Scott Ludlam (WA, Australian Greens) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I move:

That parliamentary approval should be required for Australian forces to be deployed to Syria.

You would be aware, I think, that the first bill that I introduced when I came into this place in mid-2008 was to pick up a bill by the former Democrat Senator Andrew Bartlett on parliamentary approval for Australian troops to deploy into conflict zones. It was a bill that had been on the Notice Paper in this place in one form or another since the mid-1980s. I acknowledge the work, in particular, of the former Clerk of the Senate, Harry Evans, who was a long-time advocate for the transfer of what is called, somewhat casually, the 'war power' from the executive to the parliament.

This may sound a little bit dry and anodyne but what it means in principle and practice is this: at the moment there is nothing at all preventing the Prime Minister of Australia, on the advice from a very small handful of individuals, from deploying the Australian Defence Force into a theatre of war on the other side of the world, no matter what the consequences—without thinking through the strategic situation, without thinking through the risk to those on the ground, without thinking through or properly evaluating the risk to the personnel that we would be sending overseas or whether our participation in such a conflict would make matters worse. I am very strongly of the view, as are many other supporters of the proposal for parliamentary approval that that decision should never again rest in the hands of the Prime Minister alone.

I made a deliberate decision not to bring that war power bill back for debate in this chamber. It has been debated and voted on twice. It has been defeated twice by the government, voting in concert with the opposition, because the executive prefers to keep this power to itself. I am very strongly of the view that the bill and many of the arguments for it have been thoroughly misrepresented by its opponents, and I will go into that in a little bit of detail this afternoon.

The principal argument is the lessons of 2003, when Prime Minister John Howard committed Australian forces to the illegal invasion of another country on the other side of the world. That resulted in the unravelling of the security environment in Iraq and other consequences that, in part, we are grappling with today. The vicious insurgency that has emerged and evolved almost in viral form into something that now calls itself a state—and, indeed, as some analysts have pointed out, exhibits some of the characteristics of a state—was born in that cauldron of hideous sectarian violence in Iraq, particular during and immediately after 2006.

That decision to invade Iraq was based on false pretences. It was not because intelligence services read that situation wrongly, which is what they have been, I think, quite unfairly blamed for doing, but because politicians warped and twisted the defence and intelligence reports that they were being given by entities such as the ONA here in Australia and their counterparts in the United States and the UK, to suit a predetermined political agenda, which was to unseat Saddam Hussein and remake the Middle East in the image of secular Western democracies. Well, hasn't that been a resounding and spectacular success! If we needed more of a profound argument as to why the decision to send Australians into war should be made by the parliament, here in the Senate and in the House of Representatives, it is that grotesque miscalculation in 2003. To then turn around and pin the blame on our intelligence services, saying, 'They got it wrong; let's hold an inquiry into how they got it wrong,' really compounds the injustice.

I decided, however, that this motion today should stand alone, as it represents the principle that the Australian Greens and our allies inside and outside this parliament, picking up where the Australian Democrats left off, have been arguing for years—that this parliament is the proper place for those decisions to be made.

But I want to make this distinction very clear at the outset: once a decision has been made to deploy Australian forces into a conflict, parliament should not involve itself in tactical or battlefield decisions. That was not the purpose of the bill. I say that because I have no doubt that government and opposition senators will shortly be filing in here and telling us that parliament is not qualified to conduct a war on the other side of the world—and it isn't. Those are strategic and tactical decisions for military commanders in the event that a deployment is considered justified and necessary. However, the decision to participate in a war by choice, which is what this is, is a political decision, and it is my firm view that, before we line up in front of flags and farewell Australian service personnel who may not return or who, if they do, may return broken, we should sign our names to such a decision in this place if we support such a deployment and that we should consider very, very carefully the consequences for not just those that we send overseas but also those who will be subject to that Australian military commitment on the far side of the world.

Here again we see more than a decade later, 12 years later, a Prime Minister, having clearly made up his mind already, unilaterally committing Australian personnel to the Syrian civil war. I heard the comments that Mr Abbott has already made and those of the defence minister this morning, and they were almost unbelievably vague as to the intent of this deployment or its necessity, its purpose, its outcome, its objectives, its legality. 'Vague' barely does it justice. How long will we be there? What are the success criteria? Can you demonstrate in any meaningful way at all—and I genuinely invite a response to this from government senators and senators on the Labor Party side who again have uncritically signed off on this and simply failed to turn up to work—that this will not make things worse? It is the view of not just the Australian Greens that hurling Australian munitions into the Syrian civil war will make things worse. It is also the view of many others in the diplomatic community and in the defence community here and overseas that Australia's involvement would not be that of another foreign combatant merely trying to do our bit to preserve the global order and that it may in fact be precisely the wrong time for another foreign power to intervene militarily in the Syrian civil war.

On the news wires just before I came down here, there appears to be confirmation that the Russian government, which has long been understood to be providing weapons, training and substantial material support to the Assad regime, now has, in the vernacular, boots on the ground, that Russian forces are in fact engaged against parties that are as yet unknown, and that US Secretary of State John Kerry has talked a number of times to his Russian counterpart expressing extreme concern on the part of the United States government that yet another foreign military party is now engaged in the Syrian civil war. Mr Kerry's comments, in my view, are justified and accurate, in that for any power to take a good look at what the Assad regime has done to its own people since March 2011 and then back it uncritically, as the Putin regime has done, is utterly unconscionable. Yet Mr Kerry's warning could just as equally apply to Australia's government as to the Russian government—that this is not the time for the further escalation of military violence inside Syria; this is the time for demilitarising that benighted country, as locals on the ground are attempting to do. I see Senator Back frowning. I will let you speak for yourself, Senator Back.

There are indeed the first tentative signs of regional ceasefire zones inside Syria that locals on the ground, secular and otherwise, are attempting to widen into a so-called freeze across certain parts of the country where, for sometimes quite brief but in some instances longer periods of time, fighting ceases, allowing aid agencies or locals to get food and other supplies in to those who have been suffering horrific adversity that most of us in here could not even imagine.

The United States does not have clean hands in this regard either. Analysts have taken the time to look at the state department cables that were released by WikiLeaks, and it is fascinating to look at what the United States administration was doing in 2006. I will quote briefly from Robert Naiman, one of the few analysts who has actually taken the time to go through the WikiLeaks state department cables and analyse what the US government foreign policy was in Syria at the time that President Bush was desperately trying to contain, with a troop surge, the extraordinary sectarian violence that was unleashed across Iraq around 2006. This is what Mr Naiman says:

This cable suggests that the U.S. goal in December 2006 was to undermine the Syrian government by any available means, and that what mattered was whether U.S. action would help destabilize the government, not what other impacts the action might have. … In public, the U.S. was opposed to “Islamist extremists” everywhere, but in private the U.S. saw the “potential threat to the regime from the increasing presence of transiting Islamist extremists” as an “opportunity” which the U.S. should take action to try to increase.

There you have it. The consequences of that now unfold. It is not the United States government paying the price; it is the not the Russian authorities paying the price; it is the people of Syria.

He goes on to say in the WikiLeaks files:

… in December 2006, the man heading the U.S. Embassy in Syria advocated in a cable to the Secretary of State and the White House that the U.S. government collaborate with Saudi Arabia and Egypt to promote sectarian conflict in Syria between Sunni and Shia as a means of destabilizing the Syrian government.

Further, he says:

U.S. public disgust with the sectarian civil war in Iraq unleashed by the U.S. invasion had just cost Republicans control of Congress in the November 2006 election. The election result immediately produced the resignation of Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense. No one working for the U.S. government on foreign policy at the time could have been unaware of the implications of promoting Sunni-Shia sectarianism.

And now we see that not long afterwards, less than a decade later, Syria itself ripped apart, as Iraq has been, not through an active campaign of bombing and shock and awe and mission accomplished, as we saw unfolding over the skies of Baghdad in 2003, but quietly with weapons, with cash, with support, overt and covert, not just for the moderate democratic forces or the Free Syrian Army, as has been on the record for years, but for quite vicious Islamist subgroups and splinter groups that have now ripped that country apart.

Australians and others who have watched Syria effectively bleed to death since March 2011, I would propose, bear some foreign policy responsibility, as does the Iranian government, as does the Russian government and as does the Turkish government, who have used this entire horror show as an excuse to simply persecute Kurdish minorities inside and outside of Turkey. Nobody has clean hands, yet it is the people of Syria who have paid the price.

So are we tilting at windmills to imagine that there is any kind of peaceful solution to what is going on in Syria or, indeed, in Iraq at the moment? My colleague Senator Hanson-Young and some of her colleagues and allies in this parliament, who have put political differences and allegiances aside to argue and advocate in the cause of the asylum seekers and those refugees fleeing—not in their hundreds of thousands but in their millions—from Syria and from Iraq, yesterday heard from the UNHCR's lead in the Middle East and North Africa. One of the things that he told us—as many in this place, staff and journalists who participated in that briefing, will know—is that there is simply no military solution. There is no military endgame in Syria—and recent history surely teaches us that. Rather, we need to be looking towards a peace process. Those were the words that he used. He cannot undertake his mission in protecting those people fleeing from the Syrian civil war, without a peace process. As far as that may seem from the post-apocalyptic scenes that Syrians have experienced and have fled from, as far as that process appears to be from where we are today, it is incumbent upon us in this parliament, whether or not we support the Prime Minister's reckless and counterproductive deployment of the ADF into the skies over Syria, we should surely be doing everything that we can to promote demilitarisation and de-escalation of violence inside Syria. It is something that I believe my colleagues will be drawing out in a little bit more detail, but let us speak for the moment from some of those others who have had long experience in these matters—certainly longer than me. Former Foreign Minister Gareth Evans said:

… trying to drain the Middle East swamps through military action is, we should know by now, more likely than not to be counterproductive.

It is not every day that I quote former Foreign Minister Gareth Evans in here.

The UN commission of inquiry into the conflict in Syria led by Paulo Pinheiro said:

A resonant cry for peace and accountability rings out.

The war is increasingly being driven by international and regional powers, primarily in accordance with their respective geostrategic interests.

The competition among regional powers for influence has resulted … in an alarming exacerbation of the sectarian dimension, instigated by the intervention of foreign fighters and extremists clerics.

