diseases, including leprosy. But biosecurity encompasses other outbreaks, often because of our own stupidity and lack of research. Perhaps most notably was the ill-fated attempt by the Bureau of Sugar Experimentation Station to control the Frenchi beetle, a pest in sugar cane crops, by introducing cane toads. That was in 1935. Eighty years later they have spread south to New South Wales and west across the top half of the continent, seriously threatening local flora, fauna and even humans with their poison.

Almost as foolhardy was the release of 24 rabbits by Thomas Austin in 1859 from Victoria. That release allowed the country to be overrun by rabbits in plague populations. The damage they caused is almost immeasurable—from soil erosion to the destruction of vegetation, not to mention the harm done to our native wildlife. It ran pretty much out of control until the 1950s when myxomatosis was introduced as a control and then, more recently, the calicivirus. Nonetheless, we still have a rabbit problem. Then there was the prickly pear. Imported in the 19th century, the cactus was originally thought to be a good biological agricultural fence. That was until the plant went feral. A South American moth, introduced in 1925, finally brought the prickly pear under control. Most recently there has been an issue of fire ants finding their way to Australia by container ship. Recent outbreaks around Botany threaten all regions of Sydney, including my electorate of Lindsay. The point is we must forever be vigilant to keep our country clean and free from pests and diseases.

My electorate of Lindsay is home to communities such as Agnes Banks, Llandilo, Castlereagh and Mulgoa—the north and south wings of my electorate. These areas are agricultural lands based around the Nepean River and are also home to some of our nation's most esteemed equine studs, which enjoy great success on both the international and national stages. Local heritage estates like Fernhill, once home to Sir Henry Parkes and the Cox family, is where the current owners work hard towards a dream of hosting international showjumping events in our region—not to mention their wonderfully successful picnic race days.

To the north of the Lindsay electorate is Castlereagh and Agnes Banks, home to spectacular thoroughbred properties, like Bart Cummings' Princes farm, Godolphin or Tyreel, and home to some of our nation's greatest thoroughbreds, like Melbourne Cup champion Saintly. A few years ago, in 2007, this community, alongside much of our equine community, faced an epidemic of equine flu that cut through the area like a rampant bushfire. You see, the first case of horse flu in Australia was confirmed in a stallion at Eastern Creek, also in Western Sydney. That stallion was in quarantine after arriving from Japan. Despite 60 horses at the Eastern Creek and Spotswood quarantine stations being kept in lockdown, the equine flu still escaped. The flu could be caught via airborne particles. Worse still, it could travel kilometres on the wind, affecting horse studs suburbs away. All in all 47,000 horses would test positive to the disease across nearly 6,000 properties through New South Wales and Queensland. Seeing what my own animal, my own horse, went through is not something I would wish upon my worst enemy. It was awful and it was distressing. My horse got through the ordeal. I am very lucky. Fonteyn was very young at the time, but she did have youth on her side. Older and more mature horses were not so lucky and did not survive this outbreak.

In an inquiry, former judge Ian Callinan, who investigated the issue, described our quarantine system as 'inefficient, underfunded and lacking due diligence'. Some important changes were made in the wake of Judge Callinan's findings, but the basic century-old legislation remained in place despite a mammoth operation: 50,000 horses had to be vaccinated, 132,000 lab tests had to be carried out and 16,000 movement permits had to be issued. So many equine based businesses like self-employed tradesmen—farriers, horse dentists, vet clinics—endured economic hardship and some would never recover. My good friends Lyn and Michael White, of Castlereagh Feeds, were faced with an economic threat to their business, hence having to diversify their business into other forms of stock feed.

I go further. Lindsay is home to a whole range of other business in the agriculture space, particularly poultry and egg farms. There are businesses in Lindsay like Pirovic Enterprises, custodian to around 750,000 birds, which is one of the largest independent operators of poultry and egg production in Australia. As recently as 2013, and even into last year, businesses like this were threatened by avian influenza outbreaks found around Young. There were estimates around at the time that the loss of chicken stocks were so severe they were pushing up the price of eggs by as much as 20 per cent. As it was, egg production was cut in New South Wales by 12 per cent. Had that flu spread to my electorate, the local industry could have been absolutely decimated. That is because Pirovic farms in my electorate produce more than 60,000 eggs per day. It is a vulnerable industry. It is a vulnerable business, I might add, that directly employs 130 people and indirectly provides so many more jobs to people in Western Sydney.

We must protect our food security. Egg production is one of the most efficient means of protein production. It is essential our biosecurity laws are up to date and the very best they can be so that every protection possible is given to essential food producing industries like egg production. When I speak to people like family business owner Franco Pirovic, he tells me this legislation is a good and solid start. He says this legislation will help tighten border controls and take into account the massive traffic numbers at these points. He says this legislation will streamline the processes should the worst happen, and that gives everybody more certainty. He also says the legislation provides a springboard for the government to start looking at new biosecurity battlegrounds, what he calls the 'post border controls', because people like Franco see serious vulnerabilities.

As consumer demand is pushing industries like his away from battery egg production to free range, animal vulnerability to diseases rise. It is a simple factor of having less control over the animal's cleanliness and is a more difficult operation to quickly quarantine—especially when diseases can quickly travel several kilometres once airborne. And that is not good when you are an industry trying to keep bird flu and other diseases like Newcastle disease out. On Franco's figures, there are around 17 million commercial laying hens across Australia, but at least they have voluntary industry codes. However, that push to be green and organic, and the resurgence in unregulated backyard chicken farms, means often these farms have less than 10 chickens and are not part of any voluntary code or system. In fact, as Franco points out, the numbers are as high as 4.2 million backyard chickens being housed across Australia and these have the potential to become a big and growing issue. And with hens being bought and sold without regulation, many birds are not even getting basic vaccinations, which is a potential risk to an entire industry that is already vulnerable. It may be down the track, but there is a growing case to register pets and backyard birds in the same way we register cats and dogs. Further, domestic birds may need to have basic flu vaccinations in order to be bought and sold.

This legislation forms a modern framework where these ideas can be looked at and further legislated down the track—legislation that defends country, wildlife and, most importantly, our food security. But Lindsay supports other agricultural enterprises too. We are home to vegetable farms in Londonderry and mushroom enterprises in our mountain foothills. In fact, mushrooms from the electorate of Lindsay account for more than 20 per cent of our nation's mushroom supply. Further, there are boutique wineries, saki manufacturers and important recreational fishing areas along the Nepean River. The point is biosecurity affects us all.

On the ground, parts of my electorate are earmarked for major freight interchange and holding facilities, potentially bringing issues, once faced by our ports, straight to the heart of Western Sydney. This bill is equipped to meet the challenges of modern trade and travel logistics. Today the Department of Agriculture is annually clearing 16 million arrival passengers, 186 million international mail items and 1.7 million sea cargo consignments as well as 26 million air cargo consignments. Those who wrote the old bill in 1908 could never have envisaged these numbers—not to mention the advancement of air travel that has made our world all the smaller and more accessible. Container vessels of today would have been almost inconceivable to the authors of the original bill.

The science and research communities in my area will have more certainty from this bill, as the sector grows with major transporting hubs being planned for the region. There is a role in all of this for Australia to lead the world, and proudly the people of Western Sydney can lead the charge. Macarthur, the electorate directly to the south of Lindsay, is named after John Macarthur—the father of the merino sheep industry. The merino is the sheep often credited with establishing Australia's export market, leading to the coining of the phrase 'an economy riding on the sheep's back.' Today we as a region look to the future of this innovative area. We look to how we can grow further. We are excited about investments by companies like Baiada, who have a 256 hectare property to the south of my electorate, where they are looking to develop a national food science and research laboratory. We also have organisations like the VIVID Centre in Penrith, which is part of Virbac. They are doing some of the most exciting research into animal health, and they are also manufacturing their products.

