Graham Perrett (Moreton, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise today in support of the Digital ID (Transitional and Consequential Provisions) Bill as brought to the House by the honourable Minister for Finance. This bill is part of the Digital ID Bill package. This legislation is long overdue. Way back in 2014, the Australian government's financial system inquiry raised concerns with the lack of a cohesive approach to identity verification. It also recommended the establishment of a federated and regulated model of trusted digital identification. The former coalition government, under prime ministers Abbott, Turnbull and Morrison, ignored those recommendations and actually did nothing to develop a digital ID system. What was the result of this? While the coalition government dithered and sent faxes to each other, our world became more digital. From social media to GPS directions in our car, we're more connected now than ever before. Many of us shop online, we listen to music online, we do our banking online and we access government services online. We each have an extensive personal digital footprint, and this needs to be private and secure—now more than ever before.

There's a stark contrast between the former coalition government's terminal procrastination and the actions already taken by the Albanese Labor government. In under two years, we've held broad consultation on digital IDs, we've established an expert panel, we've drafted legislation and we've introduced these bills to the House—removing the digital road block and getting on with the job. With the bills, the Albanese Labor government strengthens and expands Australia's digital ID system by developing a framework of robust legislative and regulatory safeguards to sit behind digital IDs. Labor is committing more than $145 million over four years to support the digital ID system, including the implementation of independent regulation and oversight.

If you have a digital ID, you have a secure and convenient way to verify your identity when using online services. A digital ID takes the place of identifying yourself via traditional methods such as your birth certificate, your passport or your driver's licence. It's safer because then there aren't multiple copies of your personal identification information being stored by different organisations—organisations that may be susceptible to cyberattack. We remember the Optus data breach in 2022 that affected up to 10 million Australians. Past and present Optus customers had their names, their birth dates, their home addresses, their phone numbers, their email contacts, and their passport and drivers licence numbers stolen. It was an administrative nightmare for customers to resolve and it also led to great uncertainty and fear amongst those affected. One of my constituents told me after the breach: 'I am now living with the constant worry that my identity will be stolen and loans will be taken out in my name. I've taken all necessary precautions against this; however, I'm still extremely concerned. This should not be happening to all of these people who just signed up to a mobile or Internet plan, which are basic essentials in today's society. Our personal data is our livelihood and should be protected as such.'

The digital ID bills are part of the Albanese Labor government's response to the worrying number of cyber attacks on businesses. They'll give both businesses and consumers confidence that their personal data is secure. For Australians with a digital ID, it will decrease the possibility of their personal data being stolen, as they won't need to submit numerous copies of ID documents to numerous different businesses and organisations. This then reduces the need for these businesses and organisations to retain the data. In fact, it's estimated that digital ID could save more than $3 billion per year in identity fraud costs for Australians.

So what does the digital ID look like? It is not a new card to carry around and, thankfully, it's not a new number or associated password to remember, unlike in many other countries. We are designing the system to operate in Australian conditions, and a person's digital ID will be verified against the existing credentials. Australians will be able to verify their ID online against government-issued ID documents—the obvious ones being their birth certificate, their driver's licence, their Medicare card or their passport. We've already seen a significant take-up of digital IDs—10.5 million Australians now have a myGov digital ID, which enables access to more than 135 different government services.

Under the proposed legislation Australians will have the choice to select a Commonwealth, state, territory or industry digital ID provider. However, it's important to note that participation is fully voluntary. People can decide if they want a digital ID, when to create it, when to reuse it and when to discontinue it. This means that Australians can continue to access government services on the phone or in person if they do not have a digital ID, ensuring that we recognise that not everyone is able to access the digital world. Some people don't want to, and some people might actually go down that road and say, 'No, that's not for me.' We want to have freedom of choice.

The approach of the Albanese Labor government is inclusive. It ensures that a digital ID is available to everyone who elects to use one while it also ensures that people can continue to access government services or businesses, as they currently do and have done for many, many years, either over the phone or in person. I have some constituents who love having a conversation with people about government services. They don't want it to be quick and easy. They actually want to have a chat to people—like having a talking lane in a shopping centre.

Beyond this, we are planning a whole-of-economy rollout. The Albanese Labor government will work in partnership with the states and territories so that people can use their state digital ID to access federal government services—the cross-pollination that comes with federation. We'll also work with private sector businesses to expand the use of government digital IDs so that it becomes more secure for people to do their online banking, to get that mobile phone plan or to hire a rental car. Again, it's reducing the need to share personal ID documentation across a range of businesses and to cart around birth certificates, passports et cetera.

Another crucial benefit of having a digital ID is that it's always accessible and ready for use. In recent natural disasters, such as in February 2022 when my electorate was flooded, people with a myGov ID were able to quickly access support payments through Services Australia without having to locate the originals of their personal identification documentation, which can be hard to do when your house is under water or affected by a bushfire, or when a cyclone is imminent. It's also important that we have chargers for our phones in disasters, which is something that I know Minister Murray Watt is working on. We need easier access to financial support during disasters. It means one less thing for affected people to worry about.

Digital IDs can also be useful for women who are escaping domestic and family violence and are unable to retrieve their identity documentation when they run out of the house but, with a digital ID, are able to verify themselves for services and payments immediately. That's a big decision, particularly if there are children involved in a violent domestic household.

The bills put in place four measures that ensure Australians are in control of their digital IDs and that their digital IDs are safeguarded. Firstly, it strengthens the voluntary accreditation scheme for digital ID providers. Public and private accredited providers will have to meet strong privacy protections and security safeguards. This ensures that Australians using accredited providers can rest easy knowing their personal information is private and secure. This includes confirming that a deactivated digital ID cannot be used or reactivated without the person's consent. Secondly, it legislates for the expansion of the Australian government digital ID system so that protections are in place across the country. Thirdly, it adds to the privacy protections already in place in the Privacy Act. Lastly, it provides a strong foundation for the governance of an economy-wide digital ID system through independent regulation, initially through the ACCC.

There are further measures to ensure privacy, with people's information to be deleted when it's no longer needed. They don't need to have a copy of your birth certificate forever from that car hire from 20 years ago. It also further restricts digital ID service providers' data-profiling activities. The Digital ID (Transitional and Consequential Provisions) Bill supports the principal bill by making arrangements to ensure smooth transitions from existing unlegislated frameworks. The Trusted Digital Identity Framework will be replaced by the new Digital ID Accreditation Rules, as laid out by the principal bill. Participants in the unlegislated Australian government digital ID system will be transitioned to the new, legislated system. What this means in practice is automatic accreditation in the new system for entities that were accredited under the old system. There are provisions to make rules, after the commencement of the bill, to take future complex information technology infrastructure changes into account. This bill also amends key security and administrative Commonwealth legislation to ensure the principal bill works as intended. The acts to be amended are the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977, the Age Discrimination Act 2004, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979, the Competition and Consumer Act 2010, the Taxation Administration Act 1953 and the Privacy Act 1988.

The Digital ID initiative is just one of the ways in which Labor is keeping Australians safe online, alongside the National Strategy for Identity Resilience; funding for the ACCC's National Anti-Scam Centre, which is doing incredible work; the Identity Verification Services Bill 2023; and continued reforms to the Privacy Act and the Cyber Security Strategy.

These two bills work together to implement the transition to a legislative framework for an economy-wide digitised ID system. At the core of these bills is the fact that Australians with digital IDs can have added reassurance that their personal identification documentation is not being stored by multiple service providers and businesses and that their digital ID remains secure and private. I commend the bills to the House.

Sam Birrell (Nicholls, National Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Digital ID is a proud coalition reform. The Australian government's first digital identity, myGovID, was part of a $256 million investment, called the digital business package, as part of the 2020-21 budget. Digital ID stalled under Labor despite the program first receiving funding in the 2015-16 budget.

Digital ID has the potential to be a game changer for citizens and industry by saving time and making it easier to complete various transactions. In government, the coalition spent over $600 million developing the Australian government ID system, and over 10 million people already use this service via myGovID. I'm one of those, Madam Deputy Speaker. We also released draft legislation in 2021 to further regulate digital identity, because of the important efficiency and productivity benefits it could deliver. Digital ID needs to be efficient and productive, and it can add to those things, but there also need to be privacy protections. The draft legislation would have reduced the amount of personal data held by businesses about their customers, in turn reducing the risk to Australians from the kinds of data breaches that we have seen with companies like Optus, Medibank Private and Latitude Financial. However, this digital identity legislation, the Digital ID Bill 2024 and the Digital ID (Transitional and Consequential Provisions) Bill 2023, introduced by the Albanese Labor government, is very different to the draft bill that the coalition released. The government's legislation has many serious weaknesses.

The coalition put forward amendments designed to fix these weaknesses, and I congratulate Senator Hume and other senators for their work on that. Our amendments included stronger guarantees that a digital ID would be voluntary—no Australian would be required to have one—and that someone would not face a lower quality of service should they wish to use traditional, paper based identity documents; removal of the phasing provisions so that the private sector could be involved from the outset; and a clear requirement that changes to the Privacy Act must be made before the legislation came into force. That amendment—the changes to the Privacy Act to give people further protections—was very important. The government, certainly to my regret and to the regret of the opposition, refused to accept our amendments in the Senate. Reaching a better outcome wasn't helped by the debate in the Senate being guillotined. It never is.

Labor is ramming these bills through the parliament, and the concern is that serious issues with these bills won't be addressed. How can Australians trust Labor to manage digital ID when they won't even allow the sort of parliamentary scrutiny that would have happened had there been a proper debate in the Senate?

Let's work through these concerns. We don't believe Labor's bills adequately ensure that this bill is truly voluntary, because every Australian deserves to receive the same quality of services regardless of how they're accessing them, be it through digital ID, face to face or however else. Amendments put forward by the coalition and rejected by this government would have provided greater certainty and protection, and would have established a stronger guarantee that having digital identity would be voluntary in the future—that no Australian would be required to have one and that, as I explained, the lowest quality of services would not exist should they choose not to have a digital ID. The amendment about the changes to the Privacy Act was also very important.

This parliament's been left in an impossible position because of how the government has proceeded with these bills. It is the decision of the coalition, supported by me certainly, that we will not support this undercooked legislation. There is too much at stake when it comes to digital ID, privacy concerns and concerns about whether it's voluntary or not.

Evidence provided in submissions made by multiple industry stakeholders has pointed out that large organisations such as banks, shopping chains and telecommunication companies are often subject to hundreds, if not thousands, of cybersecurity 'attempts' per day—that is, attempted cyberattack or cyberfraud. According to the ASD cyber threat report 2022-23, the average cost of a cybercrime, per report, was up 14 per cent in 2023. ASD also found that it cost a small business an average of $46,000 in total losses per reported cybercrime.

Digital ID is an important tool to protect Australians by limiting the need to share key identity documents online. Instead, a trusted digital identity can be used and accepted as proof of identity without the supporting identity documents being shared with the service you're accessing or being stored on a database that could be targeted by hackers.

A digital ID won't be for everyone, which is why amendments were proposed to ensure a service offered online requiring digital confirmation of your identity was also offered offline, without discrimination, to those who have chosen not to or cannot take up digital ID.

For many months, members' offices have been bombarded with emails, letters and phone calls about the digital ID. In fact, we get bombarded by emails and letters about a range of issues, which I'm sure everyone here understands. Concerns have been expressed to me via these emails, but also, as I was standing at a wonderful event called the Seymour Alternative Farming Expo recently, I had a lot of people express concerns to me and want to talk through the issues.

The concerns expressed and the feared outcomes go far beyond the concerns of the coalition. To be fair, they go beyond the concerns I have. But there is one point where they intersect, and that is the point of trust. We live in a democracy where different people have different fears, different needs, different concerns and different perspectives on how these things should work. In that free democracy, and with the liberty that we have, we believe that we should respect those differences.

Trust should be a cornerstone of a secure and inclusive digital identity system. To be honest, the more people trust it, the more people are going to use it, and that's what we want. We believe this trust has been eroded by the Albanese government's management of the passage of this bill, the lack of scrutiny and the unwillingness to accept sensible amendments proposed in good faith to improve it. And that's what the amendments would have done: they would have kept the core of the bill, but they would have improved it. Trust has further been eroded by the decision to proceed in haste with these bills prior to reforming the Privacy Act.

Trust has been dealt another blow by the failure to lock in state and territory governments. There is only one agreement from the Data and Digital Ministers Meeting, and that agreement is:

… to work together toward a National Digital Identity and Verifiable Credentials Strategy to inform an update of the National Digital ID Service Transformation Roadmap.

We think it needs to be a bit stronger than that.

If states and territories are unable to sign up to a national strategy, what confidence can this parliament and the Australian people have in this government's ability to manage the Australian government digital identity system? There's a word doing the rounds; apparently it was the word of the year either this year or last year, I'm not quite sure. It's joined the lexicon via the dictionary, and that word is 'omnishambles'. Perhaps in this digital age they might want to consider that the new double word of the year, or phrase of the year, be 'virtual omnishambles'.

We oppose these bills with regret. I really believe debate, cooperation and compromise in the Senate could have led to much better bills. The efficiencies and productivities of a really good effective digital ID system, with people's privacy respected and with people's voluntary participation respected, and with people's trust—which would have led to more voluntary participation in the system—would have led to a much better situation than we have now and much better bills. With regret, we oppose the bills.

Anne Stanley (Werriwa, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to make my contribution on the Digital ID Bill 2024 and the Digital ID (Transitional and Consequential Provisions) Bill 2023. From pandemics to natural disasters the past few years have shown us why governments must act fast to deliver support and services to Australians when they need it. During the pandemic many Australians familiarised themselves with myGov, which allowed them to access important federal government services from Centrelink to the ATO quickly and easily so that government could deliver all that vital support that was so needed.

Now, almost 10.5 million Australians have a myGov ID—a useful, simple and easy way for them to verify themselves in order to access more than 130 government services. Whether it's filing your taxes or registering your business, myGov ID has become a vital form of ID verification. But there are limitations with the myGov ID system as it currently stands, and these bills will provide a framework to expand and strengthen its use. The bills before the House will ensure that the existing ID system has a strong legislative underpinning by strengthening the existing voluntary accreditation scheme for digital ID services, strengthening the privacy safeguards, expanding the use of digital ID to both states and territories as well as the private sector organisations, and establishing a digital ID regulator.

The current accreditation scheme, the Trusted Digital Identity Framework, is an unlegislated framework. The bills will create a legislative underpinning for the scheme that will be used by providers of digital ID services in both government and private sectors to apply for accreditation. The scheme is voluntary, and those organisations that choose to become accredited will be able to participate and provide services within the Australian government digital ID system. Accreditation will be available for three kinds of digital ID services: attribute service providers, those that verify particular attributes of an individual; identity service providers, those that verify the identity of an individual, enabling the creation of a digital ID as well as the authentication of a digital ID; and identity exchange providers, those that manage the flow of information between other entities.

The bills establish the requirements needed to meet the accreditation as well as the consequences for providers that fail to meet the high standards of accreditation. The Digital ID Regulator, established under this legislation, will be empowered to accredit providers as well as suspend, revoke and cancel accreditations should they fail to adhere to the rules. The bills will also provide the minister with powers to include new kinds of participants as providers, to account for the constantly changing digital landscape.

The requirements that providers must meet and continue to uphold include strong privacy and consumer safeguards. We've seen large-scale data theft occur from Optus to Medibank, and it still continues. Australians are rightly concerned about the handling of their sensitive data. The digital ID should not add to these concerns. In fact, one of the advantages of digital ID is that it reduces the need for Australians to hand over their sensitive information. Digital ID will help Australians prove who they are more safely and quickly, but this advantage relies on digital ID having a strong and robust privacy framework.