This is what Australia is now implicated in. We could have played a profoundly positive role in the de-escalation of the conflict inside Syria, but instead we send F18s.

It is my firm view that this action does not make Australians any safer at all, and I think my colleagues will probably take up that thread in their contributions. While the focus, however briefly, of the global community is on the safety of the Syrian people, I think it is worth continuing along these lines of argument: how do we deescalate the conflict? How can everybody in a non-partisan way in this place do our bit diplomatically, globally, with those powers that we do have engagement with—allies like the United States government, allies like Turkey and allies like Saudi Arabia?—as distasteful as many us might find that concept. How do we de-escalate this conflict?

Many groups and commentators are now turning to de-escalation through local ceasefires as possible measures to address the conflict. These are not theoretical, as I was outlining before. These exist in a small way already on the ground. Most famously advocated by the current UN mediator, Staffan de Mistura, the idea is to spread local and often quite organic grassroots ceasefires until there is a 'freeze' in the conflict across the country and eventually political reconciliation. One brief example: Turkey and Iran have been involved in negotiating a brief, 48-hour ceasefire in Zabadani, a rebel-held town near the Lebanese border that was besieged by Hezbollah for many weeks. It adds to recent signs of new efforts in the region to end the diplomatic deadlock. I think it is quite powerful and important that it is local people on the ground inside Syria who are driving the demilitarisation. Because so many regional powers, including Australia, now have a part in this conflict, diplomatic engagement amongst regional powers is required to make the ceasefire stick.

Steven Simon, the United States National Security Council's senior director for the Middle East and North Africa between May 2011 to January 2013, and Jonathan Stevenson, the NSC's director for political military affairs between November 2011 and May 2013, put it this way:

The most realistic short-term policy goal in Syria is to find ways to limit the areas of the country in direct conflict, with the aim of both containing extremist violence and significantly reducing the number of non-combatant deaths. This goal is not as far-fetched as it sounds, and there is already a basis for pursuing it: through a series of local cease-fires that could, if properly implemented and enforced, provide a path toward stability in several regions of the country, even as conflict continues elsewhere. In particular, clusters of cease-fires around Hama, Horns, and Damascus, and possibly Aleppo, could help end the conflict in a larger region along Syria's principal north-south axis, bringing a degree of normality to daily life in a vital sector of the country.

That is how the UNHCR is able to do its job. That is how it is able to then bring aid back into the country with partners. Australia could play an immensely powerful role in doing that and then deliver aid to the people who need it most. It is aid that we should be dropping into that country, not more munitions.

I look forward to hearing the contributions of other senators in this debate, but I would have thought the proper time for this debate would have been before the deployment, not after. I think it is extraordinary that the Australian Labor Party will say one thing in the House of Representatives and in various interviews on television—'We're pro bombing. We're just going to let the government go ahead with a blank cheque and report to parliament at its leisure and let us know how it's all going.' That was effectively the essence of what Mr Shorten told the country. Then Ms Plibersek in the media last night, quite correctly, expressed in the extreme similar kinds of concerns to what I have expressed this afternoon—that we are inflaming an already volatile situation. Where are the opposition today? Where are they? The proper time for a debate in parliament about the deployment of the ADF into a war zone on the other side of the world was before that deployment, not after it was already underway.

We do not know where this is going. The Abbott government has provided us with no rationale, no exit strategy, no endgame and no success criteria. We do not trust the government's motives. Nor do we trust its competence to carry out any kind of productive military intervention into the Syrian civil war. The solutions lie elsewhere. That is what this parliament needs to be engaged with today and in coming months.

Christopher Back (WA, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to speak to the motion of Senator Siewert that parliamentary approval should be required before Australian forces are deployed in Syria. I had the opportunity to listen to Senator Ludlam's contribution on this, as was his right to make, but he moved beyond that particular topic. I was very interested to hear his contribution. Nobody would have any argument at all with the motives expressed by Senator Ludlam—and that is that, in the case of Syria, Iraq and other countries in the region that are in the midst of such turmoil, of course we need to be trying to move towards a circumstance initially at least where there would be protection zones where civilians can be protected, can gather and can be the recipients of aid and where those providing them with that aid themselves can be safe, eventually moving towards a longer term peace in that region. But we are not in that situation yet. What we do in the meantime?

I had the opportunity of being at the United Nations from the period of September to December 2013 when Australia was a member of the Security Council. I had the opportunity to participate in both open and closed meetings of the Security Council. At that time President Obama was doing everything he could with his government to achieve a resolution with the Assad regime other than a military one. I vividly recall an interchange between the Russian Ambassador to the UN and the American Ambassador to the UN. The allegation was made at that time that chemical weapons were being used. President Obama said to his Secretary of State that a line in the sand existed and that, if chemical weapons were used, it would cause a change in the policy of the US in that region, having regard for the fact that there was a strong incentive and desire on the part of all parties to try to reach a peaceful resolution. The American ambassador made the comment that the chemical weapons were being used by the Assad regime. The retort by the other side was, No, no, no. It's not the Assad regime that is using the chemical weapons; it is their opponents.' I will never forget the startlingly obvious comment by the US ambassador when she said, 'Yes, that makes a lot of sense! Those opposed to Assad have broken through the lines of the Assad regime. They have broken into the military storage. They have found the chemical weapons. They have loaded them onto delivery systems. They have fired them. Then they have rushed back to wait to be the recipients of these chemical weapons.' Her derision was so prescient.

I have no difficulty at all with the motives—and I concur with them—expressed by Senator Ludlam. It should always be our objective—and it is the objective of all parties—to find a resolution to this conflict. But subsequent even to the time I spoke of in October 2013 we have had ISIS, or Daesh, active in this region—Iraq and Syria. That has added a totally new and different dimension to this conflict.

If you reflect on the fact that, as I understand it, President Assad is a dentist—it is my understanding that he studied and qualified in the United Kingdom; his wife is British—one would have hoped that a person of that background, with the influence around him, may well have been amenable to some sort of persuasion to find a non-military solution.

I do not know how many in this chamber have had the opportunity to meet with, spend time with and live with Syrian people. I have only had a very limited opportunity of some three or four months, when I hosted a group of agricultural scientists from Syria in 2003. I found these people to be thoroughly decent, highly-qualified, conservative and respectful. I remember showing them agriculture in the Eastern Wheatbelt, at Merredin, and telling them somewhat proudly that agriculture had been practised on this farm for some hundred years. Dr Mohamed Tarabein came up to me—a man who looked a bit like a great big basset hound—and said, 'Dr Chris, agriculture in my country of Syria has been practised in the same area for 2,000 years.' He wanted me to know the depth of their civilisation and culture. They are a proud people, they are a professional people and they do not deserve what is happening to them at this time.

Whilst I acknowledge, recognise and agree with the sentiments of the previous speaker, in terms of our demand and need to protect civilians, to find protection zones and to coalesce them into areas of safety for civilians and aid workers, until such time as we get to that stage I believe that we, as one of the world's leading developed countries, have no option other than to play our part in countering and trying to bring to the table, through military means if need be, those whose are opposed to each other.

I come now to Daesh and ISIS. Having mentioned Assad and his background, and achieving little hope or help in that regard, heaven only can reflect on Daesh, an organisation that would take a Jordanian pilot, put him out in the middle of a square in a cage, in full view of the world community, and set fire to him. Set fire to him! What is the sort of thinking of a group of people who can try to eliminate a whole culture? Who can rape; who can force girls and women into sexual slavery and marriage? Who can behead people? In the recent case of the desecration of ancient sites at Palmyra, an 82-year-old archaeologist, who as I understand it had devoted his life to the protection and preservation of those priceless assets, was not just deported, not just killed mercifully or humanely but beheaded! Let's be under no illusion in this place at this time about what we are dealing with.

Australia is not taking a lead role in this process; it is taking a contributory role. I do not propose in my contribution to address necessarily the question of Australians—those resident in Australia and those with Australian citizenship—who have been or who are still keen to leave our shores to go to fight with this horrible group of people. It is not the subject of Senator Siewert's notice of motion moved by Senator Ludlam. I do want to address myself for a moment to the specific words, but before doing so I acknowledge the comments that Senator Ludlam made about the contribution of the Russians. The Russians have been long and strong both as military advisers to the Syrian regime and as providers of military hardware for many, many years. I am not sure what the significance of the current elevation in communication between the Russians, the Syrians and the west is. I have not got my mind around whether that is significant or whether it is just a recognition of an ongoing process. There is no doubt that Russian advisers, Russian weapons and Russian ordnance have long been associated with the Assad regime, but I do not think at this moment that it is only the Assad regime causing the conflict in that country.

I come now to the question as posed by Senator Siewert, that there should be full parliamentary approval before Australian forces are deployed to Syria. I take issue with that conviction. In our parliamentary system it is the role of the executive to make these decisions, harsh and serious as they are. I consulted with a past active service military officer in forming the comments that I want to make. Before doing so, I will defer to the sentiment expressed by Senator Siewert, and that is to say that in this place and in fora such as Senate estimates there are always opportunities for any senator to raise any questions associated with issues of concern in terms of the background of the decision—in this case, the decision to send our personnel over to Syria or into any war zone. Of course, Mr Acting Deputy President, as you know and I know well, the benefit in Senate estimates is that we have not only Senate colleagues but indeed the senior military and departmental people available to us.

It is the case that the decision making, in circumstances such as these, can and must be made by an executive, a small team, who have available to them the information out of Joint Operations Command, for example, out here at Bungendore; the advice available to them from the Chief of the Defence Force, and, in turn, the chiefs of Army, Navy and Air Force. We know very well that decision making has a time circumstance associated with it. We know that it is a fluid process in a military zone. We know that the information that is available is often highly confidential, coming from alternative sources—information that must be sieved; information that must be examined and processed by the Chief of the Defence Force and those reporting to him and advising the executive. It is not possible, in the heat and the ongoing activity in a war zone, for such matters to be the subject of full parliamentary approval and debate.

Scott Ludlam (WA, Australian Greens) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

But Congress does.

Nick McKim (Tasmania, Australian Greens) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

It happens all over the world.

Peter Whish-Wilson (Tasmania, Australian Greens) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Order!

