Doug Cameron (NSW, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Human Services) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The Biosecurity Bill 2014 and related bills implement the reform of our biosecurity regime. As such, this is important legislation. We need to get it right. These bills represent the first root-and-branch overhaul of our quarantine and biosecurity framework in nearly a century. These bills began their life under the former Labor government and we are proud to have shared in their development. On that basis, this legislation is deserving of bipartisan support.

Agriculture is important. Agriculture is so important to our future—and it is complex and involves long-term planning horizons—that we must strive to take a bipartisan approach to agriculture policy. Biosecurity is of paramount importance, yet, as the Beale inquiry—a seminal inquiry into our biosecurity system—noted, biosecurity usually only rates a mention when something goes wrong rather than regularly rating a mention when things are going right, as they almost always do.

The Biosecurity Bill, like the Beale review and other reviews that went before it, was a Labor government initiative. It was an initiative of a Labor government and it was progressed and developed by a Labor government. The Labor government was ready to implement the reform when it lost office 18 months ago.

This bill had its origins with the member for Watson in the other place when he was the minister, and was progressed right through the tenure of Senator Ludwig. It was Labor that recognised the importance of upgrading and modernising Australia's biosecurity laws, and it was a Labor government that first introduced the bill in 2012. In February 2008, the then Minister for Agriculture, the member for Watson in the other place, announced a comprehensive, independent review of Australia's quarantine and biosecurity arrangements to be undertaken by an independent panel of experts and chaired by Roger Beale AO.

The bill now before the Senate is essentially identical to Labor's bill save for a few minor adjustments, which we do not have any great difficulty with, except for a very big departure in the absence of any guarantee that the Inspector-General of Biosecurity will continue to play a role. I will return to this very important point.

These bills are about modernising the now 107-year-old Quarantine Act. As Mr Beale pointed out in his seminal report, the very name change from Quarantine Act to Biosecurity Act in itself reflects changing challenges, aspirations, emphasis and of course methods. The Beale report concluded that we have a very good biosecurity system. Its overwhelming success is testament to that. We have had, by any measure, a very successful approach to keeping disease and pests out of our food chain. Mr Beale also found that the system is not perfect; that is fairly obvious. Sadly and tragically, we have seen examples of failures in recent years including during the equine influenza outbreak and the recent contamination of imported frozen berries with the hepatitis A virus. Mr Beale also reinforced, very importantly, the view that a zero-risk approach to quarantine is not a feasible approach, not one that is likely to lead to success, and certainly not one we can afford to pay for. Rather he reinforced the need for a risk based approach to our quarantine system.

The opposition will be supporting the bill, but I want to express very great concern about the key departure I made mention of,—the decision to deny the very important initiative in Labor's bill—the establishment and ongoing existence of an independent, statutory officer known as the Inspector-General of Biosecurity. Labor will be moving amendments and requests in the committee stage to establish an independent Inspector-General of Biosecurity.

It appears that, as the bill is currently framed, rather than having an independent statutory officer reviewing the performances of our biosecurity system, we will have no less than the minister overseeing these processes—that is, Minister Joyce overseeing biosecurity in this country. It is not something that fills me with great confidence or enthusiasm, I must say.

Barry O'Sullivan (Queensland, National Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

It does us.

Doug Cameron (NSW, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Human Services) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I will take that interjection. Senator O'Sullivan said, 'It does us.' Well, if Mr Joyce cannot even get support from his own colleagues, then it would be a bad day. I must say, having the support of Senator O'Sullivan and the National Party is not a substitute for good oversight in this bill. I just think that the oversight issue should not be played down, and it should not be treated as a joke. I certainly do not believe that the former Senator Joyce, now Minister Joyce, has the capacity to oversee this properly. We want an independent oversight. Given the performance of Minister Joyce recently in the changes to Hansard, how could we expect Minister Joyce to actually provide proper oversight of an independent manner when he is caught up in 'Hansardgate', and when we see his secretary being removed from his job—a competent, effective public servant being thrown on the scrapheap because he wanted to be honest. So, Mr Joyce having oversight of anything fills me full of real concern for his capacity to do it independently and properly. I would welcome more interjections from the senator on this issue.

The Labor government already had in place the Interim Inspector-General of Biosecurity. We have proposed also to further strengthen confidence and to build sustainability in the live cattle trade by putting in place an inspector-general for live animal welfare and live animal exports. Sadly, that commitment did not survive the transition to the new government, much to the great concern of those who are focused on animal welfare, particularly animal welfare in the live animal export market. The minister, as far as we can see on this side, without any advice has unilaterally made the decision that this statutory officer is not needed. The inspector-general that Labor had in mind would report independently of the minister's view and, indeed, the view of the department.

Again, I come back to this issue where we have seen Minister Joyce go through a process, recently, which is nothing more than the intimidation of the public service by having his secretary sacked because the secretary wanted to be honest. How can you for one minute say that Minister Joyce is the proper person to oversee biosecurity in this country? It is a mistake to not establish this position on a permanent basis. The position will play an important role in ensuring the integrity and transparency of the biosecurity import risk analysis process.

Not only does the inspector-general ensure transparency and integrity in the biosecurity system more broadly, the amendments will also establish a number of powers to ensure transparency in the way the role is carried out. The position of Inspector-General of Biosecurity is a position that was recommended in numerous reviews over the course of the last 17 years, and yet the minister has apparently unilaterally decided that we do not need it. By having a dedicated office to review the performance of functions and the exercise of powers by the director of Biosecurity Australia, all Australians can expect an efficient, modern and robust biosecurity framework.

The minister appears, on the surface, to remain supportive of the Interim Inspector-General of Biosecurity and the continuation of that position for the time being. But if this bill were to pass unamended, it is Labor's understanding that the Interim Inspector-General will cease to exist on 1 July this year. It appears that, while feigning support and being complimentary of the work of the Inspector-General thus far, the minister has, without any fanfare, without any good reason and certainly without evidence just decided to let this position expire on 1 July this year. Why, as we strive, I hope on a bipartisan basis in this place, to capitalise on the growing global food demand and take advantage of our clean, green, safe image and our high-quality food would we now undermine that in any way by taking away a position which, for the last couple of years, has been very effective, as acknowledged by the minister himself? This is the same. We must have full confidence in our biosecurity system. We must be able to allow the citizens of this country to see that there is a statutory officer there acting independently and protecting that system. As I mentioned earlier, and as Mr Beale pointed out, it cannot be perfect, but the independent Inspector-General is a key component in making sure that our biosecurity system is the best it possibly can be.

There has also been a bit of debate recently about the way that investors in the future, typically those who manage big superannuation funds, for example, will be discerning in their investment decisions, taking into account the ethical standards used in particular sectors. There should be no doubt that in the future the growing middle classes of Asia will be looking for food from sources where all those ethical standards have been maintained. One of those measures will be the way in which we manage our natural resources—and the way in which we manage our water and our soils are two key examples. This is why it is so disappointing that this government has still not produced a strategic plan for agriculture in this country but laid down terms of reference for a white paper—now months late—that excluded any consideration of natural resource management and sustainability. The biggest challenge in agriculture for Australia in the future will be the growing challenge of resource sustainability, particularly the challenges posed by climate change. You cannot have a strategic plan for agriculture without having, as part of that strategic plan, an idea about how you are going to tackle those natural resource sustainability issues, particularly climate change.

While we have had 18 months of policy inertia—in other words, 18 months without an agriculture policy in this country—our competitors are on the march. They are already working in Asia with their plans; they are already taking advantage of their natural competitive edge. In the meantime, under the Abbott government and under Minister Joyce, we are simply marking time. It is disappointing when I see what were very good Labor initiatives, like the one before us today, being undermined by a decision like that going to the position of the Inspector-General of Biosecurity, without any real effort to explain the decision, without any real effort to highlight that decision before this place and certainly without any effort whatsoever to justify why the Inspector-General of Biosecurity should be replaced with a minister having the final call. Why replace an independent body with a ministerial decision-making process?

I will invite the minister to highlight that point, to provide the sources of advice for the decision and to share with us what the government sees as the benefits of that decision. I do not think the minister will be able to do that, but I will welcome any attempt to do so. The very fact that the minister has not done so confirms in my mind that this is a very, very bad decision. The fact that the minister has not done so also confirms that the National Party do not seem to have their eye on the key issues in the agricultural portfolio, that they are prepared to put ministerial discretion before independence and that they are prepared to have an independent approach on biosecurity subsumed into ministerial discretion. That is not the way to go in this country.

I finish where I began: this bill and our biosecurity system are as important as anything else we discuss in this place. It does go to our food security and, beyond that, it goes to how wealthy we are likely to be as a country in the coming decades. We cannot grasp that wealth and we cannot make the most of those opportunities without the best biosecurity system in the world. Therefore, a biosecurity without any independent oversight is an inferior biosecurity system. It does not pick up on those recommendations made over the last 17 years, and for some bizarre reason we are told that we should trust Minister Joyce! We are told that Minister Joyce can do the job. In my view, that is something that anyone with any experience of the former Senator Joyce in this place would have absolutely no confidence in. The secretariat under this minister is in chaos. We have now had two secretaries of the department under this minister. This is a minister whom you could not trust to keep biosecurity issues at the forefront if it is simply based on ministerial discretion.

