Andrew Giles (Scullin, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Cities and Urban Infrastructure) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise today to speak on the Electoral Legislation Amendment (Assurance of Senate Counting) Bill 2021. This bill does two main things. Firstly, it requires the AEC to commission an audit and risk management assessment of the counting and scrutiny software used in a Senate election. It also amends the way ties between candidates in Senate elections are to be resolved.

This bill has the very laudable aim of enhancing the transparency and integrity of our election-counting systems, and this is an important objective. We know, and we should be proud of the fact, that we have one of the best electoral systems in the world. The independent Australian Electoral Commission operates with the utmost integrity and rigour to ensure a fair and accurate election result in which all Australians can be confident.

Nevertheless, there will always, unfortunately, be detractors and those who question the results, even when there's not a shred of evidence of anything but an accurate and transparent outcome. We need to recognise this, respond to it, and do all we can to stand up for trust and confidence in our electoral and democratic institutions and processes, in an environment where these have been increasingly under threat around the world, driven in part by the diffusion of misinformation and disinformation. It's the Australian Labor Party's view that electoral reform should always be done in a considered, thoughtful and bipartisan manner and that the end goal of all reform should be the betterment of our democratic system as a whole. We remain concerned about the messaging coming from some in this place that is designed to cast doubts on the integrity of our electoral system and, indeed, undermine our democracy.

Amongst the nine electoral amendment bills introduced or debated in this session of parliament, the government has left the most important, a bill to prepare for elections in times of emergency situations, to the last. That is a bill that is actually needed, as we can see from the circumstances we are confronting right now, and which has bipartisan support. It is a bill which was recommended by the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters following a reference from the Minister for Finance well over a year ago. Once again, we see wrong priorities from a tired and increasingly desperate government that can't distinguish between the national interest and its political interests, led by a prime minister who is unfailingly only concerned with himself. On what could still be, potentially, the second-last sitting day of this parliament, the Prime Minister has only just listed the Electoral Legislation Amendment (Contingency Measures) Bill 2021 for debate. Ensuring we can have safe elections during major COVID-19 outbreaks, bushfires and floods, such as we are seeing in New South Wales and Queensland just this week, must be our highest priority, not an afterthought.

Turning to the bill which is before the House, it is important to note that the Australian Electoral Commission already has a robust system for assurance and transparency of its software systems. However, we on this side of the House are satisfied that this bill will assist in providing increased confidence to the voting public and, indeed, to parties and candidates. The Electoral Legislation Amendment (Assurance of Senate Counting) Bill requires the AEC to obtain, prior to the next election, an independent security risk assessment of the computer systems used to scrutinise the Senate count. This includes assessment of the software used to scan, store and count votes. The person or body tasked with this assessment must be accredited by the Australian Signals Directorate and must provide a report to the AEC on their findings. The AEC must then publish this report on its website. This assessment must be conducted prior to each federal election.

In addition, from 1 January 2023, the AEC must arrange an independent assessment of whether the counting software for a Senate election distributes preferences and elects candidates in accordance with the Electoral Act. The AEC must publish a statement on its website stating whether the accuracy of the accounting software is assured to the appropriate standard.

The Electoral Commissioner will then be required to verify, within seven days of an election, that the AEC's using the assured version of the counting software. If there are any variations required of the software, the Electoral Commissioner must advise of these variations and the reason for them within seven days of the return of the writs.

The bill also requires that a ballot-sampling process be undertaken. The AEC must arrange for statistically significant samples of ballot papers to be checked throughout the scrutiny of votes to ensure that the electronic data captured and used in the counting of votes reflects the physical data that is recorded on the ballot papers. At least 5,000 Senate ballot papers must be checked, or 1,000 if it is a standalone Senate election. The ballot process that I'm talking about now may be inspected by scrutineers. The Electoral Commissioner will be required to publish the methodology used for the sampling and the process used for the reconciling of preferences prior to the election. Within 14 days after the return of the writs, the Electoral Commissioner must publish a statement setting out the results of the ballot-sampling process. Should any irregularities be identified, there would be time for an election result to be contested in the Court of Disputed Returns, which, of course, must be done within 40 days of the return of the writs.

We know from the extensive evidence that the Electoral Commissioner has provided to both the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters and the Senate during estimates hearings that the AEC already has robust systems in place to ensure the integrity of its systems. The AEC already works with national cybersecurity agencies to ensure the integrity of its systems and, indeed, its compliance with the Commonwealth cybersecurity guidelines. There have been multiple independent audits and testing of the AEC's counting and distribution of preference software, which have found no issues with the integrity of the vote count.

Apart from the assurance of electronic counting systems, we should not forget the important safeguards that scrutineers provide. Scrutineers can view and challenge the count, including the scanning of ballot papers and the processing of all digital ballot paper images. The fact that this process is performed in full view of scrutineers should provide significant assurance to voters, candidates and, indeed, the wider Australian community.

In a further effort for transparency, the seat-by-seat results of our elections are published on the AEC's virtual tally room. This allows anyone to view the results in any seat and to verify the results. To date, this has been at the initiative of the AEC, who have been doing this to provide public assurance and greater transparency of the process. This bill codifies this existing practice by the AEC of publishing preference data, including the distribution of preferences, on the AEC's virtual tally room.