Christopher Back (WA, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Thank you. It is the case, under our system here in Australia, long established, that it is the role of the executive.

I want to make this point: a point related to the safety and security of our personnel—our Australian Defence Force and their support personnel—in war zones. Information that becomes available and must be kept confidential may well, if allowed to be more widely canvassed, explored and debated, have the capacity to put our own personnel at risk.

Nick McKim (Tasmania, Australian Greens) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Rubbish!

Christopher Back (WA, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

It's not rubbish! I had occasion only three weeks ago to spend a few days at RAAF Base Amberley and during that time met personnel from both No. 1 and No. 6 Squadron, and, in the case of No. 1 Squadron, those who had recently returned from the theatre of action in Iraq and also those associated of course with the operations and support of our KC30 refuelling aircraft and our Wedgetail communications aircraft overflying that zone. It was interesting to have a conversation with those officers and other personnel, just in terms of: 'What is Australia's role? What information is made available? And what information do they actually provide? What is the level of safety and security for these personnel?' We discussed that in great detail because, as a member of the defence family, one can only have the highest concern for what may well happen to our personnel should they fall into the hands of the other side. I also spoke to them about what our capacity may be should the requirement be there to extend the involvement, as indeed has now been made by the Prime Minister.

Mr Acting Deputy President, as you know, to date, we have six of our FA18 Hornets and the refuelling aircraft and the communications aircraft; we have support personnel on the ground—although not, obviously, in a combat relationship. In association with the New Zealanders, we are operating in a Building Partner Capacity mission in Taji, north-west of Baghdad. And I know of no circumstance in which it is intended that the activities of that particular group will change over time.

I mentioned the importance of our serving personnel. We have obviously come out of theatres in Iraq and subsequently Afghanistan where indeed our personnel were involved in active combat service. I come back to the point that I made a moment ago: that, for the security and the wellbeing of those personnel, decision making back here in Australia has to be done by senior personnel with access to the best information, timely information, and, indeed, in cooperation with other forces with whom we are working.

It is fair to say that the Obama administration, I believe, has tried the non-military route. I spoke earlier about the issue with chemical weapons, and I guess it is really that that caused them to move in the direction that they have.

It was interesting to hear the Attorney-General today responding to questions associated with the collective self-defence argument. He presented four instances and he made the observation, in answer to the question, I think, from Senator Johnston, that indeed Australia does meet each of those four conditions. And if there are those in this chamber or beyond it who want to challenge the assertions of the Attorney-General, then of course they have the obvious opportunity to do so, both in this place and, shortly, in Senate estimates.

It is also, I think, to the credit of this country that the decision has been made to take these 12,000 extra people from Syria, emphasising that these are permanent resettlements. It is not a short-term asylum circumstance where, should that situation change in their home country, they would be able to return home. It is likely—certainly, with my support—that those who will be targeted for location to Australia would be the women and children and families of persecuted minorities who will be unable to return, regardless of if and when peace and stability return to their country, and they will be made welcome.

This is a generous offer by this country. I am delighted to learn that it has support right around this house. It seems to have support within the wider community and I know that each of the states has put their hand up to say they are behind it. At the end of the day, however, it is not the role of parliament to approve the deployment of personnel; it is the role of the executive acting on competent professional military advice.

Stephen Conroy (Victoria, Australian Labor Party, Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Labor will not be supporting Senator Siewert's motion to require parliamentary approval for the deployment of forces to Syria. I have, as have my predecessors, explained our reasons for this on a number of occasions. The reasons I give today will be consistent with the reasons I have spoken about before.

I would like to begin by expressing my support for the ADF personnel currently involved in operations throughout the world. They are doing great work and, as always, they are undertaking their tasks with great professionalism.

It is the role of parliament to debate issues of concern and to act as a focal point for discussions which take place in the Australian community. That role is particularly important when we are discussing issues like the deployment of Australian Defence Force personnel. As I have said, Labor fully supports the role of parliament as a place of debate. This is why, when Labor announced its support yesterday for the extension of Operation Okra into Syrian airspace, we called on the government to outline to parliament their long-term strategy for the defence of Iraq and to allow for appropriate parliamentary discussion.

Richard Di Natale (Victoria, Australian Greens) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

How is that going?

Scott Ludlam (WA, Australian Greens) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

They don't have one!

Stephen Conroy (Victoria, Australian Labor Party, Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I am not going to miss out on drawing attention to the fact that that has not happened. The government has previously given commitments that it would keep parliament updated on national security matters. It has been a while since we have had an update, so I do again call on the government to come into the chamber, outline developments, outline the reasoning and allow a debate to take place in the parliament. I said yesterday that the parliament, the community, the people of Australia all want the government to do the right thing—to come in and have the discussion in both chambers of parliament and allow all political points of view to be expressed. It would be a robust debate. There would be many differing points of view. But this country would be better off if those opposite kept their word—the promise given by the former Minister for Defence in this chamber that they would give regular updates. I again urge the government, in the spirit of bipartisanship, to come in and keep their promise.

This requirement should not, however, be confused with requiring parliamentary approval. The role of the parliament in approving military action is fraught with danger. The government must retain maximum flexibility to respond to threats to Australia's national security quickly and efficiently. Requiring a statement from the government prior to deploying ADF personnel and assets could unnecessarily increase the risk to the deployment. Furthermore, the government of the day has access to classified information which this parliament does not and, given the nature of that information, cannot have. Australia's defence and national security agencies provide information to the government which must remain secret for a whole range of reasons, including the safety and security of our ADF personnel. A requirement for parliamentary approval could also create situations where ADF personnel are deployed to a warlike environment without appropriate legal authority or important legal protections.

In 2010 Adam Bandt introduced a bill on this very issue. It was referred to the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade. The committee report highlighted a number of deficiencies with the operation of the bill in practice, deficiencies which—to this day, five years later—have still not been addressed. The Senate committee found that the 2010 bill 'leaves too many critical questions unanswered' and 'may have unforeseen and unfortunate consequences'. Executive government remains the most appropriate body to exercise civilian control of the Australian Defence Force.

The Greens do themselves a great disservice trying to conflate these two issues. It is appropriate for the parliament to debate government decisions that involve the deployment of ADF personnel, but that should be done in a considered way. I recommend to the Greens that they read the Labor views from that Senate committee. If they have not read them, they should. They contain some excellent contributions from some of my current and former colleagues. We will not support this motion and we urge the Senate to reject it.

Richard Di Natale (Victoria, Australian Greens) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Before I begin on the substance of Australia's involvement in Syria, I will refer directly to Senator Siewert's motion, which talks about the need for parliamentary approval before there is any intervention in Syria. The question is whether we should be having a full, frank and open debate in parliament and whether we should require parliamentary approval before there is any intervention.

I reflect on the time I have spent in this place and on some of the debates we have had. I think about the narrow, partisan debates; I think about the 'matter of public importance' debates that are nothing more than an opportunity for one side of politics to attack the other; and I think about question time and the time wasted with dorothy dixers and non-answers. I think about all that enormous waste of time in this parliament—and then I think how now we have an opportunity to discuss something of huge importance, something that involves risking the lives of Australian men and women in the name of an intervention that might make Australia itself a target. In the words of Clive Williams, adjunct professor at Macquarie University:

In the words of Clive Williams, adjunct professor at Macquarie University:

The more we do militarily in the Middle East against IS and announce it publicly, the more likely it is that its acolytes will try to mount attacks in Australia or against Australians in Muslim countries.

So let us be clear about what is at stake here. What is at stake are the lives of Australian service men and women, and there is the potential to increase the likelihood of all of us in Australia being targets, not to mention the countless civilian deaths that may be sacrificed as a result of Australia's involvement, and yet we are denying the Australian people an opportunity to hear debate in this the Australian parliament. It is remarkable that we would prioritise some of those inconsequential issues that take up our time in this parliament and yet deny parliamentarians elected here to represent the people an opportunity to hear about why it is so critical that we put those lives at risk and why we potentially make Australia a target for terrorists. It is utterly remarkable. Making a decision like this is subject to all sorts of influences. It is always difficult to be clear about the motives of people in this place and I do not for a moment intend to contribute specific motives to anyone, but the mere fact that it is possible that a Prime Minister could use a conflict like this in order to further their own political self-interest—just the fact that it is possible—is reason alone for us to ensure that this is a debate of the parliament and are not a captain's call.

So far we have heard that this is a conflict of questionable legal basis. We understand that in fact it may be possible that what we are witnessing here is an illegal intervention. A number of people have indicated that there is no sound legal basis for our involvement. What we may see is that ultimately Australians who are involved in this conflict are forced before the International Criminal Court to justify their actions. Michael Cornish, the Australian academic and former lecturer in peace at the University of Adelaide, says:

Any Australian intervention in Syria would clearly be illegal under international law. The practical benefits of bombing Syria are limited, if any.

He then goes on to talk about the moral debate. So we have academics and people who have had experience in international law questioning the mere legality of this conflict. When we look at what we do know about what the government has indicated about its strategy, we realise that we know very little. We do not know about the numbers of people involved or the time that will be involved. We have heard conflicting accounts—we hear two or three years on the one hand, from the defence minister, and we hear a commitment that is open-ended from the Prime Minister—as long as it takes. It is scary because we have heard those words before and we know where they have taken us. We have not had any discussion about the costs of this conflict. We have had no discussion about the alternatives and whether alternatives have been considered. We do not know what success looks like. It has been argued that success looks like an end to the genocide, but what does that mean? What is an end to the genocide? The Prime Minister says that success looks like an end to terrorism being exported overseas. What does that mean? How on earth do we judge whether we have had success when we do not know what success really looks like? There is no exit strategy. There is no strategy overall. It does bring back memories of the debate we had on the intervention in the Iraq War, and it feels very much like we are going into another conflict with no plan and no clear exit strategy, potentially making a bad situation much worse. We only have to look at what other parliaments around the world do. In the UK parliament—a democracy not unlike ours—the Canadian parliament and the French parliament there has been frank and open debate before any commitment has been made to sacrifice service men and women in the name of this sort of conflict.