I support this bill. The bill is important for our nation's future, it is important for our food security and it is important for all Australians.

Jane Prentice (Ryan, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Australia has an enviable reputation around the globe as a place which is free of many of the most harmful agricultural diseases. We do have our own range of unique circumstances but, as history has shown, the worst threats to Australia have been introduced. Rabbits, cane toads, foxes and feral pigs are obvious examples. Other introduced plant species are prickly pear cactus, bridal creeper and Paterson's curse. And in Queensland, particularly the Brisbane and Gladstone areas, we have the ongoing problem of fire ants. That is why biosecurity is so important to Australia. We must remain vigilant to keep our country free of harmful diseases and pests. A report by the CSIRO released on 25 November last year says we are fortunate to be free of many pests and diseases. However I share the view of Minister Joyce, who says:

In biosecurity luck only happens to those who plan and work hard and with effect.

If we were indeed truly lucky in terms of biosecurity there would be no rabbits in Australia. National biosecurity is the responsibility of every Australian and every person who visits Australia. Instead of being worried about being caught for a few copied DVDs you bring back from Bali, be more concerned with the parasites that might be hidden in those carved wooden statues you have in your bag. Those DVDs might be seized and you might lose a few dollars but if a harmful parasite sneaks in in your luggage it could potentially cost the country billions of dollars. The men, women and indeed dogs of Customs and Border Protection and the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service have done a magnificent job since 1901 and 1908 respectively to keep Australia a clean and healthy place for agriculture. I would like to acknowledge their efforts here today.

The Biosecurity Bill 2014 and the three accompanying bills will replace the 106-year-old Quarantine Act 1908. While the act has obviously done well in protecting Australia to this point, the 50 amendments to it are starting to create confusion and unnecessary duplication. When it comes to biosecurity we do not need a complicated system. We need one that is easy to understand and easy to administer, from government to end user. While the administration of this bill is important, the number one outcome must be a biosecurity system that is strong but fair, rigid in intent but flexible to use. This bill will allow our hardworking border force to continue to defend our borders from biosecurity threats in the effective way they have done for over a century, but it has to allow for the development of new technologies we cannot imagine.

To those who wrote the Quarantine Act 1908, manned flight on the scale we see today was unheard of or imagined, as was the size of container ships. This is why we need to update the laws relating to biosecurity now and not later. More amendments to the existing act will just add to the current jumble of regulations that are making the system harder to administer and confusing for importers and travellers.

This bill gives the Governor-General, on advice from the minister for agriculture, the power to declare a biosecurity emergency. This applies when the minister is certain there is a nationally significant risk. A biosecurity or a human biosecurity emergency can be declared for a period of three months or less. These emergency declarations will allow the minister to best direct resources to emergency areas and place requirements on certain goods such as specifying how people, goods and conveyances enter or leave a specified area, restriction of movement, evacuation or removal of goods from specified places and the treatment or destruction of goods. This may mean that hazardous material suits need to be worn or that shoes need to be washed after an emergency area has been entered. In the case of a human biosecurity emergency, it may mean a period of quarantine for individuals or groups suspected of carrying a disease. This will allow the minister and the departments the power they need to stop the spread of potentially devastating biosecurity risks.

Of course the bill also places limits on the powers that can be exercised and that is entirely appropriate. There are obligations to protect citizens from harm, and the use of these powers must be effective in achieving its purpose with individuals being inconvenienced no more than required and only for as long as is necessary. These are reasonable measures in the circumstances of a national emergency. This bill makes it legal for restriction of movement to be imposed on individuals and it is important that such restrictions be kept to the minimum time needed to make a determination on the status of someone suspected of carrying a harmful disease. This is where advice will be taken from specialists in the area to determine those periods of restriction.

This bill also seeks to address the ways in which harmful biosecurity risks can enter the country. As I said earlier, the original framers of the Quarantine Act 1908 could not have envisaged the ways in which people and goods travel today so it is important this bill reflects the current situation. Ships will be under strict observation when it comes to the discharge and recharge of their ballast water. Ballast water performs a necessary role. However, it can also provide an easy conveyance for unwanted diseases and organisms. This is especially important for ships travelling from country to country, loading and unloading, with the need to use ballast water. That is why ships coming to Australia will need to discharge ballast water in international waters before entering Australian waters. Ballast water can be, and has in the past been, responsible for the introduction of harmful species and organisms. It is essential we, as a responsible government, do all we can to prevent this happening again.

This bill also allows for the appointment of a Director of Biosecurity and a Director of Human Biosecurity, who will be appointments with appropriate seniority and experience to exercise the powers within this bill. It is envisaged that these directors will assist with the general administration of the bill and provide guidance for the introduction, transition and application of the legislation to staff and the public. The power of general administration is at all times governed by and subject to the principles of administrative law. The Director of Biosecurity will be, or will be acting as, the Agriculture secretary. This ensures an appropriate level of seniority and experience. Likewise, the Director of Human Biosecurity will be, or will be acting as, the Chief Medical Officer, for similar reasons. This is particularly important when the administration of human biosecurity could potentially involve the use of invasive testing measures.

Australia has an enviable reputation, as I said before, as a country which produces clean food, and that food is highly desirable in overseas markets. I am sure that every member of this parliament wishes to safeguard that reputation and to safeguard the people of Australia from harm. This bill will drive Australia's biosecurity for the next 100 years. What this bill seeks to achieve, and achieves, is the balance between the old and the new. The old regime has in large worked very well in keeping Australia free of biosecurity threats that are commonplace in some parts of the world. So this bill has conserved that which has worked so well but clarified the way forward for biosecurity in Australia. The Biosecurity Bill 2014 is the bill Australia needs to protect Australia's hard-won reputation as a producer of quality, disease-free produce and to protect Australians from pests and diseases which could seriously harm our way of life. I commend this bill to the House.

Dan Tehan (Wannon, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The Biosecurity Bill 2014 is about protecting Australia's clean, green image when it comes to what we export, as an agriculture-exporting nation. It is absolutely important that we get this bill right, not only because quarantine is crucial to our nation's exporting future but also because it is vitally important that we have a regulatory framework with which our exporters can work. We do not want to place too much red tape on them as they seek to find and access new markets across the world. For this reason, this bill should be supported. Consecutive governments have taken a piece of legislation which first existed in 1908, which has been amended over 50 times, and have decided, not before time, that what we need to do is consolidate all this legislation into one piece of new legislation which will enable us to have confidence in how we go about protecting our country against the importing of diseases which can do significant harm to our nation—such diseases, for instance, as foot-and-mouth disease, which would be absolutely catastrophic to our nation's economy.

For the electorate that I represent, this bill is significant. We are the largest producer of dairy goods in the nation. When it comes to beef, wool, sheepmeat, grain, our region is in the top 10 when it comes to what is produced. The area I represent is at the heart of our agricultural production. The majority of what we produce is exported, so we have to ensure that the countries that we are exporting our goods to understand that what we are sending them is disease free. We also have to do what we can to ensure that diseases which could put in jeopardy this production are kept out of our country.