I believe sincerely that all those who participated in the panel of review would say that the bill Labor had before the parliament provided the very best biosecurity system that we could possibly have. I am not convinced that the bill before us now, simply because of the exclusion of an ongoing role for the Inspector-General of Biosecurity, is a bill that provides us with the very best biosecurity regime we could possibly have. There is plenty of time for the minister to reflect on that, there is plenty of time for the government to reflect on that and there is plenty of time for the Prime Minister to reflect on that as he contemplates some of his necessary changes in the coming weeks and months—if he lasts that long. There is an opportunity here for the government either to explain and justify their position or to reinstate Labor's very important initiative. The Inspector-General of Biosecurity might cost some money, but on any cost-benefit analysis it is hard to see how what would be very small savings in the context of a billion-dollar budget is justified, given the risks that would be posed by not ensuring that this bill is as strong as it possibly can be and not ensuring that we have the strongest quarantine and biosecurity systems that this country can possibly have.

So, we have given qualified support. Other than for the inspector-general issue, we support the bill. We must have an independent inspector-general. Biosecurity is so important for the health, the welfare and the economic future of this country. I would not rely on Minister Joyce and his independent discretion to replace an independent biosecurity approach as contemplated by Labor. In my view, the minister must come to the table and must agree to the independent Inspector-General of Biosecurity that we had in our bill. The public must have confidence in biosecurity. In my view, if the public believe that Minister Joyce has the final say on biosecurity, that confidence will be shattered. It will be shattered because this is not only a government of incompetence but a government of chaos, and we need independent biosecurity analysis by the inspector-general in this bill. That is the challenge for the coalition.

Rachel Siewert (WA, Australian Greens) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to contribute to the debate on the Biosecurity Bill 2014 and related bills. This bill has been a long time coming, and fixes to our biosecurity system have been a long time coming. Our biosecurity system has held up well in Australia and has, by and large, protected our agriculture and our environment. I say 'by and large' because there have been some well-known problems, and I will come to those in a minute. This system has held up as our agriculture and international trade expands, but as more people, produce and animals travel both within and into Australia, this system is well overdue for modernisation and consolidation of arrangements. The system really has grown over the last hundred years through the existing legislation—that is, it has been a hundred-year process—and a modernising of the system is well overdue.

Having said that, the Greens are concerned that the Biosecurity Bill 2014, while a significant improvement on our current system, does not sufficiently safeguard our environment, industry, agriculture and community from biosecurity risks into the future. This is where we have our eye clearly focused. This legislation is not just about today's system; it is about our agriculture and our environment into the future. We believe that it does not provide a rigorous enough framework for ensuring that scientific risk-based assessments are not undermined by other considerations such as international trade agreements.

Australian agriculture, in particular, is dependent on high quality biosecurity arrangements. After climate change, the introduction of pests and diseases is one of the biggest threats to our agriculture, and it needs to be addressed. In fact, as climate change continues to change our environment, the risk of pests and diseases spreading to Australia increases. We saw this just a couple of years ago in my home state of Western Australia, where Chinese green mussels were able to travel into WA ports as our waters warmed.

Our reputation as clean and green is a key part of our farmers' ability to get good prices in overseas markets and at home. But it does not take much to undermine this: one lapse is all it takes. I note that Panama 4 disease is back in the media and at least one farm will never grow commercial bananas again. Other growers in Far North Queensland are taking incredible measures to stop this from wiping them out too. Panama 4 completely undermined some farms, and it is only because there has been a quick response in Queensland that others may escape this same fate. We are yet to find out what caused this outbreak, but it is a timely reminder that biosecurity requires vigilance and that a quick response to a crisis is only part of the story.

There is so much we can do to keep Australia safe and to stop disease and pests from gaining a foothold in the first place. We only have to look at the Asian honey bee and the way that came in. Many of us believe we did not take a quick enough response to that, and we are still dealing with the consequences. Myrtle rust is an example of lapses in environmental biosecurity. I will come back to the issues around biosecurity, because we are deeply concerned that this legislation is not adequately addressing the issues around environmental biosecurity. Australia has a unique environment. It is essential that we make sure we have sufficient biosecurity regulations in place to protect that. It is obviously important that our agriculture be protected. We all know that there are many diseases that we do not have here in Australia, and we need to keep them out of our country—some of them would devastate our agriculture.

The 2014 bill builds on the 2012 bill of the previous government, and we welcome the improvements that come with the 2014 version. However, there are some substantial issues that still have not been addressed. Some of the key concerns identified during the 2012 inquiry process that have not been addressed in the 2014 bill include the failure of the bill to take account adequately of regional differences; the lack of legislative arrangements that ensure that the Eminent Scientists Group and other independent industry and scientific advisory channels are always included in biosecurity processes; the failure to guarantee the independence of the inspector-general from the Director of Biosecurity; and the failure to provide a right of appeal against the Director of Biosecurity's decisions.

Unfortunately the architecture of this bill falls short of the highly regarded Beale review and fails to fully capitalise on the broad support that the review generated. From the perspective of the Australian Greens, the key recommendation that has not been implemented is the creation of a separate biosecurity agency. Ms Mellor, Deputy Secretary of the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, told the committee:

It is government's decision to not pursue the recommendation of Beale to establish a separate biosecurity authority and commission, but to maintain the management of biosecurity under this act in the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry in concert with the Department of Health and Ageing.

That was before Ageing was split off from Health. The consequence of this decision is a significant conflict of interest, for both the Director of Biosecurity and the minister. For the minister especially, there is a significant tension in being directly responsible for both the Director of Biosecurity and the inspector-general. Our biosecurity response should be an arms-length process and not exposed to politicised decisions. I must say that we, the Greens, are not just focused on what the current government may or may not do. This act is to protect our environment and our agriculture for long into the future, so it is about any governments, be they Liberal, Labor or, one day, Green. We need that independence.

The legislation also leaves too much of the biosecurity review process at the discretion of the director and the inspector-general, and in doing so fails to bring transparency into the BIRA process or to encourage industry or community confidence. In the words of Mr Prince, the CEO of Nursery and Garden Industry Australia:

It was a key conclusion that the Beale review came up with—having someone who was independent from the influence of either the trade or the department of agriculture. This legislation is huge, when you are looking at animals, humans, plants and environments. It is a very over-encompassing piece of legislation. For it to sit, or be charged, under the department of agriculture, which is very focused on primary industry, was one of the issues that was raised in Beale. You had Biosecurity Australian and AQIS—two different bodies—almost at loggerheads with each other or having different processes. So an independent body that has feedback from those other three ministers would certainly make sense and strengthen the whole process.

The Australian Greens support recommendations 1 through 5 in the majority committee report of the inquiry into this bill, which outline ways in which transparency and rights to appeal can be integrated into the legislation. But we would much prefer to have actually established a separate biosecurity agency, with a director that is not also the head of Agriculture.

While the legislation has been revised to clarify that the Director of Biosecurity must have regard to the objectives of the act, it is impossible to understand how this will work in practice. As stated by Mr Andrew Cox, President of the Invasive Species Council:

An average person would think, 'How could they possibly not take into account the other things that are a part of their responsibilities?' It is one person making a decision, who holds multiple roles. It is a simple conflict.

One of the ways that this conflict manifests is through the impact of international trade agreements on our biosecurity arrangements. While the Australian Greens support the desire of the Department of Agriculture to maximise trade between countries, we remain concerned that this responsibility has an undue influence on the biosecurity arrangements. Dr Booth, policy officer at the Invasive Species Council, noted:

I think the industry bodies come up with many examples of where they think there has been an influence of trade on decisions. We have to—and Bill emphasised this—reduce the risk of that happening. That should be for whoever is running biosecurity. So independence does that. It takes it out of a department that has a strong trade focus, so perceived and real conflicts of interest are avoided in that sense.

Furthermore, negotiations such as those taking place around the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement have been shrouded in secrecy and do not inspire confidence.

Similarly, it is our preference that the inspector-general be a statutory position. The decision to not create a statutory inspector-general position is the most significant change between the 2012 and 2014 versions of the bill. Dropping the Inspector-General of Biosecurity Bill proposed in 2012 is very disappointing and, in our opinion, a grave mistake. The 2014 bill instead provides powers to the Minister of Agriculture to review biosecurity performance. Ms Langford, from the Department of Agriculture, explained:

The intention is to delegate those to the Inspector-General of Biosecurity to allow a review of the system to happen.

However, even if the powers are delegated, this is a backward step from the arrangements proposed in the bill of 2012. The Invasive Species Council submission outlines why it is not suitable for the minister to have this level of control over the process:

The Minister for Agriculture has a clear conflict of interest as both Minister administering biosecurity legislation and person responsible for reviewing biosecurity performance. The areas subject to review are likely to be influenced by political considerations, and matters that could embarrass the government of the day are likely to be avoided. The risk of this would be substantially reduced and the public would have greater trust in the reviews if they were initiated and conducted by an independent statutory officer.

The majority committee report calls for the findings conducted by the inspector-general, or any other person delegated this authority, to be made public. This does go some way to addressing the problem, but it does not prevent the role from being substantially reshaped in the future without parliamentary oversight. It is not good enough for a rigorous biosecurity system.

The Australian Greens recommended enshrining the independence of the inspector-general in legislation by reintroducing the Inspector-General of Biosecurity Bill 2012. I move, as a second reading amendment:

At the end of the motion, add:

but the Senate calls on the Government to enshrine the independence of the Inspector General in legislation by reintroducing the Inspector General of Biosecurity Bill 2012.

There are many other issues with this bill, which I will go through briefly now, and which we outlined in our additional comments to the majority report of the inquiry into this bill. A large area we are concerned about is environmental biosecurity. We are deeply concerned that not enough emphasis is placed on environmental biosecurity. I mentioned the issue around myrtle rust earlier, which is a classic example of what happens if we do not have adequate biosecurity measures in place to protect our environment.

