Simon Birmingham (SA, Liberal Party, Assistant Minister for Education and Training) Share this | Hansard source

I present the government’s response to the report of the Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee on its inquiries into fresh pineapple imports, fresh ginger import risk analysis, and New Zealand potatoes import risk analysis I seek leave to incorporate the document in Hansard.

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The document read as follows—

Australian Government response to the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee report:

Effect on Australian pineapple growers of importing fresh pineapple from Malaysia

Effect on Australian ginger growers of importing fresh ginger from Fiji

Proposed importation of potatoes from New Zealand

August 2015

Recommendation 1

The committee recommends that the Government create a single, independent, statutory authority — separate from the Department of Agriculture — with responsibility for quarantine and biosecurity policy and operations.

Does not agree

Biosecurity is an important part of agricultural and environmental policy, contributing to productivity, trade and sustainable management of natural resources in Australia. Decisions about biosecurity matters associated with imports and the risk analysis that supports them are appropriately managed within the Department of Agriculture (the department).

One of the key commitments of the Government is to reduce the size of government and to ensure that government services are as efficient and well-targeted as possible. The Government is implementing a methodical and ongoing effort to reduce the total number of Australian Government bodies, including statutory authorities. Accordingly, the Government does not consider the establishment of a statutory authority separate to the Department of Agriculture would improve the effectiveness or efficiency of effort applied to the Government's Biosecurity responsibilities.

The biosecurity functions within the department are not easily separated, for example functions relating to sustainable resource management, agricultural productivity and economic analysis through ABARES are fully integrated with biosecurity activities.

This interconnection of issues allows the department to fully consider the implications and ramifications of any decision made or advice provided. Removing the biosecurity functions from the department would affect the department's evidence based decision making processes for both biosecurity and non-biosecurity functions. Accountability, transparency and independent decision making can be delivered in a system without creating separate bodies; for example, through clearly delineated roles in legislation and administration.

Recommendation 2

The [committee] recommends that the Government ensure that Australia ' s import risk analysis process is consultative, scientifically based, politically independent, transparent, consistent, harmonised and subject to appeal on process [ sic ].

Agreed

Australia has a world-class national biosecurity system that has served the Australian people, industry and environment well and is subject to broad ranging interest and regular scrutiny. The current process of conducting IRAs, as detailed in the Quarantine Regulations 2000, is considered to be consultative, scientifically based, politically independent, transparent, consistent, harmonised and subject to appeal on process.

As part of its election commitments for a Competitive Agriculture Sector, the Government has examined the workload, prioritising requests and considered the IRA process to ensure that robust arrangements are in place to minimise the risk of exotic pests and disease incursions into Australia. The examination focused specifically around the key areas of:

As part of the process, the department released a discussion paper and ran an extensive consultation process around Australia from July 2014 to October 2014. Consultation included a written submissions process and group discussions in Perth, Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide, Brisbane, Hobart and Canberra.

The Government released a report on the examination on 31 July 2015 which summarises stakeholder concerns, issues raised and outcomes of the consultation for the examination of the IRA process. Also released were the related findings and recommended actions which make recommendations to improve parts of the process.

The examination also takes into account any issues raised in current inquiries or recent reviews commissioned by the Government and Senate Committees, as well as ongoing areas of work such as the Agricultural Competiveness White Paper. It will also take into consideration other reports as well as issues and comments from stakeholders, clients and international trading partners on the Australian IRA process.

The Quarantine Regulations 2000 detail the process to be used in conducting an import risk analysis (IRA). An IRA is a scientific analysis of pests and diseases potentially associated with an imported commodity. As a member of the World Trade Organization, Australia conducts IRAs in accordance with the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) and relevant International standards developed under the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) and by the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE). Australia has the right to regulate imports and impose measures 'to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health… based on scientific principles and…not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence' (Article 2.2 SPS Agreement).

The development of an IRA report is based on the consideration of relevant scientific and technical information. An IRA will also draw on existing policy to ensure recommendations are consistent for the same/similar pests. Key steps in an IRA include stakeholder consultation, particularly the issuance of a draft IRA report for comment by stakeholders. All stakeholder comments are carefully considered in developing a final IRA report. In the expanded IRA process, the consideration of stakeholder comments is reviewed by the Eminent Scientists Group. The ESG have stated in a letter to the Senate 'There have been very few occasions where we have been able to criticise the science or identify omissions of science in the IRAs we have examined'.

