Mark Bishop (WA, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Hansard source

I rise in support of the Defence Legislation (Miscellaneous Amendments) Bill 2008. The purpose of the bill, as has been outlined, is to address three separate policy measures. The first amendment is to the Geneva Conventions Act 1957 and the Criminal Code Act 1995 to incorporate protocol III to the Geneva convention. As has been said, protocol III recognises the red crystal as being a third distinctive emblem of the International Red Cross, in addition to the Red Cross and the Red Crescent. The second amendment is to the Defence Act 1903 and provides regulations for the possession, storage, dispensing and administration of pharmaceuticals by Australian Defence Force healthcare professionals. Its effect will be to standardise regulations to overcome state-based irregularities and discrepancies.

Finally, the bill will amend the Defence (Special Undertakings) Act 1952 to ensure that the Joint Defence Facility Pine Gap is adequately protected under legislation to prevent unauthorised access. This final amendment follows deficiencies identified during the trial and appeal of four activists who broke into the facility in 2005. This bill was referred to the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade for inquiry and the committee received 11 submissions. The committee reported in February 2009 and recommended that the bill be passed without amendment.

I would like to address the most controversial aspect of the bill—namely, as addressed by Senator Ludlam and relating to the third amendment, the provision of protection against unauthorised entry to the Pine Gap facility. As I think is generally acknowledged, protests at Pine Gap have occurred relatively regularly over recent decades. Any attempts to enter the facility have generally resulted in minor charges being brought. However, in December 2005, as outlined, four self-described—as I understand it—‘Christian pacifists’ armed with boltcutters entered a technical support area of the base. It reminded me of a section in Matthew in the Bible:

Render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s and unto God the things that are God’s.

Apparently, it might be suggested, that is respected by some in theory but not in practice. After all, I think it is acknowledged that the Christian pacifists were trespassing with clear intent to challenge the authority and existing law that regulated the facility.

In June 2007, they were convicted of the offence of entering a prohibited area and were fined over $3,000, but they did not receive a custodial sentence. The Director of Public Prosecutions appealed the leniency of the sentence and the protestors appealed their convictions in turn. The result, as has been outlined, was the acquittal of all four defendants. At issue in those proceedings was whether the facility at Pine Gap was a defence facility for the purposes of the act. The amendments in this bill seek to clarify that position. I acknowledge at the outset that it is an emotive and emotional issue. Joint facilities raise questions of sovereign rights at the best of times. They also raise questions of the right of Australians to know what is going on within them. However, it is also fair to say that opponents of joint facilities, whether Christian pacifists or not, are generally strong supporters of disarmament, often unilateral disarmament. For this reason we need to separate fact from fiction.

If you google ‘Pine Gap’, you will find a massive amount of information on this facility which is either unsubstantiated or just plain wrong. To get at the facts we need to go back to the beginning. During the Second World War, Labor Prime Minister John Curtin changed Australian strategic priorities. In a statement to the Melbourne Herald in December 1941, following the attack on Pearl Harbor and amid fears about the imminent fall of Singapore, he made the much quoted comment:

Without any inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom.

From that time, our forces fought side by side in the South Pacific, and our fleets fought together in the Battle of the Coral Sea. It is also important to note that allied intelligence organisations were established at this time. At the end of the war, the Chifley Labor government put in place a permanent collaborative arrangement for our intelligence links. In 1951 our links in defence and security were formalised in the ANZUS treaty under then Prime Minister Menzies. For over 50 years since, the ANZUS treaty has been the cornerstone of our strategic relationship with the United States. That treaty is founded on our common values of democracy, freedom and the rule of law. It is also—arguably more importantly—based on our shared interests globally as well as in the Asia-Pacific region.

Fast-forward to the 1960s and Australia agreed to play host to joint facilities at North West Cape, Pine Gap and Nurrungar. Pine Gap, along with the other bases, was a project conceived and developed in the Cold War era to support global security. In 1966 the then Minister for External Affairs, Mr Hasluck, on behalf of the Australian government signed an agreement with the United States. That agreement was to establish the Joint Defence Space Research Facility. The head agreement, as it is known, came into effect on 9 December 1966. Significantly, it was amended in 1988. I will return to that milestone and set of negotiations later. Initially, the agreement was terminable at one year’s notice by either side. Since 1988 three years notice has been required to terminate the agreement. The agreement has also been subject to review, on average every 10 years.

Pine Gap was billed as a top-secret base. However, it did not take long for Australians to become aware that it was located 20 kilometres south of Alice Springs. Construction began in early 1967 and the infrastructure was completed in 1968. It began full operations in June 1970. Although the head agreement is not a public document, it is known that the agreement required that the Australian and US governments would establish, maintain and operate in Australia a facility for general defence research in the space field; the Australian government would provide the land for the facility and it would remain vested in the Australian government; the US government would be accorded ‘all necessary rights of access to, and joint use and occupation of, the land’; and the land would ‘be considered a secure area’. Initially, there was not a genuine joint arrangement in the management and operations of the facilities, although, it must be stated, there was an unusually high level of Australian knowledge of the more sensitive operations and of the satellite and communications systems they supported.