One of the areas we think needs to be addressed is to establish and resource an entity that can act as a key body for environmental health, in the same manner as Plant Health Australia and Animal Health Australia, and use this body to establish partnerships between the community, governments and environmental businesses in order to deliver on high-priority policy and planning issues in environmental biosecurity. My colleague, Senator Waters, will be addressing this issue in more detail when she makes her contribution to this debate.

Another area we are also deeply concerned about is that the definition of environment in chapter 1, part 2, section 9 of the Biosecurity Bill is not adequate; there needs to be a change to the definition to address Australian biodiversity so that we are clear we are talking about the variety of life indigenous to Australia and its extant territories encompassing ecosystems, species and genetic diversity. We want it to cover ecological processes and natural and physical resources. Again, Senator Waters will go into more detail about these issues when she makes her contribution. We believe these are key amendments necessary in order to strengthen the bill.

One of the areas we consistently bring up in this place is the delegation of a lot of powers from legislation to regulations—so that this place, the Senate, is not actually discussing the nature of some of the powers that have been developed through the legislative process such as this Biosecurity Bill. With so much going into regulation it is much harder to know what, in fact, the government is proposing. For example, one of the concerns that has been raised is that we are not exactly sure how the government intends changing the import risk assessment process, because that is going to be covered by regulation. We express our very strong concern, through this debate, that we do not know the extent of some of the changes that are being made, or whether they are sufficient, because they are going to be dealt with by regulation. It is a blunt instrument in this place. Yes, those regulations will be tabled in this place and we will have the right, or the ability, to disallow them; but we have always maintained that that is a very blunt instrument because you go 'yes' or 'no'. You vote them down; you cannot amend them, whereas through legislation we can. That is an area we think needs to be further developed and we would like to see those draft regulations as soon as possible.

We are also concerned that the bill does not adequately protect or provide for consultative arrangements such as the Eminent Scientists Group, and we believe this should be established in the legislation itself and not left up to a separate process. One of the other areas we think is also important is broadening the definition of biosecurity risk in chapter 1, part 2, section 9 to include consideration of the following matter: recognising changes through time, to require that risks are assessed over an ecologically-relevant time frame and take account of climate change. This is absolutely essential. I gave an example earlier in my contribution that outlined the risk to our biosecurity of climate change and the impact of the spread of pests in our marine environment. There are equally as many examples in our terrestrial environment, where climate change will enhance the risk of pests and diseases. We should be including the likelihood of new genotypes of disease or pest combining with others to exacerbate the potential for the disease or pest to cause harm, or to do greater harm than existing genotypes; and we should recognise regional differences and different levels of biodiversity, ranging from the ecosystem to the genetic level. The other issue we believe needs to be contained in the legislation is commitment to the precautionary principle. That is very, very important when we are talking about biosecurity and strengthening our system.

Another area we also think needs to be addressed is: we have the capacity to put in place biosecurity zones. We believe there needs to be the capacity, and a category, for a biosecurity zone for high-value conservation areas with high biosecurity risks, to be known as conservation biosecurity zones, as the basis for implementing biosecurity measures, plans and monitoring. I can give you a classic example of this, and that is the Fitzgerald River National Park in my home state of Western Australia. It is a bookmark reserve. It is one of the most significant, biologically-diverse places not only in Australia, but on the planet. It is at risk from pests and diseases and particularly from what we commonly call dieback. We already have elements of dieback in the park; there have been massive efforts to reduce that. They think it has already taken out 1,000 plant species in Western Australia, so you can see the risk it poses. Something like a high biosecurity zone and the ability to put that in place would help protect that park. That is an example of why we think that is important.

There should be a requirement to table a biosecurity outlook report every two years. Another area that has come up repeatedly when we have been dealing with biosecurity in this place over the years is regional difference. We know that is so important. I will speak again of my home state of Western Australia: we know we do not have many of the diseases that are already in the eastern states, and we want to keep it that way, thank you very much. You can keep your diseases and pests to yourself in the east! We need to be able to build that into our processes—into our biosecurity import risk analysis. It is absolutely essential that we be able to address regional differences. We know the WTO raises that issue. If it is in the legislation, it enables us to deal with it and sends a clear message to other countries that we are protecting our regional differences. It is very important, we believe, that that be included in the legislation. As always, there needs to be sufficient funding allocated by the government to ensure that the arrangements that are proposed under the bill can be properly implemented.

These amendments, we believe, would enhance the 2014 bill. The 2014 bill is an improvement on the 2012 bill—other than taking out the independence of the Inspector-General of Biosecurity. That is a very significant mistake. It should be fixed. These other amendments would guarantee that we have a world-class biosecurity system that protects our agriculture, the industries that are based on it, and our environment and unique biodiversity. We will be moving a series of amendments to try and address these flaws in the bill. As I said, I have already moved my second reading amendment to address the need for an independent inspector-general of biosecurity so that that position is independent of any government, no matter what persuasion it is.

Barry O'Sullivan (Queensland, National Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Before I start my contribution on the Biosecurity Bill 2014 and related bills, I would like to ask Senator Siewert if she would take the opportunity to correct a statement that she made in her contribution that was completely erroneous and has a capacity to impact adversely on a family farm in Tully in Queensland. Senator Siewert made the statement—Hansard will reflect—that there has been one farm in North Queensland affected by Panama Race 4 and that they will never grow bananas on their farm again. That is not true. I know the owners of this farm personally. I spent two days in the Tully district last week meeting with the quarantine professionals. That farm can continue to operate as a farm. The disease has been detected in five plants on one part of the farm and in one plant on another part of the farm. God willing, that will be the extent of the contamination of the disease on that plantation. That family has high hopes to continue to farm that land as they have done for a very long period of time. At some future opportunity, Senator Siewert, I would ask that you conduct your own inquiries, form your own view that present accurately—

Rachel Siewert (WA, Australian Greens) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Madam Acting Deputy Speaker, I rise on a point of order. I did not actually say the farm was in North Queensland. I actually said that North Queensland farmers have been taking measures to ensure that they do not. I was not actually referring to a specific farm in North Queensland. If either Senator O'Sullivan misheard me or I mistakenly said that, I apologise. I did not locate that particular farm. In fact I said the North Queensland farmers are taking measures to ensure that they are protected.

Nova Peris (NT, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

There is no point of order.

Barry O'Sullivan (Queensland, National Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I thank the senator for the clarification. I really do appreciate that. These people are struggling and any contribution we might make ought to be to help them rather than to hinder them. I accept your explanation and I really appreciate you having done that.

This legislation proposes to change or replace the existing legislation, which has served our nation now for over 100 years. As is well known, we are very well regarded at an international level for the production of quality agricultural product. At the heart of that is the ability for us in this clean, green quality arrangement to be able to keep pests and disease out of our agricultural industries. It should not be ignored that the act does reflect upon issues to do with the spread of disease with humans; it is not just about the agriculture alone. But the focus obviously when one talks about biosecurity is in regard to our agricultural industries.

Previous speakers have made the point—and I think it is a very important point—about the increases in passengers and trade volumes coming into our nation, which have increased exponentially over the 100 years but indeed more recently over the last two decades. Now the world is a much more mobile place. People find the ease and cost of travel are within reach and are now coming from all points of the globe. The traditional stream of visitors to Australia from traditional destinations is now much more diverse and this increases the risk involved with the transportation of diseases that can so easily impact upon our agricultural industries.

Panama Tropical 4 is a pathogen. As was raised by Senator Siewert in her contribution, it is a contemporary biosecurity example because we are currently dealing with an outbreak of it in the banana industry in North Queensland. That industry has a value of about $660 million and employs thousands of people directly—it is very hard to gauge—and probably over 100,000 people indirectly when you look at the importance of that industry to many of the small regional communities in North Queensland. The largest part of the banana industry is now located in that part of my state. The threat is real. It has virtually wiped out the commercial banana industry in your home territory, Madam Acting Deputy President Peris. It is proof that if we do not have sound biosecurity measures in place, entire industries can be completely devastated.

Additionally in this case—and this is true I suspect of many of these diseases—this pathogen can remain undetected and dormant in the soil—it is a soil pathogen—for up to 30 years, so we could have time bombs not just with Panama Race 4 but with other pathogen based diseases right across our nation. It is significantly important that we have the best most intensive biosecurity measures, particularly when it comes to agriculture.

It is right, as mentioned by one of the previous speakers, to refer to the free trade agreements, and also that Australia must put its interests first in issues to do with biosecurity, before we are to relent on any trade conditions that might affect those. Now, I would put to the Senate that there is no evidence—no evidence whatsoever—that there has been any part of the agreements made, particularly with our most recent free trade agreements, that would give rise to that argument. I believe that our trade minister, our agriculture minister and, indeed, everyone in this place and anyone in those industries, knows that the absolute Holy Grail of our ability to be competitive and to provide goods and services in agriculture and in the export industry is the quality of security arrangements that are in this country. They are the cornerstone of our reputation.

We live in a modern world. The passenger movements that I referred to are a significant focus of these future arrangements. We now have millions of people visiting our shores. I used Panama Race 4 as only one example of the many that could apply to quite literally thousands of contingent circumstances. That pathogen is a microbe. It can come in on a speck of dust on a pair of shoes belonging to someone who visited an infected area either in recent times, or—and I am no scientist, but I am happy to make this extrapolation for the sake of the argument—in the preceding 30 years. Our response to biosecurity is complex and I think that the government's decision to revisit this area and to develop this legislation is very appropriate and timely. I am very much looking forward to this place being on a unity ticket to allow this legislation to come into play so that we can further enhance these arrangements.