Prior to an IRA being finalised, stakeholders can appeal on the grounds that there was a significant deviation from the IRA process that adversely affected their interests. A final decision to allow an import is made by the Director of Animal and Plant Quarantine (or delegate) when an import permit is issued.

The current process of conducting IRAs is therefore considered to be consultative, scientifically based, politically independent, transparent, consistent, harmonised and subject to appeal on process. However, this does not mean it cannot be improved and these issues were considered as part of the Examination of the import risk analysis process (examination of the IRA process) released by Minister Joyce on 31 July 2015.

The Government introduced the proposed Biosecurity Bill 2014 into Parliament on 27 November 2014 and it was passed by Parliament on 14 May 2015. The processes for conducting biosecurity import risk analyses (BIRAs) under the new Biosecurity Legislation will be in regulations, policy documents and supporting material such as a new IRA Handbook (BIRA Guidelines) and factsheets. More consultation will be undertaken in 2015 which will build on the consultation undertaken as part of the examination of the IRA process.

Recommendation 3

The committee recommends that the Department of Agriculture give thorough consideration to the Peace report, as well as the underlying themes of all other recommendations contained in this report, in developing the new biosecurity regulations and guidelines.

Agreed

In addition to the response to Recommendation 2, some of the issues discussed in the Peace report have been raised by stakeholders during consultation on the examination of the IRA process released by Minister Joyce on 31 July 2015. These issues were considered as part of that process.

The Peace Report was commissioned by the Senate while conducting the three inquiries (on ginger, pineapple and potatoes for processing) to review Australia's risk assessment method. The Peace Report is dated 30 January 2013 and is available on the Senate website. Mr Peace is a practitioner in risk assessment although he states he is not an expert in biosecurity risk assessment. The department has considered the Peace Report and has sought advice from Australian Centre for Excellence in Risk Analysis (ACERA). ACERA was established to ensure Australia stays at the forefront of world's best practice, as a result of a Coalition election commitment in 2004. Recently, a new competitive funding bid was won by ACERA which is now known as the Centre of Excellence for Biosecurity Risk Analysis (CEBRA). The ACERA advice is critical of the risk methods recommended in the Peace Report and the department provided this advice to the Senate on 24 May 2013.

Subsequent to the Peace report, the department, and Professor Mark Burgman of the CEBRA, met with Mr Peace to discuss the recommendations in his report. Agreement was reached that the department would explore alternative ways to better represent the risk assessment process and ways to improve stakeholder understanding of the process (e.g. risk communication). CEBRA already provides advice to the department on this and related matters.

Recommendation 4

The committee recommends that the IRA Handbook should be amended to include full details of techniques available to Department of Agriculture risk analysts and any underlying data or research validating those techniques.

Agreed

This issue has been raised by stakeholders during consultation on the examination of the IRA process and were considered as part of that process.

In addition, this recommendation draws on information discussed in the Peace Report. Subsequent to the Peace report, the department, and Professor Mark Burgman of CEBRA, met with Mr Peace to discuss the recommendations in his report. As agreed with Mr Peace, the department would explore alternative ways to better represent the risk assessment process and ways to improve stakeholder understanding of the process (e.g. risk communication). CEBRA already provides advice to the department on these and related matters. Each risk assessment published for stakeholder comment contains the risk assessment method at section 2 of each report. Defining particular risk assessment techniques in the IRA Handbook may limit the scope of new techniques that could be employed (such as those recommended by CEBRA) in the conduct of risk assessments by the department. Australia's risk assessment method, including the risk estimation matrix, is widely used in biosecurity risk assessment activity. The risk estimation matrix has been used by the department since 2001 and was endorsed at the Primary Industry Ministerial Council on 2 May 2002. It has been adapted and used by Plant Health Australia and affiliated industries in assessing risk within their Industry Biosecurity Plans (including the potato, ginger and pineapple industries). It has also been used by Australian State Government Departments in assessing the risk of pests potentially associated with the movement of commodities from domestic sources (e.g. Tasmania's risk assessment for fruit flies completed on 31 March 2012).

Recommendation 5

The committee recommends that the IRA Handbook should include an IRA effectiveness checklist similar to that recommended by Mr Peace.

Agreed

The form and content of a revised IRA Handbook were considered as part of the examination of the IRA process released by Minister Joyce on 31 July 2015.

