Joe Ludwig (Queensland, Australian Labor Party, Manager of Opposition Business in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I seek leave to incorporate my speech on the second reading debate on the Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Bill 2006, the Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner (Consequential Amendments) Bill 2006 and the Law Enforcement (AFP Professional Standards and Related Measures) Bill 2006.

Leave granted.

The speech read as follows—

Key Features of the Bills

Mr President, I rise to speak on three Bills that are being moved cognate:

• the Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Bill
• the Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner (Consequential Amendments) Bill
• the Law Enforcement (AFP Professional Standards and Related Measures) Bill.

Labor agrees with and certainly supports the intent of these Bills. In fact, it is a shame we could not have seen them earlier.

The genesis of a Federal Law Enforcement Integrity Commission appears to have derived from a reference the then Labor Attorney-General Michael Lavarch sent to the Australian Law Reform Commission more than ten years ago.

The ALRC recommended such a body in its report of November 1996. It took the Liberals from 1996 to June 2004 to actually adopt this proposal as party policy.

Needless delay is clearly a hallmark of this Minister.

Since then it has taken Senator Ellison a full two years to get his act together and bring the Bills before the Parliament.

Funding for a Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner was announced in 2005 Budget, and the Bill has itself been sitting on the forward list of urgent Bills for well over a year.

In the time passed since the announcement of these Bills, we have seen the leaked secret internal Customs report that blew the lid on corrupt and criminal activity at Sydney Airport, sparking the Wheeler review.

We have seen a couple of ACC-seconded officers charged in relation to corruption offences.

We have seen extraordinary allegations made in relation to corruption of Commonwealth officials from a range of agencies in the Torres Strait.

At this point let me state unequivocally for the public record– there is no evidence of systemic corruption in Australian Commonwealth Law Enforcement agencies.

The public can and should have confidence in the integrity of Australian Federal Police, Australian Crime Commission and Australian Customs Service officers who do an excellent job in protecting the community from some pretty awful threats in terrorism, drug trafficking, sex slavery, child pornography and many other crimes.

Crime is big business – there are huge amounts of money involved, and history shows us that criminals are willing and able to try to corrupt serving officers to stay a step ahead of the law.

It is absolutely vital therefore that the long-overdue Integrity Commission is ultimately established. Likewise, the AFP’s new professional standards regime is clearly a marked improvement on the current arrangements.

This is even more so because, since September 11, our nation’s law enforcement agencies have had a dramatic increase in the range and availability of powers.

Some five long years after September 11, the Howard Government is still fiddling with these powers on a semi-regular basis, which doesn’t give you much confidence in their ability to rapidly assess an emerging threat and co-ordinate and deliver a proportionate response. At the same time as these powers are being expanded, the oversight regime has largely remained frozen – partially of course due to the Minister’s inability to progress the legislation.

This legislation goes some way to striking the right balance of strong powers with strong oversight. To paraphrase Dr. AJ Brown, who appeared before the committee, these Bills represent the most significant change in Commonwealth integrity institutions in twenty years.

Let me foreshadow then, Labor’s broad support for this legislation, before I go on to the specifics of how the legislation is not good enough.

Firstly, we are disappointed in the fact that ACLEI has been given such a narrow jurisdiction to start off with – only extending to two agencies, the Australian Federal Police and the Australian Crime Commission.

Given the number of agencies at a federal level which wield law-enforcement powers – including the Australian Taxation Office, Customs, the Department of Immigration and others – this is a massive error.

