Andrew Hastie (Canning, Liberal Party, Shadow Minister for Defence) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

HASTIE () (): I rise to support the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment Bill 2023, as it will clarify the intended operation of certain provisions in the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979. Specifically, the bill amends sections 65 and 137 of the TIA Act to ensure that foreign intelligence information obtained under certain warrants in the TIA Act can be communicated, used and recorded to protect Australia's national security. These changes will facilitate more timely sharing of foreign intelligence, which is critical to ensure our intelligence and law enforcement agencies are able to identify threats to Australia's national security as they arise and take the necessary steps to mitigate them. This includes malicious cyberactivity targeting Australian interests, terrorist communications and foreign intelligence services threatening Australia's interests.

Schedule1 of the bill will clarify the ability of agencies to communicate foreign intelligence information about threats to Australia in accordance with the proper performance of their functions. This bill, importantly, does not seek to alter or expand the information that may be intercepted under foreign intelligence warrants. The amendments would augment the existing requirement for the Attorney-General to approve the persons who can receive foreign intelligence information with an approach where the Attorney-General can limit communication and the use of information by specifying purposes or by imposing conditions for which the information can be shared.

Importantly, this bill also includes a number of safeguards to ensure that foreign intelligence information is used and communicated in a controlled and targeted way. This includes ensuring that where a person receives foreign intelligence information under the relevant parts of the TIA Act it may only be communicated in line with the relevant agency's proper performance of functions, duties or powers, and subject to any purposes specified or conditions imposed by the Attorney-General. The use of these provisions will remain subject to independent oversight by the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security.

The coalition will always support sensible changes which ensure that our legislation is fit for purpose, so that our intelligence agencies and the people who work in them can do their best to protect Australia and our national security. I thank the government for working with us on this, and we support this bill.

Max Chandler-Mather (Griffith, Australian Greens) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment Bill 2023 seeks to make changes to the telecommunications laws around ASIO's practice of sharing foreign intelligence information. At the outset, we know that this being rushed through at such a rapid pace raises significant concerns about the laws that ASIO has been operating under.

Under the current law, ASIO can only share this information with persons named in the warrants issued by the Attorney-General. The bill seeks to change this by creating a purpose test for sharing information instead of a person test and by imposing conditions. What this means is that the Attorney-General, instead of specifying who intercept material—aka the results of phone taps—can be provided to, will specify a purpose for which information can be shared. Instead of information only being shareable with persons approved by the Attorney-General, the explanatory memorandum says:

… the amendments will allow the Attorney-General to limit the communication and use of such information by specifying purposes, or imposing conditions.

However, the AG does not have to put in any limited purposes and is not required to put in conditions. The bill, in fact, refers to 'a purpose, if any', which means there is likely not even a need to provide basic purpose. This would allow the information to be shared with anyone for any purpose that ASIO sees fit. This is a fundamental flaw with the conditions clause too, since the conditions imposed only restrict ASIO and are not imposed on any people ASIO gives the information to.

The rationale for supporting the bill is that ASIO says it needs the ability to rapidly share time-sensitive information about credible risks from foreign targets in Australia to protect from risks such as cyberattacks. On balance, we do not believe the bill should be supported without significant amendment. The Greens will be seeking to move amendments in the Senate to address the accountability gaps in the scheme proposed here and implement some reasonable checks and balances. The amendments will focus on requiring the AG to put in specific purposes for the use of any information obtained by a warrant and, in recognition of the rushed nature of the bill, put in place a three-month sunset clause in the bill to allow a rapid review of the bill and consider it afresh after that.

This is part of a worrying trend for years now in Australian governments, where the context of emergency and urgency is used to rush through the expansion of powers, especially when it comes to our national security apparatus. It has been used repeatedly, often ironically, to undermine our democratic freedoms and civil liberties in Australia. This instance, in particular, highlights a practice that has been used by governments again and again. It's alarming as well that this information can be shared by ASIO with anyone, including, obviously, foreign intelligence services like the US.

