David Feeney (Victoria, Australian Labor Party, Parliamentary Secretary for Defence) Share this | Hansard source

I might take this as an appropriate juncture to set out the government's position with regard to this opposition amendment. I can confirm that the government will not be supporting this particular amendment. The government's position is that the effect of the proposed amendment would be to exempt anybody claiming to be conducting research from the entire bill. This is a far broader effect than the US exception for fundamental research, and this is because Australia and the US have different legal and defence export arrangements. This type of exception is not required in Australia, because the bill does not contain any provisions which seek to regulate the outcomes of research. This amendment would undermine the basic intent of the legislation, which the government asserts is to control the intangible supply of technology related goods listed in the DSGL.

This amendment would allow anybody who claims to be conducting research complete freedom to send any information anywhere in the world. This includes how to manufacture and use sensitive equipment such as a mass spectrometer for a nuclear weapons laboratory and how to produce chemicals such as oxalyl chloride, required for chemical weapons. Apologies for any pronunciation errors there; my chemistry teacher will not be surprised!

Under existing legislation—Customs Act 1901—all of these goods would require permits if tangibly exported from Australia today. The controls on intangible exports in the proposed legislation simply mean that the same goods cannot be virtually exported by giving information to a person overseas so they can make the same goods. The inclusion of such a broad loophole in Australia's legislation would fundamentally undermine the capacity of the bill to strengthen Australia's export controls relating to intangible technology. This would not meet the intent of Australia's commitment to the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, a commitment made in 2006 under the Howard government. Such a broad loophole would not meet the treaty ratification requirements, and the treaty could not be ratified.

The inclusion of a fundamental research exception was raised during the consultation process. This was discussed at length during the roundtable meetings chaired by Australia's Chief Scientist. The roundtable meetings recognised that not all research involving controlled technology will involve the level of detail that would require a permit. The agreed outcomes recognise that some research might involve the transfer of sensitive technology and that that should not be exempt from legislation. The agreed outcomes instead propose an implementation model which reduces the need to interact with government agencies on the legislative regime. This is specifically captured in the Chief Scientist's agreed outcomes as a model to be tested as part of the pilot. This model, to be tested during the transition period, involves academic institutions and a supplement to the Australian Code for the Responsible Conduct of Research. It enables institutions to access technology and to determine when a permit might be required. The steering group will report to parliament on the effectiveness of this model, and there will be an opportunity to amend the legislation based on the steering group report.