Julie Collins (Franklin, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Agriculture) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

[by video link] I want to be clear at the outset that federal Labor will be supporting this bill. It is not our intention to hold up this bill, because of the biosecurity risk that could impact on Australia if we were to do so.

As outlined in the explanatory memorandum, the purpose of the Biosecurity Amendment (Enhanced Risk Management) Bill 2021 is to amend the Biosecurity Act 2015, enhancing the ability to manage the risk of pests or diseases entering, emerging, establishing or spreading in Australian territory and causing harm to animals, plant and human health, the environment and the economy. The bill will effectively separate human biosecurity away from the Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment. The explanatory memorandum states that the health minister would be able to make, vary or administer arrangements and grants for financial assistance relating to diseases or pests that cause harm to human health, while the agriculture minister would be able to make, vary or administer arrangements and grants for financial assistance for other diseases or pests.

The explanatory memorandum also states that the bill 'would strengthen the management of biosecurity risks posed by maritime and aviation arrivals, improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the administration of the Biosecurity Act, and increase a range of civil and criminal penalties to deter noncompliance and provide proportionate penalties'. The bill would also amend the Biosecurity Act to 'strengthen pratique and human health requirements'. The explanatory memorandum makes reference to the Inspector-General of Biosecurity's report Confidence testing for at-border delivery of critical human biosecurity functionsRuby Princess cruise ship incident that was published in April of this year. From a human health perspective, the explanatory memorandum states:

The ability to effectively respond to and manage biosecurity risks entering Australia through the maritime and aviation pathways will be a significant consideration in reopening Australia's borders. This Bill would strengthen the legislative framework for international arrivals via these key pathways. The amendments would contribute to Australia's pandemic preparedness and response at the border. New requirements for pratique and pre-arrival reporting aim to specifically support the safe recovery of tourism and related industries.

There's also an acknowledgement that there may be impending biosecurity risks—that 'with recent detections of the khapra beetle and the emergence of a new variant of African swine fever, the number of biosecurity threats and the speed with which they travel continues to increase'. It is asserted that the growth in trade and travel anticipated as part of our economic recovery from COVID-19 will accentuate all of these risks.

This bill would have no financial impact on the Australian government budget.

I note that the government requested this bill go to an inquiry. The inquiry was undertaken by the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee. The committee handed down its report this month. The report included one recommendation: that the bill be passed.

If you're a farmer or a primary producer, why would you trust this government to deliver anything for our agriculture sector? Why would any Australian trust the Morrison-Joyce government to protect us from pests, disease and weeds coming into this country? Of course, the short answer is you can't. Despite the very hardworking biosecurity staff at Agriculture and our Australian Border Force officials, under this Prime Minister there's a history of epic failures when it comes to Australian farmers and our agriculture sector. There, of course, has been little action on climate change. There's been a crippling workforce shortage, the horrific mouse plague, a severe timber shortage and our biosecurity system has been slammed by the Inspector-General of Biosecurity and the Auditor-General. There is a lot to be concerned about.

I just want to spend a bit of time going through the concerns in relation to our biosecurity system. We know there's a lot of risk when it comes to Australia having a weak biosecurity system. The first question we need to ask is: why hasn't the government prioritised strengthening Australia's biosecurity system? In a nutshell, it has been lazy and complacent. There's been no urgency from the Morrison-Joyce government over the past eight years to protect Australians from biosecurity risks. It's clear that there's been a huge policy void until recently with COVID-19 issues when it comes to the Morrison government doing anything of note around strengthening Australia's biosecurity system. To be frank, it's shocking that more hasn't been done to protect all Australians and our valuable agriculture sector from biosecurity risks.