Let us talk about the substance of what we do know, let us talk about the substance of this military intervention, and let us look at what a number of people who have been contributing to the public debate have said. My colleague Senator Ludlam has said already that former foreign minister Gareth Evans has made it very clear that he believes, in a way that only he could frame it, that 'trying to drain the Middle East swamps through military action is, we should know by now, more likely than not to be counterproductive.'

So what are the alternatives? We do know that there have been a number of commentators and groups who are turning to the notion of de-escalation through local ceasefires, and we have seen some progress in that area. That progress is moving slowly, but what we are seeing now is that as that occurs and as we move towards a potential freeze the potential for political reconciliation has increased. Only last month Turkey and Iran were involved in negotiating a 48-hour ceasefire in Zabadani, which was a rebel-held a town near the Lebanese border. So the most realistic short-term policy goal in Syria is to find ways to limit the areas of that country that are in direct conflict, with the aim of containing extremist violence and ultimately finding a path towards stability in those regions.

It needs to be reinforced by a number of other measures. We need to ensure that there is international economic assistance. That is absolutely critical. And of course we have to redouble our efforts towards a political solution in Syria. The only way, in the words of one commentator, to wind down the conflict, is through an negotiated settlement involving all the regional powers. And let us not kid ourselves: what is going on here right now is a global power play. This is a proxy war for much bigger actors. We have the Assad regime, which is backed by Russia and Iran. We have them against the Gulf dictatorships. And we have Turkey and Western powers, which have backed myriad rebel groups. It is absolutely critical that we negotiate a settlement between those actors before we contemplate military intervention that is doomed to fail. We need to ensure that we strengthen our multilateral institutions. We need to look at a regional arms embargo to prevent weapons from going into the wrong hands. Why is it that there has been so little focus on penalties for purchasing the illicit oil that funds Islamic State? It is ironic, too, that in these conflicts it is harder to get your hands on food than on guns. We absolutely need to focus on those international borders.

We need to strengthen our international law. It would be wonderful if instead of having a coalition of the willing bearing arms we had a coalition of the willing prepared to rebuild international legal and democratic institutions. It is just so critical. We could do that without adding to civilian casualties, which will be a result of this intervention, further destabilising the Middle East. Let us have a United Nations arms embargo. Let us ensure that military supplies and logistical support for both Damascus and opposition forces are restricted. We have to stop the flow of weapons. There is cause for hope. The nuclear deal in Iran came out of the blue, unexpectedly. It shows that the United States, Russia and the Iranians, despite their conflict, despite the tension, can work together to achieve an outcome if they all believe that it is in their own national interest.

We have to work towards a political resolution within Iraq. One of the great mistakes within Iraq was to ensure the exclusion of the Sunnis from the political structures. An inclusive government means ensuring that all groups within that society are represented. The real question about the strategy of Iraq is not about defeating ISIS. That is an important outcome, but to get there we need to build an Iraqi society and politics that is inclusive of all groups, not just the Shiites but also the Sunnis and Kurds. We absolutely need to do that. We need political reform in that nation. And we have to empower the Sunni community to engage with their government rather than push them away into the arms of IS.

The definition of insanity is going the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result. The Global Terrorism Index 2014 found that despite all of our efforts, despite the focus on counter-terrorism and on military intervention, the level of global terrorist activity has greatly increased in the last decade. We are making things worse. Now is the time to pause, to reflect and to change tack. We have to ensure that we do not simply respond with more indiscriminate violence, which has the tendency to worsen conflict rather than to ameliorate it. Our responses typically neglect those long-term sustainable solutions that involve and respond to the concerns, priorities, and potential of the conflict-affected population.

I mentioned earlier the flow of arms. One concrete thing we can do is focus on the Turkish border. Turkey, which is a NATO member, has to do more to stop jihadists who cross into Syria. The Turkish border is now known as the jihadist highway. It is the only way to smuggle oil, to smuggle weapons and to smuggle foreign fighters into Iraq and Syria. It is absolutely critical that we use our influence and the influence of our major ally, the US, to ensure that we stem the flow of weapons and fighters across the Turkish border. IS supplies are largely being funded by the sale of captured oil. We need to ensure that we focus on that border. In Kuwait the terrorism financing that has occurred because there are very weak financial controls has resulted in hundreds of millions of dollars being funded to various Syrian rebel groups, including ISIS. We should be focusing on that and ensuring that we do something about Kuwait's banking system and financial system, because its money changers have long been a huge issue and a major conduit for money to extremist groups. That is absolutely critical.

I will finish by talking about our relationship with our major ally, the US. There are serious questions here about whether we invited this intervention—that is, requested of the US that we become involved. We still do not know that. That is why a frank and open debate is so necessary. Why would we invite our participation in a conflict where we know there are alternatives and where we know the costs are so high?

It does bring into question what the role of an ally is. What is it about the relationship that we have with the US that makes Australians safer and that makes the world a safer place? It does not mean following the US blindly into conflict simply because they ask us to, and it does not mean asking them to be involved in a conflict because potentially it provides some political dividend. There are significant political, financial and military costs associated with that relationship. The role of an ally is to ensure that when you think they are making a mistake you let them know. To be an equal partner in a relationship means attempting to use your power and influence in that relationship to stop people from making mistakes, rather than simply following people blindly into conflicts that have the potential to exacerbate what is an already significant unfolding humanitarian catastrophe. And we do need to recognise that it is time that we played a more constructive role in the world through a more independent, non-aligned foreign policy that puts the national interest and the global interest ahead of the interests of one of our major allies.

There are few things more important than committing men and women to a conflict where they risk their lives and the lives of others. There could be no more important thing to be debating in the nation's parliament than that very question, and that is precisely why this nation sits before the parliament. It is to the great shame of both the government and the opposition that they have prevented this motion from taking effect and not ensuring that this is a debate and a decision that is made by the Australian parliament rather than by a captain's call made by a besieged Prime Minister on the back of limited information, with no plan and no strategy.

David Fawcett (SA, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to address this issue in two ways. One is around the principle of whether the parliament or the executive should approve the deployment of our forces. I note that the Democrats, then the Greens, and then the Greens again—and now I think the Greens for the third time—have put bills into this place dealing with this issue. In fact, it has been the subject of a Senate inquiry in the past. The second part I will deal with is the topic of Syria itself and Australia's decision to extend our current operations from the Iraq area of operations across the border into eastern Syria.

I have spoken in this place before in response to the Green's contention that the parliament should be the one which authorises forces to serve outside the territorial limits of Australia. The bill they put up previously proposed that the ADF not be permitted to serve outside the territorial limits of Australia except in accordance with a resolution agreed to by each house of the parliament or in accordance with a number of specific circumstances. They went through a number of those circumstances, but also had some provisions for emergency situations where the Governor-General can proclaim that an emergency exists that may require ADF service.

As I said, that concept has been put forward before on a number of occasions. When the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee examined the bill by the Democrats, when Senator Faulkner was the Minister the Defence, they came up with a number of concerns as to the practicality of that occurring. I would encourage people who have an interest in this matter to read that report. It was a comprehensive report. It had issues such as, for example, the decisions that are made by the executive using classified and sensitive intelligence and the disclosure of that intelligence. They said it:

… may well compromise an operation and the safety of Australian forces or those of their allies.

They go on to say:

On the other hand, the committee contends that if such information were necessarily withheld from the Parliament, then those required under the proposed legislation to make critical decisions about the deployment of forces would not be fully informed—an equally concerning situation for the security of the nation and its forces.

These are two very simple and easy-to-understand concerns with this issue.

I say that as someone who is privileged to serve at the moment on the parliament's Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, where we do get access to a range of information from the various security agencies. And as we come into the public inquiries and debates in this place, it is often difficult to convey a sense of why, and the importance of, certain actions without being able to speak freely about that information. That is why the parliament does put in place smaller groups which are cleared to have access to that information, so that they can make a decision—an informed decision—on the behalf of the parliament, who are the representatives of the people of Australia.

We have just seen recently that Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security fulfilling that function quite effectively with the citizenship bill so that we achieve a balance in the legislation between the national security requirement to give agencies the powers they need with the things that characterise Australia as being an open and fair society where individual liberties are respected.

We will step up a scale: it is that same principle that is employed by having the National Security Committee of cabinet. So, the executive are the ones who, under our Constitution, provide the advice to the Governor-General around the passage of legislation. But they also make executive decisions around the deployment of Australian forces. It is for the same reason that that group—the National Security Committee of cabinet—can receive detailed, informed briefings on sensitive and classified information which will give them the context and the understanding of the consequences of action and, equally, the consequences of inaction.

They also understand the costs and benefits, in terms of global outcomes, national outcomes and the expenditure of revenue associated with each of those actions, and many of those things cannot be discussed in a public space. That is why that system, which works well, was set up, and why there is no requirement in the Constitution or the defence legislation for parliamentary involvement in most acts of declaring war or deploying troops. As outlined in a Parliamentary Library paper:

… the power to make war, deploy troops and declare peace – are now part of the executive power of the Commonwealth exercised by the Governor-General on the advice of the Federal Executive Council or responsible ministers. Contemporary practice, however, is that decisions to go to war or deploy troops are matters for the Prime Minister and Cabinet and do not involve the Governor-General or the Federal Executive Council.

Since the establishment of the National Security Committee of cabinet in 1996, this body is the primary body that has access to all the classified information and briefs from departments. They then make the decision on behalf of the government. That is the Australian system.

We have heard in the discussion today and in previous debates claims that the parliaments of peer nations provide this function. Let me turn to a few of our key peers—the Canadians, for example. Under Canadian constitutional law:

The Federal Cabinet can, without parliamentary approval or consultation, commit Canadian forces to action abroad, whether in the form of a specific current operation or possible future contingencies resulting from international treaty obligations. Under the Canadian Constitution [Constitution Act, 1867, sections 15 and 19], command of the armed forces … is vested in the Queen and exercised in her name by the federal Cabinet acting under the leadership of the Prime Minister.

So Canada still has the same executive power that is exercised here in Australia. Let me turn to New Zealand:

The formal right to declare war was clearly part of the Royal Prerogative inherited from Great Britain in 1840 and it remains an acknowledged part of New Zealand law. Defence and wartime prerogatives include the right to declare war and peace, and the deployment and armament of defence forces.

