Marise Payne (NSW, Liberal Party) Share this | Hansard source

Let me say at the outset that it is clear to me that there is nothing that the Australian Greens will not do to suffocate Australian business, no matter where it is active. Senator Milne’s remarks this afternoon are just another example of that. What the Australian government has to say in relation to this particular motion to refer the agreement to the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade is what the minister has in fact most explicitly outlined on the record until now anyway. We would not be entering into this agreement if we were not confident that Russia will comply with the commitments given in the Australia-Russia Nuclear Cooperation Agreement.

The position from which Australia starts, as far as reserves of uranium are concerned at the very least, is that we have 38 per cent of the world’s reserves of uranium, which is indeed more than any other country. In the 2006-07 financial year, we exported about $630 million worth of that uranium, which is expected to rise to $814 million in this financial year. Under the arrangement in this particular discussion, Australia will export about 2,000 tonnes of uranium annually, and that will provide about a third of Russia’s imported uranium. It is fair to say that, until this point, Russia has had its own considerable energy resources and has not needed to import uranium, but it does have considerable plans to substantially increase its nuclear fuel capacity—30 new reactors in the next 30 years—and that means it is, in fact, searching for new opportunities.

This particular agreement, the 2007 Australia-Russia Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, will supersede the 1990 treaty, which allowed for Australian uranium to be processed by the then USSR on behalf of third countries which had safeguard arrangements with Australia, but the uranium could not be used domestically by the Soviets. No Australian uranium has been sent to Russia for processing in the 17 years since that agreement was signed. In fact, until recently Russia had not designated which facilities were for military purposes and which were for fuel production, so it was not eligible for the mandatory safeguard inspections upon which Australia insists. Last year, Russia agreed to separate its military and civil programs, paving the way for this particular arrangement with Australia.

Regarding Australia’s economic engagement with Russia, I think it is worth noting for the record that Russia is Australia’s second fastest growing export partner—only just behind India and ahead of China—with 95 per cent growth in 2005-06 alone. In 2006, Australia exported $656 million worth of goods to Russia, which doubled the amount of the previous year.

Let me make it absolutely clear: in line with standard Australian treaty practice, the Australia-Russian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement and a national interest analysis will be tabled in parliament for consideration by the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties. The government has been clear on this process from the moment that negotiations on the agreement were announced. In fact, in the minister’s press release of April this year, he announced that:

In accordance with Australian treaty-making practice the agreement will be tabled in Parliament for review by the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties when negotiations have been finalised and in advance of binding treaty action being taken.

In terms of the timing of when the agreement and the national interest analysis will be tabled for consideration by the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, that is indeed dependent on the parliamentary sitting schedule. It is worth noting that, if the agreement were also referred to the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, it would then be in the situation of being considered by both that committee and the JSCOT in parallel. I understand and would have thought that it would normally be the case that there would be ample opportunity for members of the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties to seek responses to the questions which Senator Milne and other senators raise if they wish to do so—certainly Senate members of that committee, as it is a joint committee.

As I indicated earlier in my remarks, the government is confident that Russia will abide by the terms of the agreement as they are negotiated—namely, that Australian uranium would only be used in facilities covered by Russia’s safeguards agreement with the IAEA. As has been stated elsewhere and also by the minister, it is simply not in Russia’s national interests to misuse Australian uranium. Inevitably they will become increasingly reliant on external supplies of uranium to fuel their growing nuclear power industry and if they misuse it then they effectively cut off that option for themselves. They have no need to import uranium particularly for nuclear weapons. As a party to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, in the last 15 years they have made a number of statements in relation to their use of uranium. They announced in 1994 that they had ceased production of fissile material for weapons. They have made substantial cuts in their nuclear weapons build-up since the Cold War, with further reduction agreements made with the United States in the 2002 Moscow treaty.

All of Australia’s bilateral nuclear safeguards agreements, which include the existing 1990 Australia-Russian agreement as well as the new agreement, require that Australia’s consent be obtained before Australian nuclear material can be transferred to a third country. I note that that was not adverted to by Senator Milne. Russia, like all parties to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, has committed to supply nuclear material to non-nuclear weapons states only for peaceful purposes. If one looks at Russia’s record in the Security Council then it is worth noting that Russia has supported international action against Iran’s sensitive nuclear activities, including Security Council resolutions 1737 and 1747, which have imposed sanctions on certain activities, including Iran’s enrichment related and reprocessing activities.

With regard to this particular motion—and it seems to me that the motion is confusing a number of issues—and the points it raises in relation to the implications of the agreement for the sale of nuclear fuel to India, they are separate agreements, separate matters, and I am at a loss to understand where Senator Milne is endeavouring to draw a comparison. In signing the agreement Russia has, as I said, committed to abiding by all of the agreement’s provisions.

To clarify this for the record, in relation to comments Senator Milne made during her remarks this afternoon, I was indeed appalled by an observation that Senator Milne made, but not the one relating to conditionality at all—and it would be ridiculous to pretend that that were the case. What I was appalled by was the cavalier manner in which Senator Milne chose to cast aspersions on our diplomatic representatives, in this case in Russia, and what they may or may not be doing. It occurs to me that Senator Milne is most unlikely to know in fact what they are or are not doing and is even more unlikely to have made best endeavours to determine the answer to that question. Reflecting on their role and their job without even bothering to do that is in my view most ill advised in this chamber.

In relation to the other very important matter of human rights, which Senator Milne raised in her remarks and from which I do not demur for a moment in terms of their importance and in terms of issues which are currently under debate in relation to Russia, there are opportunities in this chamber and in the committees of the parliament to deal with those matters. As I understand it, membership of the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade was available to the minor parties but that opportunity was not taken up. That is a choice that they have made. It is not one which I am obliged to defend or otherwise. But other opportunities do arise and I would commend those to the senators who have raised these concerns and encourage them to participate at that level.