In terms of agriculture, Australia's biosecurity system underpins more than $60 billion in production and $53 billion in exports. Around $42 billion is contributed to the country's inbound tourism industry and 1.6 million Australian jobs across the supply chain. Talk to farmers, primary producers and those who work in the agriculture sector and biosecurity risks are always raised as a significant concern. Farmers and people in the sector know the serious risks associated with a weak biosecurity system. For example, according to the National Farmers Federation the cost of an incursion in our biosecurity system is estimated to be around $50 billion. I've talked in this place before about the government's piecemeal approach around the legislative framework of our biosecurity system, which continues to be a great concern. There have been numerous bills passed in this parliament recently, just this year, that have amended the Biosecurity Act that focus on agriculture. Having to repeatedly amend the act over past drafting issues reduces the confidence that the sector has in the Morrison government for it to adequately manage our biosecurity framework.

When you look at funding for Australia's biosecurity system you can see the under-resourcing that's been happening under this government. Prior to the 2021-22 budget, funding for biosecurity was actually going backwards. The government abandoned the work it was undertaking to introduce a biosecurity levy in 2020. The department has stated that sustainable funding arrangements for biosecurity are still being considered. Now, we don't know what this looks like or why this is the case and why the government hasn't done the work it needs to find a long-term funding arrangement for what we know is at risk. It's clear that this eight-year-old government has been far too relaxed about the serious risks of a biosecurity incursion and the harm it could cause to Australia's agriculture industry and of course to our human health, which I'll talk about a bit later.

This year alone there have been three damning reports outlining the serious inadequacies that exist across Australia's biosecurity system—two reports from the Inspector-General of Biosecurity and one from the Auditor-General. The first report was released in February this year by the Inspector-General of Biosecurity. This report looked at the adequacy of the department's operational model to effectively mitigate biosecurity risks in evolving risk and business environments. The Inspector-General of Biosecurity's broad assessment was that the biosecurity system is not in a strong position to address the diverse and evolving biosecurity risks and business environment expected to prevail in late 2021 through to 2025. The inspector-general made 19 recommendations to the government.

The second report was released in April 2021 again by the Inspector-General of Biosecurity, and I referred to this before, of course. It was about the Ruby Princess incident and the human biosecurity issues. This review found weaknesses in the department's management of human biosecurity functions and recommended the strengthening of arrangements for intercepting listed human diseases and human biosecurity risk material to ensure that all efforts be directed to the areas of highest risk. The review also found that the information systems that underpin human health activities need to be transformed. Indeed, the inspector-general made 42 recommendations to improve the management of human biosecurity in the vessel's pathway. I'll have much more to say about the Ruby Princess debacle later on in my speech.

The third damning report was released in June. This was the Australian National Audit Office responding to noncompliance with biosecurity requirements. The Auditor-General made eight recommendations to the department in this report. The performance report's findings included:

These findings from the three reports are a shocking reflection of the ineptness of this government. It has had eight years to improve and strengthen Australia's biosecurity system, but it's clear this government did not do anything until it got caught out by these reports and by COVID-19 and the Ruby Princess debacle.

We know the amendments in this bill will allow the government to say that it has responded to the issues that were under its jurisdiction in relation to the Ruby Princess. Indeed, the issues in this bill go to the very heart of the Morrison government's biggest failure at the very start of the COVID-19 pandemic. The measures contained in this bill are a frank admission that the responsibility for the Ruby Princess debacle lies directly at the feet of the Morrison government. In a nutshell, the processes in place were disregarded. There were procedures in place, and they were ignored. The Morrison government had failed to stop the one boat that mattered, and its failures led to the first COVID-19 outbreak in this country and, sadly, to 28 deaths. In my home state of Tasmania, of course, it led to a lockdown and to the hospital being closed in north-west Tasmania.

Buried at the back of the explanatory memorandum for this bill is a regulatory impact statement by the department of agriculture. It highlights three issues that the bill seeks to address:

This passage in particular speaks volumes:

Without the proposed legislative amendments, the Commonwealth's biosecurity framework would continue to be limited in its capacity to effectively secure the objectives of the Biosecurity Act. Australian society would continue to be at a heightened immediate risk of being exposed to COVID-19 or other novel communicable diseases through present and future commercial and cruise vessel operations.