The bills before the House today contain within them a range of privacy protections to meet the expectations of Australians, the first being express consent. Digital ID for individuals is entirely voluntary. Those entities participating in the use of digital ID must provide an alternate method for individuals to access their services. Some exemptions will apply for those accessing services in a professional capacity or on behalf of a business. Accredited entities will also be required to ask for express consent from individuals to share their personal information and will be prohibited from data profiling and using personal information for marketing purposes. They will also be restricted from the use of biometric information and its retention. The bills prohibit one-to-many biometric matching, which is the comparison of a person's biometric data against a database of similar data. There are also provisions and safeguards surrounding the access of personal data by law enforcement.

In the event of a data breach, accredited entities will be required to comply with state and territory notifiable data breach schemes or the Commonwealth data breach scheme, as detailed in the Privacy Act. This ensures that the regulator and Australians are notified as soon as possible in the event of a breach, and authorities as well as individuals can act fast to reduce their risk. Entities in breach of privacy safeguards may also be subject to financial penalties to ensure compliance with these rules.

To ensure the proper and continued compliance of the bills, the ACCC will be established as the digital ID regulator. They will be tasked with overseeing the accreditation scheme and the Australian government digital ID scheme. Additionally, the Information Commissioner will be tasked with enforcing the privacy provisions of the scheme and providing advice on request regarding privacy matters. To ensure greater transparency and accountability, an annual report must be provided to the responsible minister and tabled in this parliament, and a statutory review of the bill will commence within two years. A public register will also be established for accredited entities with details of their accreditation status.

Digital ID is a major reform. Australians are increasingly becoming accustomed to the use of digital IDs in various forms, the benefits of which are quite clear, but they also are becoming increasingly worried about their privacy. These bills seek to establish the digital ID scheme to allow Australians to access services more easily whilst ensuring their privacy is not compromised and instead enhanced. Digital ID will bring enormous social and economic benefits to Australians, and it is responsible of the government to ensure that there are systems in place to maximise that benefit. It is an important reform that must be done correctly, and I commend the work of the ministers and departments in putting together the legislation. I commend the bill to the House.

Barnaby Joyce (New England, National Party, Shadow Minister for Veterans' Affairs) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

One of the greatest things you have in a western democracy is the right to be anonymous. There are so many people for who the biggest thing they want is just to be left alone and to not have the government in their face. This is freedom. And the opposite of that you can see in totalitarian regimes, where they want to know everything you do every minute of the day in facial digital recognition. Once you know as much of what a person does, you can have greater control of their life. There's always some virtuous reason to have more control over a person. There's always a virtuous reason where you can say, 'Well, unless you're doing something wrong you've got nothing to worry about.' I just don't want anything to worry about at all. I just want to be left alone.

Now we have the movement to take away cash and just have digital currency. We already have so much of our information that is held. In this bill, one of our concerns is section 74(4), where it allows business to require the use of digital ID if it's appropriate to do so, and, of course, the first people who think it's appropriate to do so are the banks. We already have banks who say, 'We're not going to lend to you because you're involved with the coal industry, you're involved with the gas industry.' This might be a boilermaker or a fitter-and-turner. They are already encroaching on the basic rights of people to participate in the economics of this nation. So they have proven by their actions that they can't be trusted. And you're going to give them even more powers, more oversight over your life, and as you do this, you hand away your freedoms.

When the Banking Association went before the hearing in Canberra on 9 February this year, it was unable to give any level of assurance that it would not seek an exemption from section 74. So it could get digital recognition access to everything that you do. We've seen this creeping expansion over so many years from what is necessary to do their job to what is exceptional—to know as much as they possibly can about you. If you want people to know everything about your life then put a camera in your house—put a camera in every part of your life. They already track—and, of course, it's what the Chinese love to do. They love to hack your phones—they do—to find out where you go, to find out who you speak to, to follow your GPS. Why do they do this? Because the more they know about you—and, of course, it's not an individual watching this—

A division having been called in the House of Representatives—

In continuation, in country areas we have satellites watching us. Like everywhere, our engagement with government departments is being tracked. We have banks tracking us and wanting even more tracking of us, and, if they get exemptions from section 74, they will start to get more and more knowledge. We have banks that say there are certain industries they won't lend to. We've got the Westpac bank now saying they're going to start enforcing their climate policy on who they lend money to. Why are we protecting them—the four pillar banking policy? God only knows! They haven't done much in the protection of a lot of our industries. And now so many places in cities have digital facial recognition because they believe it's in their interests, and this is endorsement by the government.

If you want people to follow you into bedroom, I suppose that's your business. If you want them to watch you in the bathroom, I suppose that's your business. If you want them to have control over your currency and what you can and can't spend money on, I suppose that's your business. But a lot of people don't want that, and it's not that they're criminals; they just want to be free. They don't like the idea that anyone can open up a computer and almost see whether their car was there or not the night before—to see exactly what's happening, to always look for the mechanism of possible incrimination or if they've acted against the zeitgeist of certain institution.

One of the cruxes of this bill is: is it truly voluntary? Can people say, 'No, I don't want this to be a part of my engagement with the government or part of my engagement with private business'? The point is that the government did not accept the amendments to make it genuinely voluntary, and, as they didn't, it's involuntary. And, as it is such, it can't be supported.

In everything that comes with the belief of the primacy of the state over the individual, where the state reigns supreme and the individual is a servant of the state, part of that process is encapsulated in what exactly happens here, in this bill. This incremental path to an Orwellian type of existence is precisely that—it's incremental. You can't see it when it arrives. You can't deal with it when it arrives. You've got to deal with it long before.

One of the key factors that has us, on this side of the chamber, is the belief that the individual has primacy over the state. As the individual has primacy over the state, one of the great mechanisms to protect that primacy is the individual's anonymity, their capacity to say, 'The state's engagement with me is as little as possible, and its knowledge of me is as basic as possible and not something that can be used against me.' I hope that, as we move to an election—obviously we had a budget which is just an entree to an election. What the government did with that budget last night has told us all that we're not going to have another budget. So, as we head to an election, which will be sooner rather than later, I hope the government help themselves out by not leaving this on the table for us to belt them up over, because we will.

I think that Senator Canavan and Senator Rennick's forensic examination of this is something that warrants so many people out there having a close read. Senator Canavan is not known for getting anything wrong, and, as a qualified accountant with many years of experience, neither is Senator Rennick.

So, on the Senate vote on 30 November, the parliamentary inquiry was established. The submission process closed on 9 January. One month was provided, including Christmas, for people to submit. When the government start doing things like that don't you get a sniff that they're trying to ram something through? Don't you get a sense that not only do they want to remove your capacity to be free and anonymous but they're not even going to give you the capacity to properly ventilate your concerns and have them addressed? That is the nature of a government that have a motive beyond what they initially state.

The banks, of course, will love this—the greater control. We also see the banks in their quid pro quo with the government. There was no better scene in the so-called Voice referendum than when the banks decided they had a role to play in support of the 'yes' case because it fit the social zeitgeist of, to be quite frank, the upper echelons of the executive of the bank. A formal quid pro quo is coming back right here—give the banks more capacity to have greater control over people.

One of the things we put to the banks, especially in regional areas, is what their future engagement with us will be—and I note the member for Flynn is here. There are issues with allowing boilermakers, fitters and turners who are involved with mining getting access to finance. Farmers should not be impaired in their access to finance—and the great addition to that impairment and that understanding that is encapsulated in this bill.

It is going to really show, as we run up to an election, maybe end of this year—they can't have an election when the Western Australian election is on, even though they probably won't win many seats there. It's unlikely they'll ever go to another budget. Around about November, I think, the flag will go up. I listened to the Prime Minister this morning, and the one thing he didn't do is deny that we're going to an election soon. So it will be interesting to see if they ram this bill through. It's an addendum to the whole socialist policy that underpins where the Labor has now arrived. They're a different Labor Party from Hawke and Keating. They're very much a socialist type of party, with a very strong left-wing view. Socialism inherently needs more control over the individual, and that's what we've got in this bill.

In evidence to the committee, Chris Taylor, representing the Australian Banking Association, and Brad Carr, representing National Australia Bank, said they were unable to give any level of assurance that they would not seek an exemption from section 74. Furthermore, on questioning about ministerial powers to grant an exemption, or the grounds upon which the Digital ID Regulator could grant an exemption, the NAB—the National Australia Bank—and the Australian Banking Association agreed there needed to be greater charity in the bill to eventually articulate properly and quite narrowly the circumstances under which section 74 could be applied—this is the section where they can have an exemption and they can demand that the digital ID applies to you.

As I've said, we've gone from a situation where I could go to the bank and give them dollar notes to them now wanting to move to digital currencies and have a digital identification of me. No doubt, that gets interconnected with other digital identifications.

How many times have we heard: 'Oh, this will never get leaked. It's impervious. No-one will ever hack into this. No-one will ever hack into Medicare. No-one will ever hack into Telstra'? Of course, later on, we find out that they have and that our information is out there on the internet. In the Department of Veterans' Affairs, it was, 'They'll never hack into the benefits that veterans are getting,' and then, in a crossover with the University of South Australia, they did.

As you give up more of your information, it can not only be used against you by the enterprises you're dealing with—banks et cetera—but also float out into the general public. No matter how good people's encryption is, there's a person who has designed that encryption and a person who is just as competent to unencrypt it. With the development of artificial intelligence and as we move towards forms of quantum computing, the coding that you put in that would take thousands of years for a computer today will take seconds for a quantum computer in the future. So the capacity to decode what was initially coded will also be quite apparent.

In closing, I say this: growing up in the country has a lot of disadvantages: removal from services and a whole lot of things like that. One of the greatest things we want in the country and in remote areas, even where I live up in the hills, is to be anonymous. So many people like being anonymous. The reason they live there is the freedom of being anonymous. They're not criminals; they just don't want you in their life. They don't want you in their back pocket. They want to be left alone. But, more and more, we're creating a society where we have to know everything about people. People say, 'That's alright, because the government is good.' Well, not all governments around the word are good, and the actions of vindictive players are not good. And, as a general rule, when people know too much about you, that is not good—not because you may be a criminal but because they can use that information against you.

But, no doubt, we'll hear from the socialists in a moment, and they will tell us how perfect knowledge about the individual and the primacy of the state is nothing but a virtuous outcome, and how, in this, you have nothing to worry about if you've done nothing wrong. I put this challenge to them in closing: if you truly believe that that is the case then why won't you accept the amendment to section 74 so that we can make this genuinely voluntary?

Meryl Swanson (Paterson, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The Albanese government is not just providing for the Australia of today but also securing the Australia of the future. The Digital ID Bill will deliver a legislative framework for a secure, centralised network of digital identification that not only is going to be more convenient for everyday use but is going to protect millions of Australians from data breaches that leave them vulnerable.

This legislation is significant reform that supports individuals, businesses and governments, and creates opportunities for economic growth. It's an approach for identification which encourages security, contrary to what we're hearing from those opposite, who would really like us to live in a romantic, rose-coloured, revisionist, rear-mirror view of the world where nothing ever has to change and where it's all going to be okay. The member for New England said that he was concerned about having cameras in the bathroom and in the bedroom. I can assure the member for New England that is not something that we want, especially not of him—or from anyone else for that matter. This legislation is important, because individuals will be able to prove who they are with their physical documentation, once, and then a digital representation will be able to be used. Businesses will be able to verify their customers with greater ease. This bill will deliver for Australians, providing privacy and security, and will strengthen policies and frameworks already established and accepted within the Australian public.

I really would like to start with some myth-busting, after listening to the member for New England. In my electorate of Paterson, where 20 per cent of the population is aged over 65, there are some concerns that physical IDs may become invalid. There is some fearmongering going on and, quite frankly, some pedalling of absolute nonsense. People are being told that physical IDs won't be in existence anymore and that everyone will be forced to go digital. It's simply not true. Digital ID is completely voluntary. The Albanese Labor government is committed to giving Australians a choice, and this is no different. The digital ID will also be completely free to all individuals. There will be no costs and no hidden fees.

There are also some who are suggesting that the digital ID exposes our personal information or destroys our sense of privacy. Again, the opposite is true. Digital ID enhances our privacy. I'll give an example: let's say a group of friends go out to celebrate an 18th birthday. We've all got young people in our lives and we know that they're all very keen to get to the pub for a drink when they turn 18. They go to the pub and they buy a round of beer and they hand over their physical ID. Now the bartender knows that they are of age—which is a good thing—but they have also shown their full home address and their organ donor status. This information is completely irrelevant when you're buying a round of beers for your mate's 18th. With digital ID we'll be able to limit what sort of information someone can see in that scenario, without oversharing information. I think that's particularly important for young people, particularly when they're going out to pubs and clubs and may not want to divulge their address to someone they have to show their ID to for security.

What about that 100-point ID verification system? We've all been there and done that before—digging out passports and water bills and the like to make it to 100 points. Is the digital ID another layer of bureaucracy and government overreach? That's what we're told by those opposite. Of course it's not. The digital ID system allows people to undergo verification once, and then to use that ID over and over again across government and business services, without the services needing to store or file extra copies of their documents. I think that's a good thing. I don't want to have to dig out my birth certificate or my passport and give copies of those to numerous organisations. You'll be able to verify yourself once using your documentation and then, once your digital identity is established, that's what you'll use. It is going to be so much more secure and so much more convenient for people, rather than having to fetch around for all of these documents every time they want to go for a home loan or do these things.

Some of these myths have really got no place. Another myth is that some are saying that the digital ID is risky because no-one has done it before, and yet there are innovative systems in countries across the world, including in some strong democratic nations like Singapore, Denmark and the Netherlands, who use systems like ours. In Denmark, in particular, over 90 per cent of the population use digital ID. Those good folk in Denmark are pretty switched on, especially with stuff like this, and I don't think that 90 per cent of their population would be voluntarily using it if they didn't think it was up to speed. In fact, private companies like Mastercard are already offering digital ID services to individuals and businesses.

Some are saying that the digital ID system will be going unregulated—that's another myth—allowing personal data to be sold off and exploited. This is just completely false. Our legislation will introduce an appointed regulatory body independent of government that will approve and accredit services, and then ensure the services comply with the legislation and keep people's information safe. The Australian Digital ID Regulator is vital for a fair, transparent and compliant system.

This bill is not being rushed, and it is not being moved without thoughtful consideration on how we implement it. We are putting in the hard yards now and we are getting this right. I'm proud to be part of a government that is delivering for every Australian. Whether you're a student, a senior, a small-business owner or anyone in between, the digital ID is a decision for you to streamline how you use your ID and how you choose to be part of a digital future. We want to equip Australians to be part of a digital future.

This is coming. There is no point hiding under the bed covers like the member for New England projected on to all of us, saying: 'No, no, we don't want any of this. We don't want them coming for you.' What nonsense! No-one is coming for anyone. People are able to voluntarily give their own information, set up a digital ID and walk confidently into a digital world that they need to be armed and identified for—and, quite frankly, they want to be. They want to embrace technology. If it were up to the member for New England, we'd all stilling walking around with handheld lines and there'd be no mobile phones. Honestly, the troglodytes live under the bridges!

Today I want to talk to you about the Regulatory Powers (Standard Provisions) Act as well. It is very important that this bill be passed. It's something that we have to have. We just have to have the laws to go with the new technologies in our world. Here's another example: imagine you're applying for a government service and you need to prove that you're you. That's where the digital ID will come in handy. It's like a virtual version of your drivers licence or passport that you can use online. So much of our lives is happening on the internet. We need to make sure that these digital IDs are super secure, and that's where the powers act comes into play. The act is about making sure digital IDs are safe, easy to use and trustworthy, and it does a few things. There will be an accreditation scheme—this is like a stamp of approval for companies that provide digital ID services. The act makes it mandatory for these companies to meet strict standards to protect your privacy and security. Regarding expanding digital ID use, the act wants to make digital IDs more widespread so you can use them not just for government transactions but also for other online activities like shopping or banking. Privacy protections are so important. Your privacy really matters, and it matters ever so much more online. The powers act adds extra layers of protection to make sure your personal information stays safe when using digital ID. Regulation and oversight is another important thing. There are watchdogs in place, like the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, to make sure people follow the rules and keep digital IDs reliable.

