Christopher Back (WA, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to speak on a matter of extreme concern to my veterinary colleagues and my associates in the horse industry. It follows the tragic death last week of my colleague Dr Alister Rodgers in Queensland from the effects of the Hendra virus. He is the second veterinarian to die in 13 months from this virus. This disease—and related new and emerging infectious diseases—is the subject of active research through partners involved in the Australian Biosecurity Cooperative Research Centre for Emerging Infectious Disease. Regrettably, further funding for this CRC has been refused by Minister Carr and it will cease to exist from the middle of 2010.

In the light of recent events, including the deaths from the Hendra virus and the transmission of the swine flu virus between humans and pigs in July of this year in New South Wales, I call on the Minister for Innovation, Industry, Science and Research, Senator Carr, to reconsider his decision and use his powers to guarantee continued funding for this CRC well into the future. The CRC brings together the expertise of CSIRO scientists based at the animal health labs in Geelong, the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service, the Commonwealth Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Australian universities, state departments of agriculture and the private sector.

Earlier this year the CRC was advised that their application was not competitive enough against other bids and that the CRC did not have a strong track record. This is amazing in the light of the fact that in May 2009 this same CRC received a major national award for innovation for their adaptation of research and testing procedures from avian influenza to combat the equine influenza outbreak of 2007-08. The review committee advising the minister simply got it wrong and it is within the scope of the minister to reverse his earlier decision.

The biosecurity scientific world has moved towards a one health approach in researching highly infectious diseases. It recognises the multi-host pathogens passing between wildlife, domestic animals, birds and humans. A recent high-profile example, of course, is the avian influenza causing mortalities with wild birds, domestic ducks and humans in Asia and elsewhere. Of course, not surprisingly, the very CRC that is now to be abolished has done much of the critical research work and development of testing for this disease in this region. Again, I understand the CRC review committee failed to comprehend the international trend towards one health and its recommendation to the minister to not continue funding was basically as a result of their failure to understand that.

Those in the Senate might be interested to know that some 60 per cent of the 1,460 diseases recognised in humans are due to multi-host pathogens with cross-species lines. This is according to the Zoological Society of London, which warned recently of a brewing storm of highly infectious diseases moving between humans and animals. Australia has been at the forefront of international research in this area and unless the minister reverses his decision, our research effectiveness and our ability to respond to biosecurity threats will be compromised.

I return to the most recent threat to Australia’s biosecurity: the Hendra virus and its related organisms. To this day it is regarded as being indigenous to Australia. It falls within a group known as the Henipa viruses, of which another—the Nipah virus—is a member. Both of these are bat-borne viruses known to cause mortalities in humans. Both are actively being researched by members of the biosecurity CRC. Hendra virus is a viral disease that should be thought of not as an animal disease virus but as a human disease virus. We now have seven people in Queensland known to have contracted the disease—of whom four have tragically died. It is not well understood. There is an urgent need for more research into rapid testing techniques for the virus in both humans and horses; and the development of a vaccine to protect all at risk, including veterinarians and horse industry personnel likely to come in contact with the disease.

The bodies best equipped to undertake this work are those who are members of this biosecurity CRC, which leads the world in Hendra virus research. It simply makes no sense to discontinue funding for those programs in the face of the Hendra virus, whose mortality rate now exceeds 60 per cent in humans. Returning to the Nipah virus, it is also known to cause huge numbers of deaths in Malaysia. Again, it is a bat-borne viral disease, and we think it is transmitted in Malaysia between bats to pigs to humans. In Bangladesh, however, there is compelling and recent disturbing evidence that this virus has killed children as a result of direct transmission from bats to humans, which of course introduces a new and alarming element. It also raises the question as to whether there may have been direct human to human transmission of this disease.

Why is it important to Australia? Because bats and flying foxes, known to carry these viruses, move freely between Australia and our islands to the north and on their way into Asia. They are suspected to mutate easily—all of which points to severe biosecurity risks to Australia and to our neighbours, with significant threats to global health from these diseases. Australia will ignore this threat at the peril of our own population and to that of our regional neighbours.

The decision to terminate funding for the biosecurity CRC has significant implications for the next generation of health professionals in this area of disease control. There are currently 72 students undertaking PhD studies in universities which are members of—or at least partially funded under—the biosecurity CRC. While arrangements will be made for these students to complete their studies, regrettably this is only part of the story. Approximately one-third of the students are from countries in the region where evolving biosecurity risks are greatest.

The first implication is that there will be no new candidates to replace those who are undertaking their PhD studies. More importantly, the recent unsuccessful application from the biosecurity CRC included a funding proposal for current PhD students to undertake further postdoctoral studies. Why is this important? The reason is that many of our virologists, bacteriologists and epidemiologists are approaching retirement age. The people I have consulted on this tell me that it is the current crop of PhD candidates from whom they would want to draw the next generation of scientists who will protect this country and others into the future. I call upon the minister to carefully reconsider the implication of his decision in light of these facts. My colleagues in the veterinary profession strongly endorse my request to the government to urgently review this situation. Veterinarians are on the front line facing considerable risk and, of course, even the threat of losing their lives while treating animals under their care. This is justifiable cause for extreme concern and it must be the catalyst for renewed efforts.

Equally at risk are the people handling infected horses. The clinical signs of Hendra are masked by respiratory diseases, allergies and even snakebite. I urge the various groups within the horse industry to unite and lobby the government in support of continued research capability through the biosecurity CRC. It might not be known that more than 300,000 Australians derive their incomes, either fully or partially, from the horse industry. We believe there are up to one million horses in this country and more than $1 billion of gambling income alone comes to governments in Australia with no risk or investment from those governments. It was only two years ago that the equine influenza outbreak nearly crippled the horse industry in eastern Australia and of course once again it was members of the biosecurity CRC who were instrumental in the research that led to early diagnosis, development of testing regimes and subsequently a vaccine to control the outbreak.

I turn finally to the current pandemic of swine flu in Australia. Until July this year, we believed that the condition was merely transmitted between humans. Then, in July, we saw the incidence of the swine flu virus being directly transmitted between pigs and the staff of a New South Wales piggery. Yet again, the prime bodies involved in swine flu pandemic research in Australia are the members of the biosecurity CRC, whose work will be severely compromised if its funding is terminated. The review committee advising the minister on the biosecurity CRC got it wrong. They did not understand the close relationship of groups which make up the CRC, they did not comprehend the international importance of the ‘one health’ approach and, I believe, they have failed to understand the importance of training the next generation. I urge that the minister use his powers to review and reverse this decision.