These three issues have been front and centre of Labor's criticism of the Morrison government since day one of the debacle. We've always been told that it was someone else's fault. First it was the captain's fault, then it was the ship operator's and then it was NSW Health's. The reality is that it has always been the Morrison government's fault, and it is the Morrison government's own Inspector-General of Biosecurity who has called it out and recommended significant changes that need to occur. The Inspector General summarised his findings like this:

Frankly, if the department had done what it agreed to do, then the chances of a Ruby Princess incident happening were significantly reduced.

Labor will support these measures, as I said, because they are important steps to secure our community as borders reopen in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, but I understand there are some concerns that have been raised by some of the various parliamentary committees, and I want to say to the government: when it comes to the recommendations from the Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills Committee and the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights about some of the things that are needed to improve this bill and to deal with some of the concerns, Labor will support amendments to the bill if the government moves them either here or in the Senate. I want to be clear about that.

The Ruby Princess debacle is a failure of the Morrison government, who did nothing to ensure our frontline officers were properly supported, resourced and staffed to do their jobs. It's taken a long time for the Morrison government to admit it was at fault, but that's what this bill before us does today. Under the Morrison government, Australia's biosecurity system has been underresourced and underfunded. It's clear that this bill lays out the fundamental failures of the Morrison government. It has now been forced to make significant changes by the findings put forward by the Inspector-General of Biosecurity and the Auditor-General—three damning reports outlining the litany of failures that have occurred under the watch of the Morrison government.

Labor will be moving a second reading amendment that reflects our ongoing concern about the Morrison government's inaction. I therefore ask my colleague at the table, the member for Dobell, to move the amendment on my behalf.

Emma McBride (Dobell, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Assistant Minister for Mental Health) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I move the amendment circulated in the name of the member for Franklin:

That all words after "That" be omitted with a view to substituting the following words:

"whilst not declining to give the bill a second reading, the House notes the Coalition Government's ongoing failure to provide a strong biosecurity system for Australia".

Mike Freelander (Macarthur, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Is the amendment seconded?

Daniel Mulino (Fraser, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I second the amendment and reserve my right to speak.

Pat Conaghan (Cowper, National Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

We talk regularly in this place about issues of national security around terrorism and policing and those who would wilfully do us harm and impact our way of life. I have said before in this place 'what you can't see can hurt you', and this statement is true not just of people causing intentional harm to our citizens and our property but of other organisms that can carry within them the same result. The introduction of COVID-19 to Australian shores has caused undeniable devastation to Australian lives and livelihoods. It has altered the Australian psyche in ways that few things really could. The issues posed by difficulties in the detection and the effective and appropriate management of COVID-19 spreading have seemed insurmountable at times, and at other times have shone a spotlight on the areas in which the government has the power to adapt and better control matters of biosecurity in years to come. This bill, the Biosecurity Amendment (Enhanced Risk Management) Bill 2021, forms part of that important adaptation.

As its primary purpose, this bill seeks to strengthen the management of human health risks across maritime and aviation pathways, improve the efficiency and effectiveness of administration of the act and increase the range of civil and criminal penalties. With the country set to open back up to the world in a matter of weeks—as we certainly need to—it is critical that these measures be in place to preserve the hard-won freedoms that our world-leading vaccination rates have recently allowed.

Much of the detail contained within the bill is a direct result of learning from the Ruby Princess incident on 19 March 2020. I do not believe anyone would deny that considerable mistakes were made when the Ruby Princess was allowed to dock in Sydney Harbour and passengers were able to disembark into our communities. But the fact remains that, at that time, what we in hindsight consider—and hindsight is a very comfortable carriage to travel in—to be appropriate checks and balances, communication channels across departments and necessary tools for containment did not exist. We as a country had not experienced an incident of this magnitude before, particularly in relation to a maritime vessel.

