Peter Khalil (Wills, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

On behalf of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, I present the following reports: the Advisory report on the Crimes and Other Legislation Amendment (Omnibus No. 1) Bill 2024—Report, July 2024, the Advisory report on theCounter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Declared Areas) Bill 2024—Report, July 2024, and the Review of the listing of Ansar Allah as a terrorist organisation under the Criminal Code—Report, incorporating a dissenting report, August 2024.

Reports made a parliamentary paper in accordance with standing order 39(e).

by leave—In relation to the Advisory report on the Crimes and Other Legislation Amendment (Omnibus No. 1) Bill 2024, this bill contains five schedules which are together intended to support the proper administration of government, law enforcement and oversight processes.

Schedules 1 and 2 of the bill would modernise law enforcement powers to expressly account for 'digital assets'—such as cryptocurrency—being used by criminals. This includes by updating the search warrant powers and proceeds of crime legislation to expressly authorise police to seize digital assets.

Schedule 3 increases the value of the Commonwealth penalty unit from $313 to $330 to help ensure that penalties for criminal offences reflect community expectations and deter criminal behaviour.

Schedule 4 creates a new position of Communications Security Coordinator in the Department of Home Affairs to perform certain telecommunications security related functions under the Telecommunications Act 1997.

Schedule 5 includes amendments to the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (the T(IA) Act) to improve the ability of oversight bodies for state based integrity agencies to access material that has been lawfully intercepted by the agencies within their jurisdiction.

The committee received seven submissions and one supplementary submission to this inquiry, all of which supported passage of the bill.

The committee has made one recommendation to amend the bill. This amendment would broaden the T(IA) Act's existing definition of 'prescribed investigation' in relation to the Parliamentary Inspector of the Corruption and Crime Commission of Western Australia to make it more consistent with other state based oversight bodies. The change was requested by the parliamentary inspector and supported by the Attorney-General's Department.

The committee has also made two recommendations for the government to consider during future reforms of the T(IA) Act, potentially as part of the proposed electronic surveillance reforms.

Firstly, in response to a suggestion by the Law Enforcement Conduct Commission of New South Wales, the committee recommends that the government consider whether state based oversight bodies for integrity agencies should have the power to access the stored communications and telecommunications data held by agencies within their jurisdiction, in addition to the access to lawfully intercepted information that the bill provides.

Secondly, the committee recommends that the T(IA) Act be amended to require that ministerial declarations made under sections 110A, 176A, 187A and 187AA of the T(IA) Act be referred to the committee for review. The current oversight arrangements require that all amendments to the primary legislation under those sections—including minor and cosmetic changes—be referred to the committee. However, there is currently no review required for declarations made by the legislative instrument under those same provisions. The committee's recommendation is consistent with the intent of the previous committee in 2015, during its review of the bill that introduced the mandatory data retention regime, that oversight of any 'emergency' ministerial declarations to expand the regime's scope be subject to appropriate scrutiny.

With these recommendations, the committee recommends that the bill be passed. On behalf of the committee, I want to thank the secretariat and all of those who provided submissions to that particular inquiry. I acknowledge the work of the committee members, including the deputy chair, who's with us in the House at the moment.

I commend the report to the House.

In relation to the inquiry into the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Declared Areas) Bill 2024, the committee supports the measures contained in the bill, which would see the operation of the declared areas offence in section 119.2 of the Criminal Code continue for another three years, until 7 September 2027.

The bill would also provide that section 119.3—the provision under which the Minister for Foreign Affairs may declare an area for the purpose of enlivening the offence—ceases to have effect on 7 September 2027.

The committee found no cause for concern in how the provisions have been used since their introduction into Australian law in 2014. Their use only twice to date demonstrates appropriate caution and judiciousness on the part of the government.

The committee's report recommends that the bill be passed with no changes, owing to the need to urgently pass the bill before section 119.2 sunsets on 7 September 2024. However, the committee did make four other recommendations, including that certain matters be considered by the government before the powers are next due to sunset in September 2027.

Firstly, the committee recommended that the government review the list of 'legitimate purpose' exceptions for entering or remaining in a declared area in section 119.2(3) of the Criminal Code and consider whether they are still fit for purpose or should be expanded.