Let me remind Senators of just what the Immigration Department has been up to under the life of this Government. This little shop of horrors that poses as a Department of State while it has committed the following outrages:

• Wilful ignorance of the law in relation to the duration of detention, specifically the test under s196 of the Act, and in direct conflict with numerous Federal Court cases that have set the precedent.
• Supervision of an institution that, according to newspaper reports, allegedly allowed repeated rape and sexual abuse of detainees, including one reported instance of rape of a mother in front of her toddler.
• Supervision of an institution that has certainly treated detainees with mental illness extremely poorly, including very young children
• Wrongful detention of no fewer than 26 Australian citizens, and its not clear if this includes the tragic case of Cornelia Rau
• Removal of one citizen who was apparently not fit to travel to the
• Philippines to survive off a charitable home for the poor and crippled.
• Transport of five detainees locked up in the back of a van for five hours
• without food, water, toilet or rest breaks.
• Export of women and children to the island of Nauru
• Placing even mothers in the act of labour under guard and refusing the right of the family to take photographs of the newborn
• Abrogation of its duty to properly supervise a contractor GSL, or alternatively, deliberate connivance with that organisation to conceal and cover-up, using what the ANAO called “considerable discretion as to what is reported” as an incident.

The question is – would all or some of this conduct constitute behaviour that fell within the Law Enforcement Commissioner’s ambit?

The definition of engages in corrupt conduct under section 6 turns not on monetary gain but rather on “abuse of office”. Consider for a moment whether you can capture wilful ignorance, dereliction of duty, and abuse of power in the terms.

Yet, when we look at the definition of a law enforcement agency, we find something missing – this Department – which has caused so much human misery on so many people, all the while glibly and often wrongfully maintaining its authority to enforce the law – has in fact been left off the list of law enforcement agencies in the definition.

Other agencies are missing too – Customs, for example; has uniforms, guns, powers of arrest and detention, power to question, search and seize, etc. So while it swims, flies and even waddles, although I wouldn’t go so far as to say it quacks, this government plainly fails to recognise it for what it is.

Customs holds almost identical powers to police, but they too are missing from the list of law enforcement agencies.

There are other agencies like ASIC and the ATO who have investigatory and law enforcement powers to access stored communications, issue notices to produce etc. that would also benefit from oversight.

Instead of putting agencies like these in the legislation, the Minister proposes to add them at his whim and convenience by regulation. There is no guarantee that any of these agencies are or will be able to be investigated, and that is completely unacceptable.

Why should a Minister have a roving discretion to decide when an agency should or should not be investigated for corruption?

Perhaps the Minister and the Government Senators can explain —what is the public benefit in a Minister maintaining the power to add and remove agencies at whim?

This is not only dumb policy, it is dumb politically. Revealing a Government that is both tired and lazy, that’s too obsessed with its extreme ideology rather than middle Australian values and all too ready to be kicked out of office.

There are not that many federal agencies —how hard is it to sit down, work out what powers each has and make a final and definitive determination as to whether they are in fact a law enforcement agency, or exercise law enforcement powers so akin to a law enforcement agency to warrant them being treated as such for the purposes of oversight?

That is what sensible policy would do. Turning to each Bill specifically.

Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Bill

The Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Bill establishes the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity – or ACLEI – which is an anti-corruption body responsible for investigating allegations of corruption concerning the Australian Federal Police and the Australian Crime Commission, as well as state police officers seconded to those bodies. The number of overseen agencies may be expanded by regulation. Labor totally rejects the Ministerial power of veto into corruption investigations - a point I have already raised above.

ACLEI will have the powers similar to that of a standing Royal Commission. Essentially, the Commonwealth is following the lead of those states who have already set up similar bodies with similar powers to ACLEI.

I mentioned previously, there is no evidence of systemic or serious corruption in either the ACC or the AFP. Indeed, the situation we have here is completely different to the endemic corruption of the National Party regime led by Bjelke-Peterson in Queensland whose conduct was so bereft of anything approaching moral or ethical behaviour that it demanded the establishment of the Criminal Justice Commission, forerunner of the Crime and Misconduct Commission.

At least the community can rest safe in knowing there will never be another National party government again, anywhere, ever... but that’s another story.

The establishment of this anti-corruption commission is intended, instead, to provide a deterrent to such behaviour in the future, as well as to enhance public confidence in our federal crime-fighting bodies.

To return to the Bill – ACLEI may deal with corruption issues either by notification or on referral from the Minister, and it has the power to refer the investigation to another agency in certain circumstances.

The Commission also has the power to hold and conduct public inquiries on a range of corruption-related issues, on the request of the Minister.