Another transparency initiative that the AEC already uses is to outline on its website the integrity and assurance measures that the AEC has in place with regard to its computer systems. Prior to each election, the Easy Count Senate system, the ballot paper reconciliation system and the Senate scanning solution all go through testing. They are tested individually, and they are also tested in conjunction with each other to ensure that all the systems work together. Product verification testing also occurs after the close of nominations and before polling day to ensure the scanners and templates of each ballot paper are correctly set up. Then, after the election, the systems are tested again to make sure they worked correctly.

We have confidence in the independence of the Australian Electoral Commission and in the integrity of their systems. This bill does not appear to require much more than processes that are already in place. Nevertheless, if this bill will provide greater assurances and put paid to some of the, quite frankly, ridiculous conspiracy theories that float around, we in Labor are very happy to provide our support for the bill and the measures it contains. We hope as we do so that government members now provide consistent support for our independent Australian Electoral Commission and for the integrity of our electoral systems.

The bill also aligns the process for determining ties in a Senate count with the process used for this House. Instead of the Australian electoral officer for the state having a casting vote in the rare circumstance where there is a tie in the distribution of preferences, the electoral officer will have to determine the order of standing by lot. This is a reasonable amendment and provides a greater degree of certainty than the current provisions.

The bill also provides that the scrutineer observing the computerised scrutiny for a Senate election may ask for access to an original ballot paper to dispute formality. This codifies existing practice with scrutiny for the Senate count in South Australia in 2016 and also in 2019. Multiple requests that are deemed to be unreasonable, frivolous or vexatious may be refused if they would unreasonably delay the scrutiny. This is to ensure that the start of the elected senator's term on 1 July—which is, of course, a requirement of our Constitution—is not put at risk.

The measures in this bill will increase public confidence in our democratic systems; however, there is, of course, much more to be done.

To that end, I move:

That all words after "That" be omitted with a view to substituting the following words:

"whilst not declining to give the bill a second reading, the House:

  (1) notes that the explanatory memorandum states that the bill's intention is to strengthen the integrity of Australia's electoral system;

  (2) notes that Australia's electoral system would be further strengthened by;

     (a) lowering the disclosure threshold from the current $14,500 to a fixed $1,000 so political donations are transparent for all to see;

     (b) requiring real time disclosure of political donations;

     (c) reforming electoral expenditure laws;

     (d) providing more resources to the AEC to increase enrolment and turnout;

     (e) addressing the spread of dangerous misinformation and disinformation;

     (f) legislating for a powerful and independent National Anti-Corruption Commission;

     (g) making laws to prevent governments from pork-barrelling in marginal held seats; and

     (h) requiring parliamentarians to disclose secret donations; and

  (3) calls on the Government to implement these electoral integrity measures that would make a real difference to improving public confidence in our democracy".

An Albanese Labor government would continue the reforms that started with the Hawke government to enhance the integrity of our democratic processes. It was a Labor government that was the first to legislate the transparency of political donations, requiring all donations over $1,000 to be publicly disclosed. We remember that it was John Howard who jacked this up to $10,000 and then also linked it to inflation, causing the threshold to blow out to the current $14,500. We will, in government, reduce the disclosure threshold to $1,000 and remove the link to CPI.

We will also require that all donations be disclosed within seven days so people know who is donating to political parties, how much and when, and will not have to wait up to 19 months to find out, as they do currently. In fact, we have two bills before the Senate right now to do just that. But the government won't vote for them because they don't want people to know who is donating to the Liberal Party or the National Party. Otherwise, people would have found out about the $75,000 donation Clive Palmer made to the National Party before the last election instead of after they had already voted.

This government doesn't care about transparency and accountability. If it did it would have at least agreed to debate the member for Indi's bill for a national integrity commission, and the Prime Minister would not have summoned the member for Bass to his office to reprimand her for wanting action on a 1,000-day-old promise of his government—a promise fundamental to restoring trust in politics—to introduce a real national integrity commission. I note the member the Dawson received no such summons, despite all the damage he has done and continues to do to the state of our democracy, including in this very chamber.

The fact is: the Morrison-Joyce government does not care about the state of our democracy. The government doesn't care about transparency and accountability. Otherwise, it wouldn't be trying to ram through six electoral bills in the final two sitting weeks of the year. This isn't the way to make laws in this country, particularly those that go to how our democratic systems function.

If the government really cared about the integrity of our electoral system, it wouldn't have cut funding to the AEC. Last week Australia achieved a record enrolment level, with 17 million Australians enrolled to vote at the next election. But, despite the more than 500,000 additional voters added to the roll since the last election, the funding this government has provided to the AEC for the next election is actually lower than that for the last one, in 2019. That's before we get to some of the challenges that the global pandemic may impose on the conduct of this election. This diminishes the commission's capacity to perform vital functions, including public education campaigns on political disinformation and driving increases to voter enrolment and turnout.

Just 79.3 per cent of Indigenous Australians are enrolled to vote nationally, compared to an overall enrolment rate of 96.1 per cent. This is a shocking figure. It's a shocking figure for anyone who cares about our democracy. And it gets worse; the situation is even worse in the Northern Territory, with an Indigenous enrolment rate there of 69.6 per cent—less than 70 per cent. So much more needs to be done to address this democratic deficit, including investigating how people living in remote communities can be added to the roll through the Federal Direct Enrolment and Update program. But, without appropriate funding, the AEC is hampered in its mission to ensure every eligible voter has the ability to exercise their right to vote. But all this Prime Minister cares about is winning the next election, and he takes a win-at-all-costs approach.