Secondly, the committee also recommended that the government consider introducing a 'grace period' to the offence of entering or remaining in a declared area, which is presently triggered immediately upon declaration of an area. In light of the extreme circumstances that would have likely precipitated the declaration of an area, it cannot be assumed that a person in or near that area would immediately be aware of such a declaration. As such, the committee considered that the government should consider whether a grace period of up to one month could be explicitly provided for rather than relying solely on ministerial or prosecutorial discretion to not charge an individual in such a scenario.

The committee further recommended that, to avoid any potential ambiguity, the government consider including additional legislative safeguards on the Minister for Foreign Affairs's discretion to declare an area, including making more explicit the factors the minister should take into account.

Deputy Speaker Andrews, I know you are familiar with these areas. The declared area provisions, or these laws, I should say, while only to be used in extreme circumstances, are an important element of Australia's counterterrorism framework and provide the Australian government with a valuable tool to counter the international terrorism threat and to prevent and deter Australians from joining international terrorist organisations.

On this point, the committee notes that it has now been a decade since the passage of the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Act 2014 and the country is facing a much-changed security landscape. The committee considers that now would be an appropriate time to take stock of the Criminal Code's provisions on foreign incursions and recruitment, including the declared areas regime, and whether they remain fit for purpose in the current security landscape. The committee considers that the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor, INSLM, is best placed to conduct such an inquiry and has recommended that he do so and report his findings to parliament before the declared areas provisions are due to sunset in 2027.

Again, on behalf of the committee with respect to this report, I extend my thanks to those who participated in the inquiry by providing submissions and appearing before the committee at its public hearing. Of course my thanks go again to the secretariat for their work on this inquiry and to my colleagues on the committee, including the deputy chair.

I commend this report to the House.

The last one is the Review of the listing of Ansar Allah as a terrorist organisation under the Criminal Code.

With respect to the review of the listing of Ansar Allah under the Criminal Code, you would be aware, Deputy Speaker Andrews, that an organisation may be specified by regulation as a terrorist organisation provided that the minister for the Australian Federal Police, currently the Attorney-General, is satisfied on reasonable grounds that the organisation directly or indirectly engages in terrorism or advocates the doing of a terrorist act. Listing an organisation triggers the application of offences for supporting or associating with the organisation in specified ways, such as being a member of, recruiting for or providing funding to it.

Section 102.1A of the Criminal Code provides that the committee may review a regulation which lists an organisation as a terrorist organisation and report its comments and recommendations to each house of the parliament. The regulation subject to this review lists Ansar Allah as a terrorist organisation under the Criminal Code.

In determining whether the regulations for the listing of Ansar Allah should be supported, the committee reviewed the Attorney-General's explanatory statement and statement of reasons supporting the listing of the organisation and other publicly available information.

The committee also invited public submissions on the listing. Four submissions were received from interested individuals and organisations.

On behalf of the committee, I extend my thanks to those who provided submissions to the inquiry.

The committee noted the following information with respect to Ansar Allah.

I should note that Ansar Allah is often known as the Houthis, which is a name referring to their leader and the original founder of the movement. They're known by a number of other aliases of course as well, and many other names have been included in the listing. They are a Zaydi Shia violent extremist organisation that are based in Yemen.

Following the United States invasion of Iraq in 2003, the organisation became increasingly radicalised. Ansar Allah has conducted 19 terrorist attacks since 2022, utilising an array of weaponry. Its violent activity is primarily directed at Yemeni government forces, but the organisation has also targeted civilians, foreign states and foreign owned vessels, especially those going through Bab el-Mandeb in the Red Sea.

Ansar Allah has significantly contributed to conflict in Yemen. It has also demonstrated links to Hizballah and Hamas, which are both currently listed as terrorist organisations under the Criminal Code. Ansar Allah's recent targeting of vessels passing through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which connects the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, has impacted on global supply chains and contributed to rising inflation and costs of living around the world as some of the economic impacts of their terrorist attacks and activities.

After examining all of the evidence provided to it, the committee considered it is evident that Ansar Allah is directly engaged in preparing, planning, assisting with or fostering the doing of terrorist acts. The committee is satisfied that the appropriate process has been followed, supports the listing of Ansar Allah as a terrorist organisation under division 102 of the Criminal Code and finds no reason to disallow the legislative instrument. I commend this report to the House and once again thank my colleagues for their work on all three reports.

