Rex Patrick (SA, Centre Alliance) Share this | Hansard source

I, and also on behalf of Senators Lambie, Bernardi, Hanson, Griff and Roberts, move:

That the following matter be referred to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee for inquiry and report by 26 November 2020:

Australia's relationship with the People’s Republic of China.

This is the fifth occasion that I have moved a motion seeking a Senate inquiry relating to Australia's relationship with China. Perhaps I'm a sucker for punishment, but this is too important an issue to let go.

Over a year ago, on 13 November last year, I moved for an inquiry into Australia's engagement with China's Belt and Road strategy. That proposal was prompted by the Victorian government's decision to signed an MOU with China relating to cooperation on Belt and Road projects, a decision that was apparently made without coordination with the federal government. On that occasion, the coalition and Labor combined against the crossbench to negate the proposal. It was a similar story 10 months later, when I moved another motion on 9 September, proposing a broad Senate committee inquiry into all aspects of Australia's relationship with China.

As senators would be aware, that proposal for an inquiry initially enjoyed support from both the coalition and Labor members of the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, including the references committee chair, Senator Kitching, who agreed to co-sponsor the motion. However, other forces prevailed. The foreign minister decreed that China was too sensitive a subject for any Senate inquiry. So too did the shadow foreign minister. Senator Kitching was required to withdraw her co-sponsorship of the motion, and both the coalition and Labor again voted against the crossbench to negate the proposed inquiry.

It was the same story, of course, when I moved a similar motion on 16 September and again on 11 November. I moved those motions, and I do so again today, because developments and controversies in Australia's relationship with China have repeatedly underlined the importance of the parliament becoming engaged in a positive way on this key international relationship. Last week we saw the emergence of new allegations of attempted Chinese-government-directed interference in Australia's political affairs. This is not the first time that such allegations have been made. There have been a series of allegations, extending back well over a decade.

With regard to the allegations raised last week, the Director-General of Security, Mike Burgess, was prompted to issue a statement indicating that those allegations were being actively investigated and that hostile foreign intelligence activities continued to pose a real threat to Australia. Significantly, the director-general couldn't bring himself to actually name the country in question, which was China. That omission and the broader reluctance of the government and opposition to talk forthrightly about these problems are characteristic of much debate about the state of Australia's relations with China. There are big headlines in the newspapers and no shortage of partisan sniping, but there is a marked reluctance by ministers and opposition frontbenchers to speak forthrightly, even when the issue includes the Chinese Ministry of State Security hacking the computer systems of this parliament.

Obviously, there are considerable diplomatic sensitivities involved and we have allowed ourselves to become hugely economically dependent on the export of raw materials to the Chinese market. But it is a worrying thing when debate in this parliament is politically constipated for fear of reaction from Beijing. It is worth noting that some other countries, including our closest allies, are rather more direct in how they describe the increasing security challenges posed by China, especially in the fields of espionage and political interference. Last month, the director of the United States FBI, Christopher Wray, bluntly observed that Chinese espionage, especially in the economic field, is:

… the single greatest counterintelligence threat we face. Period.

In testimony to the US Senate, the FBI highlighted China's aggressive theft of defence technology and intelligence property, with the assistant director of the FBI's Counterintelligence Division, saying: 'Technology is the key to military and economic power. Time and again the Communist Party has shown that it will do whatever is necessary in an effort to supplant the United States as the pre-eminent military and economic power.'

Earlier, in April this year, Canada's National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians—a committee similar to our Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security but with a significantly wider mandate—identified China as a 'significant and clear espionage threat' and a 'country actively seeking to interfere in Canadian political life'. The Canadian committee's report observes:

China is known globally for its efforts to influence Chinese communities and the politics of other countries. The Chinese government has a number of official organizations that try to influence Chinese communities and politicians to adopt pro-China positions, most prominently the United Front Work Department—

The report highlights a 2017 warning from a former Canadian ambassador in Beijing about China's political interference and influence pedalling efforts in Canada. To get what it wants, Beijing mobilises student groups, diaspora groups 'and people who have an economic stake in China, to work behind the scenes.' The report also notes the unsavoury business of political donations on offer from Chinese businessmen with close links to China's Communist Party leadership.

Of course, some of this might sound familiar. But you won't find such candour in the reports of the PJCIS or, for that matter, in ASIO's annual reports—perhaps they're hidden in Aldi bags! The director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, David Vigneault, has not shied away from singling out China as a growing security threat. In a presentation to China's top university administrators earlier this year the Canadian security director said China represents 'the most significant and clear' challenge when it comes to espionage targeting university campuses. He warned that foreign intelligence services, 'especially those in China and Russia', were engaged in 'monitoring and/or coercion' of students, faculty and university officials in an effort to further their political influence. Again, this may sound familiar. Most recently, Vigneault warned an international cybersecurity workshop that China's building of 5G networks around the world was giving rise to 'new espionage and disruption risks'. He described China as the biggest threat because of the wide range of its cyberespionage targets.

Similar observations about Chinese espionage and interference have been made by a number of European countries, even those that are usually focused on security challenges from Russia. Perhaps some of the most forthright observations can be found in a just released annual report of the Czech Republic's Security Information Service, the Czech equivalent of ASIO. At a glance one might think that Prague would not be a major priority for Chinese espionage. However, Czech security observes the intensity and scale of Chinese intelligence activities has grown significantly. All of the most important Chinese intelligence services are reported to be active in the Czech Republic: the external military intelligence service, the International Liaison Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Public Security.