I am instructed that there was a very exhaustive consultation process in the development of this legislation. Indeed, there were certainly discussions with the relevant authorities and stakeholders in our state and territory governments. There has been a lot of consultation right across the nation with health professionals and the Australian community. Opportunities were provided for their input. Importantly, we have spoken with our trading partners because, as Senator Siewert rightly pointed out, it is very important that everybody involved—particularly those involved in the area of trade, which is where the cross-border potential for risk exists—is involved in these arrangements. So all stakeholders were consulted and, of course, the bill has had a rigorous examination by the appropriate parliamentary committee. Obviously, those recommendations have been published and taken into account for the most part, as I understand it.

Our agriculture, fishery and forestry industries have a value of some $51 billion in this country, and 77 per cent of those goods produced—those soft commodities—are exported. When one thinks about biosecurity, one thinks about protecting our borders from the importation of pests—and I used one for the purposes of this discussion. But earlier I alluded to something of significant importance: that we do not get a reputation for exporting pests. Whilst it is a matter for the importing country to deal with the arrangements that concern them in protecting their own agricultural industries, it is very important that we become even more prominent on the world stage with the export of clean, green quality products from this country.

Currently, trade arrangements are under constant review at the international level, and Australia continues to punch way above its weight in terms of its contribution to trade. We have see this most recently over the last 24-odd months where, for example, there has been a dramatic increase in our live exports. I know that not all colleagues in this place—certainly, on our side we are as one—are up for the live trade in animals. But it has become a significantly important—a very important—part of our trading arrangements in agriculture. Indeed, those who are students of such things would have noted that it has in part brought upward pressure on demand and volume within the domestic market. This means that for the first time in some 25 years many of our broadacre beef producers are enjoying returns domestically that they could only have hoped for and dreamed of even 12 to 14 months ago.

So the live export industry is a significantly important part of beef and live animal production in this country. We need to ensure that biosecurity arrangements are in place that will not ever bring threat to that industry. For example, the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Sciences estimated that if we had a relatively small foot-and-mouth disease outbreak in only one state, the impact on the economy of this country would be about $5.6 billion. And, of course, that does not include the impact it would have on families and small family corporations, who largely make up the production of beef cattle in this country. It would be absolutely devastating; it would devastate entire communities.

In the northern part of my home state of Queensland, if you were to take out agricultural industries—particularly bananas, sugar and beef production—then we would just close the shop; you could fence it off at the Tropic of Capricorn and the only reason you would go north is if you wanted to enjoy the wilderness or go for some other tourist impact.

Alarmingly, ABARES indicated that, if the outbreak were on a national level, a multistate outbreak, it would affect the economy by $50 billion. That would be a fifty-thousand-million-dollar impact on our economy for an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease. Those who followed the mad cow disease outbreak—and I might say I do a particularly good interpretation of a mad cow; I will not burden the Senate with it today, but I am happy to do it offline for anybody—would know that it absolutely devastated the agricultural industry of beef production in the UK. I personally had cause to be in the United Kingdom on a number of occasions during that time and I remember being in a restaurant or some venue having a meal and the British staff would spend a lot of time making sure you understood that the beef in any part of their menu was not British beef but that it had come from Australia or New Zealand.

So I think it is a unity ticket. If we have any sort of biological outbreak of any scale in very broad, widespread industries like the beef sector, it will not just devastate our economy and our terms of trade; it will devastate individual people. We have watched them get a caning over the last 10 years or so in some industries, and many of them—those who survived—are still recovering from the suspension of the live cattle trade.

I want to come back to putting a human face on this legislation. I can talk all day; I can quote statistics until I run out of them; I can talk about the merits of the bill. But, as is my intention in this place, I like to try and reduce the impact of legislation on people's lives. My interest is of course in agriculture. I sit here with the National Party very proudly and, whilst I am a senator for the entire state of Queensland, my interests are in rural and regional Queensland in particular and in enterprises that are involved in primary production, including horticulture and farming and of course beef and animal production.

So I can share with you recent events like this issue up in Tully with the Panama 4. I have met with dozens and dozens of families during my visit there. I attended a number of public meetings that were well attended—in fact, one on the tablelands at Mareeba I suspect was attended by just about every stakeholder in the banana industry and most particularly those who grow bananas—and I can say that some of the conversations are gut-wrenching. These are people who have invested millions and millions of dollars in family enterprises. Some of them are generational farmers. One farmer there was a fourth generation farmer and one of the pioneers of the banana industry in North Queensland. The angst that they are feeling at the moment with the outbreak of this terrible disease is very difficult to measure. These are farmers who are not necessarily wealthy people. At the moment they are investing—in some cases on the smaller farms—tens of thousands of dollars to put in measures to mitigate or to minimise the potential impact of this disease on their farm.

But let me close by saying this: in their conversations with me—knowing that I was a federal member of parliament—there was a sense of hopelessness about what they could do to protect their enterprise, their investment, and their own farm economy and their local economy. There was a sense of hopelessness about what happens beyond their farm gate. And they look to government. They look to the federal government in this case to respond and to put in place measures that will prevent these diseases coming into our nation and spreading on their farms.

I think this is a good bill. I think it is a well-considered bill. It is a very timely bill, having regard to the fact that we have not had an overhaul for a period of time. I strongly commend the bill in its form to my colleagues in the Senate.

Lisa Singh (Tasmania, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Parliamentary Secretary to the Shadow Attorney General) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to contribute to the debate on this bill. This bill very much goes to the fact that Australia's clean, green, safe food is the agriculture sector's greatest advantage, and keeping Australia's competitive edge is why this bill is of critical importance.

Having said that, though, I want to point out that the Abbott government has sat on this bill for 18 months, when the majority of the work was already undertaken by the previous Labor government. It was Labor that recognised the importance of upgrading and modernising Australia's biosecurity laws and it was Labor that first introduced this legislation back in 2012.

It was in fact on 19 February 2008 that the then Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Tony Burke, announced a comprehensive independent review of Australia's quarantine and biosecurity arrangements to be undertaken by an independent panel of experts, chaired by Roger Beale AO. This report is very well known as the Beale review. The current bill before the Senate is essentially identical to Labor's initial bill introduced in the 43rd parliament, but the Beale review recommended, amongst other things, a statutory office for an inspector-general of biosecurity. The inspector-general would report directly to the minister, have broad powers of audit and investigation and would be responsible for conducting systems audits and reviews of the biosecurity programs carried out by the national biosecurity authority. It is incredibly disappointing and regrettable that the Abbott government has not continued to support an independent inspector-general of biosecurity but, instead, has decided to give those powers to the Minister for Agriculture, Mr Barnaby Joyce. The fact that Minister Joyce—as my Senate colleague Senator Cameron mentioned in his contribution—will have the final say on biosecurity will, I agree, remove all the confidence of the Australian community and remove all the confidence of the Australian agricultural sector.

Labor strongly supported the Beale review and strongly supported the need to have an inspector-general of biosecurity. There are many justifications, but a few recent examples are: Australians contracting hepatitis A from contaminated berries; northern Queensland's banana crop suffering its first exposure to the rampant and destructive Panama disease; Northern Tasmania's eucalyptus species suffering its first exposure to the devastating and virulent myrtle rust; and the first colonies of the invasive and ecologically overwhelming red fire ant found in Botany Bay. All senators in this place should consider these examples. They are examples that are only from the past two months, and they are good enough reason alone to take the time and the trouble to establish the very best biosecurity system we can. That, of course, should include the Beale recommendation for the position of an inspector-general of biosecurity—an independent statutory holder.

The clear and present danger from contaminated food has been well publicised recently; however, even the current alarm over the spread of myrtle rust in my own state of Tasmania, even though it does not directly threaten Tasmania's major food production crops, justifies the need to have strong biosecurity laws. As the Tasmanian Farmers & Graziers Association has made clear:

If myrtle rust gains hold in our eucalypt forests, the landscape will change irretrievably. For farmers, it threatens shelter belts, hardwood plantations and forests important for their biodiversity, honey production, etc.

Yet, for no good reason, the Abbott government wants to undermine the powers, the independence and the tenure of the inspector-general of biosecurity. It simply does not make sense. Labor stands by wanting to protect the powers, the independence and the tenure of the inspector-general for excellent common-sense reasons, exactly like those I have just mentioned. If you think about it, as trade liberalisation spreads, globalisation grows and global trade increases many more such threats inevitably will emerge for Australian agriculture. To maintain our reputation for high-quality, clean and safe produce we need strong biosecurity laws in this country. The Abbott government's unjustifiable decision to amend the former Labor government's bill will undermine the effectiveness of the inspector-general of biosecurity and will weaken rather than strengthen our biosecurity system. As my colleague the shadow minister for agriculture, Joel Fitzgibbon, said in the other place:

When you think about it, there are two things in agriculture policy that rise above all others; there are two things that are paramount. The first is natural resource management and sustainability. The second is biosecurity.

Why? It is because agriculture is so important to our nation's future. That is why we have tried to strive for a bipartisan approach when it comes to agriculture policy. Dropping the ball on agriculture policy would be an existential threat because maintaining our food security and our ability to sustain ourselves, independent of any other country, goes to the very survival of our country. I think our shadow minister for agriculture said it so well that I cannot say it any better myself. It goes very much to the very survival of our country.

