Claire Chandler (Tasmania, Liberal Party, Shadow Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs) Share this | Hansard source

I rise on behalf of the coalition this evening to make a contribution on the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security and Other Legislation Amendment (Modernisation) Bill 2022. This bill amends the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 and implements outstanding recommendations from the Comprehensive Review of the Legal Framework of the National Intelligence Community, known as the Richardson review, undertaken by Mr Dennis Richardson. We in the opposition acknowledge the work of Mr Richardson and his review. The Richardson review was initiated by the coalition when we were in government. It provided important guidance about the way in which the oversight framework of our intelligence community could be strengthened.

At the heart of liberal democracies is the concept of accountability. Built into our public life are mechanisms that allow for that accountability through the media, through civil society and, of course, through the parliament. Questions can be asked of those who hold positions of authority and who exercise responsibilities on the behalf of others. The capacity for the public to inquire into and scrutinise the activities of those who hold power is part of what makes a democratic institution so strong. But, by necessity, when it comes to our intelligence community, those mechanisms must be slightly different.

The ability to operate under some element of secrecy is part of what enables our intelligence agencies to do their very important work, and that must not be undermined. To misunderstand or undervalue secrecy for those agencies is to put lives at risk and compromise the capacity of agencies to continue keeping Australians safe into the future. When secrets or information that should be classified are divulged or shared, the entire architecture of our intelligence community is undermined and weakened.

In those circumstances, the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security and other bodies that provide oversight of our intelligence agencies are extraordinarily important. These oversight bodies hold our agencies to account. They enable the public to have confidence in our agencies. Oversight must be robust, credible, effective and thorough. This is not to undermine the work of intelligence agencies but to give them the credibility they need to maintain the trust of the broader public.

The Richardson review gave Australians many reasons to be encouraged about the state of Australia's intelligence community and the legal frameworks under which it operates. While the review provided a number of recommendations to strengthen the legal architecture existing around our intelligence agencies, it also reaffirmed that the fundamental principles that underpin Australia's intelligence legislation remain fit for purpose.

It is worth spending a little time this evening talking about the role of the IGIS, the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, as envisaged under the changes of this bill. Among the changes recommended by the Richardson review was an adjustment to the remit of the inspector-general to reflect the changed architecture of Australia's intelligence community. In this respect, the bill follows the course charted by the coalition's bill in the last parliament, the Intelligence Oversight and Other Legislation Amendment (Integrity Measures) Bill 2020. The bill will enact some of the changes included in the earlier coalition government's bill, which also sought to implement recommendations of the Richardson review.

Relevantly for both the Defence Intelligence Organisation and the Office of National Intelligence, ONI, the bill will bring oversight arrangements for those two agencies in line with the treatment of other intelligence agencies when it comes to the initiation of an investigation. The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security will be able to inquire into the Defence Intelligence Organisation and ONI in response to a complaint, not just on its own motion or in response to the direction of the minister. This is consistent with the treatment of other agencies within the remit of the inspector-general.

The bill also aims to reduce duplication between the inspector-general and other oversight bodies, such as the Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force and the Commonwealth Ombudsman. It contains information-sharing provisions that are intended to avoid the double handling of complaints and inquiries. The bill also gives the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security a clearer capacity to receive information from a broad range of sources while ensuring that that information is protected to the largest extent possible. This strengthens the capacity for the inspector-general to carry out its work.

The bill seeks to ensure that, when an inspector-general of intelligence and security is appointed, they have some appropriate distance from the agencies that they will be overseeing. This is the implementation of recommendation 172 of the Richardson review. It means that a person cannot be appointed to the role of Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security if their immediate prior role was as a head or deputy head of an agency within the inspector-general's remit.

The bill also sets out other changes, including vesting the inspector-general with the jurisdiction to investigate employment related grievances at the ONI. This is because staff at the ONI may be employed under the Office of National Intelligence Act and not the Public Service Act, so they may have limited statutory recourse to raise employment related grievances. This bill aligns the handling of employment-related grievances for staff employed under the ONI act with arrangements for ASIO, ASIS and ASD employees. The bill also contains a number of measures that update the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act and allow the inspector-general to adopt more modern operating procedures. For example, it allows the inspector-general to engage consultants and contract service providers rather than employing solely staff.

The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security was referred this bill by the Attorney-General, and on behalf of the opposition I thank the Attorney-General for making that reference and the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security for their very hard work in reviewing this bill. Any time that legislation affecting our national security architecture is introduced, it should be subject to very careful scrutiny from a parliamentary committee like the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security. Parliamentary committees, as we all know in this place, have the unique advantage of being able to receive submissions and examine witnesses so that they can determine how proposed changes within legislation will work in practice. In the examination of this bill the PJCIS have made some important recommendations which are worth noting. In particular, the PJCIS noted that numerous inquiries have recommended an expanded oversight for the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, and for the PJCIS to cover the entirety of our national intelligence community. I understand the Attorney-General has given his assurance that the government is giving this matter due consideration, and we look forward to seeing the government progress this matter. The PJCIS also recommended the need for greater information-sharing between the inspector-general and the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, and we wait to see the government's response to those matters also.

As I said at the start of my remarks, many of the measures contained within this bill are measures that the coalition introduced back in 2020 in the Intelligence Oversight and Other Legislation Amendment (Integrity Measures) Bill, and we continue to support those measures in their current incarnation as they appear in this bill. To that end, the coalition will be supporting this bill.