It was interesting listening to the member for Lindsay before, when she talked about the impact that equine influenza had on parts of her electorate. As someone who follows the racing with great interest, who likes a punt every now and again and who has had a small ownership in a few horses—some slow, some which have run all right—I remember the impact that equine influenza had on the racing industry and the effort and the cost that it took to try and eradicate it. I remember going out to the Canberra racetrack, where participants had to be behind closed glass to watch the races. The owners and the trainers of horses could not physically go down and see the horses after the races had been run, because of the fear of what that human contact with those horses could have, with the spread of that disease. That is the impact that disease can have on an industry. It was incredibly important that we eradicated equine influenza from our horseracing industry, but other diseases are significant in many ways, and the impact that they could have, especially on our agricultural bulk commodity exports, would be absolutely harmful to our economy.

There are two things which I think are very important to point out about this piece of legislation. The first is the consultation which has taken place to ensure that this piece of legislation does the job that the industries on the ground want it to do. It is worth pointing out that, during the drafting phase of the bill, the Department of Agriculture established an industry legislation working group. The group consisted of 16 representatives, including the Invasive Species Council, the National Farmers Federation, Shipping Australia, Qantas, and the Custom Brokers and Forwarders Association.

It was not only that consultation which took place when the bill was being drafted. Following the agreement from the government to progress the legislation and to inform stakeholders about the changes made and the next steps, a biosecurity legislation forum was held on 24 October 2014. Approximately 80 organisations, bodies and agencies were invited to the forum, with over 40 attending. So what we are seeing here is a bill which, at the draft stage, had industry involvement in its preparation. Not only that but, once the bill was finalised, there was also significant consultation with industry and other organisations involved in this. This is good law-making because, as I said earlier, this bill is vitally important, not only to my electorate but to the nation. The processes which have taken place in putting it together have been excellent with regard to making sure that all participants and all those who could be impacted by it have been consulted along the way.

There is another element to it which is also significant. What the government has not sought to do in modernising this legislation is say, 'What we can do is put this safeguard in place, this safeguard in place and this safeguard in place and provide a regulatory burden on industry and those who are seeking to control our quarantine regime.' This bill has done all that. It is modernised, but it is done in a way which has a deregulatory benefit, and that deregulatory benefit is $6.9 million per annum. This is a significant piece of legislation for industry because it gives industry confidence in how our quarantine regime is going to be managed going forward. It also says to industry, 'In modernising this legislation, we are going to do all we can to ensure that the cost of this quarantine legislation does not burden you. In fact, it will reduce the regulatory impact that it has on you.' That is incredibly important.

There are some other aspects to this bill that need to be pointed out. The import risk analysis—the IRA review—has been replaced. A biosecurity import risk analysis will be introduced to replace the current IRA process in the Quarantine Act. An examination of the IRA process was undertaken as part of the coalition's election commitment in response to stakeholder concerns. Feedback focused primarily on administrative and minor regulatory changes to the IRA process. They have been considered in the development of the delegated legislation and relevant administrative policies.

The issue of regional differences has also been dealt with. Some stakeholders expressed the need for regional differences in biosecurity concerns to be taken account of in this bill. The idea was that there are regional differences in the way that pests and diseases might be more prevalent in one part of Australia than another. This was issued and considerable thought was given as to how this would be best dealt with. When it comes to international agreements, phytosanitary international agreements, the words 'regional difference' are not used. What the government has done is use terminology which can be used and understood in other international agreements, whether they be multilateral agreements or agreements with our bilateral partners. So, rather than using the concept of regional differences, we are using the concept of 'part of Australian territory'. We will talk about diseases or pests entering Australian territory or part of Australian territory. That is how we will deal with this significant change. Once again, this has been done through a proper consultative process which has enabled this new focus to take place in updating and upgrading this legislation.

This legislation was started under the previous government. It then went to a Senate committee and has obviously been finalised by the current minister. I would like to commend the Minister for Agriculture for the way that he has gone about this. I would also commend the Senate committee for the sensible recommendations that they put forward, some of which have been adopted and put into this bill. Also, I praise industry for their willingness to participate in the process of upgrading this legislation, because without that input we as law-makers would not have the confidence that we have in order to say that this piece of legislation should be commended to the House.

In conclusion, I go back to where I started. The government has set about ensuring that our exporters have access to as many countries as they possibly can and in the cheapest way that they can possibly export. Our free trade agreement agenda last year was definitely a significant highlight of what was achieved in this place: free trade agreements with China, with Japan and with South Korea, all of which will benefit our agricultural consistency—you know this as much as I do, Mr Deputy Speaker Whiteley.

But also, what the government has done with this bill is to say to our agricultural constituencies in particular, 'You now have another tool to ensure that you can be absolutely sure that what you are sending from Australia into those countries is disease- and pest-free. And also, you can be sure that the government is doing the best it can in a cost effective way to keep pests and disease from entering Australia.'

We all know that there is risk. But what the government is doing through this piece of legislation is to manage that risk to the best of its ability, saying to industry, 'You need to come along with us in managing that risk,' and saying to industry, 'We stand by you, side by side, especially when it comes to agriculture, to ensure that you can continue to grow and continue to be an absolutely vital part of our national economy.'

Nickolas Varvaris (Barton, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Thank you for the opportunity to speak on this Biosecurity Bill 2014 in this cognate debate. The Biosecurity Bill, which seeks to replace the Quarantine Act 1908, is extremely important and relevant for Australia as we enter into an unprecedented level of trade and globalisation.

Global trade has evolved significantly since the original Quarantine Act was legislated and passed over 100 years ago. Where law-makers once faced possible outbreaks of smallpox, leprosy, yellow fever and the bubonic plague they are now alerted to numerous modern complex infectious diseases that are viral and which can be transferred amongst animals as well as in animal-to-human transmissions and, of course, human-to human interactions.

On top of this, the previous legislation could not account for the vast changes in technology now available to businesses. Where trade once primarily occurred through ocean voyages, modern technology and demand has led to an increase in logistics choices by air travel, air cargo and ocean deployment. It is an understatement to say that means of trade have shifted. As such, it would be irresponsible for the legislation not to catch up to ensure the safety of our employees, residents and animals, as well as to protect the myriad businesses involved.

The bill today is indeed the most substantial change to our biosecurity framework. This is essential, considering the volume of goods being exchanged in Australia. Not only is this bill much needed to strengthen our existing system, it must be implemented in a manner that allows a simplified and streamlined process so that it does not hurt Australian businesses and allows flexibility in which biosecurity risks can be managed.

The world has advanced in the way in which it transports animals, goods and people, and as such our legislation must ensure they are protected and any risks mitigated accordingly. In addition, the new bill will allow for any enforcements to have scientific grounding and for those who have breached the rules to fully understand the implications of their wrongdoings. Furthermore, recent global events have demonstrated that we must be proactive in managing our biosecurity risks and that this should always be at the centre of our nation's best interests. Infectious diseases such as the SARS outbreak and the foot-and-mouth disease outbreaks in the UK, coupled with threats of bioterrorism, such as the threat of anthrax, convey that prudence in our border security and quarantine is more important than ever.

We may appear geographically isolated, given that we are the world's largest island, but we are never removed from any of the aforementioned threats since air travel and global mobility are at their world peak. Given that Australia is a major player when it comes to commodity exports, retaining a safe, secure and therefore favourable biosecurity status allows for lower food production costs for our producers and continued access to export markets whilst supporting our nation's contribution to a secure global food supply.