Why does any of this really matter? Well, it is really a big deal. We are living in an ever more digital world, and we must have laws that keep up with the way that the world and technology are changing. Digital IDs will make life easier. There will be no more digging out your physical documents, no more raking around in the back of the wardrobe for your birth certificate and trying to sticky-tape it together. You'll be able to prove who you are online. There will be more security measures in place. You'll feel safer knowing your personal info is better protected from hackers and scammers and, believe it or not, there will be a boost to the economy from making digital ID a thing. It will make online transactions smoother, more efficient and more secure. Your data is valuable. The powers act aims to ensure your privacy is respected, giving you more control over how your information is used.

So, what happens now? Well, the powers act is just the beginning—it sets the groundwork for a safer and more reliable digital world—but there is still more work to be done to put everything into action. As technology evolves and our online lives continue to grow, it's crucial to have laws like the powers act in place to keep up with the changes and protect us all. And that's what this government is doing. If we weren't passing legislation like this, we would be absolutely remiss. We would just not be up to our duty of governing. We have to have laws that protect people in an ever-changing world. Remember: your digital identity is just as important as your real-life identity. So we need to keep an eye on how the world is changing, and we need to have laws that fit those changes.

You might really be wondering what all this digital ID stuff is about. I have heard people say that. They say, 'Meryl, what's all this ID stuff?' It is just really important that people have an understanding that it is about digital identity. It is like a virtual passport or a virtual driver's licence for the internet. And that is so important. It will mean safer online transactions and, when you're shopping online or accessing government services, the digital ID will be more secure, protecting your personal information from cyberthreats. Imagine not having to stand in long lines or fill out tonnes of paperwork every time you need to access a government service. Wouldn't that be refreshing! Well, that's the beauty of digital IDs. They will make it easier to prove who you are online and also in person, saving you time and a lot of hassle, quite frankly.

Your privacy does matter. The Digital ID Bill includes measures to ensure that your personal information is protected online so you can feel more confident, knowing that your data is in safe hands, and it will boost the economy by streamlining online transactions and making it easier for businesses to verify your identity. So whether you're a student applying for government assistance or a small-business owner filling in their taxes online, Digital ID Bill is there to make your online experience safer, smoother and more convenient.

One of the things about this piece of legislation that is ever present in my mind is that we hear constantly: 'We need to cut red tape. We need to make things easier for people, for businesses. Things should be more streamlined.' I've spent most of my adult life hearing that—'Cut red tape, cut red tape'—and we're actually doing this with this bill. This is a form of red-tape cutting, yet I'm hearing, often from proponents opposite—who I've heard the most over the years proclaiming that red tape should be cut—that somehow, now, this is not a good thing, this is not where we should be taking the Australian people and this is not how we should be setting up the Australian economy. The thing that would be absolutely remiss of us is not to set up the Australian economy and protect the Australian people. There is a very lively, vibrant digital world out there. If we do not have the laws enveloping our country to make it better, to put it on the right footing for this ever-changing world, then we are not the right government for the time. That is the thing: this is not about shrinking away from the world that is ever changing, this is about equipping ourselves well and providing ourselves with the tools that we need to be bold, confident and productive in an ever-changing world. This government is providing that for Australians. It will make life simpler.

I know that for those opposite change is scary and technology is a thing of bewilderment. Well, we are embracing it. We are taking the Australian people forward with us, and we are saying that we want to be on the front foot and doing this for a vibrant, secure and technologically savvy Australia.

Melissa Price (Durack, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise today to speak on the government's Digital ID Bill 2024. I'd like to begin by thanking my coalition colleagues who have already outlined many of the concerns we on this side of the House have with this legislation. Trust me when I say that there are many. Over the last few months, I've received an overwhelming number of emails and inquiries concerning this legislation. Now, I'm sure that it's not just my Liberal or National colleagues and senators who have been contacted in such numbers. I'm sure those on the government's side have also had significant numbers of correspondence as well. During this time, I've taken into consideration many of the widely held concerns, particularly surrounding whether there are enough safeguards to ensure signing up for a digital ID is truly a voluntary decision.

As the shadow minister for government services and the digital economy made clear this morning in the House, the coalition is not opposed to the many important efficiency and productivity benefits that an effective digital ID system can deliver. We acknowledge that. In fact, the coalition established the Australian government digital identity system following the 2014 Murray inquiry, which was commissioned by the Abbott government. In government, we spent over $600 million developing the Australian government ID system. We established the trusted digital identity framework and we created myGov, which is currently used by over 11 million Australians.

In 2021, we released an exposure draft of the Trusted Digital Identity Bill. This legislation would have further regulated the Australian government digital identity system. As well as seeking to improve efficiency and productivity, the bill also sought to reduce the amount of personal data that businesses hold about their customers, which in turn would reduce the risk to Australians from data breaches. Data breaches, unfortunately, do occur too often, and more recently we've seen data breaches with the likes of Optus and Medibank.

However, Labor's bill before us today is very different to that exposure draft, as it contains many serious weaknesses. When the legislation came before the Senate earlier this year, the coalition put forward amendments designed to fix these weaknesses. Our amendments included the following: a much stronger guarantee that having a digital identity would be voluntary, that no Australian would be required to have one, that someone would not face a lower quality of service should they wish to use traditional paper based identity documents, removing the phase-in provisions so that the private sector can be involved from the outset and imposing a clear requirement that changes to the Privacy Act must be made before this legislation comes into force.

Unfortunately, the government rejected these amendments. They also guillotined debate, which was an interesting move from a government that ran on a platform of transparency. It's reasonable to ask: how can Australians trust Labor to manage the digital ID system when they chose to ram through these bills and deny proper scrutiny?

As I've said, the main issue with this legislation that has been raised with me is whether this bill will provide for a truly voluntary system. Those opposite love to say that criticisms are just misinformation or disinformation, but these concerns aren't unfounded and they are already playing out. Take, for example—it's not a good example; it's probably a bad example—the WA Labor government's student assistance payment, which was announced earlier this year, in effect disadvantaged those without a digital ID. For parents to access the payment, they could either apply through the COVID-era ServiceWA app, which requires you to have a myGov digital ID, or through an alternative online or postal method. Not only did the government fail to properly inform families of the alternatives to ServiceWA, my submission is that they, indeed, hid that there were alternative ways. It's also my understanding that those who chose an alternative claim method were told they would expect to wait 30 days for their application to be processed. This compared to just seven days for those using the ServiceWA app.

Politicians are consistently warned that trust in government is failing, so this is something that all of us in this place and parliaments across the country should be concerned about. I believe that one of the main reasons for this is because people feel like they're being coerced into making decisions that they don't want to make. Unfortunately, this latest WA Labor government example is a stark example of what we're actually debating here.

It's undeniable that in the middle of Labor's cost-of-living crisis, many families are struggling. I think we'd all agree on that. In fact, under the Albanese government's budget to date, the typical Australian household with a mortgage is more than $35,000 worse off. This is before we even mention the rising cost of food, fuel, electricity, gas and insurance. But just think of the position some of these families will be in when the WA Labor government announces they will prioritise those with a digital ID. Do those Western Australian families—those hardworking families who all need a break—who might not want to sign up to the digital ID system but who are in desperate need of immediate relief have a real, genuine choice? I would argue that many of them do not. For it to be truly voluntary, those who choose not to sign up, whatever the reason, should not be disadvantaged. Every Australian deserves to receive the same quality of services. Certainty of quality should not be dependent on whether they have an Australian government digital ID.

Now, this very bad example from my home state of Western Australia clearly demonstrates that we need to work more closely with the states and the territories to ensure that the system is a voluntary one. However, the states and territories have not yet signed up to the finance minister's so-called national digital identity and verifiable credentials strategy. It's frankly unacceptable that the government is proceeding with these bills without first having the states and territories fully on board with a consistent national strategy.

In conclusion, it's time those opposite reconsidered adopting the amendments we put forward in the Senate. But until such time I won't be supporting this legislation, and I urge the government to take very seriously the concerns of my Durack constituents that I've outlined.

Michelle Ananda-Rajah (Higgins, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Imagine not having to produce your documents to verify your identity over and over again to rent a place, to change bank lenders, to take out a new mobile phone plan or to take out one for your kids. What about not having to rifle through boxes or files underneath the bed or behind the wardrobe to find those original documents? A digital ID will allow Australians to verify their identities once and to use this for various government services, telcos and businesses, rather than repeatedly supplying paper or scanned documents for individual organisations.

For decades, Australians have proven their identity when applying for government services, applying to rent a property or for a loan, starting jobs or opening bank accounts through the 100-point check. Paper documents or cards are provided and calculated to make up that 100 points. Photocopies and scans are stored in the systems of different organisations under varying standards of security—your local real estate agent versus a bank, for example. Scans, PDFs and photos are transmitted by email or phone. Real estate agents, accommodation providers, telcos and even loyalty programs all require that ID to be proven to some degree using hard copies. Renters, mortgage holders and people starting a business provide these documents over and over and over again. This legislation will reduce the need for individuals to provide such documents and for organisations to safely store them.

I shudder to think of all of the times that I have hastily sent a photo of my driver's licence via email to prove my identity and of where this has actually ended up. The number of times we all have divulged personal information—and the many silos it is currently stored in—over time is staggering. Is it any wonder that identity theft and scams are growth industries?

Digital ID in Australia is not brand new. It is currently available for government services through myGovID. More than 10.5 million digital IDs have been created using myGovID, which enables access to over 130 federal government and state and territory government services. Some private providers, such as Mastercard, are also accredited to provide digital IDs, but the current situation has limitations. It is not national, so the Commonwealth can only verify people biometrically against their passports, not against their drivers licences or any other ID documents issued by other governments. Also, it can only be used to establish identity for government services. It is not currently legislated and requires stronger privacy and security frameworks to be used in other sectors and domains like the private sector.

Apart from the obvious security risk associated with having personal data sitting in multiple places under variable security arrangements, there is the red tape—delays and the associated cost of doing business, and your personal time, a finite but precious resource that should be closely guarded.

This legislation before us aims to, firstly, strengthen an existing voluntary accreditation scheme for digital ID providers. It will ensure only trustworthy and reliable private and public sector entities are accredited to provide digital ID services to Australians. Accredited providers will be given a trustmark to build consumer trust and awareness of digital IDs, and there will be severe penalties for providers who breach the terms of their accreditation. These bills will embed privacy and consumer protections additional to those within the Privacy Act. Finally, they will strengthen the governance for an economy wide digital ID system by establishing a digital ID regulator, systems administrator and data standards chair. These are the structures to ensure privacy and consumer protections in the bills will be met.

It is important to note that establishing a digital ID is voluntary and at no cost, as it is at present. Individuals will not be compelled to sign up to a digital ID; it will be entirely their own choice. Australians who choose to keep using paper documents to prove their identity will be able to do so. But, I must say, once this takes off the benefits of using a digital ID will far outweigh using analog and paper documents. It will be a step change in people's lives.

Organisations will not be able to mandate use of a digital ID for individuals. People will need to consent to establishing a digital ID and will need to activate its use each time they wish to employ it. They can deactivate their consent at any time, and there will be no ID card or number. It is appropriate, however, to ensure that the privacy and security framework around the digital ID system is robust and that voluntary participation is futureproofed. This legislation proposes something quite simple but the legislation that underpins it is worthy of detailed consideration. Questions such as the access law enforcement agencies may have and whether profiling of individuals can occur through the system are important and need to be clear and strictly enforced—and they will be. Amendments that have already been proposed by a Senate report are being considered.

The benefits are multiple. Privacy and security are enhanced as the need to provide documentation is not required over and over again. At a time when productivity is on everyone's minds, digital ID is an important economic and productivity reform. Quicker and more accurate identity provisions allow businesses and their customers to interact more efficiently. More speedily obtaining a tax file number or submitting a tax return will reduce the time individuals spend on annoying, life-sapping admin.

Then there are the benefits to vulnerable Australians, noting that anyone is only a step or two away from vulnerability. A woman fleeing domestic violence, a family rebuilding after a natural disaster like a flood or bushfire, a young person filling in paperwork for their first job or to duplicate their data for those multiple rental applications—these people will know that verification of their identity is accessible digitally.

Digital IDs enhance equality. Insecure housing, short-term or insecure employment and serious mental health conditions do not always allow secure identity document storage. When identity has been difficult to prove due to family estrangement, unregistered birth, unofficial adoption, living in a remote location, language barriers or any other factor, proving identity once digitally and having it accessible as needed can be invaluable. The digital ID could be the ticket to participation in that inclusive economy we all wish for. Wishing for it is good but voting for it is better.

The world's richest people acknowledge the link between participation and productivity. According to the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, in August last year:

Digital IDs are an effective tool against poverty … If a person cannot prove who they are, can they take advantage of all the opportunities society has to offer?

I commend these bills to the House as important planks in our progress towards a more secure digital future and a productive, streamlined and connected economy, and as a means of providing smoother access to services for all.

Colin Boyce (Flynn, Liberal National Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to express my strong opposition to the Digital ID Bill 2024. I've been contacted by many constituents regarding this legislation, and they've expressed their fears as to what it means for them, their family and their business. I believe the Labor government's Digital ID Bill is seriously flawed and a massive overreach. This is classic 'Trust me; I'm from the government' and simply doesn't pass the pub test.

Labor are ramming this bill through parliament. For instance, they guillotined debate on this legislation in the Senate. How can Australians trust the Labor government to manage digital ID when Labor won't even allow parliamentary scrutiny? What has the government got to hide? In the Senate, the government had an opportunity to address the concerns raised by stakeholders and the many constituents who made submissions to the Senate, in addition to those individuals who wrote to all members about these bills. The coalition's sensible amendments, which were developed in close consultation with industry stakeholders, would have enhanced the privacy protections of the bill.

The coalition's amendments sought to establish a stronger guarantee that having a digital identity would be voluntary—that no Australian would be required to have one—and that someone would not face a lower quality of service should they wish to use traditional, paper based identity documents. In addition, we moved an amendment that sought to impose a clear requirement that changes to the Privacy Act be made before these bills came into force. The opposition and other senators were unable to scrutinise these bills clause by clause, and we were denied the opportunity to speak to the amendments. More problematically, the guillotine prevented senators from scrutinising the government 's supplementary explanatory memorandum, their five pages of amendments and the four pages of Greens amendments the government allowed to be tacked onto the bill. Greens senator Penny Allman-Payne, who is based in Gladstone, needs to look her constituents around Central Queensland in the eye and explain why she voted for the Digital ID Bill. Maybe if she focused on the issues of the residents of Central Queensland and spoke to them about their concerns with regard to the Digital ID Bill, rather than engaging in culture wars, she might learn a thing or two. It's not good enough for bills which engage our most basic of human rights to be steamrolled through the parliament in this fashion.

I have serious concerns about the Digital ID Bill and the threat of cyber breaches and hacking. Companies Canva, Latitude, Optus and Medibank all have had their data breached over the last couple of years. The Optus data breach was one of the biggest security breaches in Australian history. As Optus is the second largest telecommunications company in Australia, this security incident brought up questions about Australian data security policies and how companies handle them. It affected almost 10 million customers. Personal data in the compromised dataset included names, birth dates, addresses, phone numbers, passport information, drivers licence numbers, government ID numbers, medical records and Medicare ID numbers. How can the government ensure that the data of anyone who signs up for a digital ID will be secure?

According to the ASD cyber threat report 2022-2023, the average cost of cybercrime per report was up 14 per cent in 2023. The Australian Signals Directorate, ASD, found that it had cost small business an average $46,000 in total losses per reported cybercrime. Accordingly, it is unfortunate that the government's rushed handling of these bills has materially weakened the quality of important provisions in the Digital ID Bill as they relate to cybersecurity incidents and fraud detection and prevention. As industry experts have raised in their submissions, the Digital ID Bill's definition of a cybersecurity incident, in clause 9, is inconsistent with commonly accepted definitions officially established by the government elsewhere—for example, the definition contained in the Australian Cyber Security Centre's Information Security Manual. As the definition of cybersecurity incidents includes 'attempts' and each attempt must be reported to the Digital ID Regulator, there is a concern that this definition, as currently drafted, will have the capacity to simply overwhelm relying parties and the regulator. As multiple industry stakeholders have pointed out in their submissions, large organisations, such as banks, shopping chains and telecommunication companies, are often subject to hundreds, if not thousands, of cyber security attempts every day.

