Penny Wong (SA, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Corporate Governance and Responsibility) Share this | Hansard source

In rising to speak to the Prohibition of Human Cloning for Reproduction and the Regulation of Human Embryo Research Amendment Bill 2006 can I at the outset thank those constituents, both supportive and opposed to this legislation, who have communicated with me, and proponents and opponents of the bill who have taken the time to present their case to me both in person and in writing. I have found their contributions extremely useful in coming to my views about the legislation. I also place on record my thanks to Senators Stott Despoja and Webber who obviously have contributed substantially to this debate through the development of the Stott Despoja and Webber legislation. I thank Senator Patterson for the work she has done in bringing this bill forward. I also thank all members of the Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs who, in the week the parliament was not sitting, spent a significant amount of time grappling with the somewhat complex ethical and scientific issues associated with the legislation.

It seems to me that the community does have the right—in fact the imperative—to set the ethical boundaries on scientific research. A primary way in which that is done, but not exclusively, is obviously through the parliament. I do not believe that scientists should determine the ethical boundaries of research. That is in great part the responsibility of this parliament. It seems to me that the key issue in this legislation is as formulated by Father Frank Brennan in one of his papers. I agree with his formulation of this but I flag that my conclusion about the ethical issues differs from his. Father Brennan pointed out that the key issue is this:

The moral quandary confronting law makers has been determining what respect, if any, is due to the entity which is created by means of the successful transfer of the nucleus of a human adult cell into an enucleated human or animal egg.

That seems to me to be the primary issue that the Senate needs to consider when looking at this legislation. There have been a substantial number of arguments placed before the chamber by those opposing the bill as to the merits or otherwise of scientific research. There have been suggestions about the prospects of success arising out of the research that is proposed or encompassed by this legislation. There have been criticisms of any prospects of cures or other medical advances being able to be arrived at as a result of this research and there has been discussion about the relative benefits of utilising adult stem cells.

It seems to me that it is perhaps lacking in a little intellectual rigour for senators to try and second-guess where science may lead us as a basis for determining their position on this bill. It seems to me that our job, as I have outlined, is to consider whether the research that is permitted in the proposed legislation transgresses or is within ethical boundaries that we consider to be appropriate in today’s society. It is impossible for anyone, even scientists with far more expertise in this area than any senator—and certainly it is impossible for law-makers—to make some determination as to the likely future success of any research. We are not able to divine that, and it seems to me that to make an argument about whether the scientific research may or may not be questionable is not the key issue before the chamber. It seems to me that the issue of primary relevance is to consider what sorts of rights should accrue to an SCNT embryo and whether or not the research that is permitted within the fairly limited strictures of this legislation is considered ethical in today’s society.

I am concerned that some of this debate has gone to the issue of whether or not any research would be successful. I make the point that there are a great many examples through the history of science—in medical science particularly, but in all endeavours of science—where the ultimate use of research findings could never have been divined at the outset. An example is a recent quote from Professor Frazer, who would be well known to all senators, who made the point that if a proposed moratorium on genetic engineering had gone ahead in the 1970s he would never have developed a cervical cancer vaccine with the potential to prevent half a million deaths a year. Penicillin is another example of that in the history of medical scientific research.

Professor Frazer’s point is a good one. There were people some 30-odd years ago who argued that genetic engineering or that kind of genetic research was inappropriate. Obviously they are entitled to their view, but the point he makes is that at that point we could never have determined or divined that some 30 years later that research would ground the finding of a vaccine which will, I hope—and according to scientists and medical practitioners—be of great benefit to women around the world in the prevention of cervical cancer.

I want to emphasise, when we are talking about the embryos that seem to be the subject of the debate, that we are not talking about an egg fertilised by human sperm. We are not talking about a human ovum fertilised by human sperm. I want to refer to page 16 of the community affairs committee report, where committee members make this point:

Another source of human embryonic stem cells could be Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer (SCNT). This is a process commonly called cloning. It is important to remember that the word cloning is used to describe replication of single cells, genetic material as well as whole beings. It is vital that the different outcomes are clearly acknowledged.

The committee goes on to explain the SCNT process:

... where the nucleus of an egg is removed and replaced by one taken from a donor adult cell eg. a skin cell. This is then stimulated and it behaves like an embryo ...

The committee then goes on to clarify that the SCNT technique cannot be used under the strictures in the legislation to clone a whole human being for four reasons: that there has been and shall remain, under the legislation, a strict prohibition on SCNT embryos being implanted in the body of an animal or a human; that such cells are prohibited from developing beyond 14 days; that there are substantial penalties in the legislation for transgression of these safeguards; and, finally, that scientists believe that the current indications of such embryos developing are extremely remote.

I want to comment on one point that is made by the committee, and that is that the word ‘cloning’ is used to describe both the replication of a whole human being or a whole being as well as the replication of single cells and genetic material. It seems to me that one of the ways in which this debate has been conducted is to conflate, in a sense, those two concepts. The replication of a whole human being is something that I do not believe anybody would contemplate as being ethical and appropriate. Unfortunately some of the conflation of these two concepts has, I fear, been utilised to try and gain the response that I think all people would have to the prospect of cloning human beings, when what we are talking about is cloning a single cell or the replication of single cells, not a whole human being.

I also make the point that the sorts of safeguards contained in the legislation, which are described in the paragraph of the committee report that I have just referred to, really do demonstrate that we are not talking about human cloning in terms of replicating a whole human being. There are substantial safeguards in the legislation and we ought not to conflate the two concepts or to utilise people’s reasonable fears about the prospects of human cloning to steer this debate towards the end that some might wish for.

