Kristina Keneally (NSW, Australian Labor Party, Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate) Share this | Hansard source

I rise to contribute to the committee stage of this debate and move amendment (1) on sheet 1117:

(1)      Clause 2, page 2 (table items 1 to 3), omit the table items, substitute:

1. The whole of this Act   At the same time as the Migration Amendment (New Maritime Crew Visas) Act 2020 commences.

I flag that Labor has a number of amendments that have been circulated to the chamber. I will be speaking to those and asking some questions, and I would encourage senators to consider the issues that have been raised. As I flagged in my speech in the second reading debate, Labor has a number of concerns in relation to the transport security serious crimes legislation. The amendments that we are moving seek to address those concerns.

The first amendment that I wish to speak to tonight and questions that I wish to ask go to the issue of foreign flagged crew. This amendment delays the commencement of the legislation until the Migration Amendment (New Maritime Crew Visas) Bill 2020 commences. I start with this amendment because it is, I understand and accept, an unusual amendment for us to consider. That is, the effect of this amendment would be that, should the transport security serious crimes legislation pass this parliament, its commencement would be delayed until a private senator's bill that I have submitted, the Migration Amendment (New Maritime Crew Visas) Bill 2020, commences. I will just belabour this point because this is the only way that we have to deal with the gaping hole that sits in this legislation. The gaping hole that sits in this legislation is that, while the government is making changes to the provision of security clearance cards for Australian domestic workers at Australian airports and seaports, it is not doing one thing at all to address flag-of-convenience vessels and their foreign crew and the security challenges that they pose.

Let's understand this: under this legislation, while Australian workers can be subject to a three-month wait for their security clearance, foreign crew can currently access a maritime crew visa, subclass 988, and enter Australia with as little as 24 hours notice, with no security clearance and no MSIC required. We know that at one stage last year Rio Tinto used eight ships in Queensland waters. Four of the ships had Australian seafarers, and all required an MSIC. Four had crew on foreign vessels. Through flag-of-convenience arrangements, none of these crews needed an MSIC or a maritime security clearance. This issue came out in the Senate inquiry. Foreign crew are currently escorted by an MSIC passholder when in secure areas of ports, but Australian government authorities have been concerned that foreign crew can be open to exploitation from organised crime syndicates or terrorist groups. As indicated by the then Department of Immigration and Border Protection, this isn't some stakeholder group that the government likes to dismiss. This was actually their own department raising concerns in 2017 that:

There are features of flag of convenience registration, regulation and practice that organized crime syndicates or terrorists may seek to exploit.

Reduced transparency or secrecy surrounding complex financial and ownership arrangements are factors that can make flag of convenience ships more attractive for use in illegal activity, including by organized crime or terrorist groups. This means that FOC ships may be used in a range of illegal activities, including illegal exploitation of natural resources, illegal activity in protected areas, people smuggling, and facilitating prohibited imports or exports …

These are not my words; these are the words of the Department of Immigration and Border Security.

In 2017 we also heard evidence that the New South Wales coroner was investigating three highly suspicious deaths onboard Sage Sagittarius. The foreign master of that ship was a person of interest in those investigations. The same man, Captain Salas, had admitted to being a gun runner when subpoenaed to appear in the Coroners Court. Captain Salas was allowed to work in the Australian domestic shipping industry under a maritime crew visa for eight months.

It is all well and good for the government to stand up and parade about and say they're getting tough and they're cracking down on security arrangements for Australian workers who work at ports and airports, and we have a number of amendments that go to some of our concerns about the legislation. But there is nothing in this legislation that addresses the security risk posed by foreign crew, by flag-of-convenience crew. That is why I am moving this amendment—because Labor proposes that there is a better way to ensure that foreign crew are subject to more-extensive security requirements, and that would be to reform the maritime crew visa. We feel so strongly about this that we are asking this Senate to approve that this transport security bill cannot be commenced until the security challenges around foreign crew have been addressed.

We're going to hear the government say that the vast majority of maritime crew visa holders do not require unescorted access in maritime security zones. They'll say that any seafarer, whether Australian or foreign, is only required to hold an MSIC if they require unsupervised access to a maritime security zone. And they're going to say that obligating visa holders to comply with elements of the MSIC scheme where they do not require unsupervised access to a maritime security zone would pose a significant financial burden on the administration of the scheme for no discernible benefit. While the Canberra boffins here tell their ministers that foreign crew do not have unescorted access to ports, any wharfie can tell you that this is not the case. Any worker on a wharf can tell you that that's not the case.

The Morrison government have taken their eye off the ball when it comes to security at our ports, and foreign crew, as we heard in Senate inquiries, are routinely left to wander around secure areas. This is something that was examined in the recent RRAT inquiry into this flawed bill. So, my first question to the government is: does the government agree with the Department of Immigration and Border Protection's 2017 finding that there are features of flag-of-convenience registration, regulation and practice that organised crime syndicates or terrorists may seek to exploit? Does the government agree that, as the Department of Immigration and Border Protection said in 2017, reduced transparency and secrecy surrounding complex financial and ownership arrangements are factors that make flag-of-convenience vessels more attractive for use in illegal activity, including by organised crime and terrorist groups? Does the government agree that flag-of-convenience ships, as the Department of Immigration and Border Protection said, can be used in a range of illegal activities, including the illegal exploitation of natural resources, illegal activity in protected areas, people-smuggling and facilitation of prohibited imports or exports? And if the government doesn't agree that there are risks, can it please explain where the Department of Immigration and Border Protection is wrong?