That's his focus. And, as we see from the legislative agenda—the threadbare legislative agenda—that's before the House today and across this sitting fortnight, it's his sole focus. He knows that Australians have worked him out, that they know he has nothing to say to them about the future and no record worth speaking of, that he only stands for himself and that he is only concerned to do whatever it takes to cling to power. He doesn't care about the truth. He will say anything to win, even telling outright lies, about a holiday to Hawaii while Australia burned, to the French President, about electric vehicles, when he's damned by his own words.

Australia deserves so much better than this. It's only an Albanese Labor government that will provide transparency and accountability in government, and it's only the Labor Party that will always stand up for democracy, for defending and strengthening our democratic institutions, because on this side of the House we trust Australians, and we are prepared to trust their judgement.

Julie Owens (Parramatta, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Is the amendment seconded?

Ged Kearney (Cooper, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Assistant Minister for Health and Ageing) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I second the amendment and reserve my right to speak.

James Stevens (Sturt, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I briefly make this comment on the amendment, because it's the same amendment that was moved to the last electoral bill that we addressed. I really do commend the contribution from the member for Mackellar on some of these points, particularly in relation to the perverse outcomes of this concept of proactive ongoing disclosure and the fact that, in many cases, that would actually lead to a lower standard of public disclosure. If we have a regime that calls for disclosing a donation in real time, so within seven days of the donation et cetera, you could see people gaming the system. Clearly there would still be some disclosure threshold. Let's say it was Labor's proposition of $1,000; that kind of regime means someone could donate $500 every day of the year and not get picked up. Whereas, at the moment, if a major corporate, an individual or a union donates to a political party, we have to aggregate the total value of the donations over a financial year, and that is the threshold. Over a financial year, if you donate more than the $14½-odd thousand amount that the threshold, index linked, is at the moment, that's what triggers it. So there are a lot of misleading concepts in the amendment. But, as I say, it is basically the same amendment that was moved to the last electoral bill, and I commend the contributions that were made in addressing the points there.

Coming to the substance of the question on the second reading itself, obviously I am rising to support this bill, the Electoral Legislation Amendment (Assurance of Senate Counting) Bill 2021. I think the indication is that we all support this bill to provide some assurance over the Senate voting count process. The previous speaker outlined what those measures are, and I won't reprosecute those points. It does remind me, when we're thinking of looking at voting count machines et cetera, of the very famous 2000 presidential election in the United States. Some in this chamber, probably many in this chamber, have an interest in and follow closely the US political system, the US democracy. There was a particularly famous circumstance in November 2000 which ultimately saw then Governor George Bush become President George Bush, thanks to him winning the electoral college delegates from the state of Florida. But that was disputed for a period of time. There's a fairly entertaining movie made about it, pretty biased in favour of the Democratic angle, but, nonetheless, it's an enjoyable watch if you are interested in the conduct of elections, which I'm not suggesting is a huge proportion of the population, but those of us in this chamber probably are. Of course, the issues that were disputed in that circumstance related to the way in which their counting systems operate in the United States.

Some will be aware that, in the United States, they don't have the equivalent of our AEC. It's up to each state to run the voting process for selecting their delegates to the electoral college, much like they run all their other elections on the same day in the United States. So you go in with a substantial ballot paper and vote for everything from President to dog catcher, at times, and everything in between.

There is not necessarily the same voting process in different jurisdictions. If you vote in, say, the state of Florida, you'll probably be undertaking a different voting process than you might if you are voting in the state of Texas or New York or whatever it might be. But I certainly don't support that; I'm a very strong supporter of us having our own federal Australian Electoral Commission that oversees and conducts our general elections to this chamber, our by-elections and of course the election of senators.

This bill, at its heart, as the previous speaker said, is in some cases just legislating what is already current practice with the AEC, so it is putting a requirement on them that they already voluntarily undertake, essentially. But, to ensure that there's no ambiguity around that into the future, it does make sense to make that very clear and put it into legislation around preference flows and publications et cetera. As I say, it already happens, but we're ensuring in this bill that there wouldn't be a case in the future where, potentially, an electoral commissioner decides that they don't want to continue that practice, because of course they'll be required to do so now under the Electoral Act.

The other is the requirement to have a very clear standard of how we validate and confirm the automatic vote-counting tallying machines that the AEC currently use and ones that they potentially will use as technology develops into the future. I think this is an important area for us to anticipate future risk. I can't think of any example in the history of this parliament or our federation where there have been questions over the fair conduct of elections. As much as we have spirited campaigns and contests and sometimes we might not necessarily think that the conduct of candidates or advertisements or actions by volunteers et cetera was fair, I don't think we've ever heard the allegation that our Electoral Commission itself has ever conducted elections with anything short of the utmost integrity. I can't reflect on any contest I can recall where there was a suggestion that the way in which the votes were counted was either in dispute or, even worse, led to an outcome that wasn't what the people voted for. I can't, to my mind, think of any example where that has happened in the history of any election in this country, particularly federal elections. That's a source of great pride for all of us in this chamber who believe in the upmost supremacy and importance of the democratic process and the people making decisions as to who represent them. We've got that. There is no suggestion whatsoever that we haven't had that in the past, but this is a measure that anticipates future risk and makes sure that we will never have that situation in the future—in this case, specific to Senate voting.