Finally, a new Parliamentary Joint Committee will be created to oversee ACLEI. This is a matter of some concern to Labor, as it looks like a waste of cash. Both the Senate Legal and Constitutional Committee, and the Parliamentary Joint Committee of the Australian Crime Commission itself recommended that the PJCACC could take on this role.

On the one hand you have Senator Minichin making unfounded claims about how the Howard Governments attack on the Senate Committees will save money. On the other you have Senator Ellison establishing a new committee that even his own backbench says should have been rolled into the PJC on the ACC.

We look forward to the Government’s explanation of why the government is yet again ignoring its back bench.

Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner (Consequential Amendments)

I might speak shortly on the consequential amendments bill. The Bill purports to make a number of recommendations to the Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979.

That Act was amended by the recently passed Telecommunications (interception) Amendment Act 2006.

Part of Subitems 31(1) and (2) of Schedule 1 amended the title of the Principal Act from “Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979”, to “Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979”.

The commencement of these items took effect on proclamation, which was done on June 13th.

However, reference is made throughout these Bills to the principal Act under its previous name. Labor successfully moved amendments in the House to bring the Bill up to date, and a similar error in the main bill.

In addition, the legislation as originally proposed by the Government purported to add a new paragraph (ea) to Schedule 2 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act after an existing paragraph (e). However a paragraph (ea) already exists in that Act. Labor again was successful.

It is that kind of sloppy inattention to detail that we have come to expect from this Government. It is the type of blase administration that would lead one to enact redundant laws that may have to be revisited soon after and amend or repeal them.

It is a sign of high handed arrogance that the Attorney-General, in whose portfolio the TI legislation resides, did not prepare a suitably amended Bill before dumping it on the table of Parliament in the other place. It is also the sign of an administrator who is less than firm in his grip on the job.

What else can we expect from an Attorney who ignores even the friendly and sage advice of his own backbench - on sedition, for example. He is either so busy trying to find a new political wedge or so drunk on his diminishing power that he cannot see the errors that lie plainly before him.

Labor was successful in excising the shoddy drafting. In future the Government should present consequential amendments to the parliament only when they are fit to be dealt with.

AFP Professional Standards Bill

The Professional Standards Bill updates the complaints procedure for the AFP, to bring in – as per the Explanatory Memoranda – a `contemporary managerial’ style of complaints handling.

The amendments in this Bill are the outcome of the 2003 Fisher Review into professional standards in the AFP, which recommended the repeal of the Act that previously covered this area, the Complaints (Australian Federal Police) Act 1981 and the establishment of a new complaints regime with clear definitions of the types of conduct which it covered.

The Professional Standards Bill categorises misconduct into four levels of seriousness:

• Category 1: Inappropriate conduct
• Category 2: Minor misconduct or inappropriate conduct that reveals unsatisfactory behaviour
• Category 3: Serious misconduct
• Category 4: Corrupt conduct

. . . and allows the AFP Commissioner and the Ombudsman to assign certain behaviours to a category of conduct.

Misconduct will be dealt with according to the category to which it relates. The lower levels will be dealt with by managers whereas higher complaints, and complaints of corrupt conduct, will be investigated by a specific internal unit or ACLEI, respectively. Importantly, ACLEI must be notified of any instance of corrupt conduct.

Again, the Minister has the power to arrange an inquiry concerning the conduct of the AFP or anything else to do with the AFP. Investigators under this legislation have wide-ranging powers, such as the power to enter AFP property, and the power to direct and AFP appointee to provide information.

The Federal Ombudsman is also given powers under the new regime. As I have already mentioned, he or she can determine —in conjunction with the Commissioner —what kinds of issues belong to different categories. The Ombudsman will also conduct annual reviews of the operation of the professional standards section of the AFP.

The Committee’s View

As I have already said, all three Bills are largely welcomed by both Labor and were referred to the Senate’s Legal and Constitutional Committee, which made a large number of sensible recommendations to improve the Bill.