The Royal Prerogative is primarily exercised by the Governor-General on the advice of elected ministers or executive by authority of the Letters Patent Constituting the Office of the Governor-General of New Zealand 1983.

Let us look at the UK, a case which has frequently been quoted recently:

The deployment of troops and the issuing of orders to engage in hostilities are matters of Royal Prerogative, exercisable by Ministers. The Government has liberty of action in this field, and Parliament need not give its approval.

…   …   …

Since 2003 there have been calls for aspects of the Royal Prerogative, including the monarch’s war powers, to be codified and subject to parliamentary scrutiny.

A draft bill to modify the UK legislation is before the House of Lords, but it is far narrower than the legislation which has been presented on several occasions in this place. It applies only to decisions by the government to authorise the use of force by UK forces if that is both outside the UK and regulated by the laws of armed conflict. At this stage it is still only a draft before the House of Lords. The decision of Prime Minister Cameron to seek in-principle support from the House of Commons in 2013 was a decision he made and accepted. But he used his discretion to do that. The UK government is not bound to do that by their law.

In the United States the constitution, under article I, section 8, clause 11:

… grants to Congress the power to declare war, to raise and support armies, and to provide and maintain a navy.

While the President is made the commander-in-chief of the armed forces under article II, section 2, clause 1, the specific power to deploy US armed forces is covered by the War Powers Resolution 1973, also known as the War Powers Act. That resolution imposes on the President the following:

The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances …

Well, like in a lot of areas of politics, these things are not necessarily agreed. 'Every possible instance' and 'consult' are not defined by the resolution and have been interpreted in different ways at different times by different parties. Notably, the term 'consult' does not equate to the approval of Congress, a matter that is being put before the Senate today. Many US presidents have claimed that the war powers resolution is an unconstitutional infringement on their authority as commander-in-chief and have refused to be bound by it. The US courts, likewise, have been reluctant to accept jurisdiction in matters seeking to enforce the resolution, asserting that it is a political rather than a judicial matter. In one case in 2003, a judge of the District Court:

… rejected the contention that the president must have congressional authority to order American forces into combat by saying 'Case law makes clear that the Congress does not have the exclusive right to determine whether or not the United States engages in war'.

It is fairly clear that Australia has a system that is not unlike most of our peers—Canada, the UK, the US and New Zealand—whereby the executive, for very practical reasons, has the authority to make informed and timely decisions.

I come now to the topic of Syria. The discussion that has occurred in the last few days in terms of Australia's commitment to extend our air operations into Syria would almost have you believe that we had decided to redeploy the AIF and invade the Middle East. In practical terms, as the CDF mentioned during the media conference the other day, the difference this extension makes is that the sorties that go into Iraq will either divert about 10 degrees left of track, or go 50 or 100 miles further north of their current area of operation.

If you look at the map, you will see that the eastern part of Syria comes across the northern part of Iraq. The practicalities on the ground are that Daesh know that our rules of engagement are tight because we have a policy of not inflicting civilian casualties. They know that they can avoid the containing airpower of the Allies in two ways. The first way is by embedding their fighters amongst civilians. We have seen that before, in Gaza, and its horrific consequences for civilians. People commit horrific war crimes by doing that.

They also know that, under the current rules of engagement, if they withdraw across the border—and, bear in mind, we are talking about a desert where, in practical terms, the border does not exist—like crossing the chamber here, a certain number of participants in the allied action cannot prosecute action against them. This means that, if you are notified of a target and, by the time you get your asset in place, that target has driven 100 yards further on, you cannot legally attack it. This means that we no longer give people who have been wreaking havoc in Iraq the option of seeking refuge by driving 200 yards across the border. It is not a significant force going to invade Syria. We are talking about a very pragmatic extension of the area of operations to avoid the situation where forces who have been either conducting combat operations or providing logistics support within Iraq can seek refuge by just crossing the border, waiting for the aircraft to leave and coming back and do it all again. I do not see that that can be criticised in any way in that it is a very common sense extension of the rules of engagement of our forces there so that they can effectively reduce, or hopefully destroy, the military capability of Daesh.

The fact that we are doing this is legal—that was covered off today by the Attorney-General—under the principles of collective self-defence and the four requirements that are laid out under international law. All four of those requirements are met in this case. So it is legal, it is practical, in terms of avoiding people seeking refuge, and it does not expose our forces to any greater danger in that kind of operation just into eastern Syria than their current operations do. Obviously, if they were to go deep into Syria where Assad's forces are and where Russian forces are potentially moving in, that would be a different scenario, but that is not what is being proposed. It is important that people realise the limitation that has been placed on the area of operation that is being considered, or has been decided on, in this case.

The last part I want to talk about is principle. Senator Di Natale might be surprised by this, but I agree with him: the long-term solution is not just about Daesh; it is about all the forces that are acting in that region: the Assad forces, the regime, the Sunni majority, the plethora of opposition groups, the external actors who are taking part in that. But no amount of talk here and no amount of goodwill here is necessarily going to bring those parties to the table immediately. Hopefully it will happen one day—probably with the exception of Daesh, who I do not believe are actually inclined to negotiate with anyone—but it does not happen overnight.

The Greens mentioned the treaty with Iran and said it occurred out of the blue. It was hardly out of the blue. A lot of nations worked at that for a long period of time, with many extensions before that finally occurred. The question practically is: if we strive for that goal—and I do not see that we are militarily going to be able to impose a solution to a problem that has been inherent in this part of the world for centuries—it is going to take a period of time. Just as we look back at situations like Rwanda and the genocide that occurred there, there is collective guilt in the United Nations—recognised by Mr Ban when he spoke at the 20th anniversary—that the UN could have and should have done more to prevent that genocide. We cannot wait for a month, a year or five years. How long will it take before those parties to come together if they have had these tensions for centuries? Therefore, just as we look back and say, 'Why didn't we do more in Rwanda?' we are saying here that, as a minimum, we will not give Daesh the freedom to roam at will and form into large groups to conduct major military operations. Clearly, they are still there and they are still active. They embed themselves with the civilian population. But we have managed to degrade their capabilities and, particularly, degrade their ability to form large military-like organisations to use indirect firepower indiscriminately by application of air power. Every time we have seen a recognisable target, we have been able to interdict and destroy that target.

The mission here is about saying, 'What can we do at reasonable risk to degrade Daesh while the very things that Senator Di Natale talked about are occurring? How do we stop the flow of oil and arms across the Turkish border? How do we stop the recruitment of foreign fighters?' The Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security visited the US, the UK and France in dealing with this whole topic. That visit highlighted that one of the key things that attracts Australians, Americans and Europeans of the Muslim faith to go over there to fight is the very existence of the Islamic State. It is seen as fulfilling a destiny.

Ways to degrade Daesh include stopping oil and stopping the flow of arms, but also one must stop the flow of fighters. Clearly, the more we can degrade their military capability and degrade their presence on the ground the more we create an environment where perhaps the other parties can negotiate for peace. But it is important to understand that the context of the motion that has been put forward by the Greens is that, for very good reason, it is the executive and not the parliament—not only here but in the countries of our allies—who make these decisions. The decision to go into Syria is not a huge step from where we have been and it is occurring for very good and practical reasons. Our whole presence there is not just mindlessly lobbing bombs; it is to say, 'What reasonable steps can we take to prevent genocide and the freedom of action of a particularly nasty force which this world will be well served to see the back of?' I will not be supporting this motion.

Nick McKim (Tasmania, Australian Greens) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

It is a very timely debate that we are having in this house today. I rise to strongly support the motion that, prior to any decision to send Australia into foreign conflict or war, this parliament should be placed in a position to endorse that decision and have veto over any decision. We are having this debate today in the context of an announcement very recently by the Prime Minister that Australia would, through aerial bombing, engage in the Syrian conflict. What was lacking from the Prime Minister's announcement was any strategic objective and any exit strategy. In fact, it is entirely accurate to say that the Prime Minister has no plan and no idea of what he actually intends to achieve through this armed intervention.

In Australia's Westminster system the authority of executive government flows from the parliament, not the other way around. To put that another way, it is the parliament that is sovereign over government in this country. You cannot form a government unless you have the numbers to do so in the House of Representatives. If you acknowledge the simple fact that parliament is sovereign over government, you then have to ask yourself: isn't it reasonable that the biggest and most important decisions that are made in this country are ultimately made by the parliament? It is this parliament which decides who forms government and it is this parliament which should decide whether Australia goes to war.

The current situation in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East is highly complex and has a range of contributing factors. No-one here is denying that. We have a brutal regime in terms of the Assad regime but we also have long-term causal factors including a lengthy drought which displaced many hundreds of thousands of people in the eastern Mediterranean area. As I mentioned in my inaugural speech we also have findings from the US National Academy of Sciences which conclude that long-term climate influences have played a causal role in the Syrian conflict. When you have complex causal factors that have led to civil war, rampant human rights abuses and large-scale civil dislocation there is a strong argument for a robust, comprehensive process to determine whether this country should involve itself in that region militarily.

There have been a number of arguments raised in rebuttal of the Greens' position today. I want to rebut those rebuttals because, frankly, many of them do not take into account the realities of the situation. Firstly, we often hear the argument that decisions to go to war or enter into armed conflict need to be made quickly. The desirability of speed in these contexts is often vastly overrated. In fact, when the decisions are around entering into armed conflict or going into war the Greens would prefer that a correct decision were made rather than a fast decision. We would prioritise a correct decision over a quick one.

It is undoubtedly true that there are doubts over the legalities of this decision by the Prime Minister. The Greens absolutely agree with Paul Barratt, a former secretary of the Department of Defence, who recently said that the parliament should require an opinion from the Solicitor-General to be tabled in this place to reassure members of both houses of this parliament that the action being taken is actually legal.

As our leader, Richard Di Natale, said in his contribution to this debate, the simple fact that a decision to go to war, to commit Australian armed forces to war, can be made in the Prime Minister's political self-interest is enough of an argument to require that that decision come before the parliament. Frankly, it is an outrageous scenario that in this country someone who has the good fortune to be made Prime Minister can in his own political self-interest, or that of his political party, decide to commit Australia to war. It is something that we need to address.