We do live in a world now where there are increasing threats of interference in our democracy, and I made some comments in a previous electoral bill debate around that and, in particular, foreign actors seeking to influence our democracy. In the previous bill, that was related to donations from foreign sources. Of course, in this case, it could be the potential for sabotage of or interference in the way in which the actual count process is conducted and occurs. What this bill puts in place is a legislated framework to have another layer of assurity and confidence for all of us that the way in which the actual count itself is occurring is robust. It requires the Australian Signals Directorate to engage with the AEC, advising them on ways in which they can get an audit process around the accounting systems they currently use or may use into the future to make sure that there's a robustness and an accuracy there, but also, clearly, to make sure there's not an ability for someone to seek to interfere with our democracy by hacking into the system or undertaking some kind of cyberattack on the system, or by doing something to either frustrate the process or engineer an outcome different to that which the people of this country have voted for.

In supporting this legislation, I think it's very worthy that we take this opportunity to put in place a legislated process to assure that that is what will need to happen into the future.

We have to anticipate that technology will continue to provide new opportunities for the AEC to consider to help make the electoral count as efficient as possible. We're going to have to constantly balance the opportunity for efficiency against the higher risk the efficient system might have of being abused or influenced. This is going to be the challenge. Obviously, the voting system we have at federal elections is not availing itself of the absolute best technology that we could choose to use, because we accept that there's very high risk in things like electronic voting and allowing people to participate in the process in a much more digital way. We still require, and no-one's proposing to change the need for, a very physical process in casting our ballots: paper and pencil in a ballot box, then counted by hand by officials from the AEC, with the option for all candidates to scrutinise the counting of ballots in a contest that they are a participant in.

If you brought someone from the first federal election that we held, in 1901, to the 2022 election, it wouldn't be that different for them to vote in 2022 to how it was back then. Whilst perhaps that's a good thing, there will be opportunities as technology develops to further consider whether we can make the experience for people more efficient, without introducing any risk around whether or not that system can be manipulated to achieve an outcome that wasn't what the people voting intended. I've got no doubt that the AEC will continue to look for ways to undertake a more efficient count.

I think we can be honest: the Senate count is enormously complex, particularly for the people it affects the most, those people who are candidates and are waiting for the outcome. We all know that Senate results can take many weeks, and sometimes it is a very uncertain outcome until the keyboard strike of 'enter' spits out who those six people are who have been elected from a state. I'm sure we would be happy to see anything the AEC could do to safely improve the process of counting and get us a more rapid result, as long as we all had confidence that that wasn't risking the outcome becoming distorted.

This bill is going to mean that into the future there's a framework in place for the AEC to assist with the count on the existing machinery that they use, but, just as importantly, it puts them in a position to have a framework for other technological advances they might seek to pursue and use in the interests of getting a more rapid outcome. This is a good thing, as I say, as long as it isn't at the expense of any risk of the assurity, confidence and integrity around people's vote meaning what they want it to mean; people getting the outcome that they vote for rather than the risk of anything different. I think this is very sensible.

I think that it's something the AEC are probably happy to have some clearer legislative direction on. When it comes to running elections, it's very important that we have as little ambiguity as possible. I think that being prescriptive is a virtue. I don't usually say that when it comes to government and legislation, but, when it comes to our elections, I think it's very important that it's very clear in the Electoral Act the way in which we want to have the processes undertaken by our very hardworking and impartial electoral commission. We do not want to have them in a situation where they're having to unnecessarily make decisions because there's something unclear in the act. I'm sure that in the case of this bill before the House it is something that is going to have broad support. As I say, it merely improves and enhances the integrity and assurances around the Senate voting processes. I can't see why any of us wouldn't be happy to see those sorts of measures become that little bit more robust within the act.

On that basis, I support these changes. I think that we should continue to look for other opportunities to strengthen the integrity around our voting system. As a member of the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, I am very encouraging of the AEC looking for, pursuing and bringing forward proposals to be considered within our democracy to improve its efficiency, but never at the expense of its integrity. I'm sure that's something that we would all consider to be a fundamental principle when it comes to the democracy of this nation. With those words, I commend the bill to the House.

Tim Watts (Gellibrand, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Assistant Minister for Communications and Cyber Security) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to make a few brief comments on the Electoral Legislation Amendment (Assurance of Senate Counting) Bill 2021. Labor will be supporting this bill because electoral reform should always be done in a consultative and bipartisan fashion. The ultimate aim of electoral reform should be to enhance our democracy, not undermine it. While this bill will provide increased assurance to candidates regarding the veracity of the AEC's systems, I do just want to make a few points about this bill from a cybersecurity perspective, my own portfolio perspective. The member for Scullin has gone through in quite some detail what this bill does, and I won't go over that again. But, from a portfolio perspective, the Electoral Legislation Amendment (Assurance of Senate Counting) Bill 2021 requires an independent audit and risk assessment of the counting and scrutiny software used in a Senate election to be undertaken. So, prior to the next election, the Electoral Commissioner will arrange for an independent body accredited by the Australian Signals Directorate—that is a very common practice for certifying and assessing IT systems in the Commonwealth—to conduct a security risk assessment of the AEC computer systems used to scrutinise the Senate vote. The accredited assessor must provide a report to the AEC as soon as practical. After receipt of this report, the AEC must publish a statement of assurance on the AEC's website.

