Scott Ludlam (WA, Australian Greens) Share this | Hansard source

by leave—I move Greens amendments (1) and (5) and (6) to (14) as they relate to essentially the same issues of the constitution of the monitor’s office:

(1)    Clause 4, page 4 (lines 26 and 27), omit the definition of National Security Legislation Monitor, substitute:

National Security Legislation Monitor means:

             (a)    in Division 2 of Part 2, other than in subsection 11(1)—any one of the three members who constitute the panel appointed in accordance with section 11;

             (b)    elsewhere in this Act—the panel of three members appointed in accordance with section 11.

(5)    Clause 11, page 9 (line 4), after “Monitor”, insert “is to comprise a panel of three members, each of whom”.

Amendments 6 to 14 are consequential upon amendments (1) and (5)

(6)    Clause 11, page 9 (lines 7 to 14), omit “the National”, substitute “a National” (wherever occurring).

(7)    Clauses 12, page 9 (lines 18 to 21), omit “The National”, substitute “Each National” (twice occurring).

(8)    Clause 13, page 9 (line 24), omit “The”, substitute “Each”.

(9)    Clause 13, page 9 (line 26), omit “the”, substitute “each”.

(10)  Clause 13, page 9 (line 28), omit “The”, substitute “Each”.

(11)  Clause 14, page 10 (line 4), omit “the”, substitute “each”.

(12)  Clauses 15 to 18, page 10 (lines 8 to 22), omit “The National”, substitute “Each National” (wherever occurring).

(13)  Clauses 19 and 20, page 11 (lines 2 to 24), omit “the National”, substitute “a National” (wherever occurring).

(14)  Clause 20, page 11 (lines 26 to 28), omit “the Monitor”, substitute “a Monitor” (twice occurring).

What these amendments seek to do is act on recommendations that came through very strongly during the original inquiry of the legal and constitutional affairs committee into Senator Troeth’s private senator’s bill which I participated in and which foreshadowed the debate we are having now. During that inquiry it came through very strongly from a number of witnesses that, rather than a single part-time independent reviewer, what was required was a panel of three to create some diversity of opinion and background in the make-up of the office. The issue was discussed at great length. The conclusion that we came away with was that a diversity of experience on the panel would allow for a more rigorous process in what will actually be an arduous workload. We are tasking this office with an enormous workload of monitoring of past and ongoing law reform efforts in this crucial area of counterterrorism legislation. We felt that a panel of three would be able to undertake this workload supported by a secretariat or a small staff much more effectively than, as is the government’s proposition, a single part-time officer.

The UK does have a single appointee in this role, but in my view the committee’s inquiry was provided with compelling reasons as to why we in Australia could improve on the UK model rather than just following it in every instance. I think there is less risk of the office of the monitor being perceived as an advocate for Commonwealth laws, which I think is really very important, if we get three reviewers with diverse backgrounds and relevant expertise. Given the number of new antiterrorism laws, the discussion paper that was tabled by the Attorney-General last year and the sheer number of these laws on the statute books, I think there is more than enough on which a panel of reviewers might report. If there were three reviewers I think their appointment could conceivably be part time, but, as I said during the second reading debate, a single part-time reviewer is more or less completely inadequate for the task at hand.