Anthony Chisholm (Queensland, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Hansard source

As part of this inquiry, the committee heard from the PKKP people, including Mr Burchell Hayes, a descendent of Juukan, who described the gorge as 'an anchor of our culture,' and said:

The loss of Juukan Gorge rock shelters is also a loss to all First Nations people and the community within Australia and internationally …

He talked about how neighbouring Indigenous groups have a direct connection with Juukan and also feel powerless and angry at this happening. The traditional owners said that the incident had caused immeasurable cultural and spiritual loss and profound grief.

It was fantastic that committee members were able to go and visit the PKKP people on their lands, talk to them and visit the site. Unfortunately, due to the restrictions of COVID and quarantining, I wasn't able to do that myself. But because of the importance of this inquiry and the nature of it—that it be concluded or the interim report be delivered this year, given the significance of this issue—it was worth that sacrifice, for people to be able to go and be on location and view what had gone on.

Since the inquiry began, it has received over 142 submissions and held 11 public hearings. The committee held a yarn session with the PKKP people and some members were able to visit the site itself. I'd like to thank the committee for their support on this work, because it was a difficult year, particularly with the geography and locations that we were dealing with. It was such a significant issue with not only national interest but also international interest, given the nature of the company that we are talking about.

I think the role that Rio Tinto had in the destruction is obviously crucial. The committee heard from the now former CEO, Mr Jacques, and his leadership team. I think one of the more consequential pieces of evidence that we heard from Rio was that they actually had four proposals that they were looking at in regard to expansion. But they only presented one of those options to the PKKP people, and that involved the destruction of the gorge. We also found out, through the evidence, that that was worth $134 million extra to Rio because of the higher grade ore that would be gained from the destruction of Juukan. It was obvious from the evidence that we teased out of Rio that they were going to make more money by the destruction of the gorge and mining that area than they would have if they had considered some of those three areas that they had looked at for expansion. There's no doubt that the decision was a financial one that would have resulted in more returns to Rio and their shareholders.

In the days leading up to the blast, there were clear examples of how they failed to consult with the PKKP people. When the Rio Tinto heritage team was meeting with the PKKP people on 14 May, the heritage team were unaware of the plan to blast the site. On 18 May the heritage team requested to temporarily suspend blast plans to allow further consultation with the PKKP. Yet, even after the suspension at the request of the PKKP, Rio Tinto continued to load explosives into the site.

On 20 May when Richard Bradshaw, the lawyer for PKKP people who had planned on lodging an injunction to prevent the explosions and protect the rock shelters, contacted Ken Wyatt's office regarding the destruction, he was told to contact Minister Ley. Despite calling Minister Ley's office twice and being promised a call back, he never heard back from the minister's office. The next day Mr Bradshaw was sent an email from a law firm representing Rio Tinto, reminding him that under the agreement between the PKKP people and Rio Tinto there was a gag clause and that they could not speak publicly. If they did, there was a risk that they could lose payments.

The failure in communication is a broader symptom of the corporate culture at Rio Tinto, and this is also shown through the delay in Rio Tinto apologising to the PKKP people. On 31 May 2020, Chris Salisbury, the Rio Tinto boss iron ore boss in WA, apologised for the distress caused but not for the destruction of the gorge. Similarly, Mr Jacques apologised for the distress caused, not the destruction. They have subsequently apologised and acknowledged that it shouldn't have occurred, but it speaks to the broader cultural issues that the committee recognised were more than just some unfortunate mistakes or ineptitude—that Rio Tinto prioritised commercial gain over meaningful engagement with traditional owners.

Rio Tinto had a number of reports and major excavation of rock shelters in 2014, both highlighting the significance of the site. Ms Niven, who was in charge of relationships with traditional owners and was Rio's most senior executive for Indigenous relations, never visited the Juukan Gorge site and in her role only offered to meet with the PKKP people after they had made a submission to the inquiry, despite being in her role for a number of years. It is worth noting that the three senior Rio executives that have lost their jobs—Mr Jacques, Mr Salisbury and Ms Nevin—walk away with a payout of tens of millions of dollars whilst the PKKP are left with the destruction of the site.

Over recent years, there's no doubt been a degrading of culture within Rio Tinto, especially in relation to Indigenous relations. There have been actions like moving Indigenous relations into the public relations team and then basing that overseas rather than on the ground in Australia where they could actually deal and build a relationship with these people. We heard evidence from Mr Cochrane, a former executive at Rio Tinto, that the Indigenous relations function used to be an integral part of Rio Tinto's operations but is now lumped in with public relations and based in Washington DC. He said:

It's been a source of some puzzlement to me – and I still don't understand it …

He went on to suggest that, in the early 2000s, there was a shift that mining companies like Rio could cut costs and earn high marks for corporate social performance in questionnaires from international organisations. He said:

If these forms could be filled out in a central office, by people with little field knowledge, why maintain social science specialists in the communities?

And that is unfortunately what they said.

We know there was plenty of evidence provided by experts and by former Rio executives to understand that they had degraded their relationship with Indigenous Australians. They had moved it into a function so that it was dealt with as part of the government relations rather than actually administering and working with Indigenous Australians. There's no doubt that the culture that Mr Jacques had in relation to 'fit in or f-off', which Senator Smith raised as well, played a role in executives and management not being as truthful and honest in dealing with these issues as well as they could have.

The results from this are devastating. The report is very honest, it's very confronting and it deals with substantial challenges not only for the mining community in WA but also for the government of WA and the Commonwealth government. It's why we have delivered an interim report to deal with the substance of WA and what went on with Rio, and it was important that that was done in a timely fashion. I look forward to continuing the work of the committee into next year as we look at the nationwide implications and at how we can work with this parliament to ensure that there's a spotlight on these issues so that something like the Juukan Gorge destruction can never happen again.