I also want to rebut the accusation we heard from the Leader of the Government in the Senate, Senator Abetz, during question time this afternoon that, somehow, a questioning of the decision making mechanism in this context is somehow an attack on the men and women who serve in the Australian Defence Force. That argument is the last refuge of the weak. It is the last refuge of the political scoundrel. It goes to show how absolutely unable Senator Abetz was, this morning, to make a rebuttal to the Greens suggestion. This is in no way a reflection on the capacity of the men and women of the ADF. In fact it is a reflection of the Greens respect for the men and women of the ADF because, when you make a decision to commit Australia to war, you are making a decision to place the men and women of the ADF in an extremely dangerous position. We owe it to them and we owe it to their families to ensure that we have a robust decision-making process before we make a decision to commit them to danger. The Greens have an absolute respect for what the men and women of the ADF do. We just want to make sure that they are not unnecessarily committed to war and conflict that places them in more danger than they otherwise would be.

Senator Conroy, in his contribution, said that he wanted the government to explain to this parliament what its plan is and what its exit strategy is. We agree with Senator Conroy that that should occur. There are two major problems of course with that. Firstly, the government does not have a plan or an exit strategy in relation to Syria but, secondly, what Senator Conroy is calling for is an after-the-fact process not a before-the-fact process. That is where the Greens very strongly differ from the position of the ALP in relation to this matter. We strongly believe that before any decision is made and as part of that decision-making process the parliament needs to have a capacity to determine whether or not Australia should enter armed conflicts or war.

Ultimately a parliamentary debate and decision would enhance, significantly, the legitimacy of any deployments or war that Australia entered into. That is very important. Because we are the representatives of the people in this place I would hope that all members of this chamber would want a majority of the Australian people to back any decision to deploy into conflict or war overseas. Parliamentary approval would give legitimacy to a decision and it would remove the capacity of people to allege that a decision to go into a war or into an armed conflict was made out of political self-interest or political expediency.

There are many matters that come before this parliament. There are matters that many would think of as relatively trivial and there are matters which are of the absolute highest import. The decisions that we are talking about today fall clearly into that latter category. They are amongst the most serious and significant decisions that can be made. They are decisions that can expose, not only members of the ADF, but ultimately in the long term every Australian citizen to more danger. Because these decisions can expose every Australian citizen to more danger they ought to be made in the parliament which ultimately is accountable to the people through the ballot box.

The Greens have said consistently that we have extreme concerns over the decision the Prime Minister has made to commit us in Syria. We believe he has absolutely no plan. We believe he has absolutely no strategic objective. We believe he has absolutely no exit strategy. We basically believe the Prime Minister does not know what he is doing. I have to say that it strikes me that the Prime Minister has made this decision primarily so that he could be seen to be doing something even though he has no plan, no strategic objective and no exit strategy.

Ultimately we need to start talking seriously about peace in that region. We need to start getting people together, sitting down and talking about how we are going to remove or mitigate some of the causal issues that have led to this conflict. As I said at the start of my contribution, this is an extremely complex scenario. There are a range of causal factors here. Ultimately, if you are not sitting down and talking about peace, then you are not going to achieve peace. When people pick up guns and get into planes to drop bombs, that is a step away from the peace that every human has a fundamental right to and that every human hopes for.

It is very easy for us to sit in this place, but we need to put ourselves in the shoes of the men, the women and the children who are, right now, cowering in their houses, who are, right now, afraid to go outside and who are, right now, wondering what their long-term future is. We all need to put ourselves into the shoes of those people and ask ourselves: is an Australian intervention in an armed conflict with no strategic objective, no plan and no exit strategy the right way to go here? When you make these big decisions, you need to ensure you have adequate checks and balances. That is a fundamental principle of any democracy. In the Greens' view, leaving a decision like this in the hands of a Prime Minister does not provide the necessary checks and balances.

A further rebuttal that has been made today is around the confidentiality of sources of information and the difficulty in placing it before parliament. They seem to manage that all right in the congress in the United States. They seem to manage that okay in the United Kingdom, where matters similar to this have in fact been brought before the parliament. I would say that information that supports any argument that Australia should go to war or should enter into an armed conflict absolutely ought to be able to be provided to parliament. Maybe it needs to be de-identified in some way to protect sources or to protect people who are operating on behalf of Australia, but we believe that it can be done and that that argument also has little or no merit.

Ultimately and fundamentally, this is about whether or not you believe that parliament is sovereign over government or the other way around. Clearly, parliament is sovereign in this country. So I am very proud to support the motion before the Senate. It is worth pointing out, in the context of Syria, that we are now being committed by Mr Abbott to enter into a conflict which ultimately risks making the situation worse. It is worth remembering that it certainly will put men and women serving in the ADF at greater danger than they otherwise would have been. For those reasons and the other reasons that the Greens have articulated today, we absolutely need in this country a process such as that exists in the United States and many other countries, where the parliaments get an opportunity to debate and determine whether their countries should enter into war and armed conflict.

Linda Reynolds (WA, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I too rise to speak on this motion. Twelve months ago, I rose in this place to speak on the Defence Legislation Amendment (Parliamentary Approval of Overseas Service) Bill 2014, and, 12 months later, I am here to speak on the same issue again. Twelve months after this place first addressed this issue, our Constitution has not changed but Australia is facing an increased and heightened challenge posed by stateless enemies—by Daesh. It is not just the people of Australia who face this grave threat; it is also the millions of Syrians and Iraqis who have been displaced and who now need protection from Daesh.

There is no greater responsibility for any elected national government than to keep the nation safe and secure and in making the decision to utilise military personnel in a wide range of roles, both domestically and overseas. Under our Constitution, the decision to deploy troops is clearly the responsibility of the executive, which is elected by the Australian voters and accountable to them through the parliament. Additionally, our military forces are accountable to the executive and to the Crown, not to the parliament. I believe it is not within the spirit of our Constitution, and it certainly was not the intent of our founding fathers, after many decades of very considered debate, that executive government would ever consider abrogating its responsibility for the serious decision to deploy Australian defence forces in harm's way. Ultimately, in our Constitution and in our country today—in our parliamentary democracy—that is what our executive has been charged with.

Personally, I willingly, and certainly knowingly, have served under both Labor and coalition governments in uniform. Throughout my nearly 30 years in uniform, I always understood and accepted that the government of the day, regardless of its party affiliations, was responsible for making decisions that impacted on not only my service but also the men and women I served with. I knew that would possibly impact on my life itself. While I was never deployed, I always knew that I could be—in fact, I still could be. I had absolutely every confidence, again, regardless of who was in government, that the executive would take the right decision and that it would take into consideration everything that needed to be before it made that decision.

I firmly believe that the Commonwealth Constitution is the birth certificate of our nation. It has operated very successfully for over 100 years and it does provide for the separation of power in Australia between the Commonwealth and the states and between the arms of our government. Chapter I of the Constitution sets out the powers of the Australian parliament and chapter II addresses the executive government. Section 51(vi) of the Constitution gives the Commonwealth the power to make laws with respect to:

… naval and military defence of the Commonwealth and of the several States, and the control of the forces to execute and maintain the laws of the Commonwealth;

In addition, as far as I can see there is no requirement in our Constitution or in any of our defence legislation for parliamentary decisions in most, if not all, aspects of declaring war and the engagement and deployment of our troops. Indeed, former royal prerogatives, including the power to make war, deploy troops and declare peace, are now part of the executive power of the Commonwealth, exercised by the Governor-General on the advice of the Federal Executive Council or the responsible ministers. Contemporary practice is that decisions to go to war or deploy troops are matters for the Prime Minister and for cabinet and do not directly involve in the decision-making process the Governor-General or the Executive Council.

Since the establishment of the National Security Committee of Cabinet in 1996 by John Howard and his government, this body has proven to be the most influential and the most knowledgeable in considering any Australian government decision to commit the Australian Defence Force personnel to the domestic operations or overseas deployments. I see absolutely nothing in the Commonwealth Constitution or, as I said, in defence legislation that requires the executive to engage in a debate or a vote in parliament before committing military force. In fact, parliamentary committees have previously found quite the opposite. For example, in 2010 the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee published a report on the Defence Legislation Amendment (Parliamentary Approval of Overseas Service) Bill 2014. That Senate report highlighted several very significant concerns with potential parliamentary involvement in decisions on the deployment of ADF personnel overseas.

There are three main concerns that greatly troubled me with this proposal and the committee highlighted very genuine concerns about the disclosure of sensitive or classified information. They also raised concerns with the lack of responsiveness and a lack of ability of the parliament to respond quickly, particularly when confronted with the dynamic battle spaces that we have these days and how things need decisions very quickly. They also identified that there was a lack of clarity around when the bill would apply and when these circumstances could be evoked.

That was in 2014 and I do not thing anything has changed since then. In fact, I think the folly of this bill has actually been played out in many, many government decisions now dealing with Daesh and the consequences of their heinous behaviour. In fact, in the current security environment, the need for executive power over the use of military force is, as I said, more necessary than ever and the National Security Committee of Cabinet has proved to be a very effective and very adept organisation of this executive in making these decisions under both governments—this government and the previous government.

Threats can no longer be easily characterised. Even less than 50 years ago, it was still much easier to determine who a likely enemy might be. The armies of states dominated our security environment. But in the early period of the 21st century that we now find ourselves in, this is absolutely not the case. Stateless enemies and terrorists using asymmetric tactics are an ever increasing threat, as we are seeing daily in the Middle East and also now on our own shores. These threats demand the capacity to respond quickly and flexibly and routinely require operational security without the operational knowledge being out there in the general community and available to our enemies. All three of these criteria would be all but impossible to meet if the executive was required to gain the approval of parliament every time it were to commit, change or adapt the utilisation of our military forces.

When you start to unpack and explore the practical implementation of this proposal, there are many credible scenarios relating to why it is not appropriate to require a parliamentary vote to commit our forces overseas. One simple, but very powerful, example of this is to consider the situation of a prorogued parliament. If this legislation were to be in effect, it would be impossible to gain parliamentary approval and for quick and decisive military action to be taken. As one of my colleagues in the other place, Andrew Nikolic, noted recently, this situation has happened and is not hypothetical. In fact, it was August 1914 when Australia went to war. At that time, federal parliament was prorogued. The government of Prime Minister Joseph Cook had been elected with a majority of one and a hostile senate went to a double dissolution election in June 1914. Imagine the circumstance in 1914 if the executive had not been able to meet around that wonderful table, which is now at the National Archives, and quickly made the decisions that needed to be made. Clearly, it was not in the national interest then for this sort of requirement to be in place, just as it is not in the national interest today.