Jurisdiction

Firstly, the Committee examined the issue of the jurisdiction of ACLEI. As I have previously mentioned, ACLEI – as the Bill stands – only has the power to investigate allegations of corruption made against members of the AFP and the ACC, although that is expandable by regulation.

This is plainly ridiculous. To quote the Commissioner of the Federal Police, Mick Keelty, in referring to the oversight of ACLEI over Law-Enforcement bodies:

There is a gap here – and I do not want to name agencies – if you look at the powers, such as access to search warrants, access to the use of firearms and access to detention.

There’s an old saying - what is good for the goose is good for the gander – and it certainly is true when you are talking about all important oversight powers.

As witnesses to the Committee argued, there are gaps in the AFP’s effective jurisdiction over corrupt conduct in other agencies – being limited to the investigation of criminal matters in cases where there was conduct that was corrupt but not clearly criminal.

Finally, the Committee investigated the allowance in the legislation for its jurisdictional expansion by regulations. The final report stated, and I quote, that `no rationale has been provided for this potential expansion of jurisdiction by stages via regulation’.

But it not just a matter of expansion. Any agency actually listed by regulation could be removed from the jurisdiction of the Integrity Commissioner with the stroke of the Minister’s pen.

As such, the Committee has recommended that other agencies be brought under the aegis of ACLEI by legislative change rather than regulation, and that the government should give a timeframe for adding additional agencies to its jurisdiction.

Right of Review

At recommendation 13, the Committee also advised:

4.65 The committee recommends that the lower level disciplinary matters (categories 1 and 2) should be subject to internal review while more serious matters (category 3) should be the subject of external review for example, through the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.

This begs the question, what is category 3 conduct?

Category three conduct is defined by the proposed section 40RP in the professional standards Bill as conduct that;

“i) is serious misconduct by an AFP appointee; or

ii) raises the question whether termination action should be taken in relation to an AFP appointee; or

iii) involves a breach of the criminal law, or serious neglect of duty, by an AFP appointee; and”

is conduct of a kind that does not raise a corruption issue.”

So what then is defined as serious misconduct?

Section 40K (3) of the existing AFP Act defines serious misconduct as:

“a) corruption, a serious abuse of power, or a serious dereliction of duty; or

b) any other seriously reprehensible act or behaviour by an AFP employee, whether or not acting, or purporting to act, in the course of his or her duties as an AFP employee”

That is a very wide. It is even wider when you consider that misconduct of category one and two level, if committed in conjunction with category three misconduct, must as per s4ORK (6) be taken to belong to the category three conduct.

It is only natural, in the view of the Labor Party, that someone who is being tarred with serious allegations of this type, who:

• Has not been terminated and therefore has no access to a claim for unfair dismissal, and therefore
• Does not have access to an external independent mechanism for review;

should certainly have access to external review. That is common sense.

This is particularly the case with regards to law enforcement, because there are plenty of examples in the past, in Australia and overseas of corrupt officers conspiring to set up a whistleblower on false allegations.

The Government moved amendments in the other place that took up a number of the committees recommendations. This was a welcome development.

But a couple of recommendations that are of particular importance to Labor, and we won’t desist our efforts to see that they’re acted on. At this point I foreshadow that I will be moving Labor’s amendments to deal with these recommendations during the committee stage.

I’ll now briefly turn to the substantial amendments to the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979.

I’m gravely concerned that these amendments were not referred to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, whose members and secretariat are all highly regarded for their grasp of national security and intelligence matters.

Of course the Government has given assurances that these are relatively ‘minor’ amendments. But it is the Joint Committee, not the Government alone, that is best placed the make such assurances. Indeed, if there is sufficient review of new laws and powers covering security agencies before they’re enacted, the task and burden of operational oversight is both improved and made easier.

I encourage the government to refer these changes to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, alternatively I’ll raise it with them myself.

I conclude with those remarks.

Natasha Stott Despoja (SA, Australian Democrats) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Similarly, I seek leave to incorporate my speech on the Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Bill 2006 and cognate bills. I do so in the interests of time and not because this is not an important issue to me or the Australian Democrats.