What this legislation fails to address or to consider is the lack of telecommunications in rural and regional Australia. From Gladstone to the gemfields, Moore Park Beach to Monto, Baffle Creek to Biloela, Alton Downs to Agnes Waters, or Woorabinda to Wondai, regional telecommunications would have to be one of the biggest single issues in the Flynn electorate, no matter where you come from. Many constituents have told me that banks and government departments have gone solely digital, and this legislation is another step towards this. Problems that arise are when customers try to complete transactions or documents online, as two-factor authentication is required. They are not able to complete these requests in regional Australia as often the two-factor messages do not come through.

There is a further issue with the Labor government winding down the use of cheques across the banking system, with federal departments to use other payment methods by 2028. A goal has been to set the end of the use of cheques completely by 2030. What support is the Labor government going to provide to rural and regional Australia if the Digital ID Bill passes? The silence is deafening. What support is the Labor government providing or going to provide to older Australians if this legislation passes? According to the aged-care guide, older Australians are struggling to keep up with the growing digital divide, with more than 80 per cent of people aged 65 and older struggling to adapt to the changes in technology or learn digital literacy. One in four Australians are also classified as digitally excluded, whether that's due to a lack of digital skills or an inaccessibility to digital services like smartphones and computers. I've had countless constituents visit my electorate offices as they have had issues dealing with government departments and their mad rush to the digital age. This mad rush is leaving older Australians behind.

The cornerstones of any trusted, secure and inclusive digital ID system are that there be strong, robust and voluntary safeguards. In the context of these bills, 'voluntary' refers to the legislated capacity for individuals to choose to use and create or not to use and create a digital identity when interacting with the entities within the AGDIS. These bills do not satisfy the opposition that the AGDIS will operate on a genuinely voluntary basis. As noted in the opposition's dissenting report, we're concerned that the AGDIS will fail to operate without causing detriment to those individuals who choose not to create a digital identity. The opposition is also concerned that the digital ID systems of the state and territory governments, which will form an integral part an expanded AGDIS, will not operate with the same voluntarist and inclusivity of safeguards required of Commonwealth entities.

Let me be clear: the opposition is strongly of the view that any government, be it federal, state or territory, must be offering an alternative non-digital means to access government services. This condition must be satisfied and established in the legislation accordingly of any state and territory government which wishes to join and expand AGDIS. Failure to extend the exemption to state and territory government entities will have the effect of significantly undermining trust, choice, inclusivity in the AGDIS, and the opposition will not allow that.

I wish to also quote Senator Canavan and Senator Rennick's additional comments regarding the Digital ID Bill:

1.2 The Government claims that the use of a Digital ID would remain voluntary under its scheme. However, section 74(4) of the Bill provides the Regulator with the power to allow businesses to require the use of a Digital ID if it is "appropriate to do so". While the Bill seeks to provide some examples of where a Digital ID may be required to be mandatory, there is no limitation on the Regulator's powers but the vague and open-ended requirement for a mandatory requirement to be "appropriate to do so."

1.3 In effect, the Government's Bill provides no protection against the creeping expansion of Digital ID requirements under the Regulator's powers. If the Government is serious about claiming that its Digital ID scheme is "voluntary" it is not clear why it cannot limit exceptions to its voluntary standard to a narrow, prescribed list of circumstances.

1.4 In addition, even for those businesses that do not receive an exemption, the Bill provides no requirement for an organisation to provide non-digital ID services on a similar basis. For example, a bank could very easily make it very difficult for someone that wants to use traditional identification documents to open account by making people wait weeks for an appointment, or through a variety of other methods. There are no protections in the Bill that would stop a business just making life hard for its customers that choose a non-Digital ID option.

Many stakeholders have given evidence that the government's phasing model of the Australian government ID system expansion is misguided. The Australian Banking Association said of the lack of timeline for expansion required:

publication of timelines against each phase as soon as possible to enable industry alignment with delivery timelines.

These concerns were echoed by the Tech Council of Australia, who recommended the government:

Provide greater clarity on the proposed timing of the phased expansion of the Australian Government Digital ID System and ensure swift integration of private providers

The National Australia Bank provided this statement:

With multiple private sector Digital ID offerings either in-market or preparing to enter in 2024, slowing the ability for the private sector to fully participate risks inhibiting innovation and uptake of Digital ID …

Australian Payments Plus, who were accredited under the existing, trusted digital ID framework by the former coalition government to operate ConnectID said:

AP+ does not however support the proposed phased approach to the sequential expansion of the AGDIS—

the Australian government Digital Identity System. For the lack of clarity regarding the government's phasing approach, the Business Council of Australia recommended:

The Government prioritise and clearly outline a timeline for private sector access to and use of the legislated digital identity system.

The Commonwealth Bank, in their submission, urged the government to rethink the phasing, arguing the following:

CBA does not support the proposed phased approach of the AGDIS rollout. In keeping with the design principle of citizen choice, consumers should have the ability to choose their preferred trusted Identify Provider …

In conclusion, Labor's bill does not adequately ensure it is truly voluntary. Every Australian deserves the same quality of service, regardless of how they're accessing it, be it through digital ID or face-to-face. The government should not proceed with this bill until such time as they've reformed the Privacy Act. There should be simultaneous private sector participation in the AGDIS, ensuring that ID is a truly national whole-of-economy solution. The coalition has worked hard and in good faith to address the flaws in these bills by moving amendments in the Senate. Our amendments would have enhanced the privacy protections for Australians who choose to use digital ID. These amendments were not supported and, accordingly, I oppose the Digital ID Bill 2024 as I feel it will cause more harm than good, and this is nothing more than over reach by the current Labor government.

Louise Miller-Frost (Boothby, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Scams, including identity theft, cost Australians around $2.7 billion in 2023. There were more than 600,000 reports to Scamwatch, and that's probably the tip of the iceberg, because many who are victims of scams are too embarrassed to report it or may not actually realise they're being scammed yet. People over 65 make up around 25 per cent of those scam victims, and around 50 per cent were investment scams. Many, if not most, of the scams now occur online in some way—through social media, through direct emails or through SMS asking you to 'click this link'. Likely, every owner of a mobile phone or an email account has received an unsolicited approach asking you to 'click this link' or maybe asking you to update your details with your bank, your utility provider or a government service. Unfortunately, people—us—are the weak link here.

I remember doing a cybersecurity course as part of a board I sat on a number of years ago. The cyber expert told us about a criminal group that had recently been broken up in Europe. The group consisted of a couple of PhDs in computing and four PhDs in psychology, because social engineering—the psychology of tricking you, convincing you to overcome your doubts and creating a sense of urgency or opportunity—is how the majority of these scams work. Last weekend, I spoke to a constituent, Elizabeth, who told me she was so frightened about being scammed that she refused to do anything online, which is increasingly difficult in an age where so many of the activities of daily life, from paying a bill to checking your bank balance and engaging with government departments, all occur online. Each of these services requires you to confirm your identity in exactly the same way the scammers get you to confirm your identity so that they can steal it. Of course, that's not the only way your identity can be stolen and used by criminals. Many Australians have been victims of major data breaches. Some of the larger ones were the Medibank and Optus breaches that affected millions of Australians. Details of identity were released and, in some instances, put up for sale on the dark web.

Fraudulent use of identity is a major risk for us as individuals, as businesses and as government. That's where the Digital ID Bill comes in. The digital ID is a secure, convenient and voluntary way to verify who you are online against existing government-held identity documents, without having to hand over any physical information. Digital ID is not a card; it's not a unique number nor a new form of ID. This bill will help to address the challenge of identity theft. The digital IDs enabled by this bill will avoid the need for Australians to repeatedly share their documents and, very importantly, will reduce the need for government or businesses to retain those documents, because every time your data is taken and stored somewhere else by a company or organisation there is another point of vulnerability.

This bill does four things to ensure that Australians are in control of their digital IDs and that their digital IDs are safeguarded. Firstly, the bill will legislate and strengthen an existing voluntary accreditation scheme for digital ID providers. Secondly, the bill will legislate and enable the expansion of the Australian government digital ID system, so protections for digital IDs are in place across the economy. Thirdly, the bill will embed in place privacy and consumer protections additional to those in the Privacy Act. And, fourthly, the bill will strengthen the governance for an economy-wide digital ID system by establishing a Digital ID Regulator, the System Administrator and a Digital ID Data Standards Chair to ensure privacy and consumer protections in the bill will be met.

I know that some of my constituents will still be nervous about the notion of a digital identity. Some will still want to ensure that this works and is secure before they engage with it. Some, like Elizabeth, will decide that they do not want to have a digital identity and will still feel more secure engaging with entities in real life at branches and the like. Hence, importantly, this is a voluntary accreditation scheme. The voluntary accreditation scheme in the bill will enable more digital ID providers to demonstrate that they meet strong privacy protections, security safeguards and accessibility requirements. The bill will replace an existing, unlegislated policy framework for accreditation—the Trusted Digital Identity Framework—with a legislated accreditation scheme for public and private sector digital ID providers. The bill will ensure only trustworthy and reliable private and public sector entities are accredited to provide digital ID services to Australians. Accreditation rules made under the bill will set out a range of requirements for each type of service an entity can be accredited for by the Digital ID Regulator.

The bill will ensure that there are real consequences for accredited providers if they do not meet the high standards of their accreditation. The powers of the regulator set out in the bill to suspend, revoke or cancel accreditations will ensure the accreditation rules, safeguards and privacy protections in the bill are adhered to. The bill will provide for a trust mark for accredited providers to build consumer trust and awareness of the digital IDs, imposing civil penalties on entities who falsely promote their services as meeting the strict requirements of accreditation.

The accreditation scheme will give Australians who choose to create, use or reuse a digital ID issued by an accredited provider greater confidence that their personal information is being protected. Many of us are familiar with the existing myGovID system. The existing unlegislated Australian government digital ID system is well established, with more than 10.5 million myGovIDs—which can be used to access more than 130 government services. However, the current system has limitations: it is not national; myGovID can only be used to access government services; and private sector services can't currently use myGovID to verify their customers. This falls short of the vision for a national, economy-wide system.

The Digital ID Bill provides a legislative base for broader use of digital IDs via a phased expansion of the Australian government digital ID system to include state, territory and private sector entities who choose to participate. Consistent with the phased approach to expansion, the bill provides for the Digital ID Regulator to manage arrangements for other matters, including statutory contracts between participants, liability and charging for providers and connected services in the future.

The Australian government digital ID system is based on the principle that people can choose which digital ID provider they use to access any website, app or other service that is connected to the system. In the legislation, this is called the interoperability obligation. The minister will, however, have the discretion to exempt some government services from this obligation and only allow a single digital ID provider, such as the myGovID. Exemptions will only be granted in limited circumstances, such as for government services where there is potential for identity fraud to have a significant impact on the financial circumstances of individuals or businesses in Australia—for example, the tax system, the social security system and the NDIS.

Additional privacy and consumer safeguards privacy protections in the bill are designed to ensure that digital IDs meet community expectations. The bill contains a comprehensive range of privacy protections that apply to the accreditation scheme that will operate in addition to existing protections in the Commonwealth Privacy Act. If the Commonwealth Privacy Act does not apply, the bill will ensure that accredited providers are subject to equivalent privacy protections. The bill includes measures that will protect Australians' sensitive information—such as their passports, birth certificates, driver's licences, Medicare cards and biometric information that they may use to verify their identities—by requiring express consent to create a digital ID and before information about them can be collected, used or disclosed to a service they wish to access; by requiring accredited providers to deactivate a person's digital ID if they withdraw their express consent at any time; and by prohibiting accredited entities from collecting particularly sensitive types of personal information such as a person's political opinions or sexual orientation.

The bill addresses the risk of commercialisation and misuse of digital IDs in the economy by preventing data profiling or the tracking of a person's activities using a digital ID and by preventing personal information from being disclosed for marketing purposes. The bill contains safeguards over law enforcement access to digital ID information held by accredited entities. Access to this information will require a warrant, unless it is being disclosed with consent or disclosed for the purpose of an accredited entity reporting digital ID fraud and cybersecurity incidents.

The bill includes measures to ensure the Digital ID Regulator will be notified of any breaches of accredited providers under Commonwealth, state or territory data breaches to facilitate quick mitigation of the risk or remediation of the breach. If there is no state based scheme, the Digital ID Bill requires the entity to report breaches under the Commonwealth scheme. To ensure these protections are meaningfully regulated and enforced, the bill will give the Information Commissioner a full suite of investigative and compliance powers. If an accredited entity breaches any of the privacy protections, they can be liable for civil penalty.

Those less able or willing to get a digital ID should not be left behind. An essential safeguard in the bill is that digital ID will continue to be voluntary for individuals accessing government services through the Australian government digital ID system. The bill will require Australian government agencies to continue to provide alternative channels for people to access services. Where an individual is accessing Australian government services on behalf of a business or in another professional capacity, a digital ID may be required because digital IDs will address the increased fraud risk associated with some business services. The regulator will monitor and regulate the compliance of entities participating in the Australian government digital ID system and may impose civil penalties for any breaches. These safeguards will help ensure people who choose to create and reuse digital IDs they can be confident that their information is safe and secure and that their privacy will be protected.

The bill will establish the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission as an independent digital ID regulator, with the responsibility of overseeing the accreditation scheme and the Australian government digital ID scheme. The bill will also provide for the systems administrator to perform day-to-day operational matters to ensure the performance and integrity of the Australian government digital ID system. Finally, the bill establishes a data standards chair to consult with industry and issue data standards.

The bill will make sure the regulatory watchdog has teeth to enforce the safeguards, with a broad suite of monitoring, compliance and enforcement powers, including civil penalty provisions, enforceable undertakings and injunctions. The Office of the Australian Information Commissioner will advise and enforce privacy protections, provide complaint handling for breaches of the privacy safeguards and report on privacy aspects of and the exercise of its powers and functions under the legislation. Further transparency will be provided through public registers for accredited entities, including whether they have ever had their accreditations revoked or suspended. The regulator will be required to report annually to the minister for presentation to parliament on applications on approvals for accreditation or participation and fraud or cybersecurity incidents and responses.

Further, a statutory review of the bill will be required within two years of commencement. The scope of the review would include any supporting rules and standards made after the commencement of the bill.

The Digital ID Bill is about the safety and security of Australians and of their digital identity. We've all been horrified by the data breaches and the ensuing issues that come from them—with people being vulnerable to identity theft and scams. It's an entirely voluntary exercise, it has built-in security measures and it has a regulator to ensure compliance. I commend the bill to the House.

Kylea Tink (North Sydney, Independent) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

You know, the world's become such a complicated place. Often what's sold to us as something that's designed to make life easier does anything but. There was a time when if you had a paper copy of your birth certificate, which had probably been issued to you by the local magistrate, your identity was assured. But in an increasingly digital world, our legislation must not only keep up but, ideally, stay ahead of change.

As we digitise we have a responsibility to protect the privacy and personal information of every Australian. And ultimately, our digital ecosystems must protect against major data breaches that expose millions of Australians to identity fraud and scams. Australians are increasingly transacting online and new cyber-risks are emerging. They do, in this way, highlight a need for a secure way to verify your ID online and use that ID to access trusted services. But as we work towards this, we must also ensure that we are very focused on protecting privacy and personal information as tightly as possible. There can be no compromise.

We also need to ensure that we don't leave large segments of our community behind, nor fundamentally erase what I think is essential for a healthy, fully functioning society, and that's human contact. Digital ID systems do present an opportunity for improved convenience in accessing services and facilitating economic advancement through the use of such technology. Australians having access to a safe, secure and convenient way to prove who they are online, to enable them to access more services and businesses from the comfort of their own home, is a good thing, but it requires strong accompanying legislation that upholds privacy and other human rights, and there have been valid questions from right across our communities, particularly from mine in North Sydney, as to whether this bill achieves that. My community in North Sydney have expressed very real concerns about this bill. I've heard from my constituents that they're worried this legislation risks their personal freedom and privacy and provides institutions and governments with too much power and control over their personal information.