The incident was subsequently reviewed by the Inspector-General of Biosecurity, and a New South Wales special commission of inquiry was undertaken. A number of recommendations were then made to prevent a repeat occurrence from impacting on Australians. They included: the operation of provisions within the Biosecurity Act; prearrival reporting obligations and the importance of human health assessments prior to entry to a port; and powers to manage the human health of groups arriving in terminals, including an increase to civil and criminal penalties under that act. It should be noted that none of the above changes are considered onerous or disproportionate to the risk posed.

When looking at the Ruby Princess as a single incident, the ripple effect included at least 28 deaths and 662 coronavirus cases linked to the Ruby Princess, noting that at the time testing was not readily available to the wider community. It was also an immediate catalyst for the lockdown of New South Wales and the nation, as the world braced itself to learn more about the disease and how to manage it. Additionally, it's widely accepted that the first cases of the virus that seeded into my own electorate and, indeed, the first death from coronavirus in Cowper were as a direct result of the Ruby Princess incident.

Taking this into account, I believe the following measures included in this bill to be appropriate. A group direction may require those in the determined classification of people covered by the direction to stay in a certain place or to wear protective equipment. They may be required to provide information for contact tracing or undergo certain testing with consent. It should be noted that, in relation to the use of group directions, protections have been built in so that force will not be used against an individual and appropriate medical standards will be applied.

Decisions about whether to make group directions and what requirements may be included in the direction will be made by human biosecurity officers who have appropriate public health training and experience. Human biosecurity officers must be satisfied of certain things before making a group direction or including a requirement in a direction, such as ensuring that the direction and its requirement will be effective in or contribute to managing the risk posed. Civil penalties will apply if people fail to comply with a requirement specified in a group direction.

I feel it's important to note that the bill has been developed through consultation with the state and territory health departments and through the cross-jurisdictional Chief Human Biosecurity Officer Forum, chaired by the Commonwealth's chief medical officer. It has also been considered by the scrutiny committee of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights. While a number of suggestions were given which led to the finessing of finer detail, all conceded that strengthening biosecurity measures at Australia's borders is vital to protecting the environment and the economy, and all accepted assurances that biosecurity group directions would be proportionate to the risk level. It is also accepted that the creation and use of greater penalties for a wider range of responsibilities is a necessary deterrent for noncompliance with the Biosecurity Act.

Whilst this bill refers entirely to marine biosecurity, I want to pay attention to the work that this government has done—both on a federal level and in New South Wales, including in my electorate—with tropical soda apple, which was introduced into New South Wales, unfortunately, in 1988. Whilst tropical soda apple sounds like a wonderful cocktail that you could sip on around the pool on a Friday afternoon, it is an insidious weed from Brazil that was introduced into the Mid North Coast.

This government has invested millions of dollars in my electorate alone to attempt to eradicate tropical soda apple. I would like to commend the Kempsey council, in the Macleay Valley, for the work that they're doing with farmers to attempt to eradicate tropical soda apple. It is a six-foot high weed that, if left for six months, can turn into a very thick privet-style bush and overtake acres and acres of very fertile, high-yield paddocks. It is completely devastating. The farmers around my electorate have spent a great deal of time and a great deal of their own money, but they are very appreciative of this government's financial assistance to look after their own paddocks. Only recently, there was a grant to Kempsey Shire Council for some $300,000 to assist those farmers to continue with their efforts. Hopefully, it won't spread further north into the member for Page's electorate or further south down into the electorate of Lyne. Again, I'd like to recognise the work done by Kempsey Shire Council and the contribution by the New South Wales state government, and also the contribution of the federal government, in trying to eradicate this very noxious weed.

In conclusion: we, as a government, must take all reasonable consistent and appropriate measures to ensure the safety of Australian lives and livelihoods, whether from a conscious human threat or any other. COVID-19 has undeniably altered our perception of appropriate measures and highlighted issues within the current assessment process of risk. This is not necessarily a bad thing. It has provided us with the opportunity to learn, adapt and plan for the future security and success of this country, and this bill is one step in that important process. I commend it to the House.

Debate adjourned.