A reformed, stronger biosecurity system also means that our environment and our standards of living can be protected from biohazards and other infectious diseases. Increased global travel and tourism demonstrate the significant impact of existing and emerging infectious diseases affecting trade, animal production, public health, wildlife conservation and economic growth. Moreover, since 1994 there have been more new animal disease viruses identified in Australia than at any other time. The risks that our country faces are noteworthy, given that transmission of disease affects tourism and trade: the increasing movement of people and products, an evolution of infectious diseases against a backdrop of shifting climates, changing ecological patterns and current limitations in surveillance and response capabilities—especially with unstable movement patterns in neighbouring regions like Papua New Guinea, East Timor and Indonesia.

As our nations become increasingly borderless and our trade wholly dependent on globalisation, it is vital that we have the resources and regulatory framework in place to ensure the safety of our people and businesses. Institutions like the CSIRO, that are at the forefront of Australia's research, are continuously finding solutions to evolving biological hazards and infectious diseases that can affect millions of lives and destroy agriculture. These solutions must be part and parcel within an updated legislative reform.

The bill today seeks to introduce a range of enforcement powers, not simply criminal penalties as the Quarantine Act did, so that those who are wilful in their negligence are dealt with accordingly, compared to those who have unintentionally broken the law. Very importantly, today's bill will allow appropriately qualified and trained biosecurity enforcement officers to apply for and execute a range of warrants to enter premises, including buildings and vessels, and to carry out certain activities to risk manage biosecurity hazards. This is increasingly needed and appropriate, given the scope of our trade and tourism levels.

To reiterate why we are doing this and the need for this bill, I will refer to some statistics. For example, in the financial year ending 2013, the Department of Agriculture cleared approximately 186 million international mail items, 1.7 million sea cargo consignments and 26 million air cargo consignments. This is on top of the 16 million international passenger arrivals to our borders. It must also be noted that for the past two decades, 75 per cent of emerging infectious diseases have been infections transmitted from animals to humans, mostly wildlife in origin.

IAS, short for invasive alien species, is believed to cause the greatest financial loss to agricultural production. The CSIRO has reported that IAS is the largest biological threat to global food security and one of the top two international threats to biodiversity. This cannot be underestimated given that IAS costs Australia approximately $8 billion a year in agricultural damage and leads the way in destroying our native species. This is an extraordinary figure when our agricultural export market is worth $60 billion. Not only does IAS cause crop damage; it has serious ramifications for humans as well because it carries serious allergens and other disease vectors. As I mentioned, transmission of disease does not just occur between animals; it can be passed from animals to humans. Any outbreak of disease, whether human or animal, ultimately affects our supply chains including tourism, trade and national health.

The primary focus of this bill is to strengthen the regulatory framework that enhances our biosecurity without negatively impacting on the businesses that Australians trade with. Every year, Australia has seen an increase in animal, goods and vessel movements through our borders, and this is only going to increase further. The past 10 years have seen air travellers increase by 80 per cent, sea container movements by 82 per cent and bulk cargo by 16 per cent. Thus, legislation must encompass the necessary protection for our primary industries as well as our environment.

This bill is an opportunity to improve our system and the development of new legislation will alleviate the existing burden on Australian farmers and businesses. We have consulted extensively with stakeholders and they have informed us time and again that they want something simple and effective, not further red tape and bureaucracy. This bill will now provide them with this. I am pleased to report that this bill will see a reduction of more than $6.9 million a year in business compliance costs as a result of a clearer and more user-friendly framework. It will provide new powers to allow the Commonwealth to respond to biosecurity risks within Australia and assist state and territory counterparts with nation-wide pest and disease management, including the marine ecosystem.

Another significant change this bill will bring will be the ability to assess the compliance history of a business—a background check if you will—to fully risk-manage the likelihood of an organisation breaking quarantine rules. Under the old Quarantine Act, assessments were only made for goods themselves. Thus, businesses could breach their obligations, intentionally or not, without suffering appropriate penalties. The bigger issue is the risk this would pose to our biosecurity. Having legislation which sends a strong and clear message to those wilfully negligent ultimately protects Australian commodity exports. It will allow goods to be transported without unnecessary delay and, in the event of biosecurity risks, allow for them to be appropriately and effectively managed.

For our farmers and consumers, a strong biosecurity system, as a result of improved legislation, means agriculture is safer from exotic pests and IAS, and livestock is also better protected from instances of disease such as the foot and mouth outbreak in the UK. It will prevent Australian businesses from losing out on their bottom line from invasive diseases and pests, and will give them a simpler framework to use, without unnecessary red tape. Better business outcomes for them ultimately mean a bigger contribution to our national economy.

Today's bill will also allow appropriate transitional periods so that ports, vessels and landing place operators can upgrade their facilities where necessary and undertake any amendments that may be required. As discussed previously, a substantial amount of commodities arrive via sea and air—more than ever before. Thus, any biosecurity risks must be immediately managed. Industry participants can also voluntarily enter into an arrangement with the Commonwealth to have their operations managed in an efficient and effective way.

The Biosecurity Bill 2014 is absolutely necessary to sustain current Australian export trade and cultivate further growth into the future. Whether in primary industry, wholesaling or based in export, strengthening our biosecurity legislation will lead to increased capacity for continuous domestic production, and sustained international exports with domestic and international businesses. For Australians, it means increased opportunities for commercial markets operating in a reliable system that affords them confidence, dependability and protection.

Losing close to $7 billion a year to compliance costs coupled with a further $8 billion in agricultural loss is far too much for any economy. This bill is the first step in mitigating further losses so that Australian businesses can harness and cultivate all opportunities, whilst minimising preventable financial losses. Moreover, we have the responsibility of ensuring the safety of our wellbeing from the food and livestock we consume or breed to the goods that we import and export. I commend the bill to the House.

Brett Whiteley (Braddon, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I thank the member for his contribution. The question is that this bill now be read a second time. I give the call to the member for—help?

Tony Pasin (Barker, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I am not going to help you, Mr Deputy Speaker!

A government member: Barker.

Brett Whiteley (Braddon, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Barker. Thankyou.

Tony Pasin (Barker, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I was going to start with such high praise of you in the chair, and all these things, but I think that I might just pass over that!

Brett Whiteley (Braddon, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

You should do.

Tony Pasin (Barker, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise today to speak on the Biosecurity Bill 2014 and associated legislation. The bill is supported by four other bills that are designed to help ensure the smooth transition from the Quarantine Act 1908 to the enactment of the bill. Australia's world-class biosecurity system relies on a legislative framework that was designed more than 100 years ago. It is time to update it to match the changing global environment. When the Quarantine Act 1908 was written, people and goods arrived only by sea, and biosecurity threats included diseases like the bubonic plague, leprosy, yellow fever and smallpox.

As a member for an electorate whose economic wellbeing is inextricably linked to the biosecurity of our agricultural sector, I consider this raft of legislation to be fundamental to the people in business in my electorate. Representing the leading wine-, citrus-, potato-, rock-lobster-, nut-, cattle- and sheep-producing regions in South Australia and arguably the country, I believe that strengthening the biosecurity of these sectors is an essential innovation to enhance our continued prosperity, both within my electorate and for our nation's export driven advances into new markets.

It is a nice segue, given that I am joined in the chamber by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for the Environment, who accompanied me through my electorate, so you can take his word for what my constituents do and the great products they produce—not that we consumed all of it! We had a fair go, whether wine, beer—

Bob Baldwin (Paterson, Liberal Party, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for the Environment) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

My wine!

Tony Pasin (Barker, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I know; it is coming; don't worry! I am being chimed, of course, because the parliamentary secretary was expecting a bottle of the famous Hill of Grace, which of course is a product of the Henschke family. It will arrive.