This recommendation of an IRA checklist draws on information discussed in the Peace Report. The department will review whether an IRA checklist would improve the process and stakeholder understanding of an IRA. The department notes that the key steps in an IRA are already diagrammatically listed in the current Import Risk Analysis Handbook 2011 (see Annex 1 of the handbook). Of these steps, the publication of a draft report provides opportunity for stakeholders to comment on all aspects of the report. Any deficiencies, differences in interpretation, new evidence can be submitted by stakeholders to the department as a result of the draft report. A final report is only issued after consideration of matters raised by stakeholders. Once an IRA is complete and a final report is issued, the department continues to review information relevant to an import pathway and can make further changes to import conditions as supported by suitable technical and scientific information.

Recommendation 6

The committee recommends that stakeholders ' risk perceptions should be incorporated into risk criteria used to analyse the consequences of a given import risk.

Does not agree

Australia's risk assessment method is conducted in accordance with the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) and, for plant IRAs, additionally relevant International standards developed under the International Plant Protection Convection (IPPC). Australia's world-class biosecurity and risk analysis system is based on strong and defensible science. The inclusion of 'stakeholders' risk perceptions' in a risk assessment would not be consistent with the SPS Agreement where measures must bebased on scientific principles.

This recommendation of risk perceptions draws on information discussed in the Peace Report. Subsequent to the Peace report, the department, and Professor Mark Burgman of the CEBRA, met with Mr Peace to discuss the recommendations in his report. As agreed with Mr Peace, the department would explore alternative ways to better represent the risk assessment process and ways to improve stakeholder understanding of the process (e.g. risk communication).

Recommendation 7

The committee recommends that the Department of Agriculture consider ways to improve the way it communicates risk (and the risk assessment process) to stakeholders.

Agreed

As outlined in response to Recommendation 2. In addition, this recommendation to consider ways to improve stakeholder consultation draws on information discussed in the Peace Report. Subsequent to the Peace Report, and as agreed with Mr Peace, the department would explore alternative ways to better represent the risk assessment process and ways to improve stakeholder understanding of the process. The department consults regularly with stakeholders through meetings, correspondence and their submissions on risk assessment draft reports. This issue were considered as part of the examination of the IRA process released by Minister Joyce on 31 July 2015.

Recommendation 8

The committee recommends that the Department of Agriculture reconsiders the operation of geographic impacts in the IRA process, and give consideration to developing consequence scales based on, for example, national GDP, percentage of national crop at risk, or viable planting area at risk.

Noted

The recognition of regional differences, including the status of a pest within Australia, is a key issue raised and discussed in the examination of the IRA process. The new biosecurity legislation will specifically include the consideration of regional differences within a Biosecurity Import Risk Analysis by outlining that the level of biosecurity risk associated with goods may vary according to the place in Australian territory at which the goods are to enter or be unloaded. The conditions applied may also vary accordingly. The new biosecurity legislation was introduced to Parliament in on 27 November 2014 and was passed on 14 May 2015.

This recommendation to consider the issue of geographic impacts on the scale of consequences was discussed in the Peace report. Subsequent to the Peace Report, and as agreed with Mr Peace, the department would explore alternative ways to better represent the risk assessment process and ways to improve stakeholder understanding of the process. Improving stakeholder understanding of import risk analyses was an issue raised during the examination of the IRA process released by Minister Joyce on 31 July 2015and was considered as part of that process.

Recommendation 9

The committee recommends that before commencing the importation of fresh pineapples from Malaysia, the Department of Agriculture should establish to a much greater degree of certainty the degree of post-harvest latency of pineapple fruit collapse and heart rot.

Noted

The Government notes that import conditions can be reviewed at any time in light of new scientific information and the Department of Agriculture will continue to review any new information relevant to this risk assessment.

The Senate report raises concerns presented by stakeholders that latent infection of pineapple fruit collapse and heart rot is not well understood and new studies have been conducted since those referenced in the IRA. As discussed in the pest risk assessment (PRA) heart rot is associated with the leaves of the pineapple plant. As the scope of the import risk analysis (IRA) is for decrowned pineapple with the crowns and the basal leaves removed, heart rot is not considered to be on the pathway.

The department conducted a detailed assessment of the entry potential of Erwinia chrysanthemi (pineapple strain, Dickeya sp.) (fruit collapse). Section 4.3.2 of the final IRA report included a literature review by Lim (1986) citing research conducted in 1937. Those results were confirmed in a study by leading experts in the field (Lim and Lowings 1979) and this work was also cited in the IRA.

Lim and Lowings (1978) studied the expression of Erwinia chrysanthemi and reported that latency is associated with the physiological status of the developing fruit. Latency breaks during ripening when polyphenoloxidase activity decreases and sugar levels increase to a level conducive for bacterial growth. This allows symptoms to express starting well before harvest. Lim and Lowings (1979) looked at disease incidence in fields and found that the percentage of fruit collapse is highest 2–3 weeks before harvest.