Andrew Wallace (Fisher, Liberal National Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

by leave—Coalition members of the committee support the listing of Ansar Allah, otherwise known as the Houthis, as a terrorist organisation under the Criminal Code, noting that the opposition first raised this with the government on 9 January 2024, calling on the government to consider listing the Houthis as a terrorist organisation in Australia. The coalition is deeply alarmed at the significant delays in ministerial consideration of this terrorist listing. It took at least 49 days for the decision-making process to list Ansar Allah to be bounced between the Minister for Home Affairs and the Attorney-General, and it took another 28 days for the Prime Minister to write to first ministers in relation to the decision to list. Overall, it took 126 days for the Houthis to be finally proscribed as a terrorist organisation after the initial recommendation of the Department of Home Affairs.

By contrast, for the 2021 listing of Hizballah and the Base, it took only one day for the then Minister for Home Affairs—that would be you, Madam Deputy Speaker Andrews—to consider and approve the listing of those two organisations and they wrote to first ministers on behalf of the Prime Minister on the same day. Similarly, for the 2021 relisting of Al-Shabaab, Hamas's Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the Kurdistan Workers Party, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Palestinian Islamic Jihad it also took only six days for the then minister, Deputy Speaker Andrews, to consider and approve the relistings and they wrote to the first ministers on the same day.

The bureaucratic delays evident in this terrorist listing process are very clearly a symptom of the Albanese government's dismantling of the Home Affairs portfolio. It started when it came into office with its machinery-of-government changes. This has resulted in the terrorist listing process being duplicated by two ministers rather than being handled by just one minister as was the case under the coalition. This has clearly created friction and confusion in the government as to which minister is chiefly responsible for national security policy.

That confusion will be further amplified by the Prime Minister's decision to also relocate ASIO, in addition to the AFP and the ACIC, from Home Affairs to the Attorney-General's portfolio despite ostensibly leaving policy responsibility for national security with the Minister for Home Affairs. The coalition is deeply concerned by the government's unnecessary and harmful unwinding of the national security architecture that has served our country extraordinarily well since the establishment of the Department of Home Affairs, especially given the government never told the Australian public prior to coming into office that it would seek to unwind the Home Affairs portfolio. The unwinding of the Home Affairs portfolio could not have come at a more unfortunate time, with ASIO making the decision on 5 August 2024 to raise the terrorism threat level to 'probable' for the first time in years.

The listing of terrorist organisations is a serious business. It is one of the principal tools in the counterterrorism toolkit available to the government to protect the Australian public from harm. It enables the government to prosecute any person who finances, associates with, trains with or otherwise supports a listed terrorist organisation. It also enlivens the prohibited hate symbols legislation which makes it a criminal offence for any person to publicly display a symbol associated with a terrorist organisation in certain circumstances.

The coalition committee members are deeply troubled by the fact that it took over 126 days to formally list the Houthis after it was first recommended by the department. This underlines the unnecessary duplication and confusion that has arisen as a result of the government's machinery-of-government changes. The government should immediately restore the Home Affairs portfolio to streamline the terrorist-listing process and reverse the damage done to our national security architecture. If the government chooses not to do so, the coalition will restore the Home Affairs portfolio to its proven and successful settings.

Finally, I want to deal with the current government's failure to take any action in listing the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist group. Australia's inaction is at odds with our Five Eyes partners—the United States, which listed the IRGC in 2019, and, most recently, Canada, which announced its listing of the IRGC in June 2024. As the Canadian government has pointed out, the IRGC supports the terrorist activities of Hamas and Hizballah, and the IRGC is widely reported to be a principal financier and military trainer of the Houthis. Coalition members of the committee reiterate the offer of support from the opposition to list the IRGC, including by legislative amendment to the Criminal Code if that is necessary.

It's rare that I get to my feet as the Deputy Chair of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security. It's rare that I do that because national security is beyond and should be beyond politics. But, where there are instances where the coalition members on the committee feel that the government is not doing what it should be doing to keep Australians safe, it is my duty as the deputy chair to stand up on behalf of all coalition members and make a point that the government is failing on these points in relation to the listing of terrorist organisations, and it needs to smarten up its act.