For many of us, biosecurity is still in some sense about a quarantine regime rather than biosecurity. Whether you call it a quarantine regime or biosecurity, it is clear that both, being one and the same, are of paramount importance to our nation. Yet, as the Beale inquiry, a seminal report on our biosecurity system, noted, biosecurity in this place usually only rates a mention when something goes wrong rather than rating a mention as things almost always go right. I think it is somewhat a source of disappointment that we only highlight when things go wrong rather than looking at when they go right.

The Biosecurity Bill 2014, like the Beale review and other reviews that went before it, is clearly a past Labor government initiative. That is why it has Labor's support—because it was an initiative of a Labor government to start with. It was progressed and developed by a Labor government. But that was some 17 months ago now. The Abbott government could have brought this legislation forward some 17 months ago. It was Labor that recognised the importance of upgrading and modernising Australia's biosecurity laws, and it was Labor that first introduced this bill back in 2012.

I will just go to the heart of the Beale review. The Beale report concluded that we have a very good biosecurity system. Its overwhelming success, I think, is testament to that. We have had, by any measure, a very successful approach to keeping disease and pests out of our food chain. Beale also concluded that the system is not perfect, and that is fairly obvious. Beale also reinforced, very importantly, the view—and I am sure this is a view shared by all senators—that a zero-risk approach to quarantine is not a feasible approach, not one that is likely to lead to success and certainly not one we could afford in fiscal and resourcing terms. Rather, he reinforced a risk based approach to our quarantine system.

This bill is a significant modernisation that has been a long time in the making, and on that basis the opposition will be supporting the bill. Having said that, though, the position that this government is taking in relation to the position of the Inspector-General of Biosecurity, a position that has been recommended in numbers upon numbers of reviews and inquiries over the last 17 years, is, as I have said, very disappointing. Labor's Biosecurity Bill 2012 provided for the Inspector-General of Biosecurity independent powers of review and detailed transparency provisions, including parliamentary reporting.

This government has carried forward, sensibly, Labor's lapsed Biosecurity Bill 2012, with some tweaking. It has introduced largely the same legislation into parliament. But this version has one important and irresponsible—I would say—change that has been made. Granting new powers to Minister Barnaby Joyce to conduct reviews on biosecurity performance and dropping the plan to create that statutory, independent Inspector-General of Biosecurity is very, very irresponsible. It is irresponsible, it is short sighted and it is unnecessary, and it is in complete contradiction to what was laid out through the Beale review, as I have said, along with many other reviews.

In brief, this important role, a very important role in the original legislation, will no longer be independent. That is the bottom line here. It is Minister Barnaby Joyce who will be having all the power and all the say. There will be no independence, and that is of grave concern. The minister has indicated that he intends to use these powers to delegate an ongoing review role to the current Interim Inspector-General of Biosecurity, which will now be a non-statutory position. So it appears now that, rather than having that independent statutory officer reviewing the performance of the biosecurity system and all of its players, we will have no less than just Minister Barnaby Joyce overseeing these processes. That is a concern to me. It is a concern to the opposition. It should be a concern to everyone in this place, if they are speaking honestly. It should be of concern, quite frankly, to the minister himself because it is not a responsibility he should even seek to have.

The inspector-general that Labor had in mind has, on an interim basis—and would have—reported independently of the minister's view and indeed of the view of the department, so the position plays an important role in ensuring the integrity and the transparency of the biosecurity import risk analysis process. Stakeholders also have the opportunity to appeal where they believe there has been a significant deviation from the biosecurity import risk analysis process, which might have adversely affected their interests. Not only does that inspector-general ensure transparency and integrity in the biosecurity system more broadly; the position also establishes a number of powers to ensure transparency in the way the role is carried out. The position was recommended, as I said, in numerous reviews as well. It was a fixed term appointment, allowing for the officer to give frank advice without fear of personal repercussions and to probe into the affairs of government even if that is politically uncomfortable.

How on earth will Minister Barnaby Joyce be able to conduct such a transparent role when he himself is a minister of the executive, a minister of government? How can there be confidence? How can the Australian community, the Australian agricultural sector or anyone have confidence in the integrity of any review process when Minister Barnaby Joyce is carrying out this role and cannot remove himself and be an independent player within it?

There is clearly a conflict of interest when the minister administering biosecurity legislation and the person responsible for reviewing biosecurity performance are now going to be one and the same. Surely those government senators see that. Surely those government senators have concern for that. It simply does not make sense. It simply highlights a conflict of interest that it has.

Of course, Labor was so much better than that. The legislation that we put forward in 2012 was so much better than that. We have tried to have ongoing bipartisan support in agricultural policy, because of the importance of agriculture to our nation's future, because it goes to the heart of food security in our nation's future. So to undo that bipartisanship by the removal of that independent statutory office holder to review our biosecurity processes is simply a backward political manoeuvre. I know it is a manoeuvre that is making a number of senators on the government side unhappy and uneasy, knowing that Minister Barnaby Joyce now has all the cards and all the power, carrying that conflict of interest.

Finally, I just want to say that this bill has no independent authority or alternative arrangement that minimises potential conflicts of interest. Its primary safeguard is a requirement that the Director of Biosecurity 'have regard to' the objects of the biosecurity legislation. However, this person is also the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and has broader roles relating to the promotion of agriculture and trade and government priorities. It is simply not good enough to hope that the Department of Agriculture will at all times be able to avoid conflicts of interest in managing biosecurity risks and resisting all the pressures from within and outside government. Further, the nature of any review is undescribed and totally discretionary. There is no requirement to publicly release terms of reference of any review or to release the results.

There is no good reason to undermine Australia's biosecurity framework as this government would wish. In fact, as Australia's exposure to biosecurity risks increases, the reasons for a tougher framework get stronger. I go back to those original examples that I talked about at the start of my contribution: the Panama disease affecting the banana crop in Queensland; in my home state of Tasmania, the myrtle rust in Tasmania's northern eucalyptus species; and the first colonies of the red fire ant in Botany Bay. They are, just in the last two months, some of the important reasons why I call on the Senate to demonstrate some more of our collective common sense and strengthen Australia's biosecurity legislation by installing the inspector-general position. (Time expired)

Christopher Back (WA, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

In rising to speak strongly in support of the Biosecurity (Consequential Amendments and Transitional Provisions) Bill 2014 and those bills associated with it, it is disappointing to register the contributions by Senator Singh and Senator Cameron before her, two people who have had absolutely and utterly nothing to do with the formulation of the legislation we have before us. I am delighted to be able to record that here in the chamber with me are Senators Heffernan, Sterle and Siewert, who with me have been vitally associated with this legislation and its development over time—the transition to where we are today.

I suppose the best reflection of when you do not know what you are talking about is to spend 20 minutes ignorantly focusing on one or two very, very small areas that, in the overall context of the legislation, pale into insignificance. But, for Senator Singh's interest, the original inspector-general position had its origins as the inspector-general of horse imports as a result of the equine influenza outbreak that we had, which led to the Beale review and to others. Before she goes, I would just like Senator Singh to know that the inspector-general, Dr Michael Bond, is a very close personal friend. We are both Western Australians and were both at Queensland university in the 1960s, and I have maintained a very close association with him since that time. For that position to be belittled and to be focused on for the length of time it has! Dr Bond and the gentleman before him have been—and I am sure inspectors-general into the future will be—fiercely independent. If Senator Singh is in any doubt at all, she need just go back to the questions asked in Senate estimates of the inspector-general and about the role he plays and, in fact, his independence in terms of the questioning.

I did not even want to speak about partisanship, because this has been such a strongly bipartisan move that gets us to where we are today, and it is disappointing when people descend to political partisanship, especially in something of the importance of agriculture. I just reflect that this replaces a bill that came into existence in 1908, some 107 years ago. Senator Singh was going on about Minister Joyce having all these powers, almost as if they are particular to him. Does she think that he is going to still be the minister in 107 years time? Not even Minister Joyce hopes for that outcome.

But let us reflect briefly on what would have been the circumstances in 1908. Exports were of no interest at all. The newly formed states, once the colonies, were desperately trying to feed their populations. The concept of import was almost unknown. We were desperately trying to produce and to sustain those communities as they grew. Also, of course, one of the imperatives for Federation was to be able to try to normalise trade across what became state borders. So the concept of a Quarantine Act in 1908, important and all as it was, of course was totally and utterly different to where we are in 2015. And let us hope that, as a result of the excellence of the work that we are doing here and into the future, this 2014-15 bill will hold good as indeed the original Quarantine Act 1908 did. Of course, it was modified some 50 times. Yes, it was the previous government that introduced the first draft of the Biosecurity Bill that we are discussing, but to minimise, trivialise and simply say it is some failure of an Abbott government that we did not bring the legislation in five minutes out trivialises the importance of the work that has been done by senators in this place, by departments and by ministerial officers to get to where we are today.

And there may be further changes needed. If there are, all well and good, but how important are the agriculture and agribusiness industries of this nation, currently generating in excess of $50 billion a year, more than 77 per cent of which is export? That is a critically important thing for people to understand. We are an exporting nation. From our own home state of Western Australia, as Senators Siewert and Sterle know only too well, we export more than 95 per cent of our grain. We cannot consume it. And so, when people say to us, 'Why is it so necessary that we are trading internationally not only in the Asian region but beyond?' it is because we depend on export trade. As a result of that, we must allow import trade, and so the Biosecurity Bill goes to the issues associated with it.

In 2012-13—and contrast this to 1908—there were some 16 million international passenger arrivals, 186 million international mail items, 1.7 million sea cargo consignments and more than 26 million air cargo consignments. We know that, when the children sitting up in the gallery now are adults, those numbers will have increased exponentially. Therefore, while you are watching this you need to know that legislation we are debating here will have an impact on you as young adolescents and as adults. As you travel overseas, as you study, as you develop your links overseas, everything that relates to this Biosecurity Bill will be critically important to you. When you come back into Australia and wonder why there is quarantine inspection of what you are doing, remember what is being protected here.