I know there are some election wonks and tragics who obsess over these issues following this debate on Twitter at the moment, but for a civilian who is following this debate and doesn't live in the weeds of how Australian elections are undertaken and to avoid any conclusion I just want to note that there isn't electronic voting in federal elections in Australia. No-one is going in and pushing buttons on a computer in Australia. But, as anyone who has voted in recent elections knows, the ballot paper and the number of candidates in Senate elections can be enormous. So it has been necessary for the count to be assisted by the scanning of ballots into a computer system that then uses optical character recognition to determine how the elector voted to assign their preferences. This is all done in the full view of human scrutineers. So, to be clear, this is a verifiable human process first. Then there is a subsequent computer process to help capture the preference distribution.

I really want to be absolutely clear here—and this is the only reason that I'm speaking on this bill today—in saying that the integrity and security of the Senate count isn't in question by anyone of any credibility or authority in Australia. We should be absolutely clear on this. The Electoral Commissioner has given evidence that there is thorough testing undertaken of the AEC's distribution-of-preferences software and that the AEC works with our internationally renowned national cybersecurity agencies to ensure the integrity of its systems and its compliance with the Commonwealth cybersecurity guidelines.

The AEC's website outlines the integrity and assurance measures the AEC currently has in place, and they are not particularly different to what we're talking about in this bill, frankly. So why is there a bill to have an independent cybersecurity audit of the AEC's counting system proposing that the AEC does not much more than what the AEC already does? Well, the answer to that lies in the Senate. This bill is a product of another import of US politics into the Australian political system. This time it is of disinformation and conspiracy theories springing from the 2020 US presidential election. The government has introduced this bill in response to a somewhat less constructive proposal by One Nation senator Malcolm Roberts.

Senator Roberts has been seeking to import the disinformation narrative that there were widespread issues with electronic voting machines in the United States at the last presidential election. It's a false claim, propagated by former President Donald Trump and his supporters to advance their equally false narrative that the former president did not lose the last US election. It's a narrative that tries to cast doubt on the democratic process of the United States—our great security ally who we share similar democratic values with—and seeks to undermine public confidence in elections. Senator Roberts, along with some other members of the coalition, frankly, are pandering to conspiracy theorists and autocrats by spreading these messages in Australia, where they have even less basis. And let's just be clear about the credibility of the people spreading this kind of conspiracy theory in the United States. Mike Lindell, the 'MyPillow guy' who's been running this conspiracy, is such a grifter that he's managed to grift himself in the process of doing this and cost himself millions and millions and millions of dollars in a complete fool's errand of trying to prove fraud in the US. He has undertaken a series of quite humiliating live streams involving cybersecurity experts attempting to prove fraud, which have turned up absolutely nothing of the sort.

The idea that someone would seek to import this kind of nonsense into Australia is pretty depressing, frankly, for the health of Australia's democracy. Internet brain worms do not respect international borders, and, unfortunately, we share an information ecosystem with a lot of these never-do-wells in the United States. Those of us who care about the health of our democracy and our democratic institutions in Australia need to stand up to this kind of thing in Australia. We don't need to enable this kind of conspiracy-broking and disinformation. We don't need to play footsies with extremists here. Anyone who is tempted, or thinks that there is short-term political advantage in playing to these kinds of people, needs to understand that, as that great US president John F Kennedy once said, those who seek power by riding on the tiger's back usually end up inside.

Australians can have confidence in the Australian Electoral Commission and its ability to conduct free and fair elections. I know as a member of parliament that the Australian Electoral Commission is not beholden to elected representatives. They act with an extravagant disregard for my submissions to them about what they ought to do in my area of the woods. The latest redistribution of electoral boundaries in Victoria has managed to redistribute my house, my electorate office and my kids' schools out of my electorate. That's not my preferred outcome, but I wouldn't swap it for the alternative, because it is an independent outcome. It's an outcome developed with an utter disregard for partisanship or for political advantage. It's an independent process.

While this bill does seem to have been introduced by the government in response to Senator Roberts's private senator's bill, which was more problematic, it doesn't contain the same deficiencies that his private senator's bill did. Labor will support this bill on the basis that it doesn't cause any harm and will provide some enhancement to transparency and public trust in an already unimpeachable, rigorous system. I do just want to place on the record today that Australians do not have anything to be worried about; this is not a real issue that's being addressed.

I encourage other members of this place to think about their roles as custodians of our democratic system. All of us here are only in this place by virtue of the health of our democratic institutions. We all owe obligations to the system. This place doesn't exist just as a platform for us. It's not a tool for us to exploit for our own interests. It's a system that we all have an obligation to invest in and to sustain. It doesn't sustain itself. It's in moments like this, frankly—when you have people from outside the bounds of reasonable debate casting insinuations, spreading disinformation and seeking to undermine public confidence in our democratic system for their own short-term political gains—that all members of good faith are called on to rise up and really reject that kind of thing. We all need to treat our democracy better in this place, and in that respect I'm happy to join with the government in supporting this bill today.

Melissa McIntosh (Lindsay, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Confidence in electoral processes is essential to safeguarding the integrity of our democratic institutions. The knowledge that one person gets one vote, that your vote matters and that your vote is counted is a pillar of our democracy. Free and fair elections are the foundation upon which our representative government stands. Australia has the most robust and resilient democracy in the world. This is something that every Australian should be proud of, not just here in the parliament but in every community including in my electorate of Lindsay.