Work conducted in Malaysia on Erwinia chrysanthemi,where disease incidence was up to forty percent, was undertaken in pineapple fields prior to targeted measures had been developed to manage this pathogen. Under these conditions, a maximum of two percent latent infection could occur at harvest. After harvest, latently infected fruit will continue to express. Based on this information the PRA has taken the stringent approach and assumed that up to two percent infection could occur at export. However, in well managed fields grown under standard commercial production practices, which implement a number of disease management procedures for this pathogen, it is likely that disease incidence in the field and latently infected fruit would be considerably less.

Before any imports of fresh pineapples from Malaysia can occur, the department must first agree upon a work plan with the Malaysian Department of Agriculture, detailing how Malaysia will ensure compliance with Australia ' s strict import conditions. The department will not issue any import permits until the work plan has been considered and compliance with Australia ' s import conditions is audited.

Recommendation 10

The committee recommends that the Department of Agriculture review its assessment of the probability of importation and the probability of distribution of the Dickeya sp. pathogen. If a risk above Australia ' s ALOP were to emerge from the review, then the committee expects stronger risk management measures would be required.

Noted

If such risk management measures were not sufficient to reduce the risk to Australia ' s ALOP, then imports of Malaysian pineapples to Australia should not be permitted.

Agree in-principle

A final import risk analysis (IRA) report completes a risk assessment process that considered relevant information available at that time. As is normal practice, the department continues to monitor new information, including from stakeholders, which may affect the biosecurity risk associated with an imported commodity. Since the publication of the final IRA for fresh decrowned pineapple fruit from Malaysia no new information has been published that would support a change to current import conditions for this commodity pathway.

Import conditions can be reviewed at any time in light of new scientific information.

As discussed in the response to Recommendation 9, the figure of latent infection of export fruit is likely to be less than two per cent. The final report has taken a stringent approach and assumed that up to two percent infection could occur at export. The final report also took into consideration the commercial quality procedures implemented at the packing house and the small volume of trade (Malaysia has indicated a potential capacity to export 200 tonnes of fresh decrowned pineapple fruit a year). Based on all this information the department considers that the rating of 'Low' for the probability of importation in the final report is appropriate.

The department considered the distribution of the pineapples from Malaysia in section 4.3.2 of the final report. As stated above, the import volume will be small (about 200 tonnes per year). Section 4.3.2 of the final report provided detailed information to support the conclusion that only a small proportion of this small volume of imported pineapples could be distributed to areas in the vicinity of pineapple production areas or where host may occur.

The value of pineapples for fresh consumption is at least five times of the value of pineapples for processing (the figures included on page 46 in the Senate report support this). This along with the low import volume, the department considers it unlikely that it would be financially viable for Malaysian pineapples produced for fresh fruit market would be imported for processing(at facilities that would be near pineapple production areas). Also, when assigning the 'Low' rating for the probability of distribution, the final report already took into consideration that some imported pineapples may be used in processing facilities.

The final report recognised that some of the vectors for this bacterium are present in Australia and discussed the possibility for each of these vectors in transferring the bacterium to pineapples (the only susceptible host) in section 4.3.2. The information detailed in section 4.3.2 lead to the conclusion that suitable vectors would need to be present in close proximity to the freshly infested fruit waste and a susceptible host (pineapple plant).

The department considers that the likelihood estimate for distribution of 'Low' in the final report is appropriate.

Recommendation 11

The committee recommends that the Department of Agriculture review its assessment of the consequences of the establishment of the pineapple heart rot and fruit collapse pathogen Erwinia chrysanthemi (pineapple strain, Dickeya sp.) in Australia. If a risk above Australia ' s ALOP were to emerge from the review, then the committee expects stronger risk management measures would be required.

Noted

If such risk management measures were not sufficient to reduce the risk to Australia ' s ALOP then imports of Malaysian pineapples to Australia should not be permitted.

Agree in-principle

A final import risk analysis (IRA) report completes a risk assessment process that considered relevant information available at that time. As is normal practice, the department continues to monitor new information, including from stakeholders, which may affect the biosecurity risk associated with an imported commodity. Since the publication of the final IRA for fresh decrowned pineapple fruit from Malaysia no new information has been published that would support a change to current import conditions for this commodity pathway.

Import conditions can be reviewed at any time in light of new scientific information.