We all know the importance of Australia's reputation as a green and safe environmental exporter and producer of foodstuffs. We also know—and again it would be of interest to those who are watching—that we will be feeding 1.9 billion people more in our region alone by 2050. But more importantly than that—the events recently with hepatitis A only serve to emphasise it—is that that community of people to whom we have the opportunity to continue providing foodstuffs want even more security of supply and greater safety of supply when we look at the risks. The Chinese—only one example—say that a hungry man is an angry man, and the government of President Xi is all about making sure his community does not become angry. So the opportunities that we have are enormous.

For me, one of the absolute delights of this legislation found its way as a joint submission in January of last year by the departments of agriculture and health. Why is that so critically important? Simply because we have got to have the world understand the one-health approach, not a health department associated with human health and a department of agriculture associated with animals and plants. It is well known internationally that more than 65 per cent of all human infectious and probably parasitic diseases have their origins in animals, and so therefore this legislation, in my view, is groundbreaking because it combines into the Biosecurity Bill those elements that are required in associating ourselves with the risks to human health and indeed those for which agriculture has responsibility.

The concept is of us joining human health and agricultural responsibilities into the one biosecurity bill to address the risks of pests and diseases that may be coming into this country. We need only think of the risk of the Ebola virus at the moment. We have the Hendra virus, which has killed a number of my veterinary colleagues. That same virus, borne through bats in this case into horses and on to humans, with a mortality rate in excess of 70 per cent is exactly the same virus as the Nipah virus, which in Malaysia, India and Bangladesh has caused and is causing the deaths of children and adults as a result of that virus coming through bats to pigs to humans and indeed directly from bats to humans. So that is just one area of significant importance in this Biosecurity Bill before us. I think that is what made me so disappointed when all I could hear from Senator Singh and Senator Cameron was some mention about an inspector general. Important and all though that position is and occupied though it is by my very close friend Dr Bond, there is far more to it.

I ask you to reflect for a moment on the figure I just gave, which is that agriculture contributes some $50 billion to the Australian economy. It has been estimated by ABARES that, if Australia gets foot and mouth disease,—and as a veterinarian I would extend that comment to 'when Australia gets foot and mouth disease'—if it spreads nationally, the estimated figure of the cost to eradicate foot and mouth disease is the same figure—$50,000 million. If there is one state alone, be it Western Australia, Queensland or the Northern Territory, into which the disease is going to come, the cost estimate is somewhere between $3½ billion and $5½ billion. As, I believe, Senators Siewert, Sterle and Heffernan would know, those are just the direct costs. They are not the costs associated with stopping the movement of people across the north. Imagine that now, in March, at the end of the wet season, we got foot and mouth disease across the north of Australia and we had to put a halt to vehicle movements, in other words, halt tourism across the north of Australia. That $50 billion would be short change compared to the overall impact on the economy of the north. Why do I say 'when' rather than 'if'? I am not suggesting to you that the presence of veterinarians is going to stop foot and mouth disease. Between Geraldton and Darwin we have one Commonwealth veterinary officer for the risk of a disease that would decimate this country's economy. So, there are very, very important elements in this bill associated with the capacity of this country to be able to deal with an incursion.

Of course, because of those figures that I quoted earlier, we have had to move to a risk based approach. In other words, we cannot guarantee that there will be no incursion of any organisms into Australia. Senators Sterle and Heffernan were very much involved when there was a strong request by America, Canada and Japan to allow beef to come into this country. Of course Canada and America did have—and probably in Canada's case it still does have—BSE, mad cow disease, bovine spongiform encephalopathy. At the time there was pressure on the then minister, Mr Burke, by the then Prime Minister, Mr Rudd, and the then trade minister, Mr Crean, to allow that beef to come into this country without there being the discipline of an import risk analysis. Senator Heffernan and Senator Sterle would well remember this, and maybe Senator Siewert would remember also. We had a number of hearings into that issue. Japan fell out as an applicant because they got foot and mouth disease. The Americans could not meet what Australia imposes on itself, which is a national livestock identification scheme for cattle. I do recall it was about this time in 2010 when we had what turned out to be the last hearing when I said to the then chief veterinary officer, 'Well, Dr Carroll, are you going to tell us about the seven-year-old Angus cow from Manitoba in Canada that has BSE, or am I?' and that led, of course, to Minister Burke requiring that there be a full import risk analysis. I make that point because the processes in place in this bill will ensure that there is a full biosecurity import risk analysis.

Time does not permit me in this discussion to actually go through all of the safeguards that are in place. Contrary to the comments made earlier about what role the Department of Agriculture might have, or what role the minister might have, it is the parliament that has responsibility to the Australian taxpayer. The reason I used the example of the importation of BSE beef, or beef from countries that have had it, was simply to make the point and to remind the chamber that on that occasion, despite the intense pressure of then Prime Minister and the then trade minister, eventually the then agriculture minister made the right decision. That decision was made as a result of the processes of the Senate, and the processes of the Senate required that there be an inquiry and that there be a number of hearings. The inadequacy of the original decision process was, in fact, exposed and the then minister made the right decision. History records, of course, that the Americans, the Canadians and the Japanese on that occasion all withdrew. It just makes the point that the parliament must always have the right and the role.

There are issues associated with regionality. We have a rich difference regionally in this country. The island state of Tasmania has certain advantages and challenges by virtue of it being insular. Australia, indeed, has certain benefits as a result of being an island continent. We in Western Australia have a whole series of different sets of circumstances, and each state and territory would claim those. I am pleased to see in the legislation that there is acknowledgement of regional differences within the overall capacity to deal.

If I have one concern, it is the question of regulations. The committee, which prides itself on putting policy before politics and has done so for some years, made a number of very, very important recommendations to which the government responded. For those interested, they should get hold of the responses by the government to the recommendations. Many of them are not in the act itself, if proclaimed, but in the regulations. Some of the issues that we have discussed here today are, for example, the demand to obtain independent scientific expertise, the demand and the right of wide consultation, the expectation and the opportunity of those who are likely to be adversely affected by decisions to be given further information prior to a final decision being made, and there are others that relate to the regulations. The point that I want to make, and I would make it whether or not we were in government or in opposition, is that the Senate committee must have the right to review those draft regulations, to examine them and to challenge them, if need be, before they are accepted. That is a normal process.

There are some definitions, for example, associated with external territory. There is some change in definition to the 12-mile limit rather than the 200-mile economic exclusion zone. There are issues associated with ballast water. The 1908 act was silent on ballast water in ships. I do not want to make light of it, except to say how critically important this is. What pleases me about this legislation, which was started by the previous government—to whom I give credit—which is being continued now and which will hopefully be completed by this chamber is the fact that it can be a living document; it can grow as time needs. We are all aware that the future of this country lies in our agricultural production, our agricultural exports and, indeed, our reputation.

Glenn Sterle (WA, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to make my contribution to the Biosecurity Bill 2014 and related bills. Senator Back makes some very good points. Probably one of the most poignant points that Senator Back makes is that the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport references and legislation committees are diligent. We set about in our work to do what is best for our nation, what is best for our farmers, what is best for our fishermen—anyone involved in horticulture, aquaculture or agriculture food production—and what is best for Australian consumers. There is absolutely no doubt about that. We do our best. We do not politicise it. Unfortunately, sometimes we have a few senators who blow in and want to make a political point, but we are all focused on the main intent: to look after Australia's agriculture, horticulture and fishing industries. We have worked diligently together for a number of years and under some fantastic chairmanship by me—I give myself a plug there—and by Senator Heffernan. So it is the same farm but a different paddock with whoever may be chairing at the time.

As Senator Back said, this bill is to replace and act that was first introduced in 1908. All credit to former agricultural ministers in the Rudd-Gillard era—Minister Burke, Minister Ludwig and Minister Fitzgibbon. I got agreement with my committee members that the new biosecurity bill, which we are going to put in place of the last one, was too important to rush. I got agreement that it did not matter what might be the will of the government of the day, we could not rush this bill. We had to thoroughly examine it. I had their full support. Of course, we know there has been a change of government.

Before I go to the circumstances of my problems with the bills as they stand now, I want to reiterate that biosecurity is probably one of the most important issues this nation has to address. We are an island and so fortunately we have some defences to save our agriculture and food production industries, but unfortunately through the best efforts of everyone involved we do get some serious incursions. I am fortunate to be part of the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport committees. We have looked into just about every incursion that has hit this country; and, if we have not looked it and examined it, we are very well aware of it and have certainly not been backward in coming forward to talk about it and make recommendations to our relevant ministers.

When I walked into this place in 2005, the first inquiry I copped was on citrus canker. I had a fistful of papers put on my desk and was told, 'Read that, because you've got to come up to speed with citrus canker.' It frightened the living daylights out of me! What I did find out through those first few months in the Senate committee process was that that incursion came in through—I cannot put it any other way—a devious method. I have to tell you that, at the time, the department did not cover themselves in glory. They were very, very shoddy in their work. They could not have been any more shoddy than warning the perpetrator that they were coming to have a look at the possible place of incursion. They gave them plenty of notice. The rest is history. It is something which we should not be proud of. But what it did do was take the committee, under the chairmanship of Senator Heffernan, to Emerald in Queensland. We saw firsthand the devastation that occurs to not only an industry but a community when someone drops their guard or when someone is being sneaky. We saw the wipe-out of the citrus industry in Emerald, even to the point where orange, lemon and lime trees in people's own backyards—everything—had to be destroyed.

