Peter Whish-Wilson (Tasmania, Australian Greens) Share this | Hansard source

This bill, the Biosecurity Amendment (Advanced Compliance Measures) Bill 2023, would amend the Biosecurity Act 2015 by increasing the powers of the Director of Biosecurity and introducing new civil penalties for failure to comply with instructions or provide relevant information or documents. This bill would enable Australia's biosecurity system to better detect threats and prevent incursions. The most recent amendment to the act was made in response to the threats of foot-and-mouth disease and lumpy skin disease. This bill seeks to build upon those changes and is focused on addressing biosecurity risks posed by travellers. The impacts of an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease or lumpy skin disease on Australian farmers would be devastating. I was part of the Senate inquiry that look into this recently, and the Greens support action to mitigate these threats at the border and internationally.

In the May budget the Labor government announced more than $1 billion in new funding for biosecurity and stated:

This Budget delivers new biosecurity funding totalling more than $1 billion over the next four years, with more than $260 million guaranteed every year after that.

However, following the budget it has come to light that revenue generated by both the increased industry levies and the passenger movement charge will go to consolidated revenue rather than being hypothecated to, or earmarked for, a special account exclusively for biosecurity. This presents a significant risk that these funds may be diverted to other priorities by a future minister or government. While the government has promised to increase funding through increased agriculture industry levies, there is a significant opportunity to strengthen Australia's biosecurity system through ensuring biosecurity risk creators, such as importers, are appropriately levied to match the risks that increasing trade poses to Australia.

Long-term, sustainable funding for Australia's biosecurity system is critical if we're to manage the growing biosecurity risk posed by increased tourism and trade. While the government's recently announced biosecurity funding is welcome, there are concerns that its allocation and distribution are primarily directed towards creating protections for our Australian agriculture industry, while environmental biosecurity—protection from threats posed to our environment by invasive species—receives funding that is piecemeal at best and only a few per cent of the overall budget allocated to biosecurity. This is a key point I want to make in my contribution today.

Australia has had 136 incursions of 106 invasive species since records began, in the year 2000. The introduction of invasive species, diseases and pests poses a significant risk to native species and ecosystems as well as to our primary industries and tourism sector. New incursions of invasive species are a major risk to Australia's environment. Contemporary arrivals, including red fire ants, yellow crazy ants and myrtle rust, are devastating our environment right here, right now, and have also had significant social and economic impacts.

Despite the significant threat that invasive species pose to Australia's environment, environmental biosecurity remains underresourced and historically has generally been deprioritised in Australia's biosecurity system. I've continually asked the department questions on this exact issue at Senate estimates. The Greens would obviously like to see that change. In a minute, I'll be moving a second reading amendment for the Senate to acknowledge this.

What does sustainable biosecurity funding for the environment look like? The Invasive Species Council commissioned Frontier Economics to evaluate methods of delivering sustainable long-term funding. Their key finding was that biosecurity services should be funded by risk creators in the first instance, followed by beneficiaries and the general public. The second reading amendment that I will move shortly speaks directly to this point and urges the Senate to agree to the prioritisation, in both focus and funding, of the risks posed to Australia's environment and environmental biosecurity by invasive species.

A number of other independent reviews have identified the poor performance of Australia's biosecurity system when it comes to protecting our national environment. One biosecurity, the report to the Australian government by the independent Review of Australia's Quarantine and Biosecurity Arrangements, also known as the Beale review raised this issue as early as 2008. The review of the Intergovernmental Agreement on Biosecurity, or IGAB, in 2017 by Dr Wendy Craik AM also raised this issue. The CSIRO, in their 2020 report Australia's biosecurity future, also raised this issue. All these reviews call for heightened focus and resources for environmental biosecurity, as being necessary for biosecurity protection, biodiversity protection and extinction prevention, along with ecosystem resilience and better primary production. Australia needs ongoing, sustainable funding to support our biosecurity system, which will both safeguard our agricultural sector and ensure our natural environment is protected. Environmental biosecurity remains underresourced and is generally deprioritised, and we need to change that.

For example, currently there is no environmental biosecurity preparedness body that is driving action to prepare for new environmental pests before they arrive. We've just had a Senate inquiry into doing this for lumpy skin disease and foot-and-mouth disease. Where are our strategic plans for dealing with these environmental pests? Industry bodies such as Plant Health Australia and Animal Health Australia are set up to deal with agricultural pests once they arrive, but we have no similar body to deal with environmental pests. This means that the responses to high-risk environmental pests are generally slow and poorly coordinated and have a low chance of successful eradication. The National Priority List of Exotic Environmental Pests, Weeds and Diseases, whilst a good start, is not comprehensive. High-risk species slip through our border controls, including new species and variants. Myrtle rust, Asian honeybees, red imported fire ants and yellow crazy ants are just some examples. We have not done the necessary risk assessments or prepared response plans for environmental threats, and we need to change this.

National leadership and coordination sit with the Chief Environmental Biosecurity Officer within the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, DAFF. The Chief Environmental Biosecurity Officer is, at best, severely understaffed and underfunded to perform its base functions, in contrast to what could be achieved if it were adequately resourced. There is insufficient funding for or focus on national research and development on priority pests and diseases and plans to deal with those.