Leave granted.

The speech read as follows—

I rise to speak to the Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Bill 2006, the Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner (Consequential Amendments) Bill 2006 and the Law Enforcement (AFP Professional Standards and Related Measures) Bill 2006.

The Democrats applaud any moves to reduce corruption within Government law enforcement agencies and believe that this Bill is an important step in the protection of the integrity of our law enforcement agencies.

It has been suggested by academics in this area that significant reform has not been conducted for more than 20 years and is urgently needed. As such, I Welcome the changes that the bill proposes.

Corruption can be an unfortunate side effect of power and responsibility and has the potential to pervade any area where that power and responsibility is exercised. It is crucial to responsible government that all measures are taken to prevent corruption occurring and the Federal Government should lead by example.

It is disappointing to note in the Bill that the scope of jurisdiction given to the Integrity Commissioner is only with regard to the AFP and the ACC.

If we are to have a truly accountable system and intend to rid our governmental agencies of corruption altogether we need to be aggressive in our approach, the first step being that we should give jurisdiction to the Integrity Commissioner to investigate all Agencies that posses law enforcement powers.

Equivalent investigative bodies in New South Wales, Queensland and Western Australia already have a general jurisdiction, whereas the Commonwealth seems to be following the Victorian model which it initially criticised and said it was trying to avoid.

In a Joint Media Release on 16 June 2004, the Attorney-General and the Minister for Justice and Customs announced the intention of the Government to establish an independent anti-corruption body. They also stated in this media release that;

No evidence exists of systemic corruption within the Australian Crime Commission and the Australian Federal Police.

The aforementioned Ministers made this claim despite there being two reports in the media in the two months prior to the announcement of Police Corruption within the ACC. To date, the Government has not acted expeditiously to tackle corruption.

They continue to be lack lustre by not allowing the Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner to investigate corruption in all government agencies that posses law enforcement powers.

Agencies such as the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the Australian Taxation Office, Australian Customs and the Australian Securities and Investment Commission have considerable power and responsibility in their decision making.

Should these agencies fall under the purview of the Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner, special care will have to be taken to ensure that private contractors who are employed by relevant Commonwealth Agencies also fall under ambit of the Commissioner.

Commonwealth Agencies increasingly are outsourcing important work to private contractors and there is an inevitable blurring of responsibilities between the private and public sectors as a result.

In our contemporary situation, the dynamic interactions between these two sectors can possibly lead to corrupt practices whereby one sector’s actions will bleed into the others.

This, therefore, represents a significant loophole and needs to be seriously addressed.

We believe it is not enough to simply limit the investigative scope of the Commissioner to personnel from Commonwealth Agencies tasked with law enforcement. Hence it is our position that the Commissioner’s powers should be extended to private personnel working for Commonwealth law enforcement agencies as well.

Take, for example, the Department of Immigration which considers compliance and detention and has discretion to decide over visa issues or the Australian Taxation office which has the ability to choose which taxpayers should be audited and can make advisory or binding rulings over tax issues.

Dr A J Brown, Senior Lecturer at Griffith University and Senior Research Fellow at the Australian National University stated in the recent inquiry into the Bill that;

Unless broadened, the restricted jurisdiction of the proposed Integrity Commission will represent a missed opportunity to properly strengthen the public integrity regimes of the Commonwealth Government in a manner which comparative research indicates is now overdue.¹

The benefits of widening the jurisdiction of the Commission were also recognised by the Commissioner for the Australian Federal Police, Michael Keelty, who stated:

If we are serious about this, and if it is not just a quick fix, then the AFP could benefit in its investigations if the ACLEI had a wider remit than what is proposed in the bill.

The Government has made provisions in the bill for further agencies to be added to those which come under the jurisdiction of the Integrity Commissioner, however, the Government has provided for this through. the prescription of an agency by regulation.

The effect of this means that the Government can just as easily remove an agency from the jurisdiction of the Commissioner whenever it pleases it to do so, this allows the Government to strip the Commissioner of independence and places the work of the office at the whim of the government of the day.

