Andrew Murray (WA, Australian Democrats) Share this | Hansard source

by leave—I move Democrat amendments (1) and (2) on sheet 4914:

(1)    Schedule 1, page 3 (after line 8), after item 2, insert:

2A  After subsection 12(3)

Insert:

       (3A)     In making an appointment in accordance with subsection (2) or (3), the Governor-General is to have regard to the merit selection processes described in section 12A.

(2)   Schedule 1, page 3 (after line 12), after item 4, insert:

4A  After section 12

Insert:

12A  Procedures for merit selection of Board

        (1)    The Minister must, within 9 months of the commencement of this section, determine a code of practice for selecting and appointing directors of the Board that must include the following general principles:

             (a)    merit, including but not limited to appropriate broadcasting industry knowledge; and

             (b)    independent scrutiny of appointments; and

             (c)    probity; and

             (d)    openness and transparency.

        (2)    The Minister must cause to be tabled in both Houses of the Parliament a copy of the code of practice within 15 sitting days after determining the code in accordance with subsection (1).

        (3)    The Minister must cause to be tabled in both Houses of the Parliament an amendment to the code of practice within 15 sitting days after the amendment is made.

These amendments are not unfamiliar to the chamber. This is, I think, the 31st or 32nd time these amendments have been moved. We consistently move these amendments to various bills covering various acts with the intention of applying a general principle to the issue of appointments to government boards and agencies.

The amendments do not reflect adversely on many fine appointments made by both the Labor Party when in government and by the coalition since it has been in government. Plainly, many appointments to government boards and agencies have been exemplary and the persons concerned have performed to expectations with respect to their duties. However, there is an issue of both perception and reality. The widespread perception in the community is that political patronage applies. This is a complaint laid before all governments all over the world, and it is a reality that people who are close to, networked with or in touch with the government of the day—are simpatico with them, if you like—end up being appointed to boards and agencies as a consequence. That perception and reality has led to the phrase ‘jobs for the boys’ being coined—although, in this age of nondiscrimination, it turns out to be jobs for the girls as well.

The difficulty with the ABC is that it is a particularly sensitive institution. All politicians are extremely sensitive to the media and to media commentary. It is a fact that, whilst all politicians will argue that they want the media to be objective, effectively they much prefer if the media are biased, but biased to their particular argument and their particular character. And, when the political class have the opportunity to influence the media, they are seen to do so. Therefore, any appointments to the ABC board would be seen within that prism, and it is an area which is particularly sensitive.

This is not just a national problem; it is an international problem. The Democrats therefore searched around to see how other parliaments and other governments have dealt with it. We have decided that the United Kingdom model would be most attractive—and, as you know, as a country we are very close to the United Kingdom, both constitutionally and culturally. The interesting thing about the United Kingdom is that it is much less of a democracy than ours. For a start, it has a grossly elitist and unelected upper house—in complete contrast to our nearly proportionately representative, democratically elected, compulsorily voted for, preferentially voted for upper house. They do not have any such thing. Like us, of course, they have the house of the executive—there it is known as the House of Commons; here it is known as the House of Representatives—where the party of the day rules. Fortunately in England, to my knowledge, all parties admire conscience votes. The Labour Party there, which is in government at present, is mature enough to allow conscience votes, so it tends to be a far less rigid house than is our House of Representatives, in the sense of the views expressed and the way people vote.

The point of those remarks about the United Kingdom parliament is that, even there, where the executive, in my view, has even greater sway than the executive in Australia, they are constrained by both convention and public opinion. Public opinion, reinforced by strong and consistent media campaigning, resulted finally, in the nineties, in pressure to review the way in which government appointments were made. It was in those circumstances that Lord Nolan was commissioned to review appointments, and he came up with a set of criteria which have been adopted.

Yesterday, in my speech during the second reading debate, I outlined the Nolan committee principles, which were accepted by the United Kingdom parliament in 1995. Those principles to guide and inform the making of appointments are: a minister should not be involved in an appointment where he or she has a financial or personal interest; ministers must act within the law, including the safeguards against discrimination on the grounds of gender or race; all public appointments should be governed by the overriding principle of appointment on merit; except in limited circumstances, political affiliation should not be a criterion for appointment; selection on merit should take account of the need to appoint boards that include a balance of skills and backgrounds; the basis on which members are appointed and how they are expected to fulfil their roles should be explicit; and the range of skills and backgrounds that are sought should be clearly specified.

When the United Kingdom government accepted the Nolan committee’s recommendations, the Office of the Commissioner for Public Appointments was subsequently created. Its level of independence from the government was similar to that of the Auditor-General to provide an effective avenue of external scrutiny. That has not meant that controversy has not continued to reign over appointments, but it has meant that there is a system to limit the controversy and to provide a framework for appointments to be made objectively and in circumstances in which political patronage can be limited. That is a very useful model.

The alternative model is the American model, whereby appointments are vetted by the parliament and can become highly politicised and extremely personalised. That has some very unpleasant side effects, both from the perspective of the individuals under scrutiny and from the point of view of the parliament. My party and I are thus more attracted to the United Kingdom model.

The Minister for Communications, Information Technology and the Arts is quite correct in saying that a number of acts do specify some criteria—mostly about the sorts of abilities or skills that should be apparent in some appointments to some particular tasks. The Australian Broadcasting Corporation Act is one of those, but it does not cover the field—which is what the Democrat amendments are about. Although all governments—federal, state and territory—continue to resist this model, in my view the desire for good government and good governance should require them to take it up eventually. One would hope that an opposition would have the honesty and the integrity to finally adopt a standard of governance which lifts standards rather than maintains old standards. And one would hope that the media would continue to be persistently and consistently aggressive in this field.

Whatever we as politicians or members of the public may say about the media in general, most media organisations are corporations and many of them are publicly listed corporations. Most board appointments are subject to the election process established in the organisation’s corporate constitution. When you get to government appointments, the nature and the character of the minister and of the agency affect the way in which appointments are made, and all governments—federal, state and territory—should really be driving to resist political patronage in this area.

Democrat amendment (2) does not seek to repeat the Nolan principles word for word. It merely states:

The Minister must, within 9 months of the commencement of this section, determine a code of practice for selecting and appointing directors of the Board that must include the following general principles:

(a) merit, including but not limited to appropriate broadcasting industry knowledge; and

(b) independent scrutiny of appointments; and

(c) probity; and

(d) openness and transparency.

This is an extremely broad remit; it is a generous remit which does not unnaturally confine the minister. In fact it is, in some respects, quite weak in comparison with the Nolan principles, because the Nolan principles are very specific. Our amendment is designed in this way because we recognise the apparent limits of and the resistance to this principle by the governments of the day.

I do not think that the principle of appointment on merit is enshrined anywhere in the Commonwealth statutes—and the minister can correct me, and I am sure the advisers would know the statutes well. I do not think that it says anywhere that appointments should be made on merit. This seems to me to be a quite extraordinary omission which reflects very badly on the bureaucrats who advise the ministers as to how bills should be constructed. It reflects much more on the ministers and the backbenchers who decide on the content of bills. We really should, in this modern age, be into the principle of meritocracy and without regard—with respect to the lady senators who are present—to gender discrimination, which still goes on. The glass ceiling still exists. The number of women appointees on both private and public boards is still too low. That is still an issue, and perhaps an appointment on merit process might advance that cause as well.

With that reasonably broad-ranging motivation for the Democrat amendments—which will no doubt be turned down for the 30th or 31st time, to the discredit of those who vote against it, may I say, without reflecting on the vote of the Senate, because it has not occurred yet—I commend the amendments to the Senate.