Chinese career diplomats are also alleged to have resorted to crude pressure tactics to advance China's interests. The Czech security services provide some insight into the modus operandi of Chinese espionage and interference, and I'll quote from the report:

In the context of Chinese activities aimed at the Czech academia, security bodies and state administration, the BIS—

which is their security service—

identified a growing number of Chinese invitations addressed to Czech citizens for trainings, seminars and excursions. China offers to cover all expenses for the invited individuals (transport, accommodation, food allowance, registration fees) and even to give Czech guests spending money. Such journeys ensure a whole range of benefits for China—the country thus establishes a contact network of individuals, who will regard it with favor, or more specifically feel that they "owe China something" and will be willing to be forthcoming towards China. From an intelligence point of view, the most risky aspect is the physical presence of the guest in China. Chinese intelligence services usually use the stay of persons of interest in China or in a third country … to approach them for cooperation.

That's what is said in the report. One wonders how many Australian MPs have been approached over the years. The Czech security service highlights China's exploitation of social media to target potential sources or cooperators, like academics, students, civil servants and other persons potentially with access to sensitive information. Reference is also made to the activities of a Chinese cyberespionage group that targeted the Czech ministry of foreign affairs.

Australia is geopolitically and economically much more important to China than a small Western European nation such as the Czech Republic. We are also economically much more dependent on our trade with China and have extensive people-to-people ties as a consequence of the large Chinese diaspora and a large Chinese student presence. Canberra, Sydney and other Australian cities are a much bigger focus for covert Chinese government activity than far away Prague.

Some former Australian security officials have been more forthright than current ministers and officials. The recently retired ASIO director, Duncan Lewis, has warned the Chinese government is seeking to use insidious foreign interference operations to take over Australia's political system. According to Mr Lewis, Chinese authorities are trying to place themselves in a position of advantage by winning influence in political, social, business and media circles. He said:

Espionage and foreign interference is insidious. Its effects might not present for decades and by that time it's too late. You wake up one day and find decisions made in our country that are not in the interests of our country.

These are very serious concerns expressed by someone with long experience of government and Australia's counterespionage circumstances. He is indeed a former military officer as well.

That is only part of the story. As I have previously stated, Australia's relations with China are increasingly challenging, but they're also multifaceted and include great economic and other opportunities. We would be wrong to consider these issues solely through the lens of security. That is where recent debate has focused, and there has been an increasing partisan edge to that. In that regard, I think it's useful to refer to recent observations by a highly qualified observer of China-Australia relations, Yun Jiang, a former officer of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, the Department of Defence and the Department of the Treasury, who has published some thoughtful commentary on the Lowy Institute's blog, The Interpreter. She observes:

It is in Australia's national interest that we continue to contemplate China's role in the world and to debate how Australia should respond to the challenges posed by China. This is a conversation that needs to be conducted based on facts and the merits of the argument, not on insinuation of intention.

Yun Jiang makes three specific suggestions for improving the quality of our national debate:

All three of these suggestions would be advanced by a Senate inquiry—a forum through which senators can engage in a nonpartisan thoughtful way drawing on the full range of available expertise from government, business, universities and NGOs.

As I have previously said, China is the No. 1 issue in Australia's foreign relations. There can be no question about that. How can the Senate stand aside from this? We have a much more complex and challenging relationship, a relationship that is increasingly fraught in some respects, and it is all the more important that the Australian parliament fully engage on this vital question. As I have previously said, an issue that could very usefully be examined is China's strategic ambitions in South-East Asia and the Pacific, including Beijing's growing influence in Timor Leste, the Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea and elsewhere. The inquiry could examine our vital trade relations with China, including our dependence on raw material exports and the potential to develop new trading opportunities and a more balanced export trade pattern. There's also the question of Chinese investment in Australia in resources and critical infrastructure as well as agriculture. We need to consider the federal aspects of our relationship with China—not only the role of the Australian government agencies but also the engagement of state and territory governments with Chinese trade and investment activities. We also need to take a close look at China's influence and alleged interference in Australia, including the activities of the so-called 'united front' organisation and the role of Chinese government controlled student organisations on Australian university campuses. There's no getting around those issues. They must be examined and directly dealt with by this parliament.

There would also be the opportunity to examine human rights issues, including the deeply worrying case of imprisoned Australian Yang Hengjun. As I've said previously, I've no doubt that the Chair of the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, Senator Kitching, would lead a very measured and substantive inquiry. The shadow minister for foreign affairs has repeatedly asked the government to provide parliamentarians with confidential briefings on China. The government has declined this request, although it has also said departments and agencies will brief appropriate parliamentary committees.

A Senate inquiry, such as that proposed by this motion, should provide an opportunity for the government and opposition to move beyond partisan positioning and work together in our national interest. The inquiry proposed by this motion would engage all elements of opinion within the Australian parliament: the coalition, Labor, the Greens and the crossbench. If the government and opposition cannot support this proposed inquiry, they should at least offer some more substantive arguments and alternatives than they have offered to date. Who knows, if they do not reconsider their position, we might just find our way through partisan controversy and move towards developing a forward-thinking approach to this critically important relationship. We might just find a way forward that would enjoy support not only across this parliament but across the broad Australian community. If we don't do that, Australia may eventually pay a very considerable price in terms of internal partisan division, potential social conflict and very real harm to our national interest and our sovereignty.