Jeannie Ferris (SA, Liberal Party) Share this | Hansard source

I have listened very carefully to Senator O’Brien’s contribution today, and some of the points that he raised I agree with. The Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee is very much a committee that takes its work seriously and looks at the overall range of issues that apply to regional and rural Australia, including the transport issues. In the past there have been a number of inquiries carried out by this committee that have had bipartisan support, and this is one of the rare occasions on which the government disagrees with an opposition motion. I think it is important to say at the outset that the National Farmers Federation does not support a Senate inquiry into quarantine such as Senator O’Brien has outlined today. The National Farmers Federation, of which I was once a very proud staff member, is the peak farm body in this country. As a matter of fact I had discussions with the National Farmers Federation about this matter just yesterday to clarify why they were not supporting the call by New South Wales farmers for an inquiry, and I am led to believe that the president of the New South Wales Farmers Federation does not support the call for the inquiry either. So I do not think it is fair or true to say that the New South Wales farmers support this inquiry. The government also does not believe that a Senate inquiry is needed to bring about further improvements to our quarantine and biosecurity arrangements.

Australia’s strong and consistent quarantine policies have been vital in maintaining our high standard of animal and plant health, and it is critical that this situation continues. Australia already has one of the most scrutinised quarantine systems in the world. In fact, since 2000, elements of the system have been subject to several Senate committee inquiries of which I and Senator O’Brien have been members. There has also been scrutiny of the system as a whole, including two audits by the Australian National Audit Office and a review by the Joint Committee on Public Accounts and Audit. All of these inquiries have been thorough; they have examined matters of policy and operations beyond the issues at hand. The government is working closely with the National Farmers Federation and other industry organisations to identify improvements to our quarantine and biosecurity arrangements. These improvements can and should be achieved without a lengthy Senate inquiry.

The National Farmers Federation hosted an industry forum on biosecurity just last month, on 14 July 2006. It was held in Canberra, and it included representation from 35 industry organisations. That forum provided an opportunity for the government to hear industry views on the quarantine system, particularly the import risk analysis process. The majority industry view presented at the forum was that, while improvements can and should be made, Australia’s quarantine system is fundamentally sound and is serving our national interests well. The National Farmers Federation is currently analysing the outcomes of the forum and will advise the Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry of the priorities that are determined by the forum.

Over recent years the government has made progressive increases to quarantine funding. Since 1996 these increases have totalled more than $1.3 billion and have been directed towards maintaining and, where necessary, strengthening our stringent quarantine regime. Nevertheless, the system is not perfect. We found that during the inquiry most recently into the outbreak of citrus canker in Queensland, and the committee made some very stringent recommendations as a result. The government has made, and continues to make, changes that will strengthen its operation of the quarantine structure and build stakeholder confidence. The government has commenced a process to deliver more refinements to our quarantine system, drawing on industry views of what needs to be done to continue to deliver high-quality, science based quarantine policy for Australia.

Let me reiterate and emphasise some of the more interesting facts about the government’s commitment to quarantine. Since 1996 the government has made progressive increases to funding which, as I said before, have totalled $1.3 billion to maintain and strengthen our regime. What could be clearer than that? Since 2001 AQIS has employed an additional 1,200 staff. It has deployed new technologies and significantly increased intervention levels across import pathways, including international mail, from less than five per cent to 100 per cent; containers, from five per cent to 100 per cent; airports, from 35 per cent of passengers to 95 per cent of passengers; and seaports, from 30 per cent of passengers and 70 per cent of vessels to 100 per cent intervention in both. It is a very strong record of increased scrutiny at our borders. Biosecurity Australia has received $6 million from the budget to strengthen arrangements for assessing quarantine risks through on-the-ground inspections in overseas countries and to develop systems to improve data and information management.

Senator O’Brien made some comments before—and I said I agreed with them and I know that other members of the committee do as well—about the system still not being perfect. While ever we have a high number of visitors and ships coming in and out of our country—and we are an island continent—of course it is going to be difficult to maintain perfect quarantine arrangements. We agree that the system is not perfect.

The government has and will continue to make changes to improve stakeholder confidence. Of course, industry views are a key input into this process. There have been a large number of them, as recently, as I said, as last month. We are working with industry to make sure that those views are presented and considered. The government is also investigating other options for reform but, importantly, we will do nothing that compromises the integrity of our system.