Just a couple of week ago, with the support of the North Sydney ageing-while-working group, I hosted a scams awareness event, with Scamwatch and Lifeline, so my community of North Sydney could learn more about what's currently going on. What really struck me was the level of very real and deep fear that was evident across those from my community who attended that seminar. There weren't just questions like 'Who's scamming me?' More fundamental than that, there were anxious questions that related directly to: 'Who can I even trust to help me navigate this system?' During that forum my community learnt that last year the ACCC reported that a total of $3.1 billion—that's right, $3.1 billion—had been lost due to scams in the previous 12 months, and the over-65 age cohort accounted for around one-fifth of those total losses. Clearly, communities are increasingly vulnerable to scams, particularly our older population.

An effective ID system, then, undoubtedly has the potential to provide convenience for users and enhance the security of personal information. For businesses, initiatives like this bill will in theory mean a simpler way to verify their customers, access to a market of accredited digital ID providers, and peace of mind for their customers. For entities offering digital ID services, the bill will provide a nationally consistent set of standards they can be accredited against and give them greater awareness and access to government agencies and businesses requiring identity services. For the government, the bill improves security and streamlining processes across agencies—or so it's argued—making it easier for Australians to access more government services and decreasing the risk of identity fraud. For individuals, the bill should extend privacy protections beyond those already in the Commonwealth Privacy Act, which in turn should strengthen the safeguards to protect personal information.

But where data is gathered en masse there will always be a target for those that wish to abuse it. For example, any entity that becomes accredited for the scheme must adhere to additional privacy safeguards that go beyond those in the Privacy Act. Key among those safeguards are prohibitions on the use of single identifiers, a prohibition on disclosing information for marketing, and restrictions on the collection, use and disclosure of biometrics and other personal information. Importantly, the Information Commissioner will have the power to make sure those safeguards are provided. I do welcome the inclusion of a maximum civil penalty rate for privacy breaches and liability provisions for cases of noncompliance; however, the privacy law provisions could be further strengthened under this legislation.

The external oversight mechanism included in this bill is welcomed, as is the expert panel to provide independent advice on the system. These measures will contribute to the integrity and accountability of the digital ID system. For the user, it's encouraging that this bill enables choice. The decision to use digital ID is voluntary, and parties cannot require participation as a condition of service, but the voluntary nature of this system is critical and should not be understated. Concerns have understandably been raised as to whether people who choose not to participate will receive the same level of service as those who do and whether, over time, that option will be quietly faded into the background.

This bill has great potential to be a positive thing for our community, but it must protect the best interests of the individual and uphold human rights. The amendments to this legislation made in the Senate have addressed some of the issues raised by my community, but there remain concerns, namely the gaps in the overarching privacy laws in this country and the ability for law enforcement to access personal information. Ultimately, the privacy provisions in this legislation are a continuation of the piecemeal and deeply unsatisfactory approach to strengthening Australia's privacy laws whereby bits and pieces are tweaked here and there rather than the privacy law framework as a whole being strengthened.

At the international level the right to privacy is protected under article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and this is enshrined in other human rights treaties to which Australia is a party. Yet, without decent human rights protection under domestic law, privacy in Australia is yet another area lacking adequate protection at the domestic level.

The Attorney-General's Department review of the Privacy Act between 2020 and 2022 concluded that it's necessary to overhaul Australia's privacy laws, as many other countries have done, to ensure that our laws remain fit for purpose in the digital age. The government's response released in February last year committed to privacy law reform in Australia—reforms that would ensure Australians can be more confident that their personal information is being protected appropriately and that action will be taken where entities fail to manage personal information appropriately. Yet, despite a clear expectation that the government would act accordingly, no proposed amendments to the Privacy Act have been made public. Instead, extensions of privacy protections have been made under multiple pieces of legislation, including this one, when, ideally, reform of the framework at large would have come first.

The Privacy Act overall is outdated, and it lacks the robust protections we need in today's digital landscape. Australia's privacy laws are fundamentally not coherent, with experts from Allens Hub at the University of New South Wales finding we have around 40 different privacy regimes across Australia, both federally and at the state level, with many carveouts within those laws. We need one strong Privacy Act, and ideally we would have had that act before these bills were introduced to ensure that all necessary safeguards were in place and that any potential loopholes were closed. I call on the government, therefore, to prioritise that reform. Do the big work before we start fiddling around the edges.

Back to the specifics of the bills before us. Another aspect of significant concern to the community of North Sydney is broad access to personal information by law enforcement agencies. An enforcement body, as deemed by the Privacy Act, includes criminal enforcement agencies and other bodies such as the Department of Home Affairs and bodies with the power to issue civil penalties or sanctions. Personal information can be disclosed when an enforcement body has started proceedings against a person for an offence against the law, including minor penalties or sanctions. While this has been debated and amended in the Senate, it's still unclear when personal information might be disclosed to law enforcement. People in my community have literally asked me, 'Will my personal information be able to be accessed by the police if I have received a parking fine?' People are clearly afraid of adopting digital ID if it opens them up to law enforcement access for minor crimes or misdemeanours. I reiterate calls for law enforcement access to be restricted to serious crimes only and for clear messaging around what justifies that access.

Additionally, the voluntary nature of the system raises concerns that will need to be addressed to ensure public trust in the system. Choice is only meaningful if there is an assurance that people will not be disadvantaged if they choose to retain current methods of identification. Those who choose not to participate or have limited ability to participate because they don't have access to wi-fi for two-factor verification must be guaranteed equal entitlements and access to services, because not everyone will have equal access to digital ID. This includes individuals living with disability, the Indigenous communities living in and around our rural and remote Australian regions, living without the financial means to access technological devices, and older Australians with lower digital literacy—just to name a few groups. I understand that provisions for accessibility are included in the legislation, but this point must be emphasised. It's crucial that service providers are held to account for the services they are providing and that assurances are put in place that no-one is being left behind, whether they choose not to participate in the scheme or they're not able to participate in the scheme for other reasons.

The statement of compatibility with human rights attached to these bills states: 'The voluntary nature of this scheme ensures that the adoption of digital ID systems by service providers does not impede the accessibility of services for individuals. The choice to use a digital ID to access the service will not replace existing options, and that existing alternative channels such as the telephone need to be maintained as alternatives.' I say this is a positive thing. But it's also idealistic to rely on the trust in service providers rather than to have strong measures in place within the bills to ensure those measures are enacted and compliance is tracked. Where service providers, particularly government services, are already at capacity and are difficult to access—I don't know if those who drafted this legislation have tried recently to contact a Services Australia office—the sustainability and quality of these other services should be guaranteed under this scheme. These services must not reduce access to face-to-face appointments, nor to phone services upon uptake of a digital ID system.

Ultimately, this bill does much to move us forward. But we need to move forward with caution, consideration and compassion. It is a significant piece of legislation that serves an important purpose in strengthening privacy safeguards, but the best interests of the individual must be paramount in the design of the scheme. The government has a responsibility to ensure the strongest-possible protection of personal information and privacy, and for personal autonomy to remain. It's crucial this bill is strong, it's crucial this bill is transparent, it's crucial this bill is future-proof and, fundamentally, it's crucial this bill is designed for the humans that it will impact. Thank you.

Tania Lawrence (Hasluck, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to speak on the Digital ID Bill 2024. We need greater online security. We've seen over the last few years now just how many internet scams are being experienced across the country. Criminal and sometimes malevolent state sponsored actors, or even state actors, have found ways to subvert and steal personal documents and identities, and sometimes phone numbers and bank accounts.

The ACCC Scamwatch report shows that our seniors have been especially vulnerable, having not grown up with online cues that others perhaps are more accustomed to. They find themselves not only more susceptible to scams but also more targeted. The National Anti-Scam Centre reports that Australians lost $2.74 billion in scams in 2023 and $3.1 billion in 2022. That small decline is due to the strong action taken by the Albanese Labor government and the Minister for Cyber Security since coming to office, but it is still a huge amount of money and we cannot be complacent—especially with the advent of commercial AI and the danger that it carries. Obviously, we're not even counting there the cost of the personal toll and stress this takes on any single person subjected to these scams.

Yes, we've seen a serious number of data breaches in Australia across the corporate world. The Latitude Financial breach in 2023 saw 14 million customers affected across Australia and New Zealand, and Medibank had 9.7 million people affected by a breach in 2022, when a Russian based gang demanded a $10 million ransom. The Optus data breach in 2022 saw 9.8 million customers affected. These breaches don't just affect current customers but they also reach into the past. The Optus breach, for example, included personal information collected by Optus as far back as 2017. In 2018 the ANU suffered a breach which was not discovered until six months later. The information stolen included names, addresses, phone numbers, dates of birth, emergency contact details, tax file numbers, payroll information, bank account details and even student academic results.

Instead of having to provide identification documents again and again to all manner of private organisations, companies and departments—some of which, or their parent entities, reside offshore and are not always effectively or even directly subject to our laws—this legislation will enable us all to secure an ID and provide it once. We can then rely on that single government-ratified point of reference to satisfy ID requirements for all manner of purchases, memberships, contracts and registrations. It is a voluntary scheme, designed to allow all of us to more easily and securely protect ourselves in day-to-day dealings with government, business and other organisations which require proof of identification.

I have received correspondence about concerns around the introduction of the digital ID—unfortunately, inflamed by some of those opposite trying to link it to various conspiracy theories. Some of those opposing the ID do so because they don't actually understand its purpose or its benefits to security. To explain, I can say that, where adopted, the system will make people safer than they are at present, as they will be providing their personal data to one highly secured repository, rather than to many different ones, some of which have lax security and some of which, as we have said, have data being held offshore. But those concerns that centre around privacy and the voluntary nature of the scheme are, in fact, legitimate, and I thank my constituents for raising these matters of concern with me. Being a responsible government, we've ensured that privacy is built into the legislation. Express consent is required to create a digital ID, and that consent can be withdrawn at any time. Guardrails are there to prevent the collection of particular types of information. This will prevent data profiling, tracking or the use of data for marketing purposes.

I know we all use different platforms for different reasons, be they for shopping or banking. But even just to be able to book accommodation online you now have to offer up not just your drivers licence as proof of ID; you also have to take a photo of your face for facial ID recognition. This data is now being held by an overseas organisation and we've got no assurance as to where that data is being used or who it's being sold on to. We're interacting day to day with organisations that require us to produce personal identification in order to be able to access their services. It's these sorts of examples that go to the heart of this bill. It's intended to ensure that people can have a means of providing a single digital ID so that all that sensitive data that could potentially be misused or manipulated isn't held by people around the world.

Digital ID is being embraced as an answer to online criminal activity all over the world. Germany has one, Hungary is launching its digital ID, India has a digital ID, Sri Lanka has a digital ID—

Singapore has a digital ID, Malaysia has a digital ID, and many countries are developing one, including the UK, Ethiopia, Kenya and Bahrain. In Germany, in fact, for the member for Kennedy's information, reports indicate that 63 per cent of Germans are using it. They feel confident and comfortable with the fact that it's far better to have a single source of ID that's encrypted, rather than having to engage with every single business or entity and share their personal identity and information instead. They are voting with action by utilising their system.

In fact, the previous government started looking at this as long ago as 2016 but, for whatever reason, was unable to finish it, because in their work between 2016 and 2022—six years—nothing was done. But perhaps, like many other portfolio areas, this was yet another case where there was division in the party room. But, as Minister Husic commented in regard to this issue in 2018, they couldn't keep track of all the projects that were going off the rails. In yet another example, the member for Bradfield spoke in this debate on the amount of time and energy it can take for any person in this country to prove their identity to a bank. He used the words 'long, cumbersome and painful process'. I can only agree. It's yet another reason why this legislation should, in fact, have been enacted a long time ago, and it's why we're getting on with it now.

The member for Bradfield also described the proposed governance structure of the Digital ID Bill as 'fragmented' because different parts of that governance structure are responsible to different ministers. That is not a design fault; that is a design feature. Wholly reasonable concerns about privacy, probity and security need to be met by a structure that instils confidence, partly by ensuring that different parts of the governance structure are independent of each other. We cannot have public confidence if checks and balances are not built into the system. The member for Bradfield also had the gumption to speak of 'dither and delay'. The government of which he was part did little else on this and across so many areas. We are acting. We are catching up with the world. The bill is here and, given that the opposition were trying without success to put it together on their watch, they should be supporting it now and not pretending that they won't go out and register themselves for a digital ID as soon as they can, too.

How are we showing our commitment to this digital ID? We're certainly doing it with a lot of money—$288.1 million has been allocated for the national digital identity program. The 2024-25 funding will be used to run pilots with the private sector and to develop the infrastructure, the regulation and the security. Businesses will be able to participate in the scheme within two years of the passage of this bill. Most of this funding—$156 million—will be spent by the Australian Taxation Office to upgrade the myGov platforms to allow users to securely access government services on behalf of a business using a digital ID. Another $23.4 million will be spent to upgrade the encryption of the myGov and myGovID platforms because we rightly expect that the security for this system will be of the highest order.

In summary, the use of this digital ID will be voluntary. Organisations will need to provide alternatives for those who do not wish to use the system. It won't be difficult, as each organisation or government department already has a system for requiring and proving ID. This bill will reduce the need for people to share their personal and identification documentation and other information repeatedly with the many departments and businesses that now require it as standard practice. This bill will make people safer. It will make the holding of our personal identification more secure and convenient—and we'll ensure it's voluntary. I commend the bill to the House, and I thank the minister for her stewardship.

Bob Katter (Kennedy, Katter's Australian Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

To the speakers supporting this bill: maybe the education system doesn't have Brave New World or 1984 on their reading lists. But in Queensland, up until the nineties, anyway, I can assure you they were on the reading list, and every child, every young person, in Queensland, read Aldous Huxley's Brave New World and George Orwell's 1984. The characterisation in those books, as in all the movies that have been made about these two wonderful books, was: Big Brother is watching. You people are advocating Big Brother watching. These people will win the next election, and you'll see what it's like when they have access to every movement that you make.

Honourable Member:

An honourable member interjecting—

Bob Katter (Kennedy, Katter's Australian Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Unlike you, I happen to be a very strong trade union man. We've had to have discussions in situations that were very, very prickly. They didn't want to see, and I didn't want to see, anyone looking in on our discussions. But there's no privacy now. You've taken our privacy away.

I sat in the room when we were assured that the gun laws would not interfere with your personal freedoms and your right to protect yourself in your own home. We're now putting before the Queensland parliament the Castle Law, which has been the law of the British tradition since Magna Carta—your right to protect yourself in your own home. The Liberals are not voting for it—they're too scared—and, of course, Labor is opposing it, as usual. You know the three famous assurances: 'I'll respect you in the morning'; 'The check's in the mail'; and 'I'm from the government; I'm here to help you. I'm from the government; you can trust me.' Under the gun laws, a government authority can walk into your home any time they like. Did we lose our rights to privacy, freedom and the idea that an Englishman's home is his castle? Of course we lost all those rights.

On Telstra, I said: 'You've got to be joking, Mr Prime Minister. If you privatise Telstra, how the hell are we going to get services in our little towns, on our station properties, in our remote areas and in mining? How are we going to get coverage?' The former Prime Minister, John Howard, assured me—and he's a very good man and a very good Australian; please don't take my remarks as being critical—saying, 'No, no, no Bob. We are putting universal service obligations in there.' Go and tell that to people in Julia Creek or the people in the Gulf Country. What use are the universal service obligations? If you trust the government with your freedoms, you are a fool and you betray the people that you represent. Not one person in the ALP has had the guts to stand up on the issue, and I would suspect that many of them are not on side with this proposal.

