Andrew Murray (WA, Australian Democrats) Share this | Hansard source

I think this is a very interesting topic and I want to take a little time to deal with it. Essentially, when statute requires people to appear before a parliamentary committee for oversight purposes, it is to make clear that there is a formal relationship between those people and the committee concerned. In law, it is unnecessary. This is the supreme body in the Constitution. No citizen, agency or person can refuse attendance before this chamber, this chamber’s committees, the joint committees or the House committees. Of course, if they do refuse attendance, those committees all have the power of subpoena. In actuality, there is no need in statute to require attendance, but for purposes of propriety, formality and clarity it is useful to ensure that individual bodies know exactly to whom they report in oversight terms.

Quite properly, previous governments have required, for instance, ASIC, to have a formal requirement to appear before the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services. There is a specific statutory provision with respect to the Auditor-General and the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit. And then, of course, there is the House of Representatives standing committee with respect to the Reserve Bank. The precedent is properly established. But when you go down that route, you then want to be sure that, where you are determining oversight by statute, it only occurs with respect to one master. You cannot serve two masters. I understand the sentiment of Senator Fielding’s amendment, but you really should not have an oversight rule or requirement which spreads the parliamentary responsibility. It should be either the Senate committee or the House committee or a joint committee; it should not be a number of them.

Having said that, Senator Fielding, it is entirely within the power of any committee, including any Senate committee, to call the Reserve Bank governor if they wish. There is absolutely no prohibition on that and there never will be, because the Constitution of Australia gives this parliament that authority and power. So I will not be supporting Senator Fielding’s amendment, on the grounds that you should only have statutory oversight given to one parliamentary body, and the parliament as a whole—not an individual house but the parliament as a whole—have decided that the House of Representatives standing committee is the appropriate one for the Reserve Bank.

The second point that I want to make is that I do not support the coalition’s amendment. I do not support it because I do think you can meet with the Reserve Bank more than twice, as is presently provided. You can meet with them as many times as you wish. I am convinced that if the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Economics says to the Reserve Bank governor, ‘Listen, we want you to come down and chat to us,’ then he will. It would be a very odd occasion if the Reserve Bank governor were to refuse such an invitation. So I think that it is unnecessary. You can have three, four, five or six meetings if you wish, but to put into statute that it must be a minimum of four is over the top. Assume a year such as 2007 when we had an election and there were actually very few sitting weeks and so on. To have been able to meet with the Reserve Bank governor in four quarters, for instance—which is what you would assume—might have ended up being very difficult.

Again, I have absolutely no problem with the coalition wanting the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Economics to meet with the Reserve Bank governor on more occasions than it does at present. I just do not think that it should be in statute. On those grounds I must say that, whilst understanding the motivation of Senator Fielding, I think he gives too little credit to the sheer power this parliament has to call who it wants, at any time it wants, either by invitation or through subpoena. Secondly, I think that it is undesirable to have someone having to report formally through statute to multiple committees. Thirdly, I do not think that it is necessary to put a greater oversight requirement into statute than exists at present.