Russell Trood (Queensland, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The Rudd government is approaching the second anniversary of its election to office. It has been a period of extraordinary change and more than a little turmoil in international affairs. Most notably, of course, the ramifications of the global financial crisis continue to define our predicament. Its economic impact has been the most visible, but it will almost certainly have widespread geopolitical consequences. Considering that Australia has escaped the most severe fallout from the crisis, commentators have been inclined to give the Rudd government high marks for its management of foreign policy. This perspective should not go unchallenged. Certainly there has been plenty of colour, light and movement in the Rudd government’s policies. Indeed, it has elevated high-profile activism into an art form. Mr Rudd may be seeking to fulfil some of his election promises on foreign policy, but constant adventure and a commitment to change should not be mistaken for achievement. And in foreign policy, as elsewhere in public policy, reform does not necessarily equate with improvement.

I acknowledge and welcome some of the government’s foreign policy initiatives. Its strong and continuing commitment to Afghanistan is important. Canberra’s contribution to rebuilding the global financial architecture after the ravages of the global financial crisis could prove to be of enduring value. Reform in this arena has long been overdue, and I acknowledge the important role that Peter Costello played in 1997 in ensuring that it was launched. I also agree very strongly with the importance the government attaches to continuity in our relations with the United States.

The central shortcoming of the Rudd government’s foreign policy has been an almost excessive and obsessive commitment to grand plans and big ideas. Whether it be the G20 as the central element of the new global financial architecture, Australian diplomacy as ‘best in the world’, a new Asia-Pacific community, Australia as ‘a creative middle power acting as an effective international citizen in enhancing the global and regional order’ or an ambitious clutch of other visions for the future, there has been no shortage of seemingly feverish thinking.

Of course, ideas are important in foreign policy. As in any other national endeavour, big ideas can be arresting. But their worth needs to be measured by the results they yield and the costs they impose. Judged by these standards, the Rudd government’s foreign policy is seriously wanting because so far the yield has been low and the costs have been high. Too often international grandstanding has served as a substitute for diligent pursuit of the nation’s interests. Far too frequently the Prime Minister’s devotion to the presumed virtues of multilateralism has clouded a clear understanding of the value of Australia’s unique policy interests. A very crowded policy agenda pursued at an often frenetic pace has placed enormous strains on Australia’s already thinly stretched diplomatic resources. Power in the formulation of Australia’s foreign policy—indeed, in relation to national security generally—has drifted into the Prime Minister’s hands. This has marginalised the influence of other agencies such as the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and is largely neutralising the role of key policy ministers. National interest is a talisman that the government attaches to all of its foreign policy endeavours, but Australians have good cause to wonder whether the government has any, even a basic, understanding of the meaning of the phrase. In policy declaration after policy declaration, it is almost never clearly defined and never persuasively argued. How could anyone think seriously, for instance, that it is in Australia’s national interest to spend $11 million on a resident Australian Ambassador to the Holy See when Australia’s diplomatic resources are stretched so thinly elsewhere?

Nor has the government succeeded in establishing a set of policy priorities that serve the national interest. Australians are still mystified about why Mr Rudd has so single-mindedly committed so much of Australia’s modest diplomatic resources and over $15 million in pursuit of a seat on the Security Council. And why has the government been so delinquent in giving high priority to the preparation of a counterterrorism white paper, when the threat of international terrorism remains so acute, when Australian lives are under direct threat from it, and when the need for a coherent strategy is so compelling?

On another front, it is rather alarming how badly Australia’s relations with key countries in Asia have been handled since 2007. We have lurched from one policy failure to another, with the result that Australia’s relations with Japan, China and India are now in a far worse state of repair than when the coalition left office in 2007. Given the Prime Minister’s supposed expertise in foreign policy this is surprising and suggests that there was a great deal that the Australian people did not know about that—and about so much else of the Prime Minister’s character—before they entrusted the keys of the Lodge to his, hopefully temporary, care.

Mr Rudd’s perverse determination to pursue the Asia-Pacific community idea, against all good sense and opinion, illustrates some of the reasons for the government’s problems. It is not surprising that the Prime Minister has placed great store on Australia engaging more deeply with Asia. The policy rests, he has argued, on the fact that in the decades ahead the ‘changes and challenges in Asia will be great’ and that for Australia engagement is the ‘coincidence of several imperatives—geographic, economic and strategic’. It is difficult not to agree with that proposition. But why has Mr Rudd handled this matter so poorly? The Asia-Pacific community idea has all the hallmarks of having been hastily conceived and not fully thought through. A great many questions about the proposal remain unanswered, not least how the new institution would relate to all of the existing elements of the regional architecture. Having come up with a poorly conceptualised idea, the Prime Minister carelessly tossed it into the public domain. No preparations were made and no consultations with any of Australia’s regional friends took place.

Given all this, it is hardly surprising that the Asia-Pacific community concept now lies dead in the water and commands no serious support around the region. This idea is going nowhere. Rather than spending more of the government’s limited foreign policy budget on bankrolling an international conference in December, Mr Rudd would be well advised to find a dignified way to walk away from the APC and quietly dispatch it into history.

Grandstanding, whether on the regional stage or the wider international stage, may have its allure but it is no substitute for conscientious policy planning and implementation. Being practised in the art of multilateralism should be part of every government’s foreign policy armoury, including Australia’s. It is not, however, an end in itself, but rather a means to an end.

Multilateral processes can be deeply flawed, as the failure of discipline within the G20 on the issue of protectionism so vividly and clearly demonstrates. The Rudd government’s apprehension of these flaws seems disturbingly limited. When the Prime Minister argued not long ago that multilateralism offsets some of the ‘brittleness in a foreign policy based on bilateral relations’ he had things completely back to front. The truth is that multilateralism will always be brittle and that wise statecraft will always rest on strong bilateral relations kept in good repair. This is a lesson the Rudd government has been slow to learn. Architectures, forms and structures are the preoccupations of its foreign policy.

Finally, it is important to make reference to the resourcing of Australia’s foreign policy. In opposition, Labor’s foreign policy platform spoke eloquently of the need to ensure that increased resources were provided to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the needs of Australia’s foreign service. The Rudd government has so far failed abysmally in this endeavour. DFAT is seriously under-resourced and the new government has compounded the problem by its very ambitious policy agenda and its penny-pinching failure to provide any significant increases in funding. As remarked in the Lowy Institute report, Australia’s diplomatic deficit, earlier this year:

Australia is ill-equipped to secure fundamental objectives internationally that have a direct bearing on all us, let alone to implement the ambitious international agenda set by the Prime Minister, which includes election to the UN Security Council, establishing an Asia-Pacific Community, and re-invigorating nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament negotiations.

All of this is hardly consistent with the Mr Rudd’s aspiration that Australia becomes an active and creative middle power on the world stage. Contrary to all lofty expectations, the Rudd government has assumed custody of Australia’s foreign relations with a remarkable lack of competence. It has chartered an ambitious role for Australia in regional and global affairs, but failed to articulate a coherent narrative on the way this will advance our national interests.

Many of the new government’s policy actions have exhibited a level of incompetence that highlights both sloppy policy formulation and careless policy implementation. Equally, it has failed to make a persuasive case that the aspirations of ‘creative middle power diplomacy’ can be met from the financial and policy resources currently allocated to it.