Having said those things, freedom is a real issue in Australia today. My grandchildren were coming up a few years ago. I said: 'Oh, beauty! I'll get out the air rifles and we'll shoot a few toads.' My wife informed me that boys below the age of 13 or 15—whatever it is—are not allowed to use any firearm whatsoever. 'Yeah, but this is a 70-year-old air rifle!' 'They're not allowed to use them.' So that freedom is gone for every generation of Queenslanders who live in a small town. He had his air rifle and, later on, his .22—well, that one's gone. I said, 'Alright, I'll set up the flying fox and—zoom, zoom, zoom—splash in the swimming pool.' She said: 'No, you'd have to take the panel off the fence. If you take the panel off the fence, that's illegal.' 'But they're not going to inspect it. We're out of town.' She said: 'They came and inspected it last week, and they informed us that our fence was 2½ centimetres below what it should be. They want the whole fence replaced'—at a cost of $3,500.

That's not the end of it. I said, 'We'll start work on the second stage of the tree house.' 'Uh-uh. A kid fell out of a tree house in Brisbane two months ago. Tree houses are banned.' Tree houses are banned. Grandad's 70-year-old air rifle is banned from shooting toads. I'm not allowed to use the swimming pool. I said, 'Alright, we'll just go down the flat and boil the billy.' The most iconic Australian scene is boiling the billy. We should teach all our grandkids how to boil a billy and make a bit of damper. My wife said: 'No, you have to get a permit to light a fire in the open. It will take at least three months for the permit to come through.' A free country? You people in this place and in the state houses have never understood freedom. You've had such an abundance of freedom in this country that you have a cavalier attitude towards it. And you are paying a terrible penalty. When government officials can walk into my house at any time they like, I am already paying a terrible price for freedom.

Every single school child in Queensland was made to read Aldous Huxley's Brave New World and George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four because it is an important part of your understanding of freedom. That was why it was on the reading list for every single kid that ever went through schooling in Queensland's history. You people either don't understand it or haven't read it, because, when your party says to go ahead with some stupid, ridiculous, terrible infringement of our freedoms, you just do it—and you don't even kick up a stink! You're not even game to open your mouths in the party rooms. I was in a party room for 30 years. The people who I selected to go into the ministry in Queensland were the people who did stand up in the party room, because I knew that, when we went out in the public arena, they were going to stand up for the principles that they believed in. We were born and birthed in freedom in our country, and we never had to fight for it like the Americans. They had to fight for it twice: freedom for the black people and freedom for themselves from the pernicious rule of Great Britain.

While I'm on the subject, I can't help but mention that we have a lot of growing up to do as a country. Any country that would put a foreign monarch on their coin says (a) you do not believe that all people are born free and equal, and (b) you do not believe that we're a separate country. You cannot put a monarch of England on your coin and say that you're a separate country. It is not Australian. And yet that's what you're going to do.

And it's the same with freedom. You haven't grown up—you're not like France or America or even Britain. You can criticise Oliver Cromwell if you like. You can criticise the founders of the Magna Carta, or Archbishop Langton, the region of England—you can criticise them, but you enjoy those freedoms. Remember, every freedom that you enjoy has been bought with the blood of hundreds of thousands of martyrs, and you come into this place and just fritter it away until you've got no freedoms left.

I use the example of my grandkids coming home. Freedom? Is this a free country! I would say that Queensland would be the most un-freest society on earth. Queensland is worse than the other states. We have had more government for a longer period than the other states. So I would say that. And if you are to fire me then you start the argument. You give me an argument. Here you are taking away our right to privacy, and to some degree I'd say it's the most powerful right that we still enjoy. Well, it's gone. Big Brother will be watching you every inch of the day in facial recognition. In China, the leader in this area—the great leader is China, a country that's noted for its freedoms and respect for humanity. They're the world leaders and you'll get their technology from them, and they'll have access to your technology.

I stand up with a rage and fury in my soul. I lived in the freest country on earth, the state of Queensland, which had the great Theodore Labor government, for 40 years, outside of Brisbane. Take this point, you politicians: Theodore Labor outside of Brisbane won every seat, every election for 40 years. There's nothing like it I can find in human history, because he gave us great and wonderful freedoms. You could get a miner's right and you could go anywhere you liked in Queensland unless it was freehold land—95 per cent of the land in Queensland is pastoral lease, so you could go anywhere that you liked. And, all right, I might say that you let the cattle owner know that you're going on to his place, but that was an incredible freedom. You could just go anywhere that you liked, and what a wonderful country. I could carry my rifle anywhere I liked.

And for those of you who say, 'That's a freedom you have to sacrifice for the security of the people!', in Queensland, we had eight deaths with guns when we had no laws at all. I walked into a sports shop to buy a pair of socks and I saw an AK-47 rifle so I bought the AK-47 rifle instead of my socks, and threw it in the back of the car at the Gold Coast over Christmas. I threw it if the back of the car and drove around all day with an AK-47 and 350 rounds of ammunition. We had eight deaths with guns. In New South Wales, if we had eight deaths, they should have had 16. They didn't have 16. They didn't have 26 or 36. They had 38 deaths with guns, with very strict laws. Victoria, with draconian laws had 54 deaths with guns. Taking away that freedom—what did it achieve? It achieved an increase in the number of deaths with guns. And that is the same in Europe—the same phenomenon occurs—and it's the same in America. I absolutely love the arguments.

This is a story about freedom. That's what we're talking about here. In America, they say: 'Oh, it's terrible! Deaths with guns is horrific!' But have a look where they're occurring: in North Dakota and South Dakota there have been no deaths in the last two years. Guess who's got the highest gun registration in the world? It's North Dakota and South Dakota. Washington DC has the highest death rate, where guns are almost banned.

You are taking away our right to privacy, our right to freedom. And I don't know about other people in this place, but I've had to have very delicate negotiations to head off some very harmful strikes, and in other cases to turn on some very harmful strikes to get rights for our workers and people that were working in very dangerous conditions. I don't want to have anyone looking in on those discussions. Matters are sub judice. We're not supposed to interfere in the course of justice, but there would not be a person in this place that hasn't, at some time, pleaded a case where there's a great injustice occurring and tried to head it off. And now it will be on the register and you will go to jail when you do those things, because interfering in the course of justice is an unlawful and jailable offence.

I could give you a hundred examples of where your freedom is going to vanish. It is not funny to say, 'I'm from the government. Trust me,' and that's exactly what the last two ALP speakers were saying: 'We're from the government. You can trust us.' Who would trust a government that has backed Gaza? Would you trust those people? They're justifying the murder of 1,200 innocent people with no provocation whatsoever, and they're out there barracking for Gaza. Would you trust that government? I wouldn't. Would you trust a government that has closed mines and intends to close all of the coalmines in Queensland, putting— (Time expired)

Michael McCormack (Riverina, National Party, Shadow Minister for International Development and the Pacific) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Freedom is important. We just heard 15 minutes of why freedom is important to the member for Kennedy, and I understand much of what he said. I completely understand where he's coming from. He, like me, represents a country electorate, and people in country electorates take their freedom very seriously indeed.

I know, from when I was deputy chair of the NSC, that national security is, of course, the hallmark of a good government. We banned Huawei, and I know that, following that decision, which didn't go down well in Beijing, Britain followed suit. Estonia, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania and Sweden—the list goes on and on—were concerned that Huawei, a leading global provider of ICT infrastructure and smart devices, would have too much control over the information disseminating around our nation and the nations that I just mentioned. Indeed, would they have control over systems where our hospitals were operating or over traffic lights? These are important discussions to have. As a government, you need to ensure that the safety and security of your people is No. 1. At the time, Huawei was a sponsor of the Canberra Raiders rugby league football club in the National Rugby League, and there was a lot of pressure on Australia. I raise that, in the context of this important debate, because freedoms are important, and they are certainly important to those who sit on the same side of the parliament that I do.

I am perturbed that, in the death throes of the final parliamentary sitting week of the Senate, not that long ago, this particular legislation, the Digital ID Bill 2024, was rushed through and guillotined by a government that, when it came in in May 2022, said that it would be more transparent, said that it would be more open, and said that it would respect parliamentary procedure, protocols and process. Yet on this, and on other bills, it did not. Even when you think back to 12 months ago, the appropriation bills for the second budget brought down by the member for Rankin were guillotined. I have never in all of my time here—and this is my fifth term—seen the appropriation bills being shut off and members not being allowed to speak on those particular bills. Why we would have a digital identity bill with members unable to speak on it is beyond reason and beyond belief.

These amendments which were put forward to enhance privacy protections for Australians who choose to use digital IDs were not supported. We oppose these bills; we believe they're half baked. And it's not just the coalition which thinks that they're half baked and it isn't just the member for Kennedy or, I'm sure, others. I've had a lot of correspondence into my office, some from people who don't usually reach out about legislation—they just go with the flow. In particular, there were two emails I received where I felt it necessary that I put them on the parliamentary record, on the Hansard, because the people who sent them in were very concerned about the digital ID bills and what they might entail for them and for others. One was from Jenny Madden from Uranquinty. I've known Jenny for a long time. Jenny is a good citizen; she is a passionate Australian. She said:

Although I am a user of My Health record, and an enthusiastic advocate of such a resource, I am greatly disturbed by the potential ramifications of the Digital ID Bill 2024.

Even though I completely understand that it is more onerous to use numerous different identification documents such as birth certificates, passports, and driving licences to prove ID, it is in this very aspect of variation that safety lies. With the centralisation of data comes great danger.

Firstly, the Federal Government has a poor track record of securing our information. For example, in 2020, security researchers warned the public against using MyGovID due to security flaws in its design, which the Australian Tax Office declined to fix.

Moreover, an article published by the ABC last year titled "Cyber black market selling hacked ATO and MyGov logins shows Medibank and Optus only tip of iceberg" reported on numerous data breaches involving the Australian Tax Office, National Disability Insurance Scheme and MyGov.

But what I find even more concerning is that a single digital identity database could facilitate a system of surveillance of Australians not unlike that of China's social credit score system.

That's what Jenny Madden had to say. I understand completely where she's coming from. Dan Grentnell, of North Wagga, said:

I would like to express my disapproval of the proposed digital ID legislation on behalf of my family, myself, and I think the majority of people of the Riverina and Australia who actually know how much of an overreach of government this is.

Australians have to ask themselves—do they really want the government acting as gatekeeper over every aspect of your life, I know I certainly do not.

These two are just normal, everyday, ordinary Australians but they speak for a lot of people. They're good people and what they have put in their emails to me are concerns that I know would be shared by a number of regional Australians and a number of Australians, full stop.

I know that more than 10 million people already use the Australian government ID system via myGov ID. I get that the banks and, dare I say it, even supermarket loyalty cards have a lot of information on people. But only recently I had the bank that I have been with since I was a teenager—and rest assured that is a long time ago, more's the pity!—pursuing me via text and email to actually identify who I was. All they required was my driver's licence number—not only the licence number on the front but the number that appears in the back. I'm just going through the process of renewing my licence and I now have a paper form from New South Wales. The number on the back of that wasn't the number they required so I have to ring the bank back and give the proper number when I get my little laminated licence in the mail in coming weeks. I digress, but as I said to the person on the end of the phone when I finally rang under the threat of having bank accounts closed: 'Fair dinkum! If you can't find my name, just do a Google search! And don't believe everything you read when you do that Google search!' But I was worried about being scammed because so many people get text messages via their mobile phones and via their iPads and they get emails from supposed trustworthy institutions, but they are from scammers in far-off countries who just want to take their money, get their identity and use it.

I know that a lot of MPs use social media and many MPs have people putting up fake accounts purporting to be those members. I also know that we've been told not to use TikTok. I can't understand why any MP would want to use TikTok. They might want to reach out to younger members, but it is a security risk.

People are also concerned with this particular legislation and they are concerned not only with the contents of it. How can Australians trust Labor to manage digital ID when they won't even allow parliamentary scrutiny? And why does the government feel the need to rush legislation such as this through, if it is so important that people's representatives in the parliament can't speak on it. I'm glad I've got the opportunity, but my Senate colleagues were not given that opportunity. For a government that said that they would be more transparent, why did they rush this through the Senate in the finishing hours of that last parliamentary sitting week? Labor's bills don't adequately ensure that the bill is truly voluntary, yet every Australian deserves to receive the same quality of services regardless of how they're accessing them, be it through traditional ID or face to face and so forth.

The government shouldn't proceed with these bills until such time as they've reformed the Privacy Act. There should be simultaneous private sector participation in the Australian government digital identity system to ensure that the digital ID is a truly national, whole-of-economy solution.

When in government, we did some careful, calibrated work to progress the AGDIS—the digital identity system. We worked hard, we worked in good faith, we took on board consultation from stakeholders and we made sure that what we were doing was transparent. Unfortunately, I can't say the same about this. There are many, many Australians who are concerned that hacking and professionally done security flaws and breaches will happen as a result of this sort of system, if and when it is enacted.

We released, as the coalition government, draft legislation in 2021 to further regulate digital identity. The important word in that sentence is 'draft'. We put it out there, we made sure that people were able to have a good look at it, we made sure that people were able to respond to their local members of parliament, because that's what being a federal member of the House of Representatives is—it's about taking feedback from the constituency. But this was done, so to speak, in the dead of night. This was done on a whim by Labor, and I have to say there's been a lot happen this year, there just has—a lot of legislation and a lot of things done in the parliament.

This particular legislation and the National Disability Insurance Scheme are probably the two things that my office—my electorate offices at Wagga Wagga and Parkes—have received the most traffic about. When it happened so quickly and was so rushed through the Senate in that parliamentary sitting week, I was inundated with emails. I was surprised and amazed at how many people approached me when I was out at events and in the street and wherever else I happened to be in my local communities, by the number of people who came up to me and asked me about it because they were that concerned. That's not normally the case. People will often get animated about things that might happen in the budget, things that didn't happen in the budget and all that sort of thing. But the amount of people who were very concerned that their privacy was going to be breached because of what Labor did in rushing this through the Senate, quite frankly surprised me.

The digital identity legislation introduced by the Albanese Labor government is very, very different to the draft bill which the coalition released. That concerns me, as well. The coalition put forward amendments designed to fix what we see as weaknesses in the bill. Our amendments included the following: a much stronger guarantee that having a digital identity would be voluntary; that no Australian would be required to have one; that someone would not face a lower quality of service should they wish to use traditional paper based identity documents; removing the phasing provisions so that the private sector could be involved from the outset—how important is that?—and imposing a clear requirement that the changes to the Privacy Act must be made before this legislation came into force.

As a reasonable person, I would have thought that those amendments were reasonable to the government. They weren't onerous. We were working in a bipartisan fashion with the government to try to strengthen legislation that Labor felt the need to just ram through the Senate. It always bothers me when legislation starts in the Senate and then our representatives in the Senate—the fine states' house that it is—do not get the opportunity to speak. The amendments were just brushed aside. That bothers me. The government refused to accept our amendments, more is the pity. Accordingly, the coalition voted to oppose the government's digital identity legislation because, as I said a short time ago, it is half baked—that's a good description of it. We want to make sure that any legislation that comes before the House is what it ought to be and is given proper consideration not just in this place, the parliament on the hill, but indeed right throughout this wide brown land.

Sitting suspended from 12 : 56 to 16 : 00

Pat Conaghan (Cowper, National Party, Shadow Assistant Minister for Social Services) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I'm pleased to rise to talk on the Digital ID Bill 2024 and the related bill. My electorate of Cowper is around 8,000 square kilometres, so it's not a huge electorate, but it's big enough that it allows me to conduct mobile offices around the electorate. Every week I will go to a different place, find a hall somewhere and meet constituents. Sometimes I go to The Pub With No Beer up at Taylors Arm and constituents come and meet me on the verandah there. They talk about a whole range of issues, whether that's Centrelink, child care or aged care. Sometimes it's about local council issues. Sometimes it's about state issues. Quite often people just want to come along and meet the local member.