I will take Senator O’Brien’s proposed reference points one at a time. In response to the first point, the Joint Committee on Public Accounts and Audit, the JCPAA, conducted a review of Australia’s quarantine function and delivered its report in February 2003. The terms of reference were broad ranging and encompassed the issues identified in this reference. The review took public submissions and held public hearings in a number of locations. The review followed the report of the Auditor-General, Managing for quarantine effectiveness. Given the nature of this and earlier reviews and the ongoing scrutiny of the quarantine system, another inquiry along these lines is unnecessary at this time.

It is also important to note that the JCPAA found that Australia’s quarantine function ‘is in good shape and the additional funding is being appropriately used’. Any areas identified for improvement have been, and are being, followed up by the government. The Auditor-General conducted a follow-up report as recently as December 2005 and concluded that overall, since the last audit, the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service and Biosecurity Australia have made substantial improvements in the area and in the administration of quarantine.

In response to Senator O’Brien’s second point, the government is aware of a view that Biosecurity Australia and the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service should be merged, again, into one institutional structure, such as a statutory authority. We understand that this view is currently a minority one in industry circles, and the government, like most stakeholders, believe it is more important to get on with improving the delivery of our overall quarantine system than to tinker unnecessarily with institutional structures.

During the last election the government gave an undertaking to reinforce Biosecurity Australia’s independence by making it a separate agency within the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry. Biosecurity Australia became a prescribed agency in December 2004. While Biosecurity Australia has financial autonomy as a prescribed agency, it remains part of the department in an administrative sense. Consultative structures between Biosecurity Australia and the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service ensure that close communication occurs.

The 1996 report Australian quarantine: a shared responsibility, known as the Nairn report, recommended a statutory authority model. The government rejected this recommendation in 1997 on the basis that quarantine policy and programs are essential elements of the business of government and should operate under the framework of ministerial responsibility and departmental accountability. The government did not want to sever links with other parts of government that are central to the operation of an efficient and effective quarantine service. These arguments, first expressed in 1997, still stand today. We are also not persuaded that the significant cost, disruption and delay in the progress of Biosecurity Australia’s work that would result from the restructure of Biosecurity Australia and the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service into a statutory authority are warranted at this time, particularly since the benefits that a statutory authority might provide to our quarantine system are not clear.

In response to Senator O’Brien’s third point, the government is currently reviewing the import risk analysis process, including an examination of whether the process could be improved or enhanced through existing legislation. Expert government legal advice is being drawn upon in this review process. It is worth noting that the full bench of the Federal Court recently found that Australia’s import risk analysis system is not legally flawed.

In response to point 4, Australia’s appropriate level of protection, known as ALOP, is expressed as ‘providing a high level of sanitary and phytosanitary protection aimed at reducing risk to a very low level but not zero’. All Australian governments, through the Primary Industries Ministerial Council, have agreed that Australia’s needs are met by this definition of the ALOP. Biosecurity Australia’s role is to undertake risk assessments and recommend measures to the Director of Animal and Plant Quarantine that achieve Australia’s ALOP. Biosecurity Australia does not determine Australia’s ALOP. Recent Senate committee inquiries into the draft risk analyses for apples from New Zealand and bananas from the Philippines both examined BA’s risk assessment methodology in some detail.

In response to the fifth point raised by Senator O’Brien, Australia’s quarantine regime reflects a system of managed risk based on science. This approach is universally supported. Final decisions on imports are made under the Quarantine Act 1908 by the Director of Quarantine or the delegate. Tens of thousands of decisions on import permits are made every year. Direct ministerial involvement in import risk analysis decision making is impractical. Assessment of risk and the recommendation of measures on imports to meet Australia’s conservative quarantine policy outcomes must be science based in accordance with our international WTO obligations and therefore can only be made or overturned on that basis. That role sits more appropriately with Biosecurity Australia, an independent, science based organisation.

Let me reiterate some of the points I have made this afternoon in opposing Senator O’Brien’s motion. Australia’s quarantine decisions will continue to be based on robust scientific assessments and will not be influenced by trade considerations. Let us use the information and views gathered in the numerous inquiries, consultations and reviews that have already been held, including some that have been held by the committee on which Senator O’Brien and I serve, and let us get on with the job of delivering a science based quarantine system that, to the best extent possible, protects us from human, animal and plant disease incursions.