Today, the role and functions of the facility are known. Firstly, the facility collects intelligence and provides an early warning system for the launch of ballistic missiles. Secondly, the facility aids in the detection of the proliferation of ballistic missiles and can help to identify surprise or accidental nuclear missile attack. That means the facility makes a vital contribution to the deterrence of conflict. It also contributes to efforts to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I cannot overstate the importance of this function to Australia and our allies. International verification of arms control is a means to achieving agreements between nations to limit, reduce and over time eliminate their arsenals of nuclear weapons. For that reason, effective verification is a key component in the disarmament process.

We cannot hope that nations will agree to strategic arms reduction agreements if their success cannot be measured and verified. If agreements fail it is generally because stringent verification requirements cannot be met to the satisfaction of both sides. Through early warning, communications and other functions, this facility promotes confidence in the balance of deterrence. This confidence must be maintained if superpowers such as the United States and Russia are to keep disarming. It is a contribution we must continue to make to our national as well as our global security.

The agreement as it stands today does not in any way impinge on our sovereign rights. This is a recurring theme in criticisms of the facility. I believe it stems mainly from the secrecy which shrouded the project in its early days. Since 1988 our relationship with the United States with respect to the joint facility has matured. Under the terms of the 1988 agreement, negotiated under the aegis of Prime Minister Hawke by, I believe, then Defence Minister Beazley, we are engaged in a policy of ‘full knowledge and concurrence’. As I said previously, this was not always the case. In the early seventies and early eighties only a handful of Australian personnel were directly involved in the central work of the facility. There was also a significant degree of secrecy surrounding the work of the facility.

However, following the negotiations in 1988, much of that changed. As a result of the new agreement Australian commanders are in charge of shifts and an Australian holds the position of deputy commander of the facility and becomes acting commander in the absence of the commander. That was not always the case; it is now. Also, there are now Australian personnel and contractors on every shift and, most importantly, we use the capabilities of the facility for our own national security priorities without United States veto powers. So we have control of the facility, command of the facility and sovereign rights over the facility, while we maintain an independent and highly valued contribution to the work of the facility.

All this points to the fact that the Australian government has full visibility of the role and functions of Pine Gap. Of the 800 personnel at the base, over 60 per cent are Australian government employees or contractors. Our personnel includes members of the AFP as well as members of the ADF. The work of our senior officials ensures our full knowledge and concurrence will continue. More importantly, the new agreement heralded a commitment by the Hawke government to inform the public as fully as possible about the facility. The thinking behind that policy shift in 1998 was and is simple: if there is a better understanding of the role of the facility, there may well be increased public support for it. There are of course limitations on what can be revealed publicly. Successive Australian governments in practice have not commented on intelligence matters. There is, however, enough information publicly available on the importance of Pine Gap, an importance based not only on our obligations to our allies but also on our national aims for the reduction of arms and nuclear weapons.

On Pine Gap’s 40th anniversary in 2007, the then defence minister said:

Our intelligence relationship already strong has been reinforced over the past five years. This co-operation, which now borders on seamless, has seen an increase in information exchange, technical cooperation and embedded liaison officers.

He went on to say:

The public can have confidence that its elected representatives are responsibly and accountably overseeing such activities.

Our alliance with the US provides us with crucial military benefits such as unique intelligence; sophisticated weaponry, technology and equipment; logistics, training and operational experience through exchange programs and exercises; and defence research and technical cooperation. The history of this interaction means that we now make a significant military contribution to our own national security.

The question then becomes whether as a society we are confident in the protections afforded by our democratic institutions. It is a debate that will no doubt continue as long as the need for alliances and treaties between nations exists. I acknowledge that not all Australians will support the existence of this joint facility. However, as we all know, terrorism is a global challenge and we must continue to play our part. I would like to reiterate that intelligence collected at Pine Gap contributes to the verification of arms control and achieving disarmament agreements. Verification is vital to the arms control process. Therefore, the importance of our contribution should not be underestimated. In this respect, we should all be aware that, if you will the outcome, you need to will the means.

The joint defence facility Pine Gap makes an important contribution to the security interests of both Australia and the United States. It serves a modern purpose. Pine Gap is an outstanding illustration of the commitment and level of cooperation that has been achieved in Australia’s close defence relationship with the US. It is also an Australian defence base. The changes to the Defence (Special Undertakings) Act will maintain an appropriate level of protection for the facility Pine Gap. The protections are in line with those in place for our other defence bases. We need to ensure that Pine Gap continues to make significant contributions to our national and global security. I commend the bill to the Senate.