If this body is to be an independent statutory body as it is intended to be then the jurisdiction of the Commissioner must be widened through legislative changes. These changes should be introduced immediately.

By keeping the power to proscribe agencies within the power of the Government they are ironically allowing for the integrity of the Commissioner to be questioned. Critics will see the Commissioner as being reliant on the Government’s permission to conduct investigations.

Recognising that preventative measures are preferable to punitive measures, the Democrats believe that the Bill should encourage corruption resistance measures and training : to become a substantive part of the Commission’s function. It was outlined by Dr Brown during the inquiry process that the Bill has an unbalanced focus on reactive measures to corruption rather than on proactive corruption resistance. Dr Brown submitted that:

The Bill currently provides insufficient legislative support to the ‘proactive’ detection and prevention functions of the Commission.

It is important that the Integrity Commissioner do as much as possible to investigate and prosecute instances of corruption however measures should be taken to reduce the likelihood of corruption within the AFP and ACC. This will reduce the likelihood of corruption and in turn reduce the costs involved with the investigation and prosecution of corruption.

I am also concerned with the operation of section 149 certificates.

The operation of these certificates allows for the Attorney-General to specify that the disclosure of information or a document would be contrary to the public interest. The list of grounds on which the Attorney-General may issue a section 149 certificate is exhaustive.

The result of a section 149 certificate being issued is to prevent a disclosure that would otherwise be authorised or required by the Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Bill. It prevents;

• disclosures by law enforcement agency heads to the Commissioner (subclause 150 (1)),
• documents or things being given to the commissioner or at hearings (subclauses 150(2) & (3)),
• disclosures by the head of a law enforcement agency to another government agency (clauses 151),
• disclosure by the Commissioner to the head of a government agency or a special investigator investigating alleged ACLEI Corruption (clause 152) and;
• disclosures by the Commissioner to the proposed Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity (subclause 216(2)).

The ability of the Attorney-General to suffocate an investigation in an arbitrary manner as the operation of this section seems to allow is unjustified. The grounds allowing for a certificate to be issued are too broad.

The Police Federation of Australia in its submission to the Senate Committee that a reporting process apply when the Minister issues a section 149 certificate in order to ensure openness and accountability.

The Senate Committee has made recommendations that the bill be amended to ensure that transparency of the overall system is maintained by making information available to the Parliament on the operation of the proposed system. This can be achieved by requiring the Minister to report how many times clause 149 certificates have been issued and what restrictions they have made.

Where an investigation into corruption could bring embarrassment for the Government or the Attorney-General, this section allows for an unscrupulous Member to hush up an investigation. This provision, if abused, could create a situation which this entire act is intending to remove.

Also of concern is the potential for this act to operate in conjunction with the National Security Information (Civil and Criminal Proceedings) Act which would mean that any of this information that has been designated by the Attorney-General to come under the section 149 certificate may not even be seen or heard by a Magistrate in court proceedings.

I am perturbed with the decreased reporting and accountability measures that are constantly being reduced by the Government.

We have potentially invasive legislation being introduced. Legislation that does not have adequate safeguards and do not have sufficient reporting requirements to make the parliament aware of whether or not the legislation is being abused.

The Law Enforcement (AFP Professional Standards and Related Measures) Bill 2006, is a welcome change to the existing arrangements.

In May 2002, the Commissioner for the Australian Federal Police engaged Justice William Fisher AO, QC to undertake a review of AFP professional standards. This was in order to deal with recommendations by the Australian Law Reform Commission and from concerns within the AFP management that adversarial processes were causing significant delays in resolving complaints.

The previous system is reputed to have caused high levels of concern, within the workplace and was costly due to lengthy investigations that could be dealt with in a more efficient manner.

I commend the Commissioner for his efforts that has brought about this reform.

The current measures contained in the Complaints (Australian Federal Police) Act 1981 were stated as inefficient by Justice Fisher as “any system with a punitive regime as its central focus cannot adequately address the causes of poor performance or bring about significant behavioural improvement.”