Mr Baldwin interjecting—

It does not come from the Hunter Valley, thankfully; it comes from the good people in the Barossa. But it will arrive.

Since coming to office, of course, the coalition has concluded three crucial free trade agreements with Japan, Korea and, most recently, China. Part of the rationale for these countries wanting to have greater access to our produce is the biosecurity of our exports. Australia's biosecurity regime has been successful in keeping some of the diseases and threats that have affected particularly European countries from insidiously entering our country. This biosecurity is bolstered by the knowledge that our natural water resource, land management and air quality practices add yet another layer of protection to our food production.

It is also true that our biosecurity faces threats, some of which are malicious and designed to potentially serve political ends. The threat of transnational terrorism and attempts to threaten our food supply weaken our claim to have a secure quarantine regime and mean that we must undertake improvements to legislation and regulations that will meet the needs of the 21st century threat environment we now face. Simply being an island nation is no longer sufficient to guarantee the biosecurity of our agricultural sector—though I must say that it would be better than being an island state. The world has changed and will continue to change. The legislation we are debating today is designed to flexibly support Australia's biosecurity system in any age, regardless of future challenges, including advances in transport and technology.

For example, the bill provides a range of enforcement powers rather than relying, as the Quarantine Act did, on criminal penalties. Biosecurity risks can be complex and so can our biosecurity requirements. Not everyone who breaches the rules will have understood them or have done so deliberately, so it is appropriate that we have a range of enforcement powers. In this bill, we have criminal penalties that allow us to respond to those who would deliberately do the wrong thing, as well as other powers to proportionately respond to those who inadvertently do the wrong thing.

This legislation will cut unnecessary red tape by reducing compliance costs on business by nearly $7 million a year. As we continue to strengthen biosecurity management, the bill will provide national capability to respond to pest and disease incursions within Australia, including, of course, the important marine environment.

The bill will be broadly broken up into three categories. Firstly, we have operational chapters that support daily biosecurity business such as assessing and managing biosecurity risk in relation to goods, transport and technologies. There will then be stand-alone chapters that support specialised biosecurity situations such as the management of human health and ballast water, emergency responses and, of course, the important partnerships with business. Administrative chapters that apply across the entire bill are designed to provide a framework for the smooth administration of the biosecurity system, such as compliance and, importantly, enforcement.

Agriculture—as you know, Mr Deputy Speaker Whiteley—is a key pillar of the Australian economy. It must be supported by a strong and robust biosecurity system. Any adverse changes to our world-class biosecurity status would have a direct impact on domestic productivity, farm-gate returns and export opportunities. This legislation, jointly undertaken by the Agriculture and Health portfolios, will underpin a strong and seamless biosecurity system to cover human, environmental, plant and animal health. This bill will also allow our systems to get smarter, our penalties to be fairer and our people to work where the risk is greatest.

A number of significant reviews of the biosecurity system, most recently the review of Australia's quarantine and biosecurity, the Beale review, have outlined opportunities to improve the system, including the development of new legislation. The review concluded that Australia's biosecurity system is good, often the envy of other countries, but far from perfect. It recommended significant changes to improve the system's ability to deal with changing and increasing biosecurity risks. The changes of course include improved partnerships with the state and territory governments and with industry; enhanced government structures, including an independent commission to assess the biosecurity risks of imports; a national authority to undertake biosecurity operations and an inspector-general of biosecurity to audit the authority's work; a risk-returns approach to biosecurity's operational activities; new biosecurity legislation to replace the Quarantine Act 1908; and more funding for biosecurity activities and upgraded information technology systems.

This legislation has been developed over many years, with significant consultation undertaken with industry, state and territory governments, environmental groups, health professionals and the public at large, as well as trading partners. A robust biosecurity system is important in supporting Australia to remain free of many pests and diseases that are common around the world. We have to get biosecurity right because the stakes are high, and getting it right benefits everyone. It is a big job, and we use science to help us make the right decisions at the right time to get the best results.

As well as playing an obvious role protecting Australia's environment and way of life, safeguarding Australia from unwanted biosecurity risks also protects Australia's economy. This helps maintain our reputation as a producer of high-quality and safe agricultural products for the world. The Biosecurity Bill and supporting legislation have been designed to support the biosecurity system in any age, regardless of advances in transport, technology or future challenges. Just as with the Quarantine Act 1908, the biosecurity legislation, if passed, would be co-administered by the ministers responsible for agriculture and health.

The Biosecurity (Consequential Amendments and Transitional Provisions) Bill 2014 is the first companion bill to the Biosecurity Bill 2014. It will facilitate the transition from the Quarantine Act to the Biosecurity Act. This bill makes consequential amendments to a range of Commonwealth legislation to reflect the broad scope of managing biosecurity risk. It will also replace references to the Quarantine Act with, necessarily, the Biosecurity Act. Biosecurity is wide reaching and impacts air travel, shipping and fisheries amongst other matters with the result that over 20 pieces of Commonwealth legislation will require some minor amendments.

The bill will repeal the Quarantine Act and the Quarantine Charges (Collection) Act 2014. Most importantly, it will allow the Department of Agriculture to provide a smooth transition from the old legislation to the new regulatory framework. The bill will do this by ensuring that biosecurity risks managed under the Quarantine Act will continue to be managed following its repeal. For example, if a person is directed not to move a good under the Quarantine Act, that direction will still be valid under the Biosecurity Act. If an import permit application is made under the Quarantine Act, it is taken to have been made under the Biosecurity Act. In some key areas, such as approved industry partnerships, the transition will take place over a longer period of time so business has more time to be compliant with the new regulations, and both business and the department can better manage the volume of work associated with change.

Three charging bills are being introduced as part of the Biosecurity Bill package. These will allow the Commonwealth to impose charges that appropriately reflect the cost of administering the Biosecurity Act now and into the future. The charging bills do not set the amount of the charge and do not apply any financial impacts on business. The charges, and who is liable and exempt from paying these charges, will be set in delegated legislation.

The first charging bill, the Quarantine Charges (Imposition—General) Amendment Bill 2014, will amend the Quarantine Charges (Imposition—General) Act 2014. This bill continues current cost recovery arrangements to enable effective management of biosecurity risks through the Biosecurity Bill. The bill will allow the Commonwealth to continue imposing suitable charges for activities and services relating to the administration of Australia's biosecurity system, including scientific analysis, intelligence, inspections and surveillance. This enables the Commonwealth to support and administer a robust, efficient biosecurity system where the appropriate responsibility for costs associated with the system lies with those who pose the highest risk to our biosecurity status. The charges will reflect the costs of providing services, ensuring that the department is sufficiently resourced to continue the critical job of protecting Australia's unique animal and plant health status.

The coalition treats this nation's biosecurity with the utmost seriousness, because it affects not only the wellbeing of our own people but also the wellbeing of people around the globe—the people who consume our high-value produce. That is why it is so important for our country, and for my electorate in particular, that this legislation pass. That is why I commend this package of bills to the House.

John Cobb (Calare, National Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

My reason for speaking on the Biosecurity Bill 2014 is not that the change from being a quarantine act to a biosecurity act in itself is so immense. It is the fact that this is one of the more important pieces of legislation that exists in Australia, amongst all those bills that we have in our federal parliament. Agriculture, amongst other things, is extraordinarily important to our domestic situation but even more important to our export situation, as two thirds of everything that we grow, or thereabouts, is exported.