This is because it impacts every Australian. We cannot take this for granted and we cannot be complacent, particularly when attempts to erode trust in and the integrity of our democratic institutions place them under threat. The Morrison government recognises what an important duty it is to consistently improve confidence in our voting process and strengthen its protections. That's why we're taking this proactive approach, embarking on a range of important measures to ensure the security, accuracy and transparency of voting. These are sensible reforms that preserve and enhance our proud democratic system. The Report on the conduct of the 2016 federal election and matters related thereto recommend these important changes.

In Australia, we're proud of our electoral system, which allows our senators to be chosen by the fairest counting system in the world. This bill will ensure that the Electoral Commissioner can ensure the accuracy of counted votes through computer scrutiny. A significant sample of ballot papers will be checked during the course of the scrutiny at each counting centre. This data will be compared with the electronic data captured by the computerised count of physical ballot papers and will be opened to inspection by scrutineers. If a scrutineer requests a physical ballot paper to be recalled during the computerised scrutiny of Senate votes, if a voter's preference cannot be determined using the scanned image of the ballot paper it can be resolved using the physical ballot paper. This bill will legislate the requirement for detailed data on both votes and preferences in Senate elections to be published within seven days after the return of the writs. While the AEC already carries this out on a voluntary basis, this now formally legislates the process.

Our unique system utilises a computerised scrutiny of votes using computers to ensure every preference of every vote is counted. The system is robust and voters deserve the right to know it is secure. That's why this bill will require the Electoral Commissioner to arrange for a security risk assessment of the systems used for the computerised scrutiny of votes in a Senate election. The assessment must be conducted by an independent provider who is accredited by the Australian Signals Directorate before each Senate election. The Australian Signals Directorate is vital member of Australia's national security community and, alongside our other national security agencies, plays a vital role in ensuring the integrity of our democracy.

Lastly, the bill also requires the Electoral Commissioner to arrange for an independent accuracy assessment of the counting software used in the scrutiny of Senate votes to ensure it is accurate and in accordance with the processes set out in the Electoral Act. The AEC will publish the assurance of the accuracy of the software to the appropriate standard in advance of each election.

This bill is one of a range of measures we are taking to safeguard and strengthen the integrity of our elections, including providing the Australian Electoral Commission with additional flexibility to conduct elections during times of emergency and introducing photo identification requirements for in-person voting. In addition, the Electoral Legislation Amendment (Contingency Measures) Bill 2021 will introduce powers for the Electoral Commissioner to make limited operational modifications to the Electoral Act where a Commonwealth emergency law is in force. These measured, sensible modifications could add the flexibility to grant an additional week of prepoll in areas specifically affected by an emergency, or expand the reasons a voter can apply for a postal vote.

In addition, the Electoral Legislation Amendment (Voter Integrity) Bill 2021 will further strengthen the integrity of elections and the rights of every voter. When voters show identification on polling day we reduce voter impersonation, fraudulent votes and the investigative work required to find them, and we give honest voters confidence their vote counts in the way it should. Voter fraud should not be tolerated to any extent. Even the smallest amount of voter fraud is too much fraud. No-one will be turned away or denied the opportunity to vote under this bill, with there being a wide range of identification acceptable or the ability for a voter to have their identity attested by another enrolled person who has identification or the opportunity to make a declaration vote.

In conclusion, the Electoral Legislation Amendment (Assurance of Senate Counting) Bill 2021 complements these important measures to safeguard our democracy through the protection of our free and fair elections. The Morrison government will relentlessly pursue measures that protect and promote Australia's national interests. The integrity of our elections matters greatly to every Australian, and I'm proud to support these important safeguards.

Andrew Leigh (Fenner, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Assistant Minister for Treasury) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Ensuring the integrity of our election systems is a bipartisan objective. We know that there have been attempts to hack into election systems. The Economist magazine talks about the way in which this particularly affects the United States, in the context in which voting machines are used. Even when those voting machines are air-gapped—that is, not connected to the internet—there is a risk of malicious actors loading malware onto them and then managing to bypass logic and accuracy tests. There is also a risk of attacks which target voter lists, attempting to change voter lists and, therefore, undermine confidence in democracy. We've seen attempts to influence elections electronically in other ways, as well. A Russian news agency with close ties to the Putin government launched a so-called news website called USA Really, which published a stream of articles favourable to former President Trump. Those attempts worked alongside attempts to influence the last three US elections by foreign actors using social media platforms.

The bill before the House, the Electoral Legislation Amendment (Assurance of Senate Counting) Bill 2021, provides some measures that will ensure that Australia's first-rate electoral system is protected. It provides for the Electoral Commissioner to arrange for an independent body accredited by the Australian Signals Directorate to conduct a security risk assessment of the Australian Electoral Commission's computer system and provide a report to the AEC, which the AEC will then publish on its website. This is critical for Australia, given that our electoral system has long been regarded as the best in the world.

Australians see voting not merely as a right but as a responsibility. Since 1924 we've had compulsory voting, which has seen us have one of the highest turnout rates in the advanced world. Compulsory voting also ensures that voting is representative. In voluntary-voting countries it is systematically the case that lower-income and more-disadvantaged voters tend to turn out in smaller numbers, so the result of an election doesn't represent truly the view of those who could potentially have cast their vote. Australia put in place the secret ballot, which other countries call the 'Australian ballot'. Australia has also pioneered robust electoral systems to ensure that the integrity of our voting system is maintained. Indeed, the ballot booth, according to Judith Brett's tremendous book From Secret Ballot to Democracy Sausage, is a great Australian invention.