Even when you have a look at the detail and even if parliament was not prorogued, having a look at how the practical circumstances and how the practical application would be, it would be almost impossible to implement. This would require a proclamation to be made. Consider a circumstance where the government does not want it known that forces are serving overseas for their own operational and personal security. Imagine a time when we have got a hostage rescue situation for the Australian forces in Iraq or Syria and we have got to mount a new operation—what do we do? Do we come to parliament? Do we discuss it here? Do we let our enemies know what we are doing? Time is of the essence. We may as well just post everything from the National Security Committee of Cabinet on our website here or set up a bulletin board to let our opponents and Daesh know what we are doing.

There is not only a high possibility but a very high probability that these requirements in practice—particularly in the current environment in the Middle Eastern area of operations that we are currently operating in—would put Australian service men and women in absolute physical danger. For example, the bill that the Greens put forward last year—which we debated at some extent last year—would require just that. Information on deployment would have to be provided to government within two days, even if forces are deploying on the pretences of secret intelligence or on information that cannot be publically shared.

I will just say that again. Just think about the implications for our service men and women of what the Greens proposed last year in that bill to give effect to this motion today: information on deployment would have to be provided to government within two days, even if forces are deploying on the pretence of secret intelligence or on information that cannot be publically shared. As I said, why don't we just put everything up on a bulletin board to say to Daesh and any other enemy in the future, 'Here we are, guys. This is what we're doing. We're coming to rescue our people. We're coming to do these military operations.' That is really not a very safe or a very smart environment.

That is not the only thing in their legislation last year that they wanted in their bill. They also wanted out there in the public: the reasons for the deployment, the geographical extent of the proposed deployment, the expected duration of the deployment and the number of members of the Defence Force proposed to be deployed. I cannot believe that they would actually want to disclose information that would tell our enemies in a conventional war, or in an asymmetrical war such as we are fighting with Daesh at the moment, where we are going, when we are going, how many troops we are going to deploy and how long we are going to be there. What else does the enemy need to know to actually defeat us when we finally hit the ground? It is the most ludicrous proposal. In my mind, it was ludicrous 12 months ago; but looking at the nature of the threat of Daesh today, it is even more fanciful. It is frightening to me that somebody would come into this place and put forward a bill—and now a motion—that says we should telegraph to our enemies what we are going to do, how we are going to do it, where we are going to deploy our troops, how many we are going to deploy and what equipment they are deploying with. That is the strategy for them to defeat us! I still find it unbelievable that anybody in this parliament would suggest such a thing.

This motion falls directly within the remit of findings of the joint standing committee, which identified three key concerns with this approach. It is worthy to note in this place and remind senators of what the parliamentary committee said.

Much of the information under consideration would be classified, for example risks to personnel, Defence or AFP assets, their strength and location, their force readiness, as well as the level of commitment and capabilities of likely allies, and the compatibility and complementarity of their forces. Clearly much of this information could not be disclosed and, if so, would have the potential to compromise the safety and security of any proposed operation or adversely affect diplomatic relations with potential allies.

It was not a coalition senator saying this. It was the parliamentary committee that reviewed the same proposal from the Greens last year. It was absolutely true then, and it was just as ludicrous then as it is today.

The Islamic State, or Daesh, is an enemy unlike anything we have ever faced. There is truly no way anybody can offer to hold hands with them, reason with them and talk messages of peace, because they do not understand that language. They do not respect compassion; they exploit it in the most horrifically gruesome ways—rape, roasting people alive on TV and other horrendous things. I think we heard today that they are not only selling their captives for sex; they are actually selling men and women into slavery. This is an enemy that cannot be treated lightly, and it cannot be treated in the same way that we may have treated our other enemies. We certainly will not win until Daesh is destroyed. We need to protect not only the Australian people but also the 11 million-plus displaced Syrians who will find no peace and no ability to go home until then. Daesh does not respect borders. They are not just in Iraq. They are also in Syria. It is essential for security in the Middle East and also for the Syrian refugees, the millions of displaced Syrians, that we go in and confront this enemy.

The ludicrousness of the Greens' bill last year, now reflected in this motion today, is that we would telegraph personnel details, Defence and other AFP assets—strengths, locations and force readiness—and the level of commitment and capabilities of our likely allies. So we would not only be telegraphing to Daesh, 'Here's who we are, here's where we are and this is how we're going to come and get you,' we would also be telegraphing our allies' information. They would not be our allies for very long, let me tell you. As I said, there is absolutely no other way to characterise the behaviour of these Islamic State and Daesh fighters. We have all seen the horrific photos and images of the pure evil that these people are capable of. They do not understand compassion; they exploit it in the most heinous ways.

The use of military force is never a decision to be taken lightly, but there is no other way to defeat ISIS and Daesh. There will always be risks, but sometimes there are risks in sitting back watching and waiting as the problem gets worse—with more people being killed, raped, beheaded, roasted alive and all of the things that Daesh is now doing quite publicly and wants the whole world to see. There is no other way for many millions of Syrians to be able to go back to their homes until IS, Daesh, has gone. Put in this context, I find it hard to see how Australia has any other choice than to involve itself with our allies. Operations do change and they have moved. The enemy has moved further into Syria. There is no question that, if we want to deal with Daesh, we have to go into Syria with our allies, not just leave them to do the heavy lifting on our behalf.

I fully believe that our intervention is humane and is on the side of the persecuted minorities who have been forced to flee their own homelands—those who have been lucky enough to survive. This is in conjunction with our allies and our partners. It is under the purview of the United Nations. While it may be centred on the Middle East, 10,000 kilometres away, it clearly has an impact on the security of Australians. It is incumbent upon all of us to do what is right to combat evil and to protect those who are at risk of violence and subjugation at the hands of people as evil as Daesh. As human beings it is our obligation not only to protect our own people but to do what we can to protect the people of Syria.

The Greens' opposition to the deployment of the Australian Defence Force in conflict zones is nothing new. We saw that with the bill they proposed last year. In fact, if my recollection is correct, one of my Greens colleagues who is currently in the Senate chamber said:

Terrorist is a word that is very commonly used against us by those same people in Iraq who have been radicalised.

And:

… anything that creates terror is, by definition, terrorism.

And:

Terrorism in the context of national security has a specific meaning. Anything that creates terror is not, by definition, terrorism.

My understanding of Senator Whish-Wilson's words at the time was that, given what we are doing to help the Iraqis and Syrians, our own men and women in uniform could be construed as terrorists. I found that offensive then, and I find it just as offensive today.

The decision to deploy members of the Australian Defence Force has consistently been regarded as a fundamental decision for the executive of the day. It has always been and always should be. (Time expired)

Peter Whish-Wilson (Tasmania, Australian Greens) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

It has been really refreshing that the coalition has put up some of its more sensible, rational and measured speakers for this debate today rather than the attack-dog whistle that we have seen in recent days from the likes of Senator Abetz—simply over the Greens daring to ask questions in the Australian parliament about a new deployment of our Defence personnel in a war zone. And I welcome that. That is what this is about. This is about having a debate and considering these things.

Last night at the UNHCR briefing organised by my colleague Senator Hanson-Young I heard a very emotional Tim Costello talk about the shame he personally felt after spending four years in the refugee camps around Syria, in Lebanon and in other places—his shame at not being able to convince the Australian public that this was catastrophic, an enormous crisis waiting to happen. And he was relieved last night that finally the penny had dropped. In fact, I think the words he used were that the bubble has now burst in the public consciousness on what is going on in the Middle East, especially around Syria. I think a lot of Australians like me are sitting at home now, watching TV, having discussions around barbecues, talking about these things and asking themselves the question: how did we get to this situation? It is fine for Senator Reynolds to come in here and misrepresent the views of this bill. If Senator Reynolds had been here she would know that the Greens have made it very clear in previous debates that this bill does not impact operational matters for the military; it is a debate about an initial deployment, under limited conditions—very much like what we have seen overseas.

What we also found out last night from the Reverend Tim Costello was that in a place like Syria, thanks to arms being smuggled in from, in his words, Russia and America, it is actually harder to put a banana in the hands of a Syrian than it is a weapon. His points were very poignant. He said that peace is the first line of defence but if you cannot have peace then aid should be the first line of defence. They are severely lacking in aid, but the world has woken up to the fact that in Syria and around Syria we now have a global crisis, a catastrophe, a human tragedy of proportions that we have not seen since the Second World War. We all acknowledge that, and we congratulated the government for listening to the Australian people and implementing an emergency refugee intake. But on the same day they did that, they could not resist making an announcement that they were extending the scope of Australian military operations in Syria.

Australians at their barbecues or having discussions around the dinner table will be asking: to what point has our military strategy got us up until now? How did it get to the point where four million people have had to flee? When we were speaking to our experts last night they also made it very clear that the reason we are seeing this exodus into places like Europe is that a lot of these refugees have actually given up hope that they can go home. The war has taken that long and has been that disruptive and destructive that they have given up hope, so they are now seeking a new life. This is the point we have to focus on.

At the end of his presentation to us last night, Amin Awad said something. He is the guy on the ground for UNHCR, the key guy in the Middle East who has to deal with this crisis, and I have to say, on R U OK Day, that I was looking at him last night on the TV—at the colour of his eyes, at the colour of his skin, at how tired he looked—and thinking what an incredible strain it would be to have his job. But what he said last night is very important. He said that for all the work UNHCR does, all the aid you can give them and all the refugees you can take, it is to no avail without a peace agreement. I asked him about that. I said that 'peace agreement' are two words that you will not hear in this country from this government. I asked what he meant by 'peace agreement': is there something afoot? Could he elaborate? And he said—and I must say, his answer was very terse, and I would have liked him to have elaborated a lot more—that what we need is global leadership, like we saw in Bosnia, where an impossible situation was resolved through a process that was no doubt long and convoluted. I have no doubt that Senator Fawcett's words tonight were on the money, that these things will not happen straightaway. But Amin Awad said that in Bosnia they had leadership, and eventually, through all sorts of coercions, including military action, a truce to cease fire was achieved.