Over the past six or eight months, I have to say that, overwhelmingly, the people who have been attending those mobile offices, as well as emailing my office, have been speaking to me about their concerns in relation to the Digital ID Bill. They have concerns about privacy, government intervention and their freedoms. Just because I'm out the back of the bush in halls and in the corners of pubs doesn't mean that it's the tinfoil-hat brigade coming to see me to raise their concerns. These are mums and dads, grandmothers and grandfathers, business owners and farmers. Everyday people out there are coming to talk to me about their concerns. They're saying, 'Pat, you've got to represent us in parliament against the Digital ID Bill.'

I've printed out three emails from constituents. The first email is from Angie: 'Please vote no. It is an unsafe idea, as hackers are getting smarter, as recent events show clearly. The Australian public (your voters) do not want this digital ID or wish to be discriminated against if we choose not to use it (while that is still an option). We are a free country. Let's keep it that way and err on the side of caution.'

The second email—and I get multiple of these every single day—is from Peter: 'Please vote against the Digital ID Bill. Your privacy, my privacy, our freedom—all at risk. Digital ID will become the tool for big government and big corporations to monitor, track and control us. The Digital ID Bill is a Trojan horse that threatens to transform our democratic society into a surveillance state. Please share this petition widely to help us stop this before it's too late.'

This last one is a bit longer, but I feel that I need to read it out because it is so balanced. It's from Steve: 'Dear Sir, I write regarding the Digital ID bill. As my representative in parliament, I urge you to reject and oppose this insidious bill on my behalf. I appeal to your integrity and your humanity to make the debate clear in your mind. As you know, this country is not the country you and I grew up in. I am 62 this year and I know there is something terrible happening to our country and the world. No-one can doubt the advantages of digital communications and computing but, in my opinion, the digital/AI machine is not being used for the betterment of humanity. I am beyond making arguments politically. This issue is about our humanity. Are we going to surrender our rights to the arbitrary decisions of the machine—a machine obviously being utilised by a nefarious power? I will not comply with any "digital ID requirements". I am an Australian, born in Sydney and raised in New South Wales, and I know who I am.' As a closing statement, 'I am so very tired of seeing division being cultivated by our very own governments.'

So there's a cross-section of very reasonable people who are expressing their real fears of this intervention into their lives through the Digital ID Bill. You have to ask why people are coming to me in droves over this very issue and lobbying me to come down here and speak the truth. If government wants policy passed, they have to have the trust of the public. They have to garner the trust of the public. Why does the government not have the trust of the public on this very issue? It's because over the Christmas period there was a one-month consultation period. When governments push something through over the Christmas period, what they're trying to do is fly under the radar. We've seen it time and time again. Not only did they have the consultation period over a month—a short period of time, considering the impact that this bill could have on our communities—but Labor gagged debate in the Senate. They gagged debate on this very bill. Why? That is the question the public is asking: why did they do that? When Labor don't stand up and offer a reason or give another opportunity for a consultation period, the only reason the public could ascertain is that it was for sinister reasons. They do not want this bill. They want their freedom. They want their privacy respected.

Do you know who does want this bill? The banks. The banks want this bill, and they will worm their way into the government's pockets and say, 'We need this information for the betterment of society,' and they will use your information for their own financial purposes. They will gather your information, and we're seeing it already. We're seeing it already with the banks' ESG—their environmental and social governance. If you don't comply with their train of thought, they can freeze your accounts or they can say, 'I'm sorry, you don't have the privilege of being our customer anymore.' I've seen it happen in my electorate. So the banks would welcome this—all your information. They would use that information that you hold so closely.

The other people, not too far away from the banks, who will love this are the crooks, the criminals. We have seen breaches of privacy time and time again over the last 12 or 18 months to two years. The last one was in a club where you now have to scan your licence and they take all your details. You don't just have to prove you're over 18; you've got to say: 'There are all my details. There's my date of birth. There's my licence number.' Why on earth do clubs need all that? In my day you just had to prove you had a licence and were over 18, and you walked straight in. Now it's: 'There's all my information. Please don't get hacked.' And that's exactly what's happened. All the information from New South Wales clubs went out to a criminal. And they are getting more and more sophisticated.

Imagine a world where these bills proceed and all your information is gathered and put into the system, and some brilliant hacker gets it. They will use that for their own purposes; we're seeing it now with ransomware. But what happens if they have all your details and a hacker hacks the system and decides: 'Rather than doing that, I'm going to make sure you no longer exist. I'm going to wipe your details'? This is not beyond the realm of possibility. You wake up one day, and, on paper, you no longer exist. You ring the bank and they say, 'I'm sorry, you don't exist anymore.' You go to the hospital and they say, 'I'm sorry, we don't have any records of Medicare.' This is why we need to keep our details private. This is why we shouldn't be handing out every single piece of information to big government to infect our lives.

Australia is a free country and should remain a free country. We should have the right to say 'no'. One of the biggest problems with these bills is the voluntariness of being involved. We put forward some amendments to ensure that that would happen, and Labor voted them down. Why? Is the next step, 'There is no option; you must comply'? Last week I went back and—I hadn't read it for a long time—read George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four, which, interestingly, was written in 1949. Winston Smith, the main character, spoke of his worries about where the government was in his life, and in every room you went into there was a TV that could see you, and it knew exactly where you were at a particular time of day, knew exactly what transaction you'd made and put out what the public should think. It was incredible, reading this book and thinking: 'This is where we are now. This is exactly where we're heading.' The next step will be that government will have complete control over us. This is not what we want. We want the freedoms of the past. We don't want government telling us what to do.

There are many diverse reasons that people come and see me and are opposing these bills. But the biggest one is the freedoms that we enjoy right now, followed by the real fears that their information will end up in the wrong hands. This is exactly why we should not support these bills.

Russell Broadbent (Monash, Independent) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Thank you, Deputy Speaker Sharkie, for this opportunity to speak on the Digital ID Bill 2024 and the associated bill. One thing I will note from the start is this: look at the list of speakers here. There are no Labor speakers at all, only coalition or independent speakers—not one from Labor! There's a good reason they're not lined up to speak on this bill: half of them don't like it. Half of them are very uncomfortable with the bill, but they can't say anything to their leadership about the fact that they're uncomfortable with the way this bill attends freedoms.

But it's not just the Labor party that's at odds here. I'll go back to 2022, when the coalition was in power and I was a member of that government. To give the experience—and I'll come to that a bit later on—if you ran a superannuation account on your own in 2022, the then minister, Jane Hume, introduced and passed legislation for a government sector ID for small and medium super funds. I got a direction from the government that said: 'Sign up or else. You have to have a digital identity if you want to be a director of your own super fund.' I thought: 'This can't be right. The Liberal-National government would never to do this—make it compulsory.' Not only did they make it compulsory but, under the law, directors who failed to apply for a director ID within the stipulated time frame could face criminal or civil penalties of 5,000 penalty units, which currently stands at $1.11 million. Directors of a CATSI organisation can face penalties of $200,000. So I thought, 'I better get on and get a digital ID,' because I didn't want to be the member of parliament that wouldn't sign up for, at that time, his own government's digital ID.

It was quite difficult. It was quite a strain on my wife to get that done, because you have to have facial recognition. You had to go through the process, and our accountants couldn't process our documentation. So don't talk to me about 'voluntary'. This government is talking about 'voluntary', and I'll speak a bit more on that when I get a chance later, when, internationally, this legislation is in nearly every Western country. 'Oh, surprise! 'No, it's in Australia. It's only an Australian proposition.' No, it's not an Australian proposition; it is worldwide. We are following along, tagging along, with the Americans and other countries on this bill.

We just heard the member for Cowper outline the community concerns about this bill, and what the community is on about is freedom of activity, freedom of engagement and freedom of being part of the Australian community without encumbrances like a digital identity bill. If you want to hide the bill, what you would do is introduce it in budget week. But the first thing you would do is rush it through the Senate on the last day of sitting, helped by the fact that coalition members didn't turn up to vote against it. I know why they didn't, because they proposed it themselves and put in the legislation. As a backbencher, I didn't see that legislation; I didn't see that come before the party room. I didn't see it; I wasn't told about it. But, when I did find it, it was in some obscure corporate legislation—set out here—that would have gone through the party room without comment. It would have been an uncontroversial bill. Well, it became controversial for us.

From where I sit, there's something exceptionally sneaky and suspicious about the bill and how the government is handling it. Accordingly, debate on this bill is as a pesky and insignificant piece of legislation—no big deal! Well, it isn't. To the contrary, it's one of the most heinous, overreaching and disturbing bills I've seen in the 25 years that I've spent in the parliament. Adding to my suspicion, consultation about this important bill was stifled. A quiet notice went out: one month to provide feedback. This was just before Christmas, when people were distracted and rightfully preparing to switch off—not switch on. Then, to top it off, as I said, it was rammed it through the Senate without any committee consultation. There's nothing surer than this bill having the capacity, in one fell swoop, to imprison us all as servants of the state. Have I gone too far?

There's been too much. This Digital ID Bill is already mandatory. Take the requirement for digital identity for directors of superannuation funds. I explained the situation with my wife before. We could have faced a serious fine if we hadn't done what we were told. Other people have told me that they just signed up using paperwork. How they did that I don't know. That wasn't our instruction. The reason 10 million Australians have to have a myGovID is that 10 million Australians were coerced into getting one and Centrelink won't or can't talk to you without one. Recently, in Western Australian, there was a payment to be made, but you couldn't access the payment without a digital ID. As one commentator put it:

Why should the Government have any more of our data than they already have? They don't deserve it. They have not proven that they can be trusted to handle information about their citizens responsibly.

Well, it's too late. The game's up. Australians can see through this nonsense. The Australian people will never forget the extent to which their human rights—which I screamed about every day—were violated during the pandemic, nor will I. It's clear we're already living in Orwellian times, with 24/7 surveillance through satellites, banks and facial recognition technology. How do I know about facial recognition technology? I have an in with Coles supermarkets. Bunnings tried to bring in facial recognition for their customers and dropped it because it was against the law. It's still against the law, but Coles have put in all the facilities and all the cameras for facial recognition throughout all their stores. Whether it's throughout all their stores yet, I don't know, but they're just waiting for the time when they can switch it on. What it will do is get your face against the products you're buying. It doesn't even wait until you get to the checkout; it puts it against the product you are putting your hand up on the shelf to buy. They will know everything about you.

A pregnant mother was called by her bank after their transaction algorithm picked up that she'd visited a medical centre and had had a pregnancy scan. Apparently they were offended that she and her partner had negotiated their mortgage based on having one child. Their crime, it appears, was that she and her husband didn't consult the bank before conceiving their second child, thus affecting the loan and their ability to pay it.

Then, as you know, there's the move towards a cashless society. The Digital ID Bill is yet another bill supporting the government and the banks to move us into a cashless economy. Just imagine how dangerous the ID becomes when the money in your bank account is inextricably tied to it. What worries me is that, if they give you a digital identity, the digital identity can be taken away. We just had an enormous storm go through Mirboo North. It was a unique, unprecedented storm. It smashed huge forest trees to the ground as though they were matchsticks. There was only one apparent death caused by the storm—one farmer, who was hit by flying debris—but how the rest of the town survived without death, I don't know. There was no communication, no power, no electricity, no water and no food available. As one lady said to me, we went back to 200 years. But I make the point that, because they were so reliant on cards, they couldn't get fuel, supplies et cetera. They're saying this digital ID is not mandatory, but it is, and I've been against mandatory everything through the whole of my 25 years, whatever that mandatory might be. But in this case I believe that, if it's given to you, it can be taken away. I know of a personal instance. A friend of mine was deemed by a bank to be not a suitable customer. The bank were the judge and jury, and they said, 'We and other banks will no longer deal with you.' Now his whole business operation has to go through his daughter.

We saw the government's willingness to override our human rights during COVID. We saw the closing of bank accounts, the police storming in to arrest a pregnant woman who had posted her views about a lockdown on Facebook and the censoring of social media posts put up by people sharing their heartbreaking stories of vaccine injury. When I say no to the next vaccination mandate, which I will—as I did to the COVID mandate—how might my digital identity be used to encode, punish or penalise me? Might it prevent me from paying for my shopping prevent me from travelling by cancelling my drivers licence or switch off my electricity? I think the worst part on former minister Jane Hume's was: 'A director ID will be attached to a director permanently, even if they cease to be a director, change their name or move interstate or overseas.' It will be like a tattoo! I haven't got a tattoo, but that would be a digital tattoo.

I am concerned about this; I'm concerned about freedom and the huge risks. I want to say to the people in this room that every time I've made a decision or looked at legislation, I've made that decision and looked at the legislation in the knowledge that the decisions we were making may affect you, your children and your grandchildren. Just like a tattoo, they're permanent: the legislation is permanent. Yes, this can be repealed, perhaps, by a future government chasing freedom. But every bit of legislation can be turned around and can be used by authorities. Will it be your children or your grandchildren affected by the legislation that we move today? Boring? It works. I'm with Senator Canavan, Senator Rennick, the member for New England and others who have stood up here and opposed this bill. And they've opposed it for very good reason.

We all read books. There was The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo, where she was an expert hacker. That book tells the future of how they can hack, what they can do and how they can move money and all sorts of things. It's a fictional story, but it exists today. Hackers make us look like fools. We have all talked about the scams that are happening, where $3 billion is lost every year in Australia through hacking and scamming. How can the government be so confident that we can put all this information into one bank—myGovID or whatever it is—and that they won't be hacked? Or cut out—hacked to the point where, as the member for Cowper said, you don't exist. The government didn't do it, but somebody decided to take you on and the way they can attack you now is through your digital ID. It's an Australia Card on steroids. People today want the opportunity to have control over your life—more control. So it isn't about keeping people safe, it is about control. There is no redress here in the case of fraud or cybersecurity. They've said, 'We'll find the people,' if they can find the people who did the cyberattack. They could find them, but are they likely to be in this country? I don't think so. This government today have said that we have been under cyberattack from our so-called friends and people who we trade with. That has happened already.

The government have failed to demonstrate the need for digital ID and they have failed to convince us that they are trustworthy enough to keep this information secure. I heard everything in the second reading speech that it was designed by the Public Service to say. I saw all the new commissioners they're putting in place—I saw all of that. But that won't mean one thing to the individual who is crucified under this legislation through his digital ID being attacked. I listen to my constituents, and they tell me they don't like it. They're telling the government they don't like it. The backbench of the Labor Party is telling them they don't like it and the backbench of the Liberal Party is telling them they don't like it. I heard what the shadow minister said today—I thought it was pretty wishy-washy. If you are really going to protect freedoms in Australia, you oppose this bill and you oppose it with all your strength and all your arm.

David Gillespie (Lyne, National Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I stand here to speak about the Digital ID Bill 2024 with very mixed feelings. I'm one of the 10½ million Australians that have a myGovID. I got sucked in and gave all my details, which the government already has through my tax files and through my multiple passports. But, for some reason when I was in the ministry, I needed something, so I had to sign up to it.

This is an initiative that we all know about and that was created following the review in 2014 known as the Murray inquiry. The resulting initiative is commonly known as the Trusted Digital Identity Framework. There is some merit in the system, but what is proposed is an economywide system, which is different from the way the government and citizens interact, when government provides a lot of services to Australian individuals. But the fact is that this is going to change and be virtually universal.

I'm concerned that there will be multiple identity providers, or multiple issuers of digital identities. There is a private provider already within AGDIS system. But, under what is proposed in the transitional arrangements, they will transition over.

The whole idea of it was to get efficiency for businesses that want to know who they're dealing with. To know that you're not a fake person or a criminal, they want some form of ID.

If we're going to have this system, it should be available to everyone. And there are plenty of people who don't want the government to have more and more ability to digitally track them. There is freedom of movement and freedom of association, but, if it's all in one spot, as the previous speaker mentioned, it puts a lot of architecture in place for long-term digital surveillance. We have seen problems in other nations with social credit systems that are enabled by being tracked. Your behaviour, in some autocratic nations, gives you social credit or brownie points, so you can access more services—or, secondarily, you can be denied services.