There are five key reforms needed to strengthen Australia's environmental biosecurity system. The first reform is to establish an independent body to coordinate the environmental biosecurity response, preparedness and engagement. Industry biosecurity is well served by the coordinating bodies Plant Health Australia and Animal Health Australia. A similar body for environmental pests would enhance Australia's capacity for environmental biosecurity preparedness and assist with biosecurity investment and coordination.

The second reform is to implement sustainable funding measures that target risk creators first. Funding sources for biosecurity should be based on equity, coming from risk creators first, beneficiaries second and general taxation third.

The third reform is to increase the capacity and capability of the environmental biosecurity office. Additional permanent staff and funding must be allocated to the Office of the Chief Environmental Biosecurity Officer within DAFF so it can perform its core functions.

The fourth reform is to improve surveillance for high-risk potential invaders, significantly increase investment in biosecurity surveillance, establish a community biosecurity surveillance coordinator and finalise and implement the INVASIPLAN, which was intended to be an environmental biosecurity preparedness plan.

Lastly, the fifth reform is to strengthen research, development and extension—RD&E—for invasive species. Australia needs a targeted and rapid RD&E program to address urgent gaps in environmental biosecurity research and invasive species management. Currently, funding is not coordinated or connected in this regard.

I move my second reading amendment to the Biosecurity Amendment (Advanced Compliance Measures) Bill 2023:

At the end of the motion, add ", but the Senate:

(a) notes that:

(i) new incursions of invasive species are a major risk and significant threat to Australia's natural environment, and

(ii) a number of independent reviews have identified the poor performance of Australia's biosecurity system when it comes to protecting our natural environment; and

(b) is of the opinion that:

(i) the Government must place greater priority on environmental biosecurity, and

(ii) long-term sustainable funding for Australia's environmental biosecurity system is critical if we are to manage the growing biosecurity risks posed by climate change, increasing tourism and trade".

Paragraph (a)(i) is something I can't imagine anyone would argue against. Paragraph (a)(ii) is a statement of fact.

In my remaining time for contributions, I want to talk a little bit more about the varroa mite outbreak, because it's a classic example. While we might be talking about transits, passengers in airports and in other places and giving the department more power and the ability to levy more significant penalties, the news out of New South Wales is not good. The Senate inquiry took extensive evidence on this; we visited Newcastle and other places. It is sad that, 18 months down the track, we're still seeking to eradicate this pest. Sadly, although I appreciate all of the efforts that have gone into this, it doesn't seem to be working. We recently heard about new varroa mite outbreaks.

Just for the Senate's information, while we had the first detected infested hives around Newcastle, there are now 233 infested premises across more than 1.5 million hectares of red zones in New South Wales. More than 28,000 hives have been euthanised, equating to around 40 million bees killed, and there's no end to this in sight. A number of the owners of these beehives have been small operators, and of course it's had a significant impact on their livelihoods. The New South Wales government announced a funding boost of more than $30 million to support beekeepers and horticulture and cropping industries that are affected by this deadly bee parasite. The total funding they put in is $64 million. But recently we've heard from the beekeepers associations and industries, and apparently Stewart Levitt, the senior partner of a leading Sydney law firm, is bringing forward a class action on behalf of a number of beekeepers. That's because their small businesses have basically been destroyed, and they don't feel they've been offered adequate compensation for the losses.

I wanted to raise today that this is particularly relevant because the Senate inquiry made a number of recommendations, which had full tripartisan support, about what we needed to do on varroa mite. Recommendation 7 was:

The committee recommends the Australian Government, in partnership with other stakeholders, ensures that adequate funding is provided to the National Bee Biosecurity Program.

That includes, as a critical component, paying out those who have been affected by loss of or impact to their livelihoods. The class action has estimated that the compensation of around $19 million that has so far been paid to affected apiarists falls short of the estimated impact to their livelihoods, which is between $77 million and $140 million. Remember, some of these estimates don't include losses foregone from hiring your bees out to pollinate crops. This is just the value of the bees as they've been euthanised.

While we might be talking about the impact on agricultural production here, going back to the Greens' second reading amendment, I note a number of native beehives have also been destroyed. The New South Wales Department of Primary Industries has rolled out the biggest pest eradication program in our nation's history, putting hundreds of fipronil baiting stations in national parks and in reserves. We are also killing the wild honey bee populations, and we know that fipronil—which I've used previously in my vineyard to kill European wasps—poses a lot of risks to the environment, so this is a very sensitive subject in terms of the environmental impacts.

I'm going to conclude by saying this is a classic example of where a much feared outbreak in our country has happened, and it's costing an absolute bomb. There are estimates regarding this getting into a major crop through crop pollinators, and concerns have arisen in recent days that beekeepers in Kempsey have been sending potentially infected hives to pollinate almond crops in Sunraysia. If that is the case, if there are infected bees now in Victoria, you can forget about eradication because it will be off the table. We're going to have to learn to live with this infestation and the cost is going to be in the billions. We heard in the Senate enquiry that it would most likely destroy 90 per cent of Australia's honey bee population. This is a classic example of something that is costing us a bomb, so we support the initiative to give the government more power and more resources to deal with these kinds of outbreaks.