It was good to hear this morning that at least Julie Bishop—unlike the other attack dogs in this government who love conflict in this parliament and in this society, who have relied on division for their polling numbers—engaged in this frame. And, as I think Senator Fawcett very poignantly pointed out to the parliament this afternoon, any long-term solution is of course going to have to go beyond military means and look at a whole range of different options, including geopolitical considerations, towards a peace agreement. But we have not actually had that conversation in this country, and it was only today, following the UNHCR briefing, that this actually entered our language. Julie Bishop talked this morning about the need, at the right time and the right place, for a peace agreement. At least we have got that far.

What have we achieved in this parliamentary debate today and by raising this in parliament yesterday? Thank you Senator Hanson-Young for organising an amazing forum last night. It had me close to tears when I actually realised the human catastrophe that is unfolding. I sometimes feel that putting a human face to this is the last thing our government wants us to see. Thank you for pointing that out, because like a lot of other Australians I am now awake to this and I am asking questions—where do we go from here?

When I did media this morning, I said that I do not know what a peace agreement would look like or if it is even feasible yet. But we need to start talking about how we can get a diplomatic solution to this crisis so that these people can return home and so their country can be rebuilt. If we start that conversation, no matter how brief and how stilted, at least we will have started it. I think a lot of other Australians are probably asking themselves the same thing, and they are saying that what we are doing now is not working.

Getting to the bill: I have experienced in this parliament a similar debate—or a tussle, a tug-of-war—between the executive and the parliament in the area of trade negotiations. I have learned from my experience that the big parties—Labor and Liberal—do not want to give up executive power, especially around treaties and the special powers the executive has under our Constitution. It is no different for war powers. What we are actually suggesting is eminently sensible for parliament: for each and every one of us to get up here and debate the deployment of our Defence personnel. Let me get it on record: the Greens support our Defence personnel. That is why we ask these questions, because we want to make sure that they are not being used as political tools or toys by any government and that they only go to war as a last resort—when it is absolutely necessary. That is what this is about.

As I said yesterday in this chamber, I believe that Defence personnel will respect the fact that there are people asking questions about this and asking for debate. We are not criticising them. I personally have an incredible amount of respect for all the Defence personnel that I know and have met. I save my contempt for a government that sends them into unnecessary and immoral wars. On that point, why are the Greens putting this motion up and asking this question? And why are Australians discussing this around the dinner table? Because they do not trust the executive to make these decisions. Not only did this government totally politicise national security in the last 12 months, with the help of the Murdoch press—I would dearly love to use a swear word on this next point, but I won't—but also they totally screwed up in 2003 by invading Iraq.

I read David Kilcullen's quarterly essay Blood Year and I recommend that everybody reads it to get the background to what Mr Kilcullen says. He was an expert, an Australian working with Condoleezza Rice in the US during the insurgency in Iraq. He makes it very clear what a total screw up it was, how unnecessary it was and how—and this is what I would like Senator Reynolds to have heard if she had been in the chamber—it led to the rise of Isis or Daesh, not to mention the deaths of hundreds and thousands, if not millions, of people. So excuse me for being sceptical about a government—a Liberal government—that took us to awar in 2003 that we did not need to have on the same proviso, the same messaging, that we are getting in this chamber today about eradicating and killing bad guys.

That sounds intuitive. I think all of us would like to see the end of Isis, but it did not work in 2003 when we got rid of Saddam Husain—that has backfired. Isis has made it very clear that they want us to go in and drop more bombs and they want us to commit soldiers—the likely escalation of this conflict. They are totally, criminally insane and mad. This is what they want, and this is what we are giving them. This is what they want; it is a brilliant recruiting tool.

I heard Senator Back, who I have a lot of respect for, as I heard Senator Fawcett, talk about the awful atrocities that Isis have perpetuated in the Middle East. I have to say today that I still do not get why those atrocities are so often and so clearly shown by elements of our media in this country and overseas, because that is also what Isis wants—making front page headlines with photographs of people being beheaded. I do not think that is a good thing. Why give these bastards what they want?

We are at a juncture here where it is right for Australians to be sceptical about our military involvement in Iraq. Any reasonable, rational person will be having doubts, and the only way we can deal with those doubts is to have a proper debate—a parliamentary debate—where we, as the elected representatives of the Australian people and in our positions of power, can put this on the record for them, because they are asking these questions.

Although I would love to take up my remaining time, I respect Senator Xenophon enough to know that he only has 10 minutes left before the clock ticks over. So I would say that this is a lot deeper than some of the shallow arguments that we have seen in the last few days about the Greens asking questions. We are asking questions for a very good reason and I am glad that someone is.

Nick Xenophon (SA, Independent) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Thank you to Senator Peter Whish-Wilson for graciously giving me an opportunity to speak on this important debate, because it is an important issue. Can I say at the outset that if plagiarism is the sincerest form of flattery, I will plagiarise from a speech that I gave on 1 September last year in this place in respect of this issue. I set out my position then, but it is worth setting out again and also worth updating the concerns that quite legitimately have been asked by the Australian community.

There are a number of issues that confound the proposition that parliament should be required to approve the deployment of troops prior to their deployment. It is important to distinguish between routine or non-warlike military activities—including peacekeeping, capacity building in other countries, humanitarian assistance and antipiracy actions—and activities involving the rescue or extraction of Australian citizens from threatening situations overseas, covert operations such as those involving special forces and, most importantly, full-scale deployment. These involve varying degrees of emphasis on the role of intelligence and classified materials that are available only to the executive.

There is also the requirement for Defence to mobilise its forces safely and effectively. All cases are not alike, and parliament's role differs where the specific constraints differ. The Constitution does not say anything about where the power to deploy troops lies. It is assumed that this is part of the executive power under section 61.

I note that Senator Macdonald is in the chamber. I am happy to truncate my remarks so that Senator Macdonald can have five minutes on this motion before the time for it expires, if that would be helpful to him. I have only just started, but I will try to wind up in the next two or three minutes if that would be helpful to Senator Macdonald. I am very happy to do that. I will be very quick.

Essentially, there is no constitutional requirement for the executive to seek the blessing of the Australian parliament before troops are committed to war. There is no constitutional need to even debate the decision to deploy troops, because the power to deploy troops overseas lies with the Minister for Defence, under section 50C of the Defence Act 1903.

In relation to an important issue such as this, I do not think it is practical and I think it could in some circumstances be quite dangerous to require parliamentary approval before troops are deployed because of emergencies that have arisen. But it would be reasonable, after troops have been deployed in a theatre of conflict, for us to have a debate within a reasonable period of, say, three months. A critical situation may arise for the deployment of troops, but we should eventually have a parliamentary debate and, if necessary, seek approval for that. So I take an approach that is not in line with what the Greens are suggesting, but it does say that we ought to have a debate in relation to this.

The Prime Minister is quite right to say that Daesh, or ISIS, is a death cult, but we need to look at how Daesh came about. I think it is reasonable to say, as sensible commentators have said, that, following the coalition of the willing invading Iraq in 2003 and overthrowing the brutal regime of Saddam Hussein, recklessly dismissing the entire army and dismantling the Ba'ath Party sowed the seeds of what is now ISIS, because it radicalised the Sunnis in Iraq, it ignited a vicious civil war between the Shiites and Sunnis, it increased Iran's influence and, most tragically of all, it led to hundreds of thousands of deaths. We must not forget that. I do have more to say on this, because I am critical of Saudi Arabia and its role in fuelling this conflict.

In relation to this particular motion, I believe we must be mindful of the dangers of escalation and the dangers of mission creep. But, at the end of the day, I wish our troops well. I am sure they will do us proud. I hope and pray that none our Defence personnel will be harmed in any way in what appears to be an escalation of this terrible conflict.

Ian Macdonald (Queensland, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I appreciate Senator Xenophon allowing me to go back to my original spot in the queue! But it was generous of Senator Xenophon to curtail his remarks. I am pleased that my absence at the appropriate time allowed him to make a few points as well. At this stage of the debate, my points will be necessarily brief as well.

I have no objection to a couple of the points that Senator Xenophon made, particularly about having a public debate about the deployment of troops after the event. Of course, in a chamber like the Senate, where rarely does the government control the numbers, such debates can be held at any time should the majority of the Senate agree that a debate should be held. Indeed, today is a good indication of not a full debate on the issue but a debate where many of the issues that would be raised in a full debate were raised. Should the majority in this chamber decide that it needs more than that, then the majority of this chamber can always make that decision.

Most of the speakers who have spoken before me, both from this side and from the Labor Party side, have indicated the stupidity of trying to have a parliamentary debate before any decision has been made to commit troops anywhere, because you can never predict the urgency with which a decision might have to be made. We elect governments to govern for a period of three years and, in a democracy, we give to the leaders of the government the responsibility for making decisions where the national interest is at stake, where national security is at stake. The thought that, before anything was decided, you would have a full-scale parliamentary debate is just ludicrous. I know my colleagues on both this side and the Labor side have explained that in some detail, so I will not even attempt to do so in the couple of minutes available to me.

Can I just congratulate the Prime Minister and indeed the government on the decision to take a greater number of genuine refugees in a one-off, 12,000-person hit, to do our bit. In this I want to emphasise, as I do in many aspects of public international policy, that Australia should play its part but it should not do more than the rest of the world. I raised this issue in relation to climate change. Australia emits less than 1.2 per cent of global carbon emissions. If you shut Australia down absolutely and completely—if there was no light burning anywhere in the country—it would not make one iota of difference to the world environment. Similarly, in the case of refugees, I know 12,000 is a drop in the bucket, but per capita across the world Australia punches well above its weight in the number of refugees we take in and in our assistance to refugees.

I add that many countries grandstand and make grandiose promises, whether it is in relation to carbon emissions or support for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, but very few ever meet those commitments. Certainly, that is the case with carbon emissions and offering money to support the UNHCR. A lot of countries make promises but very few actually pay up. Australia does. Australia always has done. I congratulate Mr Abbott and the government.

Stephen Parry (President) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The time for the debate has now expired.