I think a lot of it is common sense as to why it has happened. It is an old act—it is 100 years old. It deals with a lot of different issues, and it is not surprising that after this time, as I believe, there have been over 50 amendments—I am surprised there are not more—it is to be rehashed and hopefully simplified; but it is a very rare thing if you achieve simplification.

We are an export nation by our very nature, and agriculture was the first product we had which brought income and everything else to Australia, mainly because we exported wool, we exported sheep, we exported various things. The Quarantine Act—now to be the Biosecurity Act—is old, for various reasons which I have already mentioned.

Recently the Minister for Trade and Investment has been successful—I believe very successful—in negotiating free trade deals with our three biggest trading partners. If we were to take our eye off the ball on the issues of quarantine and biosecurity—but now we are going to put it under the Biosecurity Act—we would be putting at risk regional Australia's future, and a lot of Australia's future.

I think we need to keep in mind that AQIS, who are charged with looking after most of the things in this bill, have two jobs. One is, from the domestic point of view, to check the goods which come into Australia to ensure they are free of diseases, pests and the like which we do not have

And they, by and large, do a very good job of that. The greatest example in recent times is probably apples that we had to allow in from New Zealand because we lost in the disputes committee of the ATO some few years ago and had to renegotiate our agreement with New Zealand. But, because of their diligence, AQIS found trash on the apples that did come in—some 17 loads from memory—and the trash is what keeps the mites and the various things alive coming through, not the apples.

AQIS, by and large, do a very good job. Their job is to make sure we do not get pests et cetera from overseas to infiltrate Australia and threaten our own food security and the health of what we might want to export. The reason for having the job of inspecting those things we would export to other countries, particularly those three major trading partners with whom we have our new free trade deals, is to ensure that we maintain the standard demanded by our trading partners and by ourselves. We basically go on the theory that what we demand of ourselves we demand of our exports. Nobody really has a higher standard than we do.

If we did not do that and we accidentally—one would hope, if it came to that and I pray it does not—exported disease to another country, that would be the end of our favoured nation status, which we obviously seem to have got in recent times with some of those free trade deals. It is a huge, very big thing for us. Trade is our lifeblood. The fact that we produce such good articles of a high standard that are disease-free is the greatest trading power that we have. We have desired articles. We are not a big grower of a lot of things but we tend to be a big exporter. Certainly in terms of beef and wheat, we are nowhere near the biggest producers of those articles but we are one of the big exporters of them. If we do not maintain our standard of exports then we are in very big deep trouble. We are too dear for a lot of the world so we depend upon the high-price markets to make ourselves viable. This bill, I would certainly hope, has ticked the boxes, has not taken its eye off the ball and will do those things.

The old bill did allow somewhere like Tasmania, which is an island so it has good, even better security than the rest of us we hope, to export or to have a situation somewhat different to the mainland. As I understand, that will be maintained by different wording. It used to be called 'regional differences' by which we did IRAs, import risk analyses. But because of international language, it is now going to be called a 'different part of Australian territory'. I guess we have to admit that Tasmania is a part of Australia. I think it is fair enough that Tasmania should continue to have that ability. States cannot prevent imports into Australia but they can prevent trade between states. In this case, it is about Tasmania's ability to trade somewhat differently to the mainland. I have no problem with that because it has extra advantages for the mainland.

The things that are a little new or expressed differently are the ability of AQIS and the authorities to get a warrant from a judge, as you do, to go on to anyone's property. The law has to allow AQIS to inspect where there is believed to be a problem. AQIS officers have to convince the judge or the magistrate that they have a reason to go there. I do not have a problem with that. I think our favoured nation status is worth a few inconveniences to be maintained.

I commend the bill to the House, not because there is anything particularly startling in it but because it is one of the most necessary bits of legislation that the parliament will have before it.

Mark Coulton (Parkes, National Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I might just comment on the contribution my colleague that preceded me made. There would be very few if any people in the House that would have a more intimate knowledge on biosecurity than that member for Calare. In his previous role as shadow agricultural minister, he was very active in that space. Indeed, I believe it was his advice that got our current agriculture minister through a couple of sticky situations. I am very privileged to be following his contribution.

This biosecurity package of bills consists of five bills: The Biosecurity Bill 2014 seeks to replace the Quarantine Act; the Biosecurity (Consequential Amendment Transitional Provisions) Bill to repeal the Quarantine Act 1908, to update referred references to other Commonwealth legislation, and to ensure the biosecurity risk continues to be managed during the transition from the Quarantine Act to this new legislation; and the three quarantine charges amendment bills will repeal the Quarantine Charges (Collection) Bill and allow charges to be collected under the Biosecurity Bill 2014.

As we heard in other contributions, the Quarantine Act 1908 has been in place for over a century now and has been amended no less than 50 times. During this time, Australia's biosecurity risks have changed significantly as a result of passenger and trade volumes increasing and from imports from a growing number of countries, and new and sea craft technologies. The biosecurity legislation provides a strong regulatory framework that enables the management of biosecurity risks now and enhances Australia's capacity to manage biosecurity risks into the future. The Biosecurity Bill 2014 provides the primary legislative means and modern regulatory framework for the Australian government to manage the risk of pests and disease entering Australian territory causing harm to animal, plant and human health, and to the environment and the economy. The bill is designed to manage biosecurity risks, including the risk of listed human diseases, entering Australian territory or establishing themselves or spreading in the Australian territory or in part of the Australian territory.

There is a bit of background to this bill. It was first introduced into parliament in 2012. It was referred to the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee. It lapsed when the parliament was prorogued. Areas of concern identified during the inquiry have been addressed in the new legislation. There have been a number of significant reviews of the biosecurity system—most recently, the review of Australia's quarantine and biosecurity, the Beale review, outlined opportunities to improve the system, including development of new legislation. This legislation has been developed over many years, with significant consultation undertaken with industry, state and territory governments, environment groups, health professionals, the general public and trading partners.

There has been an issue surrounding the Inspector-General of Biosecurity. I understand that the shadow minister raised this in his contribution, and I am sure that in the summing up the parliamentary secretary will touch on this too. While there have been some changes to that position, the position is now part of the biosecurity legislation, with delegated information-gathering powers to be granted by the minister to ensure the role can be carried out effectively. I think the shadow minister was being a little mischievous in his contribution.

This bill is all-encompassing. I might just touch on what it means to agriculture and particularly the region that I represent. We do indeed live in a changing world. With many businesses now importing and exporting directly via the internet and other means, the flow of goods in and out of our country is not as defined and specific as it was in previous times. An example of this is, some years ago, maybe three years ago, a local group of farmers in my electorate imported some fertiliser direct from China. Upon delivery to Condobolin, it was discovered that they had been fraudulently sent not fertiliser but soil, which created a biosecurity issue. AQIS and other agencies had to act quickly to remediate the situation and clean up what could have been potentially a hazardous situation. Those situations will become more and more possible as our trade frees up, so our scrutiny needs to be much greater.

We have seen in the past what biosecurity breaches and ill-advised imports have done to agriculture. A couple of good examples of this are: the introduction of rabbits and the introduction of prickly pear. Indeed, I discovered in conversations with my father—when I was a child we would talk about his younger days—that the combination of prickly pears and rabbits meant that my grandfather was nearly unviable and nearly lost his farm, because they completely dominated the landscape. It was not until the advent of myxomatosis with rabbits and the cactoblastis moth with prickly pear that they were able to be managed.

