George Brandis (Queensland, Liberal Party, Attorney-General) Share this | Hansard source

Senator Ludlam, perhaps you want to resile from what you said, but at the beginning of your contribution you did not include those qualifying words. You said, 'Metadata is content.' If you want to resile from that now and add a qualification to what you said, we all occasionally misspeak in this chamber, but you actually did say, 'Metadata is content,' and of course it is not.

Although we have all regularly used the word 'metadata' in this debate, of course you rightly say, Senator Ludlam, that 'metadata' is not a term of art. I am sure you will understand that the word 'metadata', which is a jargon phrase of no clear and specific meaning and no technical standing—and I see you nodding in agreement, so we are of a common mind about this—does not appear anywhere in this bill, for that very reason. So, rather than use a jargon phrase of no certain meaning and no technical standing, what the government has set out in the table subjacent to subsection 187A(1)(a) is a description of six categories of information which, in a loose way, we have been referring to in the course of this debate and which has been referred to in the course of public discussion as metadata. But, for the very reason you acknowledge, we have very carefully avoided using this cant, jargonistic phrase of no certain meaning and no technical standing. That is why the legislation has been structured the way it is. I really think, Senator Ludlam—because I know you know a lot about this area; I respect the fact that this is an area of specialist knowledge you have, more so than most in this chamber—you really should reconsider whether you go along with Senator Leyonhjelm's approach here. By defining content to limited categories what Senator Leyonhjelm has done, with respect—inadvertently, I am sure—is to confine the exclusion. Senator Leyonhjelm, who thinks this is a bad bill, would nevertheless want to improve it by making the exclusion of content as comprehensive and all-embracing as possible; but by defining certain categories of content to the exclusion of other potential categories, you are achieving the opposite effect, Senator Leyonhjelm.

As a matter of logic we should leave content as broadly expressed as possible. As I counselled in a slightly different context last night: these are not legal terms of art. Content is not a legal or a technical term. The substance of a communication is not a legal or a technical term. We should avoid an infinite regression into the thesaurus. We should simply use plain English and express that plain English as widely as it can be expressed.