Russell Trood (Queensland, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

This is an interesting situation because, entirely coincidentally, I had decided that I would make my contribution to the MPI discussion on the subject of nuclear non-proliferation. Whereas Senator Milne and the Greens in general have taken what I regard as an entirely narrow-minded, conspiracy-theory-ridden approach to the problem, saying that nothing good can come of it and there will be nothing of value—a ‘we’ll all be rooned’ approach—I think I can take a more constructive approach. I must say that I think that is the intention of the government in opening the inquiry.

Unsurprisingly, I support this inquiry. I support it because I think it is timely. It is timely in the context of a renewed worldwide interest in nuclear energy as a means of addressing the problem of global warming. It will serve to provide us with valuable data and information regarding the economics of nuclear energy in Australia. It will help us to better understand the risks, potential dangers and opportunities for safety of nuclear power. Of course it will also examine the proliferation issue, which is the matter I particularly want to address today.

The last of these issues, the matter of proliferation, is particularly significant because as we develop our own uranium resources—40 per cent of the world’s resources, as Senator Milne has mentioned—however we participate in the nuclear fuel cycle, we always have to be conscious of, and I think the government is always conscious of, the awesome potential of nuclear power and the consequent need to safeguard against any misuse or application of nuclear technology or materials to weapons production. It is in the context of these kinds of concerns—such as the concern of nuclear power returning to the international agenda in the context of Australia having a potentially important role to play in the nuclear fuel cycle and in the context of the age of terror, where of course there is a danger of nuclear capabilities falling into the hands of terrorists—that we ought to concentrate on the matter of nuclear energy.

During the Cold War the international community was entirely conscious of this issue. Most of us—and I include myself—who were involved in strategic studies during that time were well aware of the way populations were held host to nuclear deterrence. We are also aware of the danger of strategic miscalculation, as nearly occurred during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. Conscious of those dangers, when the Cold War came to an end it was a relief that we all seemed to have been delivered from the potential horror. One of the more unfortunate consequences of the end of the Cold War is that we have tended to take our eye off the nuclear ball. As we have been preoccupied with terrorism for the last five years or so, we have tended to pass over the dangers still inherent in nuclear power. One of the strong virtues of the Prime Minister’s inquiry is that it will remind us of the need to focus our attention once again on those issues.

I remind the Senate of the consequences of our inattention and lack of vigilance in relation to nuclear power. Over the last few years there has been an impression in the international community that important elements of the non-proliferation regime are beginning to unravel. The indicators of this unravelling are things like North Korea’s defection from the NPT and its alleged acquisition of nuclear capability, the failure to secure the ratification of the comprehensive test ban treaty, India and Pakistan going nuclear in 1998, the Khan technology scandal in Pakistan, the Iran nuclear crisis and the failure of the non-proliferation conference in May 2002 and the New York negotiations last year. Sadly, there are many issues that cause us concern—or ought to cause us concern—about the non-proliferation regime.

It is important to get this matter in perspective. This is what the Greens consistently fail to do. They fail to get matters in perspective and they fail to acknowledge the realities of the situation. Part of this perspective is to recognise that not everything is bad. Not everything that has happened in relation to nuclear proliferation over the last few years is bad. For example, since the non-proliferation treaty came into force, more countries have given up a potential weapons capability than have gone on to acquire it. That is an important reality. The United States and Russia continue to dismantle and secure weapons and materials that were left over from the Cold War. Libya has renounced nuclear weapons and Iraq is no longer a danger. Of course we now have the Proliferation Security Initiative, which is a creative solution to the problem of containing proliferation by rogue regimes. There is a great deal more we could talk about.

The Director General of the IAEA, Dr ElBaradei, noted: ‘We are at a crossroads.’ I think that is true. We have reached a point in this debate on nuclear non-proliferation where we have to begin to face up to the challenges of reinforcing the nuclear regime. Unlike the Greens, unlike Senator Milne, I think Australia has a very constructive role to play in this enterprise. It is useful to outline the strength of that particular commitment.

We share with many other countries an interest in the safe management of nuclear materials and technologies. There is no conspiracy in that. We are focusing on what we can do to safeguard those materials and technologies. We have an economic interest because we possess 40 per cent of the world’s uranium reserves. We have a strong economic interest in developing those reserves safely for the international community. It is in that context, and I have said this in this chamber previously, that the ALP’s ‘no new mines’ policy is as foolish as it is entirely irrational—no more so than in my own state of Queensland, where it is retarding mineral development, regional growth and, of course, the generation of jobs.

