Mark Dreyfus (Isaacs, Australian Labor Party, Cabinet Secretary) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I move:

That this bill be now read a second time.

Intelligence oversight bodies play a critical and unique role in democracies. By necessity, much of the work of intelligence and security agencies is conducted in secret. This means that many of the usual forms of democratic accountability, including civil society, the media and even the parliament, are more constrained in fulfilling their usual functions. That is why Australia's dedicated intelligence oversight body, the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, is so important.

The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security was created by the Hawke government in 1986, in response to a recommendation of Justice Hope in the final reports of the Royal Commission on Australia's Security and Intelligence Agencies. As the then Attorney-General, Lionel Bowen, noted in his second reading speech on the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Bill 1986, Justice Hope's proposal for an independent watchdog over intelligence and security agencies stemmed in part from a submission the Australian Labor Party made to the Hope royal commission. While the then opposition expressed 'real reservations' about the effect of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security on the operations of intelligence and security agencies, the creation of the Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security ultimately enjoyed bipartisan support. Importantly, the Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security continues to enjoy strong bipartisan support to this day.

The creation of the Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security was a key recommendation of the Hope royal commission, and, for the last 35 years, the Inspector-General has performed a critical role in ensuring the parliament and the public that Australia's intelligence agencies act legally and with propriety. Just as the powers of intelligence and security agencies need to be adapted time to time to address new security challenges, the powers of the Inspector-General must also adapt in response to the changing nature and activities of intelligence and security agencies. To that end, the bill amends the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986, the IGIS Act, and other Commonwealth legislation to enhance the oversight of the Office of National Intelligence, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, the Australian Signals Directorate, the Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation and the Defence Intelligence Organisation.

The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act was enacted in 1986 and was designed for a smaller agency and a different Commonwealth integrity activity framework. This bill will enhance the Inspector-General's oversight of the agencies within its existing jurisdiction, ensuring Australia's oversight functions are commensurate with modern national intelligence community functions. This will provide the public with greater assurance that Australia's intelligence agencies are subject to robust oversight and integrity.

The bill includes amendments that expressly empower the Inspector-General and their staff to enter and remain on any intelligence agency premises, gain full and free access to any information and make copies or take extracts from documents held by the intelligence agencies during inspections. The bill also includes amendments to clarify that whistleblowers are able to fully disclose classified information to the Inspector-General without reaching secrecy or unauthorised disclosure offences.

This bill implements recommendations 172 and 174 of the 2019 Comprehensive Review of the Legal Framework of the National Intelligence Community to prevent the head or deputy head of an agency within the Inspector-General's jurisdiction from being appointed as the Inspector-General immediately after serving in that position and to allow the Inspector-General to consider employment related grievances for staff employed under the Office of National Intelligence Act 2018. These measures will promote the independence of the Inspector-General and resolve an oversight gap to ensure that staff employed under the Office of National Intelligence Act 2018 have access to independent review of employment grievances.

This bill introduces amendments to ensure that the Inspector-General is able to share information, subject to appropriate safeguards, with other Commonwealth integrity bodies, including the Commonwealth Ombudsman. The ability for the Inspector-General to share information with an integrity body where it is relevant to that integrity body's functions would enhance Australia's integrity framework by facilitating access to information required for oversight purposes. These amendments will also strengthen the Inspector-General's ability to co-ordinate with other integrity bodies and minimise duplication and resources.

This bill makes a range of additional amendments to the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act to ensure that the legislation governing the office of the Inspector-General is adapted to contemporary circumstances. This includes technical amendments to improve clarity, modernise drafting expressions and remove redundant provisions and address certain limitations in the Inspector-General's oversight functions and powers in order to facilitate effective oversight.

The majority of the measures in this bill have previously been reviewed and unanimously supported by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security in the 46th Parliament. The 2017 Independent Intelligence Review and the 2019 Comprehensive Review of the Legal Framework of the National Intelligence Community made recommendations that went to the jurisdiction of the Inspector-General and the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security.

Specifically, both reviews recommended that the oversight role of the inspector-general and the Parliamentary Joint Committee Intelligence and Security be expanded to include additional agencies—though the 2019 review recommended a much more limited expansion than the 2017 review.

In recent months, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security has recommended its own jurisdiction, and that of the inspector-general, be expanded to include the Australia Criminal Intelligence Commission and the intelligence functions of the Australian Federal Police.

While the bill does not extend the oversight role of either the inspector-general or the Intelligence and Security Committee to additional agencies, I would like to assure the House that the government is giving full consideration to those matters. Strong and effective oversight mechanisms do not stand in opposition to our Australia's national security interests—they are best understood as an essential part of advancing them.

To that end, this bill will bolster the ability of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security to provide effective oversight of relevant intelligence and security agencies.

Debate adjourned.