This is not political, but we have got another incursion on our doorstep in Queensland—and this is damned frightening. The rural and regional affairs committee was in Darwin last year, inquiring into something else, when we stumbled on the fact that the banana industry in Darwin was going to be wiped out by banana freckle. We know that every banana tree on every plantation in Darwin—I do not think it went any further than Darwin; I do not think it went down to Katherine, although I am not sure—had to be destroyed. Because of the incursion of banana freckle in Darwin, the industry was brought to its knees. There was a $26 million package. I do not know how you come to a figure like $26 million, because all I could see were family businesses put out of business, employees who worked in those family businesses put out of work and the service industry was left with nowhere to go. They lost a massive chunk of income and their workers were affected. This is just not good enough. I remember saying in Darwin, 'Let's hope to hell this doesn't get across the border'—and it has not.

I want to talk about the panama incursion. What we know at this stage about panama is that once it is in the soil it does not leave. I am told that it can be around for 40 or 50 years. So, goodness gracious, I have my fingers crossed! I really hope and pray that that incursion can be contained. I do not want to start scaremongering but, boy oh boy, if that gets into Queensland, not only do we talk about it being around for 40 or 50 years but it will wipe out the banana industry in Queensland. To a lesser but no less important extent is the fact that the banana industry in Carnarvon has just been wiped out by a cyclone. Fortunately, they will be able to bounce back because they are resilient up there.

I also want to touch on the importance of biosecurity, not only to our food industry but in terms of, as Senator Back touched on, the equine influenza outbreak in 2007, where we nearly did not have a Melbourne Cup—and putting aside the number of horses that were infected and put down. To come back to the intent of the bill, all I want is what is best for Australia. I want what is best for Australian consumers, and I want what is best for Australian farmers and food providers.

Not that long ago, in February, we had a Senate inquiry into this. I raised a number of concerns, as did my colleagues, with the Department of Agriculture. One of the biggest problems that I had was the possible watering down of the powers of the Inspector-General of Biosecurity. Another issue was that the department could not supply us with a copy of the regulations that were going to be hanging off this piece legislation. They tried to defend that by saying—and I am paraphrasing now—if we did not like it, it did not matter because they had consulted everyone. I think it was Senator Williams who asked who they had consulted, and they said stakeholders. Then I think it was Senator Ruston who asked for a list of the stakeholders that they had consulted, and then it came out that the stakeholders that they had consulted had not seen the regulations—there were no regulations!

When I asked Ms Mellor from the department where were the regulations and how far away were they, all I got was, 'They'll be here sometime this year.' When you are told that in February, 'sometime this year' could be up to 31 December. As a committee, and as representatives of the rest of the Senate, we were being asked to vote on a piece of legislation when we did not know what was in regulations. That was not the case when the bill was put up by the previous government; the regulations came out. We had to flush that out at Senate estimates, because the answers were a little bit different from what actually happened.

I am very keen to tighten up and do whatever we need to do to put biosecurity foremost in every government's mind, but I find it very disingenuous. I cannot accept voting on a piece of legislation when we do not know what is in the regulations. One of our fears of the regulations concerned the Eminent Scientists Group. The Eminent Scientists Group are now a part of the handbook of the decision making. When I asked Ms Mellor whether we had any guarantee that that the Eminent Scientists Group would still form part of the handbook of the decision making, I could not get a clear answer: 'We don't know; they're not ready yet.'

We in the opposition trenches cannot accept the bill as it is. In the committee, we put in a dissenting report. For us on the opposition side, putting in a dissenting report is not something we do every week, I can tell you. That goes for the government senators when they were in opposition too. We always did everything we could to achieve a consultative position where we could all agree. We would tweak words and we would add a few. We would have a few little disagreements, we would have a bit of heartburn and we would have the odd bit of biffo amongst ourselves, but we would come to an arrangement. So when a dissenting report goes through the Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Committee, it certainly does cause more heartburn. In this case there were some things that we just could not accept. I will share my concerns with the Senate. The dissenting report says:

Labor Senators do not agree with clause 567 of the Biosecurity Bill 2014 that provides the Agriculture Minister with review powers that will allow him to conduct reviews into the biosecurity system to identify opportunities for improvements in the assessment and management of biosecurity risks.

Our fear was this would all fall to the minister and he would have the final say. The report goes on:

Labor Senators also do not agree with clause 643—Delegation of powers by Agriculture Minister. This clause allows the Agriculture Minister to delegate any or all of his or her powers and functions under the Act (and any regulations made under the Act) to the Director of Biosecurity, an SES employee, or acting SES employee in the Agriculture Department, except for those relating to the Minister.

Labor Senators acknowledge concerns raised by submitters regarding the proposed review process under clause 567 and 643. The proposed review process was condemned as a 'backwards' and 'retrograde' step that would potentially allow conflict of interests.

That is the last thing that we would want to see in anything to do with biosecurity or enforcement of biosecurity. The report says:

Submitters highlighted key differences between the Biosecurity Bill 2014 clauses 567 and 643 and the review process designed under the Inspector-General of Biosecurity Bill 2012. Specifically, submitters noted with concern the proposed discretionary timing, conduct and scope of the reviews and the internal, confidential nature of review findings would not guarantee independent transparent review for example, the Australian Veterinary Association stated:

'If the Inspector-General's role is designed to be similar to that of an ombudsman (as described in the Beale Review) the public must be able to refer matters directly to the Inspector-General.'

AUSVEG came before us too, and they stated:

The explanatory memorandum for Clause 567 states that "… as the review powers are provided to the Minister, reviews will be conducted independently from the Department, ensuring independence between the subjects and the review (biosecurity officials) and the powers of the person conducting the review." However, as the powers for conducting a review into the biosecurity system lie with the Minister for Agriculture and may be conferred by the Minister for Agriculture, this cannot legitimately be described as an independent review process.

I want to quote the words that I have heard many, many times from my colleague Senator Heffernan, a government senator. In his view, and I find it very hard to argue with, you are only as independent as the person who pays you.

The Labor senators' dissenting report says:

Labor supports option 2 of the regulation impact statement that determined establishing the role of the Inspector-General of Biosecurity through legislation as a statutory officer, responsible for reviewing the performance and exercise of powers by the Director of Biosecurity, biosecurity officers and biosecurity enforcement officers as well as conducting biosecurity import risk analysis.

This is the preferred option as it would help assure stakeholders and Australia's trading partners of the integrity of the department's processes and would provide an independent, systematic approach towards maintaining and improving Australia's biosecurity system.

Labor recommends that the government adopt the recommendation of the Beale review to establish the Inspector-General of Biosecurity as a statutory body.

Establishing the role of the Inspector-General of Biosecurity through legislation would ensure that there is a statutory officeholder responsible for the independent audit—

I cannot stress enough that, on our side of the chamber, we want the independent audit—

review and assessment of the department's biosecurity activities and processes. The role and function of the Inspector-General of Biosecurity would align with the Beale review's recommendation that an effective risk management system should include formal auditing activities.

In summary of that, in our dissenting report we had one recommendation, and that was:

That the Senate either amend the bill or request the House of Representatives to amend the bill to provide for establishment of the Inspector-General of Biosecurity as a statutory body.

For the life of me, I cannot understand why Minister Joyce has a problem with that, why Minister Joyce would want to start a brawl with us, to put himself in a position where he could be the be-all and end-all of any biosecurity issues. I do not think any minister in their right mind—because of their workload and what they have to do—would ever think that was a good idea. Unfortunately that is what Mr Joyce has done, and only Mr Joyce, the Minister for Agriculture, can answer about that.

I go back to saying this: biosecurity should never, ever be used as a political football. Biosecurity is something that should unite this chamber and the other place on whatever issue it may be. Sometimes we lose sight, as a nation, of what we are actually consuming, what we are putting in our mouths, where it comes from and what the labels may say. The classic example is the unfortunate incident we have had with the frozen berries. That could be anything. In defence of the company, it was identified quite rapidly. It would have been nice if it had been quicker, but anyway it was identified and it was stopped. But it is imperative that Australians understand that, if you want to have the best biosecurity, if you want to have the best opportunity to consume the safest food, whether it be—

Gavin Marshall (Victoria, Deputy-President) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Order! I just remind advisers that they are unable to enter the chamber. I ask the whip to address that issue for me.

Glenn Sterle (WA, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Mr Deputy President, you frightened the living daylights out of me! I thought: 'What the hell have I done this time? I'm on my best behaviour on this one. I'm not my normal self.' So thank you, Mr Deputy President. I cannot remember where I was at—it would have been good, but!

I was talking about what we are putting in our mouths. I digress a little bit, but is important for all those out there. We can have the best biosecurity system in the world—and we should; there is absolutely no doubt about that; we should never skimp on biosecurity—but we should also understand that, if we want to have the best biosecurity systems, we need to fund them. We need to have agreement in this house and in the other place. But we also have to support our farmers. The best biosecurity thing we could do is support our farmers, our horticultural industry, our fishing industry. We should also be able to expect and demand and receive the greatest opportunity, when we pick up a food product, to know, through whatever is on the label—none of this nonsense about imported goods but it is put together in Australia or whatever the rubbish is—whether we are actually supporting Australian industry, Australian jobs, Australian farmers, Australian fishermen and Australian horticulturalists.

Biosecurity is one very important issue, but unfortunately in this nation we have a real mismatch and we are at the behest of monsters like—in my opinion; not in anyone else's opinion—the Australian Food and Grocery Council. Every time we talk about food labelling, my goodness don't they bolt! What have they got to fear?