Recommendation 12

The committee recommends that the full reasons and relevant supporting documentation of the Import Market Access Advisory Group should be made publicly available within 30 days of a decision being taken.

Agreed

The precise arrangements around prioritising market access requests are being considered.

In the context of the committee's report, the Government understands Recommendation 12 relates in part to the committee's views about the Government funding through the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (previously funded through AusAID) for the Pacific Horticultural & Agricultural Market Access Program (PHAMA). Under the World Trade Organization Agreement of the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), Australia has agreed to provide technical assistance to developing countries (Article 9 of the SPS Agreement).

One way the Government does this is through funding a position in the department through the PHAMA project to work with Pacific Island countries in developing phytosanitary systems. This investment benefits Australia through the improved management of biosecurity pests. For example, glassy wing sharp shooter (GWSS) is an insect that vectors (spreads) a serious plant pathogen, Pierce's disease. GWSS has become established in some Pacific Islands and, with Australia's assistance, improved biosecurity awareness and measures are helping limit the spread of this insect to other Pacific Islands and thereby reduce the likelihood of it spreading to Australia.

Recommendation 13

The committee recommends that the Department of Agriculture review its assessment of the likelihood of entry, establishment and spread of yam scale. If a risk above Australia ' s ALOP were to emerge from the review, then the committee expects stronger risk management measures would be required.

Noted

If such risk management measures were not sufficient to reduce the risk to Australia ' s ALOP, then imports of Fijian ginger to Australia should not be permitted.

Agree in-principle

Import conditions can be reviewed at any time in light of new scientific information.

A final import risk analysis (IRA) report completes a risk assessment process that considered relevant information available at that time. As is normal practice, the department continues to monitor new information, including from stakeholders, which may affect the biosecurity risk associated with an imported commodity.

The entry, establishment and spread of yam scale ( Aspidiella hartii ) were all assessed as ' High ' in the final IRA report, which are the highest ratings possible. Therefore, any reassessment can only either come to the same estimates as previously determined, which would not alter the outcome, or a lower risk estimate where no measure would be required.

The department has already taken a very stringent approach in assessing yam scale. Other comparable armoured scale pests typically are assessed below Australia ' s ALOP and do not require mandatory risk management measures.

Recommendation 14

The committee recommends that the Department of Agriculture review its assessment of the likelihood of entry, establishment and spread of the Fijian burrowing nematode variant. If a risk above Australia ' s ALOP were to emerge from the review, then the committee expects stronger risk management measures would be required.

Noted

If such risk management measures were not sufficient to reduce the risk to Australia ' s ALOP, then imports of Fijian ginger to Australia should not be permitted.

Agree in-principle

Import conditions can be reviewed at any time in light of new scientific information. The Final Import Risk Analysis Report for fresh ginger for consumption from Fiji noted in the summary that; the quarantine status and measures for this pest [Radopholus similis] will be reviewed after one year, or in the event that new information becomes available. The department announced on 17 November 2014 the Commencement of a review of import conditions for fresh ginger from Fiji (a review) (Biosecurity Advice 2014-14) that includes consideration of the quarantine status of Radopholus similis. A draft report of the review was released for public consultation on 22 June 2015 (Biosecurity Advice 2015-05).

A final import risk analysis (IRA) report completes a risk assessment process that considered relevant information available at that time. As is normal practice, the department continues to monitor new information, including from stakeholders, which may affect the biosecurity risk associated with an imported commodity.

The department has taken a very stringent approach to considering the ' Fiji variant ' of Radopholus similis as a provisional quarantine pest.

Recommendation 15

The committee recommends that the Department of Agriculture review its assessment of the consequences of the establishment of the Fijian burrowing nematode variant in Australia. If a risk above Australia ' s ALOP were to emerge from the review, then the committee expects stronger risk management measures would be required.

Noted

If such risk management measures were not sufficient to reduce the risk to Australia ' s ALOP, then imports of Fijian ginger to Australia should not be permitted.

Agree in-principle

Import conditions can be reviewed at any time in light of new scientific information. The Final Import Risk Analysis Report for fresh ginger for consumption from Fiji noted in the summary that; the quarantine status and measures for this pest [Radopholus similis] will be reviewed after one year, or in the event that new information becomes available. The department announced on 17 November 2014 the Commencement of a review of import conditions for fresh ginger from Fiji (Biosecurity Advice 2014-14) that includes consideration of the quarantine status and measures for Radopholus similis. A draft report of the review was released for public consultation on 22 June 2015 (Biosecurity Advice 2015-05).

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