In the back of my mind, the biggest risk to biosecurity and the threat to the livestock industries in Australia is the feral pig population. Feral pigs have proved to be pretty well indestructible. Despite millions of dollars and large amounts of effort and time across the countryside every year, the feral pig population is growing. While they are a problem in themselves—they have a hugely destructive effect on the landscape; I know from personal experience they can devour an entire lambing if you are not careful—if foot and mouth disease managed to become embedded in the feral pig population, then agriculture as we know it and livestock farming in this country would be changed forever and all the advantages we have would be lost.

Australia's biggest disadvantage as a trading partner is actually its biggest advantage. Our disadvantage is that we are an island surrounded by water a long way from the major markets and the high population areas, but that is also our greatest advantage. We now can import our produce into many of these countries because we are free of foot and mouth disease, bluetongue disease, mad cow disease and a lot of these other issues that really are crippling our trading competitors, and this must be defended at all costs.

We need to be fair dinkum about this. The member for Calare mentioned that we have dual responsibility. We need to be keeping a close reign on our imports but we also need to be responsible and keep an eye on our exports; because, while it is tempting to use biosecurity as an artificial tariff to protect our own producers, doing so is fraught with danger. We must rely on the science around this. We must be consistent in our exports, as well as our imports, to retain our credibility. We are treading a very fine line.

Current reality television shows about airport security show how people can inadvertently put our livestock producers at risk.

I use the example of someone who has been overseas to their country of birth and their uncle has a secret family recipe he uses to produce salami. If they secret salami into their luggage to bring home so members of their family can have a memento of their trip overseas and the scraps off the table are inadvertently thrown outside and get into a pig population, indeed we would have serious problems. I, quite frankly, do not believe, regardless of what we throw at wild pigs, we could possibly control them.

Also of real concern are fire ants. At the moment there is an operation going on around the port of Botany to track down and eradicate fire ants. Some years ago I visited some cattle ranches in Florida. The fire ant population meant that those properties could not be used for breeding purposes. The fire ants were killing calves. When fire ants get into an agriculture situation you cannot run sheep or small animals because they will be killed by the ants. Indeed, in Florida there were reports that fire ants had actually killed calves. They are such a ferocious and vicious pest. At all costs we need to make sure we keep these pests out.

I do support this bill. I understand that, despite some expected rhetoric from the shadow minister, the opposition will be supporting this bill. I commend them for that. I understand that this bill commenced its life in the previous government. It is an example of how in this place we can work across party lines to come up with legislation that is of benefit to the people we represent. This bill has my full support.

Sharman Stone (Murray, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Australia's biosecurity system is of pivotal importance, as we have been hearing from speakers on both sides of the House. It is essential for human, plant and animal health, the environment and the economy. Extraordinarily until these biosecurity bills were introduced we were depending on the Quarantine Act 1908. That act has been amended over 50 times and there have been a number of reviews. The point that then follows is that the act has become clumsy, complex and unwieldy. There is a lot of repetition in it. It is like our tax acts. So this is the time. These new bills were introduced in 2014 and in 2015 we should have a world best biosecurity system supported by appropriate legislation.

I cannot stress how important this is for my electorate of Murray. My electorate in northern Victoria depends on agribusiness. All agriculture, particularly our exports, was worth $39.4 billion to the Australian economy in 2013-14. It was when the drought broke and our agricultural exports were once again able to flow through our ports that we were able to deal with the global financial crisis in the way we did. Our agribusiness exports are critical for this country's wellbeing. Of course a good farmer who is being reasonably and viably sustained economically is a good environmentalist.

Our environment is unique in Australia. We have lots of species that are not found anywhere else in the world. Numbers of them though are incredibly vulnerable to imported diseases and pests. You can imagine if rabies got into our native population, carried perhaps by the wild pig population. The member for Parkes mentioned that the wild pigs in Australia are indestructible and are in almost all of our damper environmental places. If they carried this disease, you can imagine how it would infect so many domestic animals and wildlife. There is foot and mouth, blue tongue and a whole range of other diseases that we have not experienced or seen in Australia. This is due perhaps to good luck but I would argue it is also due to past scrupulous and careful quarantine inspection services.

Our marine industry has suffered from invasive pest species like the crown-of-thorns starfish, which was probably brought in with ballast water and released into the marine environment. We are still tackling that pest starfish. It has destroyed a lot of our unique Great Barrier Reef and other parts of our marine environment. It could have been avoided perhaps if we had had better regulation around the discharge of ballast water or sediment out of our own domestic ships and international ships. We have to be so careful of our marine environment because we are an island nation and a lot of the last remaining wild fish species are found in our waters.

Then there are the human health issues. We have been fortunate in being able to avoid the worst of the avian flu and so far, thank goodness, being able to avoid some of the crippling diseases we have recently seen, like the Ebola virus in parts of Africa. We have to be scrupulous and careful at all times in our inspection regimes and our reasonable and sensible regulation.

I am particularly conscious of what damage can be done when our quarantine system fails us or we experience phytoterrorism, when someone deliberately alleges we have a biosecurity breach or a problem with an invasive species that will interfere with our trade. I refer to the 1997-98 apple and pear fire blight scare. Australia, fortunately, has never had the apple and pear fire blight disease that effects pome fruit in most of our developed trading nations, like the United States and New Zealand. This disease is also found in much of Europe in its pome fruit industry or its wild related plants. We felt quite proud of the fact that we had not got this pome fruit disease.

My area in Murray grows over 85 per cent of all pears in Australia and over 50 per cent of all apples. So we are particularly concerned about keeping out the trade in fresh apples from countries that have this disease well established—for example in the case of New Zealand, for over 100 years. You can imagine our concern when there was an allegation from a New Zealand scientist who, on a one-day holiday to the Botanic Gardens in Melbourne, plucked a leaf or a twig from a cotoneaster hanging over a footpath. A cotoneaster is a host species to this disease. Without telling the Australian authorities, the scientist took the twig back in his pocket, or his luggage or his briefcase to New Zealand, where it was inspected and declared internationally that Australia had in fact not been truthful about its apple and pear fire blight circumstances, because this New Zealand scientist had proof in his pocket that we, like New Zealand and other countries, were suffering from this highly contagious pome fruit disease.

That announcement closed down the pome fruit industry in my electorate. No fruit could be taken to other states or exported. Over two million apple and pear trees had to be inspected by hand, one by one. There was an enormous investment by the Department of Agriculture and local fruit growers in inspecting and checking all of the other host species in the area, like the wild rose bushes. Of course, nothing was found, but the cost to the industry of that season's lost production was extraordinary. I would also add that the relationships between the two countries orchardists was shaken for a while given we had considered ourselves friends in relation to sharing in quarantine inspection standards and making sure that we were, as far as possible, soul mates in inspecting and keeping diseases out of our respective farmland. So I have experienced what can happen with a sudden announcement of a new, highly contagious disease—one that we have not before experienced in this country. It cost my growers millions of dollars in that one season.

But we have not only had this one bad experience in my area. Just last year we had an extraordinary circumstance where imported fruit, processed fruit, coming from China and South Africa was making my local SPC and Ardmona fruit processing manufacturer non-viable. There was so much of this product coming into Australia, made so cheap by the high Australian dollar and by the more lax antidumping regime—one that the new parliamentary secretary for the environment took a great deal of care in righting in his time as the parliamentary secretary to industry and manufacturing. We now have a better antidumping regime, but unfortunately this time last year the regime was not adequate to protect Australia's interest when it came to imported, dumped product, particularly fruit in this case.