At the same time, we have two other digital phenomena happening in the world. We have the cashless society being foisted on us by bankers because it suits them. I have no doubt that most of us like the ability to have a credit card and to tap and go, but most of us also like the fact that we can have real money—real cash—and deal in that way. There are plenty of people in our country who don't have access to the cashless society, so we need to keep cash.

This is just another part of a phenomenon. We are clever monkeys and we have developed amazing technology. But, when you combine social credit systems, a cashless society and digital tracking, and you put artificial intelligence on top of that, it gets to be a very scary combination of digital skills that can upend your life.

We've all heard of identity theft. What if someone were to be able to hack into the government super system, which this federal government seems to be wanting to happen? There are state based systems existing in some jurisdictions, and there have been high-level intergovernmental meetings to try and force everyone onto the one system. If it's going to be here, I'd prefer that there were some private providers, because they might be a safer venue to hold your critical information, rather than a monstrous central government system that can be hacked.

We hear about it all the time. Could you imagine if someone got an image of you and made a 'digital you' with artificial intelligence? You've seen some prominent people who've had their images stolen, a digital fake made of them and appeared in financial scams, advertising goods and services, and they have no idea. I've seen pictures of some of these celebrities and elected officials that look remarkably like them. It's a case of buyer beware with this technology. I'm happy to give my identity—that the government already has to a central location—as long as it's secure, but a lot of people aren't and they should have the right not to do that.

As we've seen up in the Senate, they tried to ram this through and did that without a full discussion. The amendments to the Privacy Act haven't been confirmed, there is a mixture of ministers who have legislative and regulatory control over the system versus another minister that has control about the creation of the licences—some are in Finance, some are in DSS. I think this is a shoddy bit of rushed legislation, and that we really need to take a slow breath, get through all these issues and make sure that when it does come in that other entities that are setting up aren't restricted from being part of the system. And people should absolutely have the voluntary right to be able to establish their identity by traditional paper, in-person attendance, written name and address, and all those things and it shouldn't be used as a vehicle for restraining trade and changing conditions of existing contracts with service providers, be they government or not government.

All in all, it's a pretty complex issue. I just think the issue is not urgent. It needs proper and thorough evaluation. It would be good to send it off to a committee that can really pull it to pieces, and we'll get a better product in the end. I reserve my rights on how I proceed in the vote on this issue.

Zoe Daniel (Goldstein, Independent) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I'd like to begin by recognising the importance that the government's digital ID proposal represents for the Australian economy and society, but I say that equivocally. I will say that the existing arrangement of digital identity verification in Australia—one decentralised and led by the private sector—is fraught with risk. One only has to look at the 2022 Optus and Medibank Private data breaches to identify the need for a secure means of digital identity verification in Australia. Names, phone numbers, physical addresses, bank details and mental health diagnoses should not so readily find their way into the public domain. Australians can and should be protected from this kind of risk.

Enabling Australian industry to rely on a secure means of digital identity verification is likely to simplify a vast range of economic activities. Banks will be able to verify a mortgage applicant's identity without having to undertake their own verification process and carry the risk of storing sensitive identity documentation themselves. Accessing government services like Medicare or the Tax Office would be made less arduous—that's the promise, anyway. It's even foreseeable that the process of entering a hospitality venue could become quicker and easier, with greater protection for underage children.

Some people are suspicious of or simply struggle to deal with the increasing digitalisation of government services that we've seen in recent decades. I understand and I acknowledge their concerns. There is an equity issue here, and we must make sure that older people, poorer people and people from a range of backgrounds are not disadvantaged. But I don't oppose the trend in principle. I can see that where evidence based policy design has been undertaken and thoroughly considered, and safeguards are in place, digitalisation can be a force for positive change in society.

Unfortunately, however, there are elements of this legislation which indicate the process has not been rigorous enough. Whether this policy will be successful comes down to a single word: trust. In the case of digital ID, I don't think the government has done enough to build that trust, and I think that's been evidenced by the speakers before me.

The government has missed several opportunities. As a starting point, it is poor public policy and legislative practice that this piece of legislation has been prioritised for enactment prior to the government's broader promised series of reforms to the Privacy Act. This view was put forward by Digital Rights Watch to the government last year but has apparently been ignored or, at worst, parked. As the government has publicly acknowledged, Australia's present-day privacy legislation is insufficiently robust to deal with a modern and internet connected digital economy. Ideally, expansion of the existing Australian government's digital ID system should only occur within a comprehensive legal framework which provides assurance to Australians that their sensitive data is private and protected.

The government's proposed model for this digital ID system is not of itself new. It's a model that has been used internationally, and many countries have adopted such a policy, the Aadhaar system in India being one significant example. India's version of digital ID, which is technically comparable to Australia's proposal, includes law enforcement access and accredited private sector involvement. But it also raises important questions about the design of its technical systems. International advocacy group Access Now, in a case study of the Aadhaar system, found that its implementation did not broadly capture all types of identity within India. In addition, in India, religious and caste identities are both contested and deeply societally complex. Visibility of such social characteristics, particularly for marginalised groups or those perceived to be 'out of favour' with the government of the time, is not uniformly desired. This is particularly the case when adequate and accessible alternative methods for verifying identity are not available—take, for example, the plight of a refugee escaping persecution while having no choice but to navigate a complex and central digital identity system.

Despite some other welcome changes to the original legislation, which I'll come to later, this bill would have been further improved had it contained specific protections against discrimination of vulnerable individuals. I raise this issue because the legislation does not incorporate such safeguards. The explanatory memorandum states that the legislation does not include express provisions to prevent the discriminatory use of a digital ID. While I understand other legal avenues may exist for individuals impacted by the digital ID system to seek redress, we must question whether proper safeguards have been implemented within this proposal which would prevent discriminatory misuse or mission creep by a future government. This is another missed opportunity to build trust in this bill.

The special accessibility provisions for law enforcement agencies to the digital ID system are one of the predominant questions surrounding this legislation. Amendments made by the Senate offer some improvement by requiring that the minister responsible for the Australian Federal Police report to parliament annually detailing the number and types of access requests made by law enforcement. I want to stress that the simple activity of verifying one's identity digital should in no way involve law enforcement and in no way improve the effectiveness or operation of the government's proposed model for digital ID. This is an unnecessary provision. Alternative means exist for law enforcement to protect Australians, and its inclusion only serves to undermine the integrity or the perception of integrity of the digital ID system for many Australians as they understand it. Perception and acceptance are particularly important when dealing with new technology and public policy and in this case are key drivers for broad uptake of the system. These principles appear to be ignored in the legislation before us. Again, it's another missed opportunity to build trust.

I commend the amendments made by the Australian Greens in the Senate relating to protecting the voluntary nature of the digital ID system and ensuring alternatives for identity verification are available as the system is implemented. This is an important provision to ensure that Australians are not forced into the system by a simple lack of other options. While the digital ID system will no doubt be quicker and more secure than any other alternatives, this important provision both respects the concerns any Australian may have in their understanding of, and trust in, it. The amendments also safeguard against indirect or unintentional discrimination experienced by Australians who are less literate in digital technologies. The amendments made by the Senate, therefore, improve the voluntary nature of this new form of secure identification. Law enforcement access is restrained and subject to those accountability measures.

On balance, I am inclined to vote for this bill based on the benefits it presents to bringing up to date secure and modern verification of one's identity. But, for the moment, I will reiterate my concerns that this must be closely monitored to guard against unintended consequences.

Terry Young (Longman, Liberal National Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Some things in this place are very black-and-white, and others are little bit grey. Being a pragmatist, I try to take on both sides of the debate and understand it from both points of view. There's no question that I have heard a lot of terrible tales about cybersecurity and cyberattacks from constituents who have lost an awful lot of money over the last few years.

The Digital ID Bill, on the surface, goes to address that issue, which is a good thing. On one hand, I'm a lot more comfortable with one organisation having my details than 20. For example, if I wanted to open an account with Optus or a bank, or whomever, rather than having to give all of these different organisations my information, the idea of giving it to one organisation, such as the government—which, in theory, would spend and invest a lot more money in securing that information than a business would, because for a business it's an expense that doesn't return any value to them, whereas governments have an obligation to protect people—on the surface it seems like a good bill. But, deep down, whenever I face these questions where I can see the good in it but I can also see the bad in it, the question I always ask myself is: does it take away the freedom of choice? That must be protected, above everything else we have in this country. This bill takes away that freedom. It has the potential to.

The government are saying that it is a choice, and on the surface it looks like that. But when you read deep down and go into section 74 of the bill, there are exemptions. We've only got to go back to what happened during COVID with the state governments. Even though vaccinations were a choice, for many people they did not feel like a choice. They couldn't go to work, they couldn't go to a football game, they couldn't go to a pub, they couldn't go interstate, they couldn't go to a funeral, they couldn't go to a wedding. That doesn't sound like much of a choice. This has the potential to do exactly the same thing, and that is my concern. It's a deprivation of human liberties. We must protect that, because the greatest gift we have ever been given as human beings is the gift to choose. When we take that away from people, we dehumanise them—we take away their humanity. We can't do that.

I'm also concerned with the fact that what will happen is corporations and businesses, because they want most of all to report a great return to their shareholders—which is their job—will do it at whatever cost to their consumer and their customer. And if they can find that this will make them more money on their bottom line—saving money from having to go through arduous other ways of finding ID and confirming someone's details—they will take it up. Then they will bring in policies that say, 'You can't open an account with us unless you go through this process.' Again, this is taking away choice. You just cannot take away that choice.

We're seeing it more and more, and we've heard make an account unless you go through this process. We've heard people speaking a lot about Orwell's 1984 and Huxley's Brave New World, and all those sorts of things. I don't want to dwell on these things because, at the end of the day they're fictional. But people are correlating how much it's starting to seem like that. I believe that it's our job as people in the parliament to sit there and, pragmatically, look at both sides. I always try to do that because I think that most legislation that's introduced has a great motivation, and I don't think this is any exception. But we've got to drill down on the detail and make sure that it's actually going to do what it's designed to do, and I cannot see it doing that.

The biggest issue with this is that, when the coalition started to work on this—and I was on the committee that was working on this particular piece of policy, and I was never a fan of it—we said that it must be a choice; it cannot be mandatory. If it had stayed on that path, I may have reluctantly gone along with it, but the fact of the matter is that with section 74 that won't happen. I also understand that there are people out there who want to give their information to the government. You know what? That's their right. They have the same rights as a person who doesn't want to give their information to the government. Both groups of people should have their rights protected to make that choice.

As far as I'm concerned, the coalition has made the right decision in opposing the bill as it stands. The amendments would have made it a greater debate. I think the government have done themselves a disservice by not even considering the amendments and rushing it through because they're trying to hide it through budget week. I think that they will pay the price for that, because there will be a backlash from the electorate, because the Australian people, more than anything, want their freedoms protected.

Stephen Jones (Whitlam, Australian Labor Party, Assistant Treasurer) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

First, I thank the members who have contributed to the debate. It's an important debate and it's an important package of bills. The Digital ID Bill 2024 and the related bill will put in place the legislative framework for an economy-wide digital ID system in Australia.

I want to respond to some of the debate that I have listened to. I haven't had the opportunity to listen to all of the contributors, but I've had the opportunity to listen to a number of them. I was in the chamber when the member for Goldstein made some contributions, and I thought they were thoughtful, to be frank. I want to assuage her concerns by pointing to the fact that the bill contains a provision for a statutory review in two years so that, as this program rolls out and unforeseen matters arise, there is capacity for a full public review to deal with any of the issues that we haven't foreseen in the preparation of the legislation to date.

I want to make a few points and address some of the misapprehension or misunderstanding, deliberate or accidental, surrounding this bill. The digital ID system does not create a new digital database of ID in the country. What it does is create a safe, voluntary and distributed means of accrediting existing ID systems throughout the country. I want to make a point on something that has come up in a number of the contributions about the safety of it. I've heard members of the coalition say that they're concerned about cybersecurity, and I believe them. Frankly, you can't maintain those concerns about cybersecurity and oppose a digital ID system. In the time that this bill has been debated in the House this morning and in the Federation Chamber this afternoon, there have been literally millions of attempts by malign actors to gain access to public and private systems and databases in this country. Most of the data that they're seeking access to is the personal identification data of Australian citizens.

One of the reasons that we have a problem in this country around cybersecurity is that just about every business—sometimes because the government tells them that they have to properly verify, and have proof that they've properly verified, a person before they can conduct business with them, particularly in the financial services system—will take a photocopy of somebody's passport, licence, Medicare card and perhaps their bank statements, and then they'll store them. Sometimes they'll store them because we tell them they have to store them. God knows the safety and security around which some of this data is secured. We're not just talking about large businesses in this country; often it is stored in small businesses. Anyone who attempts to access a club or a pub in New South Wales will be regularly asked to provide a copy of their identification, and that is scanned and God knows how that is stored. That creates a safety risk to the personal identification of every Australian citizen who has had to provide that information to access one of those venues or to transact business. The digital ID system is an answer to that problem because it provides a safe and secure alternative to those businesses and those premises having to take a copy and store that personal identification. The digital ID system is an alternative to doing that, and it is safe.

I've heard concerns about whether or not this is a voluntary system. I simply make the point—and it's an important point—that there is currently no regulation which requires a private sector business in this country to provide a choice to a consumer about whether they provide a digital ID or some other means of verifying themselves for their business. There is currently no legislation which provides a consumer with the right to say, 'I want to use that digital ID' or 'I don't want to use that digital ID'—until these bills are passed into law. Once these bills are passed into law, there will be a right for a consumer to say, 'Yes, I want to use that digital ID system' or 'No, I don't want to use that digital ID system.'

To those members of the coalition who are proposing to vote 'no' because they think they're not going to have a choice: if you vote 'no' and these bills go down, you will be denying yourself and those you represent an actual choice about whether a business can require that you use some form of digital ID or some other form of digital ID. It creates the choice and creates the mechanism through which a voluntary use of a digital ID system can be maintained and mandated in this country.

I heard the member for McMillan. I like the member for McMillan; I think he's a decent bloke. But sometimes he just gets the wrong end of the stick. I have heard him speak passionately about his concerns about scams affecting his constituents and mine. I know he has heartfelt concerns about these issues, and they are very genuine. I share those concerns. We have lost $3 billion in the previous year to scams; we're bringing that down through our initiatives. But, frankly, one of the reasons we have a problem with scams is malign actors are able to access personal information because it is being asked for and stored in an insecure way. That information is then monetised and onsold on the dark web, and is no alternative mechanism for people to safely identify themselves. You cannot on the one hand say that you are concerned about cybersecurity and on the other hand vote against the Digital ID Bill. You cannot on the one hand say that you are concerned about Australians losing billions of dollars a year to scammers and on the other hand vote against the Digital ID Bill. They don't stack up. This is an answer to the genuine concerns, the heartfelt concerns, that people across the parliament share.

Can I address a point that was made by the member for Bradfield, who said when he spoke in the House that he supports the digital ID and that in some respects it was his idea. Frankly, I don't care whose idea it was; it's a necessary reform. But you can't say you support the digital ID and then go and tell coalition MPs that, when we vote on this later on tonight, they're supposed to vote against it. He complained that there was not enough political leadership or advocacy in relation to the importance of these bills in the economy and for the security of Australia's personal data. I simply make the point that the lack of advocacy and the lack of leadership is on the coalition benches. If the member for Bradfield really feels this is an important economic reform, as he said in his second reading speech, he should be doing the hard yards and having the hard conversations with the members on his backbench to assuage their concerns, and, frankly, separate himself from some of the nutso, tin-hat stuff that has been put around about what the digital ID system is. The member for Bradfield knows that a whole heap of the concerns that are being raised are simply not true. So what the member for Bradfield should do is show some leadership, show some strength and have those hard conversations with members in his own party room. Having done that, he should return to the House and vote in favour of this sensible bill. I commend the bills to the House.

Question unresolved.

Alicia Payne (Canberra, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

As the question is unresolved, in accordance with standing order 188, the question will be included in the Federation Chamber's report to the House on the bill.