This is a part of, again, a broader trend we've seen over the last few years of surrendering a lot of this country's sovereignty to the United States. There was a recent report in the ABC with the headline 'US military analysts to embed in Australia's defence department'. It's quite remarkable that that was accepted as a sort of fait accompli—that we would invite the United States into our defence department. I think that there's a clear and worrying shift—in the context of AUKUS, in particular—towards shifting our sovereignty and surrendering it to the United States empire.

The irony of this is that so often these laws are used and claimed to be protecting Australia's freedoms and security, but, often when these laws are rushed through, you see the opposite happen, in that we give up our civil liberties and democratic freedoms without so much as a debate. It's remarkable to me that, so often when these laws are rushed through, there is very little media scrutiny, very little parliamentary debate and, in this instance, barely any consideration of the practical effects of this bill or why this is being proposed at such an urgent time.

It's clear that we should be holding our intelligence services, including ASIO, to account. We should be ensuring that there are strict rules and regulations around who they can share information with. Certainly, I think that expanding it to a purposes test as opposed to naming individuals is a clear expansion of their powers and something that the Greens are firmly opposed to.

This warrants parliament taking its job seriously around ensuring that any expansion of the powers of intelligence services are scrutinised to the nth degree and given proper scrutiny in the same way that a lot of other bills in this place are. The Greens would hope that this bill, rather than being rushed through, is given the timely consideration that it deserves and that civil society in Australia is given the chance to understand the effects of this bill and what it means.

By the way, it's clear that, while this is targeted at foreign agents, this could include intercepts that include an Australian citizen. The effect of this could allow ASIO to share information, or the results of wire taps that include an Australian citizen, with foreign intelligence services without the Attorney-General necessarily signing off on the specifics of that information being shared or naming a specific person. That is a remarkable and alarming expansion in their powers.

Sometimes it seems taboo, in a way, to comment or critique the expansion of national security powers—often using the threat of emergency or claiming that any resistance to a shift or expansion in these powers is somehow going to put Australians in danger. Of course, over the last 20 to 30 years, especially since 2001, we have seen a surrender of a lot of our civil liberties, powers and democratic freedoms that Australians once enjoyed, through the excuse that this is all about keeping Australians safe. However, over the last 20 years we have seen a marked and alarming expansion in the powers of our national security services, often without so much as a debate or any proper opposition from the official opposition in this parliament, whether it be the coalition or Labor.

I would encourage this parliament to take this bill seriously—in the same way as any other bill—ensure that it undergoes proper scrutiny and ensure it goes through the committee process in the normal fashion and isn't just rushed through again. We're never going to hear about it again with any chance to scrutinise its effects, impacts or why it's being rushed through at such an alarming rate right now.

Clare O'Neil (Hotham, Australian Labor Party, Minister for Home Affairs) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I want to thank my parliamentary colleagues for their contributions to this debate on the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment Bill 2023. The government is committed to ensuring the legal framework in relation to the use, recording and communication of foreign intelligence information is fit for purpose and underpinned by robust safeguards and oversight mechanisms. Foreign intelligence information plays a critical role in enabling intelligence agencies to identify threats to Australia's national security, foreign relations and national economic wellbeing. The communication and use of this information is critical to identifying and mitigating these threats.

The bill does not grant any new powers or expand existing information practices in relation to foreign intelligence information. The bill clarifies the ability of agencies to communicate foreign intelligence information about threats to Australia, in accordance with the proper performance of their functions. We have a system of sharing foreign intelligence which has significant, strong and effective safeguards, and none of those are changing as a consequence of this bill. In fact, those safeguards are an essential part of advancing and protecting Australia's national security interests. The bill includes a number of safeguards to ensure that foreign intelligence information is used and communicated in an appropriate manner, including that the communication of foreign intelligence information remains subject to approval by the Attorney-General. The Attorney-General may also impose conditions on, or specify purposes for, the communication of foreign intelligence information.

The government is committed to ensuring that Australia's legal framework continues to support the work of national security agencies while also ensuring that these powers are subject to the appropriate safeguards. I'd like to thank my colleagues for their engagement with this debate—particularly the opposition for their support.

Milton Dick (Speaker) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The question is that this bill be now read a second time. There being more than one voice calling for a division, in accordance with standing order 133 the division is deferred until after the discussion of the matter of public importance.

Debate adjourned.