David Shoebridge (NSW, Australian Greens) Share this | Hansard source

I also rise to speak to the report on the inquiry into the National Anti-Corruption Commission Bill. I will start as well by thanking and commending the work of the chair and acknowledge Senator Scarr's contributions in that regard. The chair approached this in a very even-handed and collegiate way, sometimes having to pull out the velvet glove and cover the iron fist to keep us on track. We had a very short amount of time and an overwhelming number of witnesses who wanted to come before us. I think in four days, through those hearings, the committee fully explored a number of the critical issues. So I do want to acknowledge the work of the chair. I think she did an excellent job keeping us all on track and ensured that the process itself was multipartisan and genuinely fair. I want to acknowledge also the work of the deputy chair, Dr Haines, the member for Indi. I acknowledge her work as well leading up to this bill. Between them, the chair and the deputy chair formed a pool of experience and common sense that got us through the inquiry and produced the final outcome, which was everybody on the committee supporting a national anti-corruption commission. No matter what their politics are, everyone on the committee supported a national anti-corruption commission. I think it was a significant achievement.

Of course, it didn't come out of nowhere. I want to acknowledge the ongoing work of Senator Waters, who managed to get a majority in this chamber to pass a NACC bill in the previous parliament. We were that close to getting NACC legislation years ago, only to be deflected by some pretty toxic politics. That's why I want to acknowledge the achievement in getting everybody on that committee to support getting the NACC Bill hopefully legislated by the end of this year.

There are a number of matters that I want to put onto the record—concerns about where we landed. The first is, on behalf of the Greens, my party, we don't support recommendation 5 of the committee which seeks to narrows the definition of 'corruption', taking away a generic definition that would allow the National Anti-Corruption Commission to investigate and pursue a broad range of corruption. In relation to the moves that are being taken now to narrow the definition of corruption, we say: what corruption do people not want the National Anti-Corruption Commission to look into? Please identify for us the corruption that you don't want the NACC to have jurisdiction for and, if you can do that in a coherent way, we'll listen. But until such time, we don't see any cause, any rational reason, to narrow the definition of corruption and the jurisdiction for the commission.

One of the other issues that I think was a significant missed opportunity in the report was the failure to actually translate the evidence we got on public hearings—the necessity for public hearings and the importance of hearings. That did not translate into the appropriate recommendation from the committee. We had current and former commissioners from the New South Wales and Victorian anticorruption commissions come to us. The commissioners from New South Wales said that, from their perspective, they found public hearings were essential for their anticorruption work for a variety of reasons, not least of which that it was a check and balance on the anticorruption commission itself, which had to justify its work and its fair processes in public. Having public hearings was actually an accountability measure on the New South Wales Independent Commission Against Corruption.

Public hearings also enabled witnesses who were otherwise not known to the commission to see what was happening and bring forward critical evidence. In relation to a number of inquiries by the New South Wales Independent Commission Against Corruption, those witnesses who have come forward after seeing public hearings have been essential for uncovering some deep and entrenched corruption and then fixing it in New South Wales.

We heard from the IBAC commissioner in Victoria about how their legislation largely prohibits public hearings—in fact, it mirrors the proposed model that we're seeing pushed by the government and the opposition—and limits them to where there are exceptional circumstances. The IBAC commissioner came and said: 'Don't repeat the mistakes in Victoria. Don't make the same mistakes.' But, unfortunately, we don't see that evidence, as well as the evidence of advocacy groups and current and former judges. A slew of highly credentialed witnesses came and said, 'Remove the exceptional circumstances test, and allow public hearings to be held in the public interest.' But, unfortunately, the committee's report does not reflect that evidence. I think that's a significant mistake. I can assure you now that it will ongoing work in our party, and we hope that with good will a majority in this chamber, in the Senate, will fix that obvious mistake in the bill.

When it comes to inspectors, we also heard some compelling evidence from, amongst others, Bruce McClintock SC, who's the current inspector of the New South Wales ICAC and I think is also the inspector of the Northern Territory equivalent. His compelling evidence was that the proposed role for inspector in the current bill is far too narrow. Basically, the inspector effectively should be a permanent ombudsman overseeing the role of the NACC. But in the proposed federal model that we see in the bill the inspector is really just a mini NACC of NACC, whose jurisdiction is only limited to seeing whether or not there is serious or systemic corruption in the NACC. That is very, very unlikely to ever occur and it's not the role we see for inspectors in state and territory equivalents, who, with their extraordinary royal commission powers, are effectively a check and balance on an anticorruption commission, to ensure those powers aren't being abused and to ensure that natural justice is delivered—to be an on-the-beat ombudsman focused on fair processes. We think there's a lot of work for this chamber to do to expand the role of the inspector in this debate.

I'd also like to say that when it comes to journalist protection, I acknowledge that the recommendation from the inquiry is to increase journalist protections. I sought, on behalf of my party, to have those recommendations strengthened in the committee hearing, and I'm glad to see that tabled today in the government's proposed amendments is a proposed amendment to go further than the committee recommendation and to strengthen, again, some of the protections for journalists to ensure that wherever a warrant is sought against a journalist then the public interest in protecting journalism and protecting journalists' sources and their important accountability role is considered in any warrant. I think we need to go further, and there is a very powerful case to ensure that warrants for the production of evidence or for the attendance of journalists are contestable by journalists. In that regard, the UK example was reported to us in the committee as the best example.

The proposed oversight of the National Anti-Corruption Commission is for a government dominated committee, where the government, through the chair, will have the casting vote and will be able to control the operations of the oversight committee. The principal role of the National Anti-Corruption Commission will be to hold the government to account. It's largely to hold the executive to account. Sometimes non-government senators and MPs go rogue, but it's largely to hold the government to account. Therefore, having a government controlled, government dominated committee as the principal oversight mechanism is a significant problem in the bill.

I note the proposition by Senator Scarr, and it's a matter that he pursued in the hearings, that at least on the choice of commissioner there should be a super majority. That is one of the options, to remove some of the executive monopoly power that's proposed in the current bill. The other option is to ensure that the chair cannot be a member of the government, so the government does not have a majority on that committee. That's important not just for the selection of a commissioner or commissioners; it's also important for ensuring that there's independent funding. In that regard, it was a missed opportunity for the committee not to recommend the same committee oversight processes that apply to the Audit Office. These should also apply to the oversight of the NACC.

I want to finish on this. If you took us back two years and you took this parliament back two years, the idea that we would see politicians, from across the political spectrum, unite in support for a national anticorruption commission would probably have been seen as close to unachievable. But we managed to achieve it in the committee. I commend the chair, I commend the deputy and I commend all members of the committee for working towards that goal. Let's get this done.

I seek leave to continue my remarks later.

Leave granted; debate adjourned.