It was not just the economic damage being done to Australian fruit growers and fruit manufacturers that was concerning. The National Measurement Institute of Australia analysed the contents of eight tins of canned peaches from China and they found that the samples contained levels of lead way above those allowed—in fact, double the lead allowed, according to the Australian and New Zealand food safety standards. That was in one sample. The second sample of the eight contained 10 per cent more lead than allowed. So one was double and one was 10 per cent more than the allowed levels.

These high levels of lead if ingested by humans create serious health problems in the immediate and long-term, including brain damage and damage to digestion, reproduction and nervous systems. Children, the elderly and the frail are particularly vulnerable. You can imagine the concern we had when we found that these cans of peaches were on shelves. They had got through our inspection systems—and that is where I am concerned. Australia does have a regime—and hopefully this new act will help us to be more protected—where, after inspections, five, without any problems found, means you have a very significantly reduced level of inspection of the food product. We have got to be scrupulous in the way we test incoming food products.

Our strictest food safety and hygienic conditions in Australia are not necessarily imposed elsewhere. So, while we can be perfectly secure almost universally when we consume Australian products grown and manufactured in Australia, we have to be extremely careful when it comes to imported foods from countries where they have serious issues with soil and water contamination or different manufacturing processes and different regimes of sanitary control. I refer to the terrible problems that China has where, for example, six infants died and thousands were hospitalised with kidney damage in 2008 from milk adulterated with an industrial chemical. That problem was known, unfortunately, it would seem, to some bureaucrats for some time before it was widely published so parents could stop using this particular infant formula.

It gets to be almost amusing when in 2014 fox meat was found substituted as donkey meat in numbers of Walmart packages that were exported from China. I do not think we should be culturally insensitive in saying that donkey meat is a bit interesting in terms of contamination. You can have very pure donkey meat, I am sure, but the problem was that fox meat had been substituted. The suggestion is that that was because the fur trade in China had become less valuable there was a lot of surplus fox for the market so they turned it into a donkey meat substitute, when fewer foxes were needed for ongoing breeding purposes.

Then of course we have the issue of the government inspectors in China finding that, in Shanghai Husi Food, expired and rotten meat was being used to make chicken McNuggets, beef patties and other products totalling more than 5,000 boxes. The official news agency, Xinhua, reported that 100 tonnes of meat products were seized and that police detained five people as part of their inquiry. That factory supplied McDonalds, KFC and other fast food restaurants in China and is a subsidiary of the OSI Group based in Aurora.

We have to make sure that our incredibly high standards of food security and biosecurity are also expected of those who import products into our country and that our inspection regimes are sufficient to keep the Australian vulnerable, frail and elderly safe. I am particularly concerned that while you can guard yourself against certain products from certain places where you are aware of incidents or problems in the past, if you are in a restaurant or a nursing home or a prison or the defence forces, where you do not know where the food has come from, then you are perhaps more vulnerable to people buying a cheaper imported food or beverage. That is why our inspection services are so critical, and I stress that is why the electorate of Murray is so dependent on good biosecurity services and a well-working piece of legislation. I strongly support this bill.

We are also at risk with things like the potential collapse of our beehives if we do not keep certain diseases from getting beyond where they are currently being detected in some parts of the country. We have to make sure that our native flora and fauna are protected in our unique environment. I commend all of those who have worked on it over many years. I also want to make sure we do not, through measures of austerity, slash too much of our human capital—for example, the number of inspectors for our inspection services. That would be a false economy because they are, after all, the front line for the protection of our country, our uniqueness, our human health, our animal welfare and certainly, I repeat, our unique environment. I commend the bill to the House.

Bob Baldwin (Paterson, Liberal Party, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for the Environment) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I would like to start by thanking all of the members for their contributions to this very important debate. Australia has a world-class biosecurity system. This system helps to preserve Australia's unique pest and disease status, and protect our environment, human health and the wellbeing of our domestic animals, plants and our way of life. Our biosecurity system must be underpinned by a modern and effective regulatory framework. The legislation that has enabled us to do this, the Quarantine Act, has been amended no less than 50 times over the past 106 years. While this legislation has served us well in the past, it has become cumbersome to administer, difficult to interpret and incompatible with our business and risk management needs.

The Biosecurity Bill 2014 and the four companion bills—the Biosecurity (Consequential Amendments and Transitional Provisions) Bill 2014, the Quarantine Charges (Imposition—General) Amendment Bill 2014, the Quarantine Charges (Imposition—Customs) Amendment Bill 2014 and the Quarantine Charges (Imposition—Excise) Amendment Bill 2014—are a collaboration between agriculture and health portfolios and will be jointly administered by them. The bill provides a new regulatory framework that supports the biosecurity system now and into the future, allowing biosecurity risks to be managed by both portfolios in a modern and responsive manner. This legislation will support the competitiveness and productivity of the agricultural sector, a key undertaking of this government.

Australia is free of many pests and diseases that are common around the world. This allows our farmers to produce higher quality products and increase the demand for those products. The Biosecurity Bill will help maintain Australia's enviable pest and disease status, which is essential for Australian farmers to maintain access to overseas markets and build on our position as an exporter of the highest quality agricultural goods. In 2013-14, the total gross value of agricultural production was $53 billion. The Biosecurity Bill will help protect Australia's environment from costly incursions by introducing a strong legislative framework that allows biosecurity risks to be managed more effectively. The Biosecurity Bill will also reduce red tape for the thousands of compliant businesses that regularly interact with the biosecurity system. It is estimated the cost to businesses will be reduced by $6.9 million a year because of the clearer, easier to use legislation and the improved processes it will enable. Finally, the Biosecurity Bill will provide the Commonwealth with the right tools to manage biosecurity threats, including health risks to the Australian population from serious communicable diseases. This has been particularly highlighted by the recent announcement by the WHO about polio and the Ebola virus disease as being public health emergencies of international concern.

The member for Hunter raised a number of concerns regarding the Inspector-General of Biosecurity. The minister has advised that I can assure the member that the Inspector-General of Biosecurity position will be maintained under the current Inspector-General of Biosecurity arrangements, which is an administrative position. This does not diminish the importance of this key position; it just means that, consistent with the government's regulatory policy, an additional piece of legislation will not be created to establish this position. The ministerial review powers under the bill will be delegated and made available to the Inspector-General of Biosecurity to review the performance of functions of the excise of powers by biosecurity officials under one or more provisions of the bill. The minister will also have the flexibility to consider other individuals with differing expertise to conduct the review and select the right person, the person most suited to carry out the review.

The member raised concerns regarding the funding of the Inspector-General of Biosecurity. Again, the minister has said that I can assure the member that this funding is secure. The Inspector-General of Biosecurity is funded by departmental funding, and this position will continue to be funded. The current interim Inspector-General of Biosecurity's term ends on 30 June 2015. However, again, the minister has advised me that I can assure the member that the position and its funding will continue.

There are some things that are critical to this position. The Inspector-General of Biosecurity will continue to be independent by reporting to the Minister for Agriculture directly, and transparent by making their recommendations public. The current Interim Inspector-General of Biosecurity, Dr Michael Bond, has proven that this role can operate administratively with a high level of independence and transparency.

The Biosecurity Bill directly addresses this government's commitment to improving Australia's already world-class biosecurity system. For Australian farmers , it means that crops will be safer from exotic pests and livestock better protected from diseases such as foot-and-mouth. For the Australian economy it means increased capacity for sustained domestic production and international exports from a competitive and profitable agriculture sector. For the Australian community more broadly it means that everyone can continue to have confidence in the biosecurity system that protects our very way of life. I commend these bills to the House.

Question agreed to.

Bill read a second time.