David Van (Victoria, Liberal Party) Share this | Hansard source

The threat landscape that we as a nation are confronted with today is vastly different from that of five, 10 and 20 years ago. It's important to note that next month marks the 20-year anniversary of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. The events in Afghanistan this week brought back the dark memories of that attack on the US people by foreign nationals. Those attacks changed the world and the way in which liberal democracies protect their citizens.

A lot has changed in those 20 years, but the need to protect Australia from attacks and interference by foreign actors has not. Technology has changed how the world works, and the massive rise of cyberattacks has created challenges which have seen the need to significantly increase the size of our intelligence agencies. The technology and geopolitics driving these changes can have serious ramifications on the effective functioning of our democracy if not properly acknowledged and addressed. Information is now more important to world affairs than at any previous point in history, as a result of those advances in data driven technology. Information is now the world's most consequential and contested geopolitical resource. It is a growing source of state power, where we have seen undoubtable evidence that many of our adversaries are expending more time, energy and resources to build and utilise this capability.

There are a variety of reasons for which states conduct intelligence, however, the foremost of these being to increase understanding and knowledge. The timely acquisition of intelligence can improve the quality of decision-making by reducing ignorance of the situation faced and enabling actions or decisions to be optimised. In order to keep Australians safe from foreign adversaries, we must be able to effectively inhibit external actors' ability to collect intelligence on Australia and our communities. This is a national security priority. As the methodologies of intelligence collection develop and change with the rapidly evolving technologies, so must our national security laws. The Richardson review was conducted as a response to this changing threat landscape to ensure that the legislative framework that we have in place effectively addresses the threat at hand. The Richardson review's examination of the legislative framework underpinning the national intelligence community is the first and largest since the Hope royal commissions considered the Australian intelligence community in the 1970s and 1980s. I would like to thank Mr Richardson for the important work he did on this. He has been, over his career, one of Australia's best public servants. That is no mean feat, especially when you see the calibre of our current bureaucrats, including the Director-General of Security and the Secretary of the Department of Home Affairs.

The Morrison government is committed to ensuring our national security agencies have the right tools and powers to combat national security threats. The Foreign Intelligence Legislation Amendment Bill 2021 amends the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979, otherwise known as the TIA Act, and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979, or the ASIO Act, to address critical gaps in the foreign intelligence collection framework.

Firstly, the reforms will update the foreign communications warrant provisions in the TIA Act to reflect changes in communications technologies. This means that intelligence agencies will be able to intercept a communication to determine whether a communication is a foreign communication. Foreign communications warrants have been a critical part of Australia's foreign intelligence legislative framework for more than 20 years. Currently, the TIA Act prohibits the interception of domestic communications. This made sense 20 years ago, when the technology available was a lot simpler and it was easier for our intelligence services to identify whether a type of communication was from a foreign source. Now, however, due to technological advances in communication and encryption technology, the source of a communication can be impossible to find out. As a result of this, our intelligence services have been avoiding the collection of foreign communication where there may be a risk of collecting domestic communication. This means, under the current act, we are effectively telling our intelligence services to turn a blind eye to what could be vital life-or-death information. The warrants enable intelligence agencies to identify threats to Australia's national security, including malicious cyberactivity targeting Australian interests and terrorist communications. Without the proposed changes, gaps in foreign intelligence collection will continue to grow and we will not have visibility of possible threats to Australia and its national security. I don't know about any of you, but the thought of that vital intelligence being missed, which could lead to devastating outcomes in our communities, makes me extremely uncomfortable, as I'm sure it does all Australians. This is why these reforms are absolutely vital, and they reflect the Morrison government's commitment to keeping our nation safe.

These reforms will allow intelligence agencies to intercept communications for the purpose of foreign intelligence where the geographic location of the sender and recipient cannot be determined prior to interception. This does not mean that we are granting the intelligence agencies more power. These reforms are simply amending the current act to properly reflect the change in how we communicate and to ensure our intelligence agencies are able to effectively deal with the growing threats we face. The nature and scope of foreign communications warrants remain unchanged. ASIO will remain the responsible agency for obtaining foreign intelligence inside Australia and the only agency that may apply for or obtain foreign intelligence warrants. These warrants do not allow the bulk collection of foreign communications now or in future. It is actually a requirement that these warrants are to be use for highly targeted operations only. Of course, robust safeguards will accompany these reforms to ensure that powers are used for the right purposes. Foreign communications warrants can only be issued for the purpose of obtaining foreign intelligence from foreign communications, such as those relating to foreign terrorists or cyberthreats. The warrant request must also specify how the risk of the incidental interception of domestic communications will be minimised.

It is important to note that ASIO's sole function is to protect Australia and Australians from threats to our security. ASIO's functions include obtaining, correlating and evaluating intelligence relevant to security. This means that they are responsible for the protection of Australia from espionage, sabotage, politically motivated and communal violence, attacks on Australia's defence system, and acts of foreign interference whether directed from or committed within Australia or not; the protection of Australia's territorial and border integrity; and Australian security responsibilities to other countries. Without these amendments, ASIO would be unable to complete their duties to the best of their ability, and therefore may be unable to effectively protect Australia and Australian citizens. That's something I'm sure everyone here agrees we cannot let happen.

The second set of reforms will close the current loophole on Australians working for a foreign power. Currently, foreign intelligence can be collected on an Australian working offshore for a foreign power, but that same intelligence cannot be collected on that Australian if they are in Australia. This means that, if there are people in Australia acting in a manner which could lead to the harm of other Australian citizens, our intelligence agencies are unable to collect intelligence on them, due to a legal loophole. For example, if an Australian citizen is working with a foreign power or terrorist organisation overseas and our intelligence agencies are collecting intelligence on them, our agencies must stop all activities on them once they return to Australia. If an Australian is working for a foreign power overseas, they are a threat to Australia and other Australians. Just because they return to our shores does not mean that this threat dissipates and our intelligence services should cease their work. It is vital that our intelligence agencies can continue to obtain information on individuals who threaten our society so that they can continue to protect and promote Australia's national security and national and economic wellbeing.

It is also important to highlight that these amendments come with a robust set of safeguards. The law will continue to prevent the request of a foreign intelligence warrant on Australian persons who are not acting for or on behalf of a foreign power. The Director-General of Security will be required to provide the Attorney-General with the detailed justification of the grounds upon which the director-general suspects the person is acting for or on behalf of a foreign power. The Attorney-General cannot issue a warrant unless satisfied the person is, or is reasonably suspected by the director-general of, acting for or on behalf of a foreign power.

When it comes to protecting our national security, the Morrison government is steadfast in its approach and in its commitment to ensuring that our national security framework is as robust and responsive as possible. It is of vital importance that these amendments are made without delay, and every day that we wait is a day that crucial intelligence may be missed. In Australia we have world-class intelligence agencies filled with some of our most capable men and women. It is our job to ensure that they have the right legislative framework in place so that they can continue to protect Australia and keep our communities safe from harm. I commend the bill to the Senate.