Putting economics to one side, our interest is underwritten by our exemplary—and I emphasise that—and longstanding record of support for a strong non-proliferation regime. This is something that the Greens fail to recognise on a very regular basis. We have a strong safeguards policy, active membership of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and all the important agencies in relation to the non-proliferation regime. We have active participation in the PSI and, of course, a very extensive network of diplomatic contacts which puts us in contact with all the countries that are involved in the non-proliferation regime. So we have credentials. We have a national interest, credibility and a standing within the non-proliferation community which provides us with the foundation to encourage a fresh look at the non-proliferation order.

What are the challenges to that order? I see that we and the international community can take a constructive role, whereas the Greens see nothing but danger, challenge and futility in the whole exercise. It is clear that most members of the international community take a positive view of things that can be done. Indeed, in the United States the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace recognises this.

First, it is obvious that we need to be relevant and realistic—something that the Greens do not seem to be able to do. Many within the non-proliferation community want the existing nuclear weapons states to move towards some kind of disarmament. It is true that that is an obligation that they have undertaken in the non-proliferation treaty. This is a worthy aspiration, but it is an entirely unrealistic one in the present climate. We would waste an awful lot of energy and time in encouraging compliance with that particular undertaking. We should concentrate on more modest measures, such as encouraging the five nuclear weapons states, especially the United States and Russia, to continue reducing their strategic reserves and encouraging them to ease the hair-trigger status of their weapons.

Second, we should also seek ways to bring India, Pakistan and Israel into the non-proliferation regime. That would hardly be an easy activity, given the fact that Israel does not admit to the possession of nuclear weapons, but I am encouraged by the attitude of New Delhi to this possibility. I think we can make progress on that particular agenda. Third, we need to stop the illegal transfer of nuclear materials and technologies. There are many constructive suggestions as to how we might address that particular issue. Fourth, we need to strengthen and enforce the existing NPT regime. We need to encourage the IAEA to have stronger rules regarding compliance with the norms.

Fifth, we need to restrict the supply of nuclear weapons. Of course, that involves protecting weapons-usable fissile material and developing rules to enforce that degree of protection. Senator Milne alluded to this matter: it is more controversial that we should seek an international ban on the further production of highly enriched uranium. Indeed, President Bush has proposed the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, which would attain that kind of objective. Australia should be careful about this. It is not obvious that that proposal necessarily includes Australia, because, at the moment, we do not enrich uranium, but if it were to pass and we were not part of it then our own capacity to be able to enrich to add value to our own uranium reserves would be affected. The Prime Minister alluded to that danger in Ottawa during his recent visit overseas.

Sixth, we need to abate demand. Logically, the most reliable and long-term solution to the dangers of nuclear proliferation is to devalue the status and prestige of nuclear arsenals. We must believe in fairies at the bottom of the garden if we think that this will happen in the near future. If anything, the prestige of nuclear weapons is growing rather than declining, but this remains an aspiration. Perhaps the number of states that have renounced nuclear capabilities might encourage us to think that it is not an entirely impossible dream.

I will say a few words in relation to American policy, which featured fulsomely in Senator Milne’s contribution to the debate. It is demonstrably evident that we need strong and sustained political leadership to make any progress on the non-proliferation regime. It is in that context that I strongly encourage Australia to take a greatly enhanced role. As I said, we have the credibility, diplomatic resources and compelling national interests that would justify that as a natural aim of our foreign policy. We should not do it alone but in conjunction with the other countries that share our interests: Canada, Japan, South Korea, Brazil et cetera. But that is not enough. It is self-evident that we require the support of the US for any initiative to succeed.

It was the United States that exploded the first atomic bomb, in the New Mexico desert in 1945. Since that time, every American president has been aware of the awesome power unleashed by that event. Not surprisingly, they have all used it to advance American security interests. It is also true that every United States president has been seized of the need to contain the dangers of nuclear power consistent with US security. They have done so on a bipartisan basis. That includes President Truman, President Kennedy, President Nixon and President Reagan, who actually took the incredible step in the context of the Cold War of abolishing a generation of intermediate nuclear weapons from the European theatre. He would have gone further had his generals not precluded him from doing so.

Every United States president in the nuclear age has been an arms control and nonproliferation president, conscious of the dangers of nuclear power. Questions have been raised, however, about the commitment of this current president, President Bush, to that end. Senators will be aware that in the United States and internationally there has been criticism of the Bush policy. Some of it I think has been entirely ill-conceived. But it is fair to say that in the Bush administration there is a stronger interest in security self-interest, less of an inclination to use multilateral structures and a reluctance to engage in arms control. (Time expired)