In wrapping up: we are calling on Minister Joyce to have a look at our request for the Inspector-General of Biosecurity. Give us a good reason why we cannot have that. It would be foolish to take away another avenue or two of the level of biosecurity we need. And to have the department not even able to tell us that the regulations will definitely contain the clause that will keep the Eminent Scientists Group—it smacks of something absolutely ridiculous. I call on the minister. It is not too late, Minister, to pick up the Labor Party's amendments and take them forward. Let us keep biosecurity foremost as one of the most important issues in this country, not only for food consumers but for our industries and for all those rural communities who are out there—we do not see them in Melbourne, Sydney and Perth—working their guts out, day in and day out, to feed all of Australia.

Anne Ruston (SA, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Before I make my contribution in relation to the Biosecurity Bill 2014, can I just acknowledge the extraordinarily bipartisan approach that the Labor Party has taken with the government in trying to come up with a good and robust set of security measures for Australia's biosecurity. This particular bill has been around in various guises for a number of years now. It has been debated, and the committee system has consulted widely on this, both when Senator Sterle was the chair of the Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee and now with Senator Heffernan as the chair of the committee. What we see today with the Biosecurity Bill 2014 is certainly a reflection of the extraordinary work that was done with the Biosecurity Bill 2012 and the committee that was chaired by Senator Sterle. This particular bill has come about because of the need to replace the complex 106-year-old Quarantine Act 1908. As anybody would realise, an act that was put in place in 1908 is most likely not going to have a great deal of relevance today. That is exactly what has happened over the intervening 106-year period—the act has been continually amended but the original act of 1908 remained principally in place. This particular bill is a reflection of the need to update that 1908 act to make sure it reflects the biosecurity risks we face in 2015.

It is interesting to note that, when that act was first passed in 1908, the only way any goods came to Australia was by sea. You can imagine that sea arrivals only would have meant there were a lot less things arriving by sea, a lot less regularly, and the ability of any government or agency to intervene, and to test and check those sorts of goods, was quite a different story than it is today. In the last decade alone, the number of air passengers has grown by 80 per cent; sea containers have grown by 82 per cent; bulk cargo has grown by 16 per cent; and these numbers are just going to continue to grow. If you look at it in the context of the requirement on the department's resources to deal with these quarantine issues, in 2012-13 alone the Department of Agriculture had to clear 16 million arriving international passengers, 186 million international mail items, 1.7 million sea cargo consignments and 26 million air cargo consignments. It really does put in context the quantum of the issue this particular Biosecurity Bill is seeking to deal with.

The main purpose of this bill is the management of biosecurity risks in general—that is, the risk of pests and diseases, including human diseases, entering Australia, getting themselves established in Australia or spreading in Australia. The risk of causing harm to humans, animals, plant health, the environment or the economy needs to be considered in the context of this Biosecurity Bill. One of the major issues is the risk of ballast water, as you can probably imagine, with our seagoing vessels in areas such as the Great Barrier Reef and the extraordinary importance of protecting that particular asset. We have to be very mindful of what is being discharged at sea. Dealing with biosecurity and human biosecurity emergencies also needs to be considered.

The idea with this bill and its principal purpose, as I said initially, is to get into the 21st century with an act to enable the administration of what is a very changeable space. It also seeks to deal with some of the complexities of the regulatory requirements and administrative practices to make sure they are much easier to administer, and to give greater flexibility to the Commonwealth so it is able to manage these risks in a modern and flexible way and in a way that reflects the current environment and contemporary industry practice. It also seeks to give powers to make sure we are able to continuously monitor and manage both onshore and offshore risks, and that the tools we give to the people we require to undertake this compliance are fit for purpose—that they are modern and useful and reflect current-day activity. The Quarantine Act only contains criminal penalties and, as we know in modern society, there are a whole heap of other tools which should be made available to compliance officers to make sure they get the best possible outcome to deliver what is being sought for Australia.

The primary objective of this bill is to manage biosecurity risk. It is interesting. I mentioned in my opening statement that this process was started under the previous administration with the Biosecurity Bill 2012. As part of that process, the rural and regional affairs committee and the department undertook a lot of stakeholder consultation to try to determine what was going to be the best possible outcome. There were a number of things that came out of that consultation process which have been incorporated in the 2014 bill, which makes this bill a much better tool to reflect our needs. One of the things that was very strongly put to us as a committee, in our negotiations and consultation with the broader industry around Australia, was the need to accept that there are regional differences. A one-size-fits-all biosecurity approach to biosecurity risk was something the regions and industries did not believe was necessarily in their best interests, so this new bill reflects the need to identify regional differences and that the risk analysis process that is associated with various products needs to be considered in this context. As a result there have been some changes to this bill, particularly to clarify the consideration of regional differences in biosecurity and how that plays out in the risk analysis—making sure that there is an level of independence in doing so. There was quite a substantial engagement with stakeholders and that consultation has resulted in these changes. One of the things we need to be very mindful of is that, while we have identified the regional differences as they currently exist today, it is a requirement that we constantly continue to talk to industry, and to monitor changes in the region and in the landscape, to make sure that future regional differences which may well come about are considered as an ongoing issue when we develop our biosecurity position in Australia.

There is no doubt that there is constantly a dilemma in this space about our ability to assist our agricultural industries, particularly in finding new markets around the world and making sure we have as free a marketplace as we possibly can to benefit the consumers of Australia, so they can get access to products which are coming into Australia they may well want to consume. As an exporting nation, Australia relies heavily on our primary producers and manufacturers to make sure the balance of payments of this country is such that we remain the prosperous and First World country we are. But one of the things that constantly and increasingly has become a risk to Australia is biosecurity. It is about maintaining a level of biosecurity that ensures into the future so that Australia does not end up a country that does not have the clean green image it currently has. But, at the same time, we have to be very mindful that we are a trading nation—and we would not be as successful or as prosperous as we are if we were not.

Senator Sterle raised in his speech the consequences of an incursion and how terribly difficult this balancing act is. Governments are faced with finite resources to put into the myriad areas which government has to fund and look after. As a primary producer myself, I would love to think that we had unlimited resources to put into biosecurity but that is not the case. So we need to make sure that we have legislative tools in place to maximise the level of protection that we can give to our farmers within the reasonable context of those parameters.

Whilst I have been a critic of the way the department has approached risk analysis in the past and I have also been a critic of letting biosecurity play second fiddle to trade on a number of occasions, there are some very clear examples that we can put on the record. There are two things that need to be balanced here. One is: what is the likelihood of an incursion? And the second one is: what are the consequences of that incursion should it actually occur? Subsidiary to that are a whole heap of other things about our readiness to respond to any incursion and our capacity to actually deal with it even if we had the resources.

The Australian Bureau of Agricultural Resource Economics and Sciences estimated that even a relatively small outbreak of foot and mouth disease in only one state has the potential to cost Australia in excess of $5 billion. When you consider that that is one tiny little outbreak in one state, you can imagine the consequences if an outbreak of foot and mouth disease was able to get away in Australia. You have to weigh up the cost of the biosecurity measures that are put in place against the potential outcome should an outbreak occur. The level of likelihood of an incursion may be quite small but it does not take you very long to realise that the cost of such an incursion would have such a devastating impact, not just on the people who are in this industry but on the broader Australian economy. We need to be very mindful that that is considered when making a decision to allocate resources.

Citrus canker occurred in Emerald in Queensland and we saw the entire citrus industry in one state completely decimated. Luckily for Australia, we were able to quarantine it in Queensland—no consolation for the Queensland industry but certainly for the rest of Australia. But once again you see how something as small as one person being able to import a particular product into Australia that was infected by disease completely took out an entire industry in a state. It is really important that when we are looking at this risk analyses that we weigh up not just the cost of the biosecurity measure but also the potential cost to our economy should such an incursion occur.

As I mentioned, we have been working on this in the Senate Standing Committee on Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport since 2012. This particular bill was referred to the rural and regional affairs committee to have a look at. The committee has only had the bill for a very short period of time but, given the amount of work that was done previous to this bill, we were able to use a lot of the information that had been obtained in the consultation that occurred over the 2012 bill. The committee made a number of recommendations, 14 of which were recommended in a non-partisan approach.

I suppose it was a tiny little bit disappointing that despite the extraordinary amount of effort that went into this particular investigation as well as the one in 2012 that there was a dissenting report and also so some adverse comments by the Greens. I was disappointed but, nonetheless, that should not go against the fact that there was a genuine attempt to try and come up with a consensus report. It was just disappointing that in the end we failed to achieve that. Given how sensible the recommendations in the report appear to be, I would think it very likely that the government would certainly consider them. There was a recommendation to ensure that any review undertaken under ministerial review powers is publicly released and tabled in parliament to give a level of transparency to this particular review process. There is no doubt that the committee unilaterally thought that that was good idea.

It was once again very clear that the committee thought: that the use of or reliance on scientific evidence and best scientific endeavour were absolutely essential to getting the right outcome; that the director of biosecurity should be given the opportunity to use whatever expert skills and advice needed to ensure the biosecurity risk assessment was as thorough as it possibly could be; and also that in the process of undertaking these risk assessments there is a constant and ongoing requirement to consult with industry. We have got science underpinning the decision making, but we also need to make sure that the interests, needs and first-hand, on-the-ground experience of the people that are going to be impacted by any consequence of an importation of a product into Australia are included in that risk analysis.

It once again comes back to this whole balance between the likelihood of the outbreak and the consequences of the outbreak. The only people who can truly give you a clear—

Debate interrupted.