Mark Bishop (WA, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Hansard source

The incorporated speech read as follows—

This Bill is important for Australia’s police and anti-terrorist efforts. It’s the second in a series flowing from the Tony Blunn review into the regulation of telecommunications access. As such, it contains no surprises. It doesn’t contain any new powers for police on either interception or access to data. Nor does it deal specifically with powers of interception—but rather access to data. By data, the bill doesn’t mean content of calls.

There’re standard procedures for that which require warrants. Rather, it clarifies the existing law. I accept the Government’s assurance that it provides some extra safeguards to that access. Today I don’t intend canvassing some of the more controversial aspects of this Bill. The debate on these has been covered by the report of the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee. During the recent inquiry into organised crime by the Joint Committee on the Australian Crime Commission, evidence was taken from state police forces.

One of the most common deficiencies, in the committee’s view, was access to telecommunications data. A little context here might be useful. One of the biggest problems confronting law enforcement agencies in their fight against organised crime is access by those criminals to modern sophisticated technology. These days, criminals use stolen mobile phones and SIM cards for single calls only. That’s because the location and data on those phones is easily traced. Or they purchase mobiles with false names—apparently easy to do.

Hence the problem for police, who need better security and identity checks for those buying mobile phones and SIM cards. It’s not just a matter of knowing what calls are being made. Information such as time and recipient is easily available,—although this Bill cleans-up some of the rules around that access. It’s a matter of identity of the person with the phone. The 100 point identity check recommended by the Committee might help here. Even though it may cause some public inconvenience. In my view that’s a small price to pay.

The next level of access by police is to real time information on call data where that is vitally important. To that extent, mobile phones can be tracking devices for the police. Some may say that’s an invasion of privacy, but I don’t agree.

Criminal access to sophisticated technology is so difficult to combat, any advantage the police can gain from it should be supported. Provided, of course, the power given by this access isn’t abused. And that’s the purpose of this Bill. Innocent people in these circumstances—where criminals need to be rounded up—have nothing to fear.

Above this level of access to call data, there is access to content. That’s interception and it’s available too, but again only according to strict rules.

Those rules are set out clearly in this Bill, just as they are for access to call data, historic or prospective. As I said, the pros and cons of those rules are addressed in the legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee report.

Problems of criminal access to sophisticated communication technology goes far beyond mobile phones.

The Internet itself has become a major vehicle for crime and organised crime in its own right.

That is, not just as a facilitator of crime. This legislation addresses that technology in the same way.

That may be something the joint Committee on the ACC didn’t sufficiently appreciate. State police expressed concern about their capacity to obtain data on e-mail transmissions and anything else through data lines.

That’s also accessible with the same rules to which I’ve referred. That means that data can be obtained on the timing, place and duration of any Internet transmission—but not content.

Access to content is possible too, just as with phones, but again, only by warrant. These are serious checks to protect those values on which some express their genuine concern. State police also expressed concern to Voice Over the Internet Protocols, otherwise known as VOIP.

This Bill also regulates access to that information. So the response to the evidence given by state police forces about access to communications data, in whatever form, are unfounded. As this legislation makes clear, access is available but only within strict rules. The next debate, then, is whether those rules are strict enough.

Again I won’t canvass that issue here because the Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee did it adequate justice. But I thought I’d pay particular attention to these issues today because I doubt the substance is well understood. Part of the reason for that is the need to avoid controversy.

That’s because the balance between public safety and the invasion of important rights is a fine one. In this case, I’m confident that line hasn’t been crossed. I accept, however, some uncomfortable trade-offs may be made in the public interest.

That judgement, as is often the case, is one for elected representatives in this place. It’s not a responsibility we take lightly. When it comes to the interception, tracking and detection of child pornographers using the Internet, there’s no question.

Thus, the threshold penalty of three years for any crime, set as a restriction on the use of these powers, has not been applied to child pornography. think the three-year limit is reasonable. also believe the exemption of child pornography offences of any degree is also laudable. These provisions, though, might warrant further scrutiny.

With respect to the rest of the Bill, it’s important to note the responsibilities In this area for telcos and Internet companies. They’re set out in detail. Without the carriers’ obligations to provide access to information on either data or content, no such scheme would be possible. I know from their evidence that state police forces are concerned at the cost of obtaining information on call data. Again, this Act being includes provisions which facilitate rapid access, yet don’t penalise the telcos. We know it’s onerous and we know there’s a cost. But its one which needs to be borne.

Mr Acting Deputy President, we support the Bill.