Simon Birmingham (SA, Liberal Party, Shadow Parliamentary Secretary for the Murray Darling Basin) Share this | Hansard source

by leave—I move:

That the Senate take note of the document.

This document, tabled out of session on Friday last week, is indeed a very clear example of the government’s mismanagement of its Home Insulation Program; in fact, no clearer example could one find. In reading this document, it becomes transparently clear that almost everything predicted by its authors, Minter Ellison, has come true. All the flaws in the government’s Home Insulation Program, which Minister Garrett failed to recognise and adequately act on early enough, were identified. In fact, they were identified and given to the government on 9 April last year. That is before four young Australians lost their lives installing insulation, before 93 Australian homes suffered fire damage because of this insulation program and before tens of thousands of other homes that were identified as possibly at risk were put at risk. All the warnings were contained in this report to the government that the minister miraculously never looked at. From 9 April last year until 11 February this year, he never looked at the report. That is what the minister says. But we know that his department told the Senate inquiry into this matter earlier today that it had briefed him continuously. We know that his department provided him with a briefing on this risk management plan in late April last year. We know that he was told of the risks and the issues in April last year, so, even if he had never seen this report until February and even if its contents had never been specifically quoted to him, we know by the admission of his own departmental officials in a Senate inquiry earlier today that he was briefed on this in late April last year—again, before deaths occurred and before houses were damaged.

This document was not the only one flagging these warnings to the minister; there was another document that the government did not think to table last week. Despite the order of the Senate and despite the request for these documents to be tabled, there was another document produced by Minter Ellison, the same authors, that the government did not think to table. That document is called the Risk Register and Management Plan, and it was delivered by Minter Ellison at 2 pm on 9 April 2009. It is little wonder that the government did not want to release this document voluntarily last week, because this document shows not only that all the risks were there but also that some recommendations were made to slow down the implementation of this program. Those recommendations, which are specifically named in this document, were not acted upon.

Let’s look at a couple of them. In relation to procurement and licensing, Minter Ellison said that there was a need for the entire program duration to be determined and fulfilled by 1 July under the government’s policy. However, they identified that that was unachievable. They suggested that the residual risk for rushing through procurement and licensing arrangements was not tolerable. There is a column in the document: ‘Is the residual risk value tolerable—yes or no?’ In response to this issue the answer is no. That is what Minter Ellison advised the government. Instead, they suggested the government should extend the rebate scheme to 30 September 2009 and consider a possible hybrid model allowing full implementation as planned on 1 July 2009 in metropolitan Sydney and Melbourne. That is right: they suggested delaying full implementation until 30 September. Instead, the government charged ahead without any proper procurement arrangements and without following through what was recommended: the need to identify the most appropriate procurement licensing model and the need to consider staged implementation of residual procurement needs to reduce time pressures. Without recognising any of these concerns, the government rushed ahead and implemented its scheme on 1 July.

Indeed, Minter Ellison noted a more sweeping concern in the report. They said that the time available to develop the program in a properly controlled way may be inadequate to deliver the program in a properly controlled way for the implementation date of 1 July. In detailing this, Minter Ellison again posed the same question: ‘Having looked at the risks of rushing through and implementing by 1 July, is the residual risk value tolerable—yes or no?’ Once again, the answer was no. Minter Ellison found quite clearly that the risk value of rushing ahead with this program was not tolerable and, as a result, once again recommended to the government that they should extend the rebate scheme to 30 September 2009 and consider a possible hybrid model. Did the government do either of those things? No, they did not. They charged ahead instead, recklessly implementing this scheme despite the fact that risks were identified in multiple reports provided by Minter Ellison and despite the fact that those risks went to the safety of installers and the safety of Australian families. This reckless abandon when it comes to the safety of Australians means that Minister Garrett and the Rudd government stand condemned for their failure to heed the advice that was given to them.

We know through evidence that has come out over the last couple of weeks that the government received at least 19 explicit warnings from industry, state governments and stakeholders about the risks that their Home Insulation Program posed—the risks to installers and the risks to homeowners, the risks of electrocution and the risks of fire. They received 19 explicit warnings. But here we have two government documents commissioned and paid for by the department of the environment which, for some strange reason, were kept secret from the minister and that demonstrate the government were warned about the risks. What is more, they were given some recommendations as to how to mitigate those risks. Of particular importance was the recommendation to slow things down and recognise that they were going too fast, and that, as a consequence of going too fast, they would put lives at risk and leave this program not only seeing tens of millions, if not hundreds of millions, of dollars wasted but also seeing Australian homeowners and insulation installers putting their lives on the line as a result of Minister Garrett’s mismanagement.

It is fail, fail, fail for Minister Garrett on all counts in the management of his portfolio. We now have a Green Loans Program that does not have a loans component, we have thousands of assessors under the Green Loans Program finding themselves out of work and we have a Home Insulation Program that has been cancelled for the time being, leaving thousands of installers without the opportunity of work until some alternative is put in place. Many of them are reputable installers who have been doing the job safely and adequately, not just for months but for years and decades. They all find themselves left out in the cold. The government has let down homeowners, installers and the Australian community. Minister Garrett has failed to heed advice on multiple occasions and has failed to heed advice contained in reports commissioned by his own department. It has been acknowledged by his department that they briefed him regularly and that the departmental secretary briefed him on a weekly basis, and yet he seems to have never managed to take the appropriate action. Cancelling the program last week does not absolve Minister Garrett of all responsibility for his past decisions—far from it. Minister Garrett needs to be held accountable for every decision that he has taken or, more importantly, failed to take in the life of this program. That is where the buck needs to stop—with Minister Garrett.

Also, whilst we are looking at where the buck may stop, Minister Arbib, after his performance in question time today, has some questions to answer as well because it was identified in those Minter Ellison reports that he was at weekly meetings. Whilst he told the Senate today that he was never told of the risks of fire or the risks of electrocution, it beggars belief, quite frankly, that he attended weekly meetings and did not hear of those risks. Somehow he claims that he delivered on all of the safety components. Mr Acting Deputy President Marshall, please explain to me how it is that, if he was never told of the risks of fire and electrocution, he could deliver on all of those safety components. Something does not add up in what Minister Arbib said. He stands as condemned as Minister Garrett.