David Shoebridge (NSW, Australian Greens) Share this | Hansard source

OEBRIDGE () (): On behalf of the Greens, I indicate that we broadly support the terms of reference that have been sent to us in the message from the other place. But there's one area where we'd seek to have some clarification from the government. The terms of reference permit the committee to appointment subcommittees to determine any aspect of the committee's jurisdiction. That's a fairly standard provision in committees, particularly joint committees that are established, and it allows the work of the committee to continue with smaller quorums—a quorum of two, for example, with a subcommittee. The concern that the Greens have, and which has been discussed with other parties in the chamber, is that it includes with this NACC oversight community the ability to establish a subcommittee to do some of the statutory functions of the NACC oversight committee. The function that gives us the greatest concern is the statutory power and function to concur with or to reject the proposed commissioners, deputy commissioners and inspectors of the committee.

Madam Acting Deputy President, you will recall there was much discussion in the course of the NACC debate about whether or not a non-government majority should have a say, and a determinative say, in agreeing or disagreeing with the government's nominee for the Commissioner of the NACC.

We eventually resolved that and supported the bill in its current form. But that was in circumstances where we had clear statements from government that the appointment of the NACC commissioner would be engaged in a good-faith process and that there would be the active seeking of consensus amongst the committee for the appointment of the NACC commissioner, deputy commissioners and the like. Unfortunately, the terms of reference, plainly read, permit that that function of the committee, for concurrence or otherwise with the government's proposed appointed commissioner, allows that concurrence to be delegated to a subcommittee of just three members. Therefore, that would remove the need for the political consensus amongst the committee that the government said—and I accept their good faith position—was implicit in their model for the oversight committee.

There are a number of ways this could have been resolved. One obvious way, of course, would have been to amend the terms of reference to expressly exclude that statutory function from the powers delegable to a subcommittee. This can probably be clarified by a brief statement from the government indicating they have no intention to do that and that it will be a function for the whole committee, and I look forward to hearing the minister's position on this.