But there are other ways in which elections can go wrong as well, and one of those is if voters have to spend too long waiting in line. Analysis by the Cooperative Congressional Election Study looked at how long voters had to wait to vote in the 2016 presidential election. Among nonwhites, 73 per cent said they had to wait in line to cast their votes, compared to 60 per cent of whites. That gap grew even larger the longer people had to wait. Nonwhites were 40 per cent likelier than whites to say they had waited longer than half an hour to vote. So that racial gap naturally affects those who finally get to cast their vote. If you're working a part-time job or caring for multiple children, you may not be able to stand in line and wait your turn.

What could blow out the length of time that people wait in line? The coalition's proposal to require that everyone who casts a ballot first produce identification. That requirement, when first implemented, would be almost certain to gum up the works of Australia's election system. Australia doesn't have a problem with multiple voting. The number of incidents in the last election was a couple of thousand. The number of prosecutions out of that election is zero. Largely, multiple voting arises because of confusion among a small number of vulnerable Australians, rather than through a malicious attempt to subvert the system. But the effect of voter identification requirements is to ensure that the lines are longer and the most disadvantaged don't turn up. Contrary to what members opposite have been arguing, it is going to be an imposition on people if they have to fill out a statutory declaration. Many will simply choose not to bother if that's the obligation. So I would urge the government to back down on their proposal for voter identification laws and to recognise the benefits that come from Australia's electoral system, in which simplicity is prized and we have one of the highest turnout rates in the world.

This bill before the House is a perfectly sensible measure and enjoys bipartisan support. The concern about the hacking of election material is a real one. Inevitably, as electronic voting comes online, we're going to have to become better at managing these systems. Electronic voting has natural advantages in ensuring the integrity of the outcome, but, without very rigorous systems in place, we can't be sure that that will work. This bill will provide increased assurance to voters and to candidates of the veracity of the AEC's systems.

But we need to also recognise there is much more that we could do to improve the integrity of the system. We still have a turnout rate among Indigenous Australians that sits around half, according to one of the AEC's reports. A 50 per cent turnout rate among Australia's First Nations people simply isn't acceptable. I have long believed that voter turnout should be one of the Closing the Gap targets. We should aim to close the voter turnout gap in Australia because having Indigenous Australians contribute to the democratic process should be seen as important for all Australians. We, of course, need a national integrity commission. That too would improve the standing of Australia's politicians. And we need to have real-time disclosure of political donations and the donations disclosure threshold brought down from its currently indexed $14,500 to a fixed $1,000, to ensure that political donations are transparent for all to see. The AEC deserves more resources to increase enrolment and turnout of voters. All of these things would improve the integrity of Australia's voting system and would greatly strengthen an already strong democracy.

On the question of voter identification, we don't need to merely speculate. We have the lived experience of the Queensland 2015 election, where voter turnout was the lowest it had been since 1980 and the lowest turnout in 12 state elections. Many voters were turned away; many were deterred from turning up at all. That's because holding an election in which you require voters to produce identification is a logistical nightmare. In the current context, it would mean that in the first national election after the COVID pandemic hit we would be attempting to train 100,000 or so AEC workers in identifying appropriate identification. This is a massive logistical task.

As the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights has noted, voter identification laws might 'reduce public confidence in the electoral system and discourage some voters from voting'. The committee also noted that it has seen:

… no evidence of, or concern about, a lack of public confidence in the integrity of the electoral system or any evidence of voter impersonation.

It also said:

… additional requirements imposed before a voter can cast their vote engages and may limit the right to take part in public affairs and the right to equality and non-discrimination.

Cassandra Goldie, the CEO of the Australian Council of Social Service, said:

Requiring voter IDs would hit hardest those people who already face barriers to voting—people who are homeless, people living in remote communities, First Nations people, recent immigrants, younger people.

In conclusion, I spoke earlier this week on a report handed down by the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Economics. I acknowledged Nicolette Cilia, who drafted that report. It was remiss of me though not to acknowledge the entire splendid secretariat of the House of Reps Standing Committee on Economics, of which I'm privileged to be the deputy chair. Iva Glisic; Danton Leary; Lachlan Wilson; Nicolette Cilia; Jenny Luu; Casey Mazzarella, before she moved on to another role; and Jazmine Rakic have all provided excellent support to the House of Reps Standing Committee on Economics. We are extraordinarily privileged to have them working for the committee, as, in general, we in this place are lucky to be served so well by committee staff and others who work in the building.

Terry Young (Longman, Liberal National Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Australia's system of voting in elections is among the best in the world. Free, fair and transparent elections are the foundation of our democracy. Without public confidence in our elections, we cannot be confident in our parliament. We've seen recently in the US what can happen when a certain element of the public loses confidence in its electoral process. We cannot allow that situation to occur here in Australia, and that's why we need to get this right from the outset. Australia has adapted and amended its electoral system over the years to better meet the expectations of voters and candidates alike. We've not been afraid to modernise and change the voting system when the need arises. An example of this was in 2016 when we introduced fundamental reforms to voting for the Senate. This included the removal of group tickets, which had been found to lead to gaming of the system, and handing greater control of preferences to voters. Voters were required to allocate six or more preferences above the line or 12 or more preferences below the line. Overall, these reforms were positively regarded by electoral experts, but the job is not yet done. More needs to be done to address the Senate election process to make it as fair as possible while incorporating modern technology to meet this end.

The Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters was commissioned to examine the 2016 election, and it has already identified three matters which it considers are in need of urgent attention. These are the authorisation of voter communications, the extent and use of foreign donations and the modernisation of the Australian Electoral Commission. Further to this, the commission looked at other matters relating to the 2016 election, including Senate electoral reform, and made 31 recommendations for consideration. In particular, it identified potential improvements to the counting methodology for the Senate, which were based on expert advice. The Electoral Legislation Amendment (Assurance of Senate Counting) Bill 2021, which is before us today, will provide additional confidence in the election processes for voters and strengthen the legitimacy of election results, which are essential to the integrity of Australia's democracy.

This bill responds to the recommendations from the joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters Report on the conduct of the 2016 federal election and matters related thereto and amends the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 to ensure the security, accuracy and transparency of the computerised scrutiny of Senate votes. Our Senate counting system is one of a kind. We as Australians can be proud of the innovative design of our electoral system, which allows our senators to be chosen by the fairest counting system in the world. Our unique system utilises a scrutiny of votes using computers to ensure every preference of every vote is counted. The system is robust, and voters have the right to know that it is secure.

In recent years there has been an increase in electronically assisted devices and processes designed to make elections easier for voters, faster to count and more accurate. However, the use of technology by the Australian Electoral Commission has not kept up with public expectations, nor has it totally eliminated integrity and security related problems. That's why this bill we are debating today will require the Electoral Commission to arrange for a security risk assessment of the systems used for the computerised scrutiny of votes in a Senate election. The assessment must be conducted by an independent provider who is accredited by the Australian Signals Directorate before each Senate election.

The bill will also require the Electoral Commission to ensure the accuracy of the computerised scrutiny of Senate votes. This will be achieved by arranging a statistically significant sample of coloured papers to be checked during the course of the scrutiny at every counting centre. This will compare the electronic data captured by the computerised count with physical ballot papers and will be open to inspection by scrutineers. Scrutineers play one of the most important roles in ensuring the transparency and integrity of Australia's electoral system. Under this bill, scrutineers will have the right to request a physical ballot paper be recalled during the computerised scrutiny of Senate votes in cases where a voter's preferences cannot be determined using the scanned computer image of the ballot paper. This will allow the challenge to be resolved on the original physical ballot paper.

The bill also makes technical amendments to how ties between continuing candidates in a Senate election are resolved. This is to address any unintended results that may occur in the rare case of a tie between three or more candidates. It also ensures where two or more candidates are in an unbreakable tie during the count that the exclusions are determined by lot, as occurs in the House of Representatives. The bulk exclusions, which is a process for simplifying the manual counting of Senate ballot papers, will be removed for computerised counts to ensure more transparent results.

The bill also legislates a requirement for detailed data on votes and preferences in a Senate election to be published within seven days after the return of the writs. The AEC already completes this important integrity measure on a voluntary basis. This bill simply legislates this initiative on an ongoing basis.

Finally, this bill will require the Electoral Commission to call for an independent accuracy assessment of the counting software used in the computerised scrutiny of Senate votes. This will ensure that it is accurate and in accordance with the processes set out in the Electoral Act. The AEC will publish the assurance of the accuracy of the software to the appropriate standard in advance of each election.

As I have said, Australia cannot afford for any section of its voter base to lose confidence in the election process. The amendments we are putting forward today provide for the utmost fairness and transparency in Senate elections, using technology in a responsible manner, and I am happy to rise in support of them.

Michelle Landry (Capricornia, National Party, Assistant Minister for Children and Families) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Firstly, I'd like to thank all those in the chamber who have contributed to the debate on the Electoral Legislation Amendment (Assurance of Senate Counting) Bill 2021. I'll also take this opportunity to recognise and thank the members of the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters for their continued consideration of matters relating to electoral laws and practices.

The measures in this bill respond to recommendation 3 of the JSCEM Report on the conduct of the 2016 federal election and matters related thereto. These amendments will provide confidence in the security, accuracy and transparency of the computerised scrutiny of Senate votes. This bill will require the Electoral Commission to arrange a security risk assessment of the computerised systems used for the scrutiny of votes and an independent accuracy assessment of the counting software.

These independent assessments will enhance the integrity and the transparency of the electoral system and provide electors with confidence in Senate election results.

To further support transparency and accountability in Senate elections, this bill grants candidate scrutineers the right to request the recall of a physical ballot paper during the computerised scrutiny of Senate votes. This will allow the challenge to be resolved on the original physical ballot paper. The amendments clarify the process for candidate ties and removes the unnecessary requirement for bulk exclusion when computerised scrutiny is undertaken.

The bill also requires the Electoral Commissioner to publish detailed data on votes received by candidates in a Senate election. These changes are necessary for the continued strengthening of Australia's democracy to support voter confidence in the election process and the legitimacy of election results. Once again, I thank my colleagues for their contribution and commend this bill to the House.

Ross Vasta (Bonner, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The original question was that this bill be now read a second time. To this the honourable member for Scullin has moved as an amendment that all words after 'That' be omitted with a view to substituting other words. The immediate question is that the amendment be disagreed to.

Question agreed to.

Original question agreed to.

Bill read a second time.