The proposed measures which restructure the complaints system towards a more managerial structure has also been welcomed by the Australian Federal Police.

What concerns the Democrats about the proposed bill however, is the fact that there seems to be no method for an aggrieved police officer to seek redress. Where a police officer has been dismissed or has had some form of punitive measures imposed on him or her, that police officer has no avenue to appeal on the merits of the case.

Naturally, under the ADJR Act it is possible to seek redress on the grounds of procedural fairness, or on a point of law, but where an officer is unhappy with any disciplinary actions taken against him or her, their only avenue of appeal is to ask the disciplining authority to reconsider their decision. This situation is completely unsatisfactory.

The Australian Federal Police Association stated during the inquiry:

We call for an external review panel, tribunal or court, as envisaged by the Fisher review and as is found in all other Australian police forces bar none.

As a measure of accountability and in order to maintain fair and equitable standards any officer who should receive disciplinary measures should have some form of appeals process available to them, especially in the instance of dismissal.

This is a serious oversight by the Government especially because it is not possible for officers to go to the Industrial relations Commission. It is important that an aggrieved police officer is given a chance to have his or her concerns heard.

It is not in the interests of the AFP to have dismissed employees walking away from the job bitter and resentful at the way they were dismissed.

I urge the Government to address this issue.

———————

¹ Submission 8, p2

Chris Ellison (WA, Liberal Party, Minister for Justice and Customs) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I will give a brief speech in reply on the Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Bill 2006 and cognate bills, and that will shorten anything I have to say in the committee stage. Firstly, I thank senators for their contributions to this debate. The government introduced this legislation in late March, and the bills were referred to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee for examination and report. The committee’s report was tabled on 11 May this year and the committee was called upon to report on these bills in what was a short time frame. The committee has done a very good job, and I want to express the government’s appreciation for the way the committee has handled this. There has been a range of submissions by interested parties, which have been taken into account by the committee. The government has accepted the vast majority of the Senate committee’s recommendations, and the necessary amendments in relation to these recommendations were dealt with in the other place.

I wish to make a few brief points about these bills. Firstly, the law enforcement reform package reflects the government’s desire to ensure that Australian government law enforcement is characterised by the highest standards of conduct. The package comprises two main components: the establishment of the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity—commonly known as ACLEI—headed by the integrity commissioner, and the reform of the complaints and professional standards regime of the Australian Federal Police. The government has taken this initiative in the absence of any major concerns about corruption in Australian government law enforcement. The integrity commissioner will operate independently but will be subject to oversight by the minister, a joint parliamentary committee and the Commonwealth Ombudsman. The Ombudsman will still have jurisdiction over the AFP and the ACC for matters other than corruption issues. Together, the integrity commissioner and the Ombudsman, with their complementary approaches, will provide the Australian public with a guarantee that the conduct of the key Australian law enforcement agencies are subject to comprehensive external review.

The Law Enforcement (AFP Professional Standards and Related Measures) Bill 2006 will modernise the complaints and professional standards regime for the Australian Federal Police. It largely gives effect to the government’s response to the recommendations made by the Hon. William Fisher in his review of the Australian Federal Police complaints and professional standards regime. The new system it creates is consistent with modern management practices and the organisational needs of the AFP, with an emphasis on dealing with issues quickly, constructively and, where possible, locally. The Australian Federal Police Association has been consulted on this legislation. As a result of these consultations, I am aware that the association is seeking a more extensive external independent review of serious conduct issues. The legislation as currently drafted maintains the current arrangements, including external review in the case of termination. Given that the current arrangements are maintained, I do not plan to hold up the bill. I will, however, give further consideration to the association’s submission in due course.

These bills have required a good deal of consultation, particularly with the states and territories. The 2004 election interrupted progress, of course. However, this legislation has always remained a priority for the Howard government. These bills are the culmination of a large amount of work in relation to what is a very important area of the law. These bills are, indeed, groundbreaking in providing for law enforcement integrity. I commend these bills to the Senate.

Question agreed to.

Bills read a second time.