I have to make this point, which relates to the previous legislation which has had some discussion in the chamber and also to the whole principle of IVF treatment. It seems to me that the ethical dilemmas associated with scientific research on human embryos are greater when considering embryos which are created by the fertilisation of a human egg by sperm. This is the same process by which all human life is created and such embryos have significantly greater potential to develop into human beings, so I am somewhat mystified by the attention or strong reaction that this legislation has engendered, given that the ethical dilemmas associated with the 2002 legislation were arguably greater. I would have thought that if we are concerned with issues about potential human life then the step the parliament took in 2002, when it permitted a human embryo created by the process by which all human life is created—that is, by human egg fertilised by sperm—to be used for research, was arguably far greater than what the Senate is considering today.

The opponents of this legislation seem to take the view that human embryos created by sperm and ova can be created and used for research under the previous legislation or in the context of IVF treatment but that entities created through somatic cell nuclear transfer cannot. I do not understand the ethical distinction that is being drawn by those who oppose the bill that suggests that we can create an embryo for IVF purposes through what is probably the way in which most people would conceptualise the commencement of human life and then utilise that for research but an entity that is created through somatic cell nuclear transfer cannot be so utilised. I have to say that I consider this to be an entirely illogical position.

I note that Senator Minchin previously in this debate described the proposition before the chamber as being repugnant and objectionable. I wonder whether a similar view would be taken about IVF treatment. The fact is that we create embryos through IVF knowing that a substantial proportion of those will be destroyed or will succumb, to use the term, and of course those are potential lives. As I understand the argument by some of the opponents of this bill, they argue that there is an ethical distinction between that and what is being proposed in this legislation—first, that the purpose for which embryos are created is different and, second, that the embryos succumb but are not destroyed.

Can I deal with the second issue. It seems to me that it is a questionable ethical step to suggest that, because something succumbs as opposed to being actively destroyed, that somehow removes the ethical dilemma or obviates any ethical issues associated with it. In fact, some might argue that, if you have the power to change something and you choose not to act, that is a very small step in ethical terms from actually choosing to act to destroy—if you stand by and permit something to be destroyed when you have the power to prevent that, how far a step is that from actually actively destroying it?

The first point that I raised as one of the defences or arguments as to why the regime in the bill that is proposed is somehow worse than what has been previously put before the chamber is a purposive argument—that is, that the purpose for which embryos are created creates the ethical distinction. That is a view that has been put to me by a number of people. I question this. Is the purpose of creation a sufficient ethical imprimatur to justify the creation of a number of embryos through fertilisation knowing that a substantial proportion of those are guaranteed to succumb or to have their existence ended? Similarly, is the asserted purpose of creation sufficient to justify the use of excess IVF embryos for research? It seems to me that is not a sound way of analysing the consideration associated with both IVF treatment and the research permitted on IVF embryos.

It seems to me that a better ethical framework for explaining our continued support for IVF, and I do support it, and for the research permitted on excess IVF embryos that we previously have endorsed is that we as a community seek to weigh the various ethical considerations and potential benefits. The community by and large supports IVF, which does involve the destruction or succumbing of embryos, because the benefit is seen to outweigh the negative consequences. In truth, what we do is place the potential benefit to couples or people with infertility problems and their desire to have a child above the rights of excess embryos which are produced. I am able to accept that ethical framework. Similarly, we also permit excess IVF embryos to be used for research, and we do so, frankly, not just because of the purpose for which they were created but also because of their potential benefit for research. I find it extremely difficult to accept that the ethical dilemmas posed by an entity created by somatic cell nuclear transfer, which has less potential for continued existence, mean it should be accorded greater rights by this parliament than an excess embryo created by IVF.

My suggestion to the chamber is that the more difficult ethical dilemma was considered by this parliament a number of years ago, and perhaps a more accurate ethical framework is that we weigh the benefits and consider what are the appropriate rights or respect that are due to embryos, whether SCNT or created by the normal process of fertilisation, against the potential benefits both of IVF treatment and also of research. My view is that the ethical considerations around permitting research using a product of somatic cell nuclear transfer do not seem to be sufficient to require prohibition of this research.

I want to emphasise the safeguards which are in the legislation, some of which I have referred to and which have been referred to by previous speakers and in the community affairs report. It seems to me that those senators who are talking about potential nightmare scenarios or the misuse of the research are really doing so because they oppose the bill, and that is fair enough; that is their prerogative. But perhaps they should be moving amendments to the legislation if their concerns are that the safeguards are insufficient. Instead, the potential misuse of the research is being used as an argument to justify opposition to the bill. I would ask those senators who consider that this research might not be utilised or undertaken appropriately, if that is the basis of their concerns, to consider whether or not the safeguards in it are sufficient and, if they do not consider that to be the case, to move amendments to increase those safeguards rather than simply opposing the legislation.

Those who support this legislation have been accused of peddling hope or of manipulating people’s hopes. It seems to me that there are some on the other side who have peddled fear. I personally try always to look to hope rather than fear as a basis for behaviour and action. Whilst I do not know where this research may lead, I do not think the potential benefits which we cannot see now should be cut off because we have concerns about a somatic cell nuclear transfer entity. I again make the point that I made before, in relation to Professor Frazer, that we do not know where science will lead. That does not mean we allow carte blanche, but the circumstances do require us to consider the ethical boundaries. In my view, this legislation is within the boundaries that the parliament should support. So, in the light of the potential benefits and the safeguards in the legislation, I intend to support this bill.