Barnaby Joyce (Queensland, National Party, Leader of The Nationals in the Senate) Share this | Hansard source

It is extremely important and pertinent that this debate clearly express what is on this occasion the bipartisan support for our efforts in Afghanistan. I will quickly refute some of the issues brought up by Senator Brown and I will start at the end. The Gallipoli campaign, as you know, was not a case of removing ourselves from that field of engagement; it was reallocating our resources to another part of that engagement. Senator Brown used Somalia as an example of a reason not to stay in Afghanistan. I think Somalia is a brilliant example of why we should stay in Afghanistan. Somalia is an example of what happens when you remove yourself from the field of contact and the anarchy that was so ably displayed by Senator Brown is an example of what we would see in Afghanistan if we were to remove ourselves from that area of engagement.

If we talk about the rights, equalities and other things that have been subverted by an oppressive regime, we are not going to go any further in upholding those rights by removing ourselves from Afghanistan. In fact, it would just be an entree for the Islamist extremists to come back in and completely subjugate the rights of women and of minority groups. It may not be a perfect situation now, but it is far and away a better situation than it would be if we were to return that territory to the Taliban.

Senator Brown talked about an exit strategy, but it is not so much a matter of when you leave but when you lose. If we leave when the situation has not been completely settled down, we will have lost and, therefore, we will have let down the 21 Australians who have lost their lives and the 150 or so who have been maimed. This would be the biggest letdown because, in essence, we would be saying that there was possibly no point to their being there, and that is an area we must never go into. If you want to negotiate, as Senator Brown suggested, then you should negotiate from a position of strength, not from a position of weakness, and you should negotiate with a position on the ground, not try to negotiate over the hope of a telephone line.

I do not know whether a vitriolic narrative against former Prime Minister Howard and former US President Bush does anything much to help the current problems or explain the current situation. We have to look at exactly where we are now, the exact form of the politics of this area and the threats to Australia, because there would be immediate threats to Australia if we get this wrong. I was interested when Senator Brown said that Osama bin Laden is not in Afghanistan. How would we know? That is an unknown, and I think it is a little bit naive to start suggesting that we know where Osama bin Laden is because, if we did, I am sure that there would be a concerted effort to strike that area and to deal with one section of a problem.

Senator Brown said that al-Qaeda are no longer in Afghanistan. That is entirely incorrect because they certainly are. He also talked about going out of our comfort zone by removing the troops. In fact, removing the troops would be going into our comfort zone. That is far and away the easier decision financially, emotionally and for a whole range of reasons, but it is not the right decision. Removing the troops may put you in your comfort zone, but it is also very naive in the long term.

I think that this battle is incredibly important. Just the other day in flying back from Europe I flew over Afghanistan. I went to a section of the plane where I could stare out of a window at the countryside that was beneath me. What a wild, rugged and diverse place Afghanistan is. The next country I flew over was Pakistan. I know that it is presumed that Pakistan holds between 80 and 100 nuclear warheads in its arsenal. I also know that Pakistan has nuclear power plants and that Afghanistan is right next door to Pakistan. There is certainly turmoil on the perimeters of Afghanistan in an area that includes Pakistan. If we were to remove ourselves from engagement in Afghanistan and we went from fighting a dispersed enemy through rugged countryside—where they at times attack us and have victory over us but in the majority of cases we are in the ascendancy and have control over them—to the collapse of Pakistan, as would be the goal of the insurgents, then we really would have a problem on our hands. This shows how clearly and quickly the results of a naive decision to remove ourselves from this field of engagement would be delivered back to us.

How would we feel in our discussions if we had the knowledge that a group of people who were quite willing to fly planes into the World Trade Center had taken over or controlled Pakistan and had the capacity to deliver a nuclear warhead? What would we then say? Would we look back and think, ‘If only we had that time again, if only we had that capacity again, we would have potentially saved the lives of so many’? No-one suggests for one moment that engagement in Afghanistan is easy. Historically, it has been one of the hardest areas for any nation to be a part of. If you go right back to 326 BC, I think, when Alexander the Great was going through Afghanistan, it was a problem for him by reason of the topography and the tribalism, one of the reasons he ended up with his arrangement with Roxane. There was the evacuation of Kabul in 1842 by the British with the loss of 16,000 lives. Then there was the demise of the Soviets in 1989 after they had been 10 years in that area.

No-one is for one moment suggesting that this area is easy—it is excessively hard—but it is excessively important that we remain in this field of engagement because we know that this is an area where Islamic extremism has taken a foothold, and it is personified in no better way than in the Taliban. The Taliban are not interested in keeping their area of influence just to the rugged hills and valleys, the topography of Afghanistan. They have moved their sphere of influence and have shown their desire in the past to reach over the horizon to affect those around them in the most virulent ways, with terrorism attacks in Africa and India. September 11 is of course a classic example of one of their attacks, but only one of many; Bali is another. It is absolutely beyond question that their capacity to deliver dissent, hurt and death to the edges of our country and to involve Australian people is without question. They have done it before. Their motivation is inspired in such a way that it will not be placated by us removing ourselves from Afghanistan.

I agree with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Kevin Rudd, that, although the decision based on our comfort zone might be to remove ourselves from Afghanistan, it would not be the responsible thing to do. In a fashion, it would be a selfish thing for us as a nation to do, because we would merely be asking other people to shoulder our burden. That burden, if not shouldered by others at the moment of our extraction from Afghanistan, would definitely be shouldered by others down the track. It would be shouldered by our children, by our sons and daughters, by our peers—by people other than us. We have a responsibility to act now so as to save hurt and harm to others later on. Leaving because of our comfort zone is merely a message to those who come after us that they will have to deal with this issue. It is right to say that if we can instil a better sense of government—even if it is not a perfect government—a better sense of law, a better sense of order and a better sense of the rights of women, children and minorities, we have a better chance, not a perfect chance, to bring a sense of stability. No-one is expecting perfection. We are just expecting to lessen the risk that is quite clearly evident.

It is without a shadow of a doubt that if we remove ourselves from Afghanistan al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden and his lieutenants would move back into that area as it would provide them sanctuary. It would also be taken as a clarion call to all those who hold extremist views that you can win, you can prevail and you can succeed. That will give them inspiration to go into other areas and do the same. Once they know that we will relent, that we will remove ourselves, that we will exit an area of hostility by reason that they are there and that the battle is protracted then no doubt it is in their form of tactics that they will extend the process of engagement. This fight is right. This fight is just. This fight is essential. This fight is one that ties up their resources. This fight will be protracted—and it is most certainly in our sphere of engagement.

What we need to show our nation is that this parliament has a bipartisan view of this. In a bipartisan way we are not taking the easy way out. We may not be reflecting the polls, but a poll-driven society is not always a reflection of what is just and what is proper, nor is there the knowledge in the polls that there may be in this building as to the long-term consequences of extraction from Afghanistan. We also have to acknowledge, whether we like it or not, the relationship with our major allies, unless we wish to extend our budget in defence spending by multiples of tens of billions of dollars a year. There is an expectation by allies that we will act as allies, that we too will put our shoulder to the wheel. That is a fair expectation to have. It is only by reason of allies that we are sitting in this parliament at the moment. Australia must never forget its own history—that if we did not have allies such as the United States we would have succumbed to the Japanese, most definitely. It is an historical fact and it is the reason we have the life and liberty expressed in this parliament today. When people talk about protracted battles and say that Vietnam was a failure, I do not believe that; I think Vietnam was a success. We tied up the resources of the Communist insurgents in such a way over such a long period of time that it exhausted them of their energy and of their capacity to continue. What we are doing now, carried out by the most gallant of Australian men and women, is something that will never show dividends but the cost will be absolutely evident if we are selfish enough to remove ourselves from that position.

If there were an easier process, if it were not necessary, there is not one reason why this parliament, this government, would be part of the engagement in Afghanistan. There is no pecuniary benefit for Australia to have an involvement in Afghanistan. There is no right to the quarries, the rocks, the minerals. There is no real gain in our involvement in Afghanistan except for a selfish reason: our own security. If we are not engaged in that context then we will become engaged in a later context in an area closer to our own nation. It has always been the aim of the infantry to seek out and close with the enemy—that is always the purpose—to kill or capture him, by day or by night, regardless of season, weather or terrain. But the whole purpose of seeking out and closing with the enemy—and this is the most important part—is that if you do not go out and seek and close with those who wish to do you harm then they, naturally enough, will seek out and close with you. It is the unfortunate reality of thousands of years of human history.

As we strive for a higher goal—the high aspiration that the future of humankind will be that conflicts will become a thing of the past—we can only do that from a position of strength. We cannot go with a begging bowl of aspirations. We must deal from a position of strength. When the strength is held by people who are moral, right and just, the world goes to a better place. But it is neither moral, right nor just to hand over that power to people who have exercised it in such ways as al-Qaeda, other Islamic extremist groups and Osama bin Laden, as the grand architect, have exercised it. We should acknowledge that these organisations and these people are still in existence; they are still there. In fact, they are proximate to the field of engagement where the Australians are right now.

We will have this debate that the Greens have insisted on, but let it not be taken as the loss of one iota of Australia’s resolute desire to obtain success in this field of engagement or as diminishing by one iota the purpose of the conduct of our troops on the ground at the moment. Each one of them is doing an amazing job. They are protecting our nation as we speak. They are engaging with the enemy so we do not have to engage with them here. They are protecting future Australians from having to do the work that they are doing at the moment. They are protecting the capacity of this nation’s liberties and rights to be exercised in other countries. They are making a statement that it is not just for Australians, New Zealanders, Americans, British, Singaporeans or Taiwanese to have the rights of democracy, the rule of law and the protection of women, children and minority groups. Just as we can transfuse blood from one human being to another and have transplants, these rights are also absolutely indivisible. They exist. Surely it is right for us to try to give other people the capacity to live and enjoy their lives with at least a portion or a semblance of the rights that we have in this nation—or are we, on another field, just going to become a selfish nation that says, ‘As long as we look after ourselves, that’s all we need to do; as long as we’re all right, that’s all we have to worry about’? I think Australia is a better nation than that as well.

But the primary reason we are in Afghanistan is our own protection. In closing, there is an argument put forward by the Greens as to whether we should be in Afghanistan or not with, I believe, a simplistic view of how you extract yourself and somehow leave the place in some semblance of the rule of law. It is an argument we can have from a position which is quite selfish, because we cannot have that debate if we extract ourselves and get this wrong. If we extract ourselves then the insurgents, al-Qaeda and Islamic extremism will once more take hold, grow and use the weakness at their peripheries to extend their reach, power and control. In extending their peripheries and their capacity for control and power in that region, they will over time gain the capacity to dominate Pakistan and other areas around them and to dominate sea channels. Then we will not have the capacity in the future to have engagement in a limited form, as we are doing now. Our engagement will be absolutely massive and we will have a fundamental change in how we deal with the world and fight for our future liberties. It would definitely put at risk our future liberties and freedoms. How would we as a nation deal with an Islamic extremist group that gets its hands on Pakistan’s arsenal? We would look back with regret at a time when it was within our control and our capacity to deal with the enemy. So that is the task that we are performing and that we must maintain our purpose for. We must seek out and close with this enemy, kill or capture him and destroy him, because it is the only way that we will survive in the long term.