Scott Ludlam (WA, Australian Greens) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs, upon notice, on 27 February 2012:

(1)   In regard to the sale of uranium to India:

  (a) has the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO) provided advice to the Government regarding uranium sales to India; if so, what advice and to whom;

  (b) what is the process and timeline proposed for advancing this policy shift; and

  (c) what is the role of ASNO in this process.

(2)   What is the current status of Australia's involvement in the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) initiative.

(3)   Which ASNO officers are involved in the GNEP initiative and what form does this involvement take.

(4)   Has ASNO provided advice to assist in Australia's preparations for the upcoming Non-Proliferation Treaty conference in Vienna; if so, to whom.

(5)   Which ASNO officers will attend the upcoming Non-Proliferation Treaty conference in Vienna.

(6)   Has ASNO had input or provided advice to the Australia-Africa Mining Industry Group proposal to link AusAID funding to Australian resource projects; if so, to whom and when was the advice provided.

(7)   Has ASNO reviewed the report of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Inquiry into Australia's relationship with the countries of Africa; if so:

  (a) what is ASNO's assessment of this report; and

  (b) to whom has advice been provided regarding the possible future steps to be taken.

(8)   What advice or assessments have ASNO officers provided to the Government or its agencies (detailing which) regarding the Fukushima nuclear disaster.

(9)   Has ASNO been involved in any assessments or responses to papers, reports or processes of the United Nations, or other international organisations, regarding the Fukushima nuclear disaster.

(10)   Has there been any material change in the legal, regulatory or operational framework of the uranium sector in Australia since the Fukushima nuclear disaster. No. 76—28 February 2012 67

(11)   Does ASNO consider the Government's approval of the proposed expansion of Olympic Dam as a 'clear signal' or is BHP Billiton board approval required.

(12)   Can the Minister outline the expected new treaty or amended treaty process with China and the schedule of events required at the intergovernmental level to explore this further, including what model ASNO proposes to use to determine the required accounting arrangements and security measures.

(13)   Which facilities in China have been approved by the Australian Government to process Australian uranium oxide.

(14)   Does ASNO recognise the potential for commercial mining interests in the Olympic Dam project to influence and drive Australia's bilateral uranium sales agreements.

Bob Carr (NSW, Australian Labor Party, Minister for Foreign Affairs) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The answer to the honourable senator's question is as follows:

(1)   ASNO has provided advice to the Prime Minister and the then Minister for Foreign Affairs in relation to requirements to be included in a possible bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement with India. Following the ALP's party conference decision on uranium sales to India, the Government is considering its policy and timelines on this matter. ASNO will continue to provide advice to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Government in relation to requirements to be included in a possible bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement with India.

(2)   In 2010 the International Framework on Nuclear Energy Cooperation (IFNEC) evolved as a successor to GNEP. Australia has been attending meetings of IFNEC/GNEP on a non-active participant basis to ensure Australia's interests in nuclear non-proliferation, security and safety are taken into account.

(3)   DG ASNO attended IFNEC Ministerial and preparatory meetings for Australia in May and September 2011.

(4)   ASNO contributes to the preparation of advice for NPT Review Conferences and meetings of Review Conference Preparatory Committees.

(5)   An ASNO official plans to join Australia's delegation to the forthcoming meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference. At this stage, that official is planned to be the Director, Comprehensive Test-Ban-Treaty and Disarmament Section.

(6)   No.

(7)   ASNO has not reviewed this report.

(8)   The primary responsibility within the Australian Government on nuclear safety and radiation protection issues rests with the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA). ARPANSA has been, and continues to be, the primary source of advice to government on radiation health and safety aspects of the accident. ASNO contributed to briefing Ministers and senior officials on technical aspects of the accident within ASNO's competence. ASNO staff were on call to provide advice as required during the initial two week period of the crisis.

(9)   There have been two major international meetings on the Fukushima nuclear accident: the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety (20-24 June 2011); and, the United Nations Secretary-General's High Level Meeting on Nuclear Safety and Security (22 September 2011). The IAEA conference was convened by IAEA Director General Amano to draw on the lessons from the Fukushima nuclear accident to strengthen nuclear safety throughout the world. The UN High Level Meeting was convened by the UN Secretary-General Ban to advance concrete actions on nuclear safety and security.

  DG ASNO joined Australia's delegation to the IAEA's Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety (20-24 June 2011) and contributed to the development of the Conference's Action Plan. ASNO continues to contribute to advice to the Government in its ongoing consideration of reports, papers and processes responding to the Fukushima accident.

(10)   No.

(11)   This is a matter for Government consideration. ASNO prepares advice to the Government on such issues.

  Before proceeding with any negotiations of a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement for the supply of Australian uranium there needs to be a clear signal from the Government of the proposed recipient country or the Australian uranium industry.

(12)   Discussions on a possible agreement to amend (or supplement) Annex D of the Australia/China nuclear transfers agreement commenced in 2009 to provide that uranium extracted from copper concentrates supplied by Australia to China would be subject to the relevant provisions of the Australia/China nuclear transfers agreement. These discussions were held in Beijing in January 2009. No further discussions have been held since.

  Accounting arrangements would need to be developed under the amended Australia/China agreement to provide assurances that any uranium extracted would become subject to the Agreement in the same way as uranium directly exported to China.

  All of Australia's bilateral nuclear safeguards agreements require Australian uranium be protected to international standards of nuclear security, and this would likewise apply to any uranium extracted from copper concentrates.

  Any amendment of the Australia/China agreement to cover extraction of uranium from ores and concentrates would be subject to review by the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties.

(13)   A list of approved facilities has been previously provided in response to Question on Notice 38 (Supplementary Budget Estimates 2011–2012; 20 October 2011).

(14)   Australia's bilateral safeguards agreements enable the export of Australian uranium subject to safeguards. The Government determines the countries